
This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<http://books.google.com>





32101 076387305

5001
436



Library of



Princeton University.



87

THE
HARVARD
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V



ISSUED QUARTERLY BY
THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
PUBLISHED BY HARVARD UNIVERSITY
1912

UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
PERCETON

The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors G. F. Moore, W. W. Fenn, and J. H. Ropes.

YTBREVND
YBARELL
L.B. NOTEDMAN

CONTENTS FOR JANUARY, 1912

THE END OF ORTHODOXY AND THE CATHOLICISM OF TOMORROW	<i>Romolo Murri</i>	1
THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON, GENESIS, CHRONICLES, AND THE PSALMS	<i>Kemper Fullerton</i>	20
MEDIAEVAL GERMAN MYSTICISM	<i>Kuno Francke</i>	110
THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SIN	<i>Edward L. Schaub</i>	121
HARVARD HYMNS	<i>Warren Seymour Archibald</i>	139

CONTENTS FOR APRIL, 1912

RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF MORAL EVOLUTION . . .	<i>James Hayden Tufts</i>	155
ZOROASTRIANISM	<i>George Foot Moore</i>	180
TWO BIOGRAPHIES OF MARTIN LUTHER	<i>John Winthrop Platner</i>	227
LUTHER AND OTHERS	<i>Francis A. Christie</i>	240
THE MYSTICISM OF MAETERLINCK	<i>Paul Revere Frothingham</i>	251

CONTENTS FOR JULY, 1912

WHAT IS DRIVING MEN TODAY BACK TO RELIGION? . .	<i>Rudolf Eucken</i>	273
IS FAITH IN GOD DECADENT?	<i>George Trumbull Ladd</i>	283
THE DIVINE REVELATION AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION	<i>Daniel Evans</i>	299
THE LUKAN TRADITION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER	<i>Benjamin Wisner Bacon</i>	322
JOHN ELIOT, THE APOSTLE TO THE INDIANS . .	<i>James De Normandie</i>	349
THE EVIL ONE: A DEVELOPMENT	<i>John Edwards Le Bosquet</i>	371
THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS: ITS FIDELITY TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE	<i>Willard Learoyd Sperry</i>	385

CONTENTS FOR OCTOBER, 1912

EMPIRICISM AND PLATONISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION	<i>Ernst Troeltsch</i>	401
CHRISTLESS CHRISTIANITY	<i>Benjamin B. Warfield</i>	423
MOHAMMED AND THE ISLAM OF THE KORAN	<i>Crawford H. Toy</i>	474
THE PRIESTLY FUNCTION IN THE MODERN CHURCH	<i>W. Ellsworth Lawson</i>	515
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTION IN RELIGION . .	<i>James H. Leuba</i>	524

INDEX OF AUTHORS

ARCHIBALD, W. S. . . .	Harvard Hymns	139
BACON, B. W.	The Lukan Tradition of the Lord's Supper	322
CHRISTIE, F. A. . . .	Luther and Others	240
DE NORMANDIE	John Eliot, the Apostle to the Indians	349
EUCKEN, RUDOLF . . .	What is driving Men Today back to Religion?	273
EVANS, DANIEL	The Divine Revelation and the Christian Religion	299
FRANCKE, KUNO	Mediaeval German Mysticism	110
FROTHINGHAM, P. R. .	The Mysticism of Maeterlinck	251
FULLERTON, KEMPER .	The International Critical Commentary on Genesis, Chronicles and the Psalms	20
LADD, G. T.	Is Faith in God Decadent?	283
LAWSON, W. E.	The Priestly Function in the Modern Church	515
LE BOSQUET, J. E. . .	The Evil One: A Development	371
LEUBA, J. H.	The Development of Emotion in Religion	524
MOORE, G. F.	Zoroastrianism	180
MURRI, ROMOLO	The End of Orthodoxy and the Catholicism of Tomorrow . . .	1
PLATNER, J. W.	Two Biographies of Martin Luther	227
SCHAUB, E. L.	The Consciousness of Sin	121
SPEERY, W. L.	The Eschatology of the Synoptic Gospels: Its Fidelity to Re- ligious Experience	385
TOY, C. H.	Mohammed and the Islam of the Koran	474
TROELTSCH, ERNST . .	Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion . . .	401
TUFTS, J. H.	Recent Discussions of Moral Evolution	155
WARFIELD, B. B. . . .	Christless Christianity	423

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V.

JANUARY, 1912

NUMBER 1

THE END OF ORTHODOXY AND THE CATHOLICISM OF TOMORROW

ROMOLO MURRI

ROME

A well-known Roman Catholic review recently observed that modernism is not merely an internal difficulty of the Catholic church, but that the Protestant and Jewish bodies are likewise tormented and undermined by it. And the remark is certainly correct. For if, on the one hand, modernism tends to apply to the internal discipline and rites of the Roman church many of those reforms which the Protestants adopted from the beginning of the Reformation,—reforms rendered necessary by the changed conditions of the times, and today even more necessary than ever,—on the other hand it is profoundly modifying the very concept of revelation and making more and more difficult every kind of stability of doctrine and every *regula fidei*; so that Christianity itself, and the Jewish religion from which it comes, are to a large extent challenged by it and are in a measure associated with the church of Rome in one common defence. This defence, so far as it has any probability of success, thus tends to change not only the relation of these religions to the spirit of contemporary thought, but even their inter-relations, constraining them to abandon one or another of those positions which caused dissension and associating them under the protection of their common spiritual inheritance. Hence it will be worth while to consider briefly what conclusions are suggested by the most recent experience in this controversy, and what forecast we can make, not so much for the future of the individual churches as for a future of much greater interest, that, namely, of Christianity itself and of the religious consciousness among the nations of western civilization.

I. MODERNISM AND MODERNISTS

Modernism is a vague and ambiguous word that readily lends itself to misunderstandings. To make the problem clearer, we need to ask ourselves:

1. Which of the scientific conclusions and practical concepts that contradict, or seem to contradict, the doctrines of the Christian religion and the requirements of the Christian bodies are firmly assured or have any great probability of prevailing in the end?

2. What situation will result from the acceptance of such conclusions by these bodies and their incorporation into doctrine and practice?

3. If, this situation being given, it is possible to retain intact the essential elements of Christianity, what then must be elucidated and defined?

4. What progress will these essential elements make in their development and action, and what changes in the internal structure of the churches and in their various relations can be foreseen as likely to follow?

The problem, as will be seen, is a vast one; to cover all the ground would call for an extended discussion, and would tax the capacity of men better prepared by profound study and wide experience. But some not unhelpful observations may be made within the modest limits of a brief article, after the intense agitation of these last few years and now that the crisis has been precipitated through the action of that very authority who has been compelled by fear to exalt herself *ad absurdum*.

A preliminary statement seems necessary and natural. Modernism, while it sincerely desires to be an internal movement for reform within the different churches and within Christianity, and while it is not opposed to the churches, so as to wish to abandon them and come out from them (as indeed would have been so easy), accepts neither one nor the other of the two classical positions,—neither docile submission to authority, to antiquity, to doctrines petrified in formulas and vigilantly guarded, nor yet abandonment, negation, resolute and entire, and war.

It wishes to be, and this is what characterizes it, a consummation and a synthesis. It accepts Christianity, but with an acceptance that examines, discriminates, judges, and therefore is in some degree the exercise of sovereignty; it is immersed in the modern spirit, has possessed itself of all the means for analysis and research invented or perfected by the modern mind, profited by all the conclusions of investigation, today so rapid and energetic, and it wishes to emerge with a rejuvenated Christianity of its own which shall not deny or ignore the present age and the tests which that imposes, but shall come forth from those tests better fitted to influence life and direct it to its highest ends. The adherents of orthodoxy are saying, it is true, that this is a sort of cunning hypocrisy on the part of the modernists, in order more surely to destroy Christianity; but no calm judge will be able easily to believe in a wickedness at once so exquisite and so nearly useless.

We do not deny that certain individuals who have arrived at negations incompatible with Christianity have called themselves modernists, and that others, modernists for a certain length of time, that is, as long as they deemed it possible to reconcile the results of their researches with religious faith in Christ and his message, have later been carried by the logic of their individual thinking beyond the confines of every positive belief. The latter is the case with A. Loisy; as is the former with the Roman modernists of *Nova et vetera*, who have nearly all remained anonymous. But whether these extremists be set aside or voluntarily give way or drop into the background, Catholicism is nevertheless a prey to the anguish of a profound internal revolution.

The conditions within which the development of the modernist movement among Catholics has been restricted since the encyclical *Pascendi* do not permit us to draw from the number and activity of its followers any deduction as to its vitality. The fundamental principle of the modernists, that they will remain in the church as long as this is not made impracticable by the excessive pretensions of the curia, together with their dignity and sincerity, constrain them to conceal themselves, and in part to change either the direction of their studies or the plane and method of their writings. In France, for instance, LeRoy,

Fonsegrive, Blondel, Laberthonnière, Bureau, Batiffol, Lagrange, and several others, a distinguished galaxy of Catholic modernists, have all remained Catholics, and have either left off writing or increased their care not to collide with the suspicions of orthodoxy. But this does not prevent their thought, for him who knows it, from far transcending the limits of old official Catholicism and of the orthodoxy of Pius X, and from becoming the leaven of profound transformations, while they, meantime, await more favorable conditions for expanding perchance into a new bloom both of writings and of practical activity.

Since, therefore, we are unable, or find it insufficient and dangerous, to judge of the movement by the number of its leaders and followers, we must seek to form our estimate of it from its content. And the problem is that which we have already stated, whether modernism is in a position to succeed in the task of preserving the essential elements of Christianity as a doctrine of life and a society of believers, and of making it once more a great directive force for human society in harmony with all the forces which are today working for the improvement and uplifting of humanity.

II. THE END OF CLERICALISM

The cause of Catholicism, and even, in part, of the orthodox churches, would be lost if these were without the vigor to adapt themselves to the state of separation which is slowly becoming more general, and which will necessarily become universal through the advances of democracy itself. But let it be noted that we are not speaking of separation in the too radical sense which the word has acquired in France. The state, as the sole fountain and organ of the law, will always have to intervene to fix the conditions and judicial forms within which the religious communities may live and develop; and since historic law is never the pure incarnation of an abstract principle, but is determined in its development by the influence of human wills, practical situations, and concrete interests, therefore the state, in legislating for and governing the religious bodies, will ever give heed to practical considerations of expediency dictated by that degree of trust which

it has in the religious communities. Hence separation does not require that the state and the church should be constituted as autonomous sources of law for all that severally concerns each, possessing a divided sovereignty, and proceeding in mixed matters by negotiations and agreements, as was the case under the separation of powers in the Middle Ages, when there was almost a division of legal jurisdiction. Religion is, and evermore will be seen to be, the unfolding of free activities among the citizens, proceeding from the innermost fibres of the human personality and hostile to any interference whatever that tends to violate personality and pervert its expression and its aims. The state will content itself with offering to religion the legal forms of outward life, not interfering in the content of the individual faiths, and will treat these with perfect impartiality, as long as they do not offend commonly accepted moral and social principles or become a peril to public order.

Catholicism and certain established churches in this or that country may show repugnance to renouncing a position of privilege and the advantages which ecclesiastical orders (rather than true piety) obtain from the protection and favor of the civil power; but no one would now venture to say that, in general, churches cannot live and develop in a state of liberty, since in other countries they have promptly adapted themselves to it and have found their advantage in it. Political clericalism, therefore, against which in several countries the modernists have to struggle, is certainly not an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of their ends; we may rather say that, if that were all, special grounds of hope for the future of the churches could be drawn from the spectacle of its more and more general collapse.¹

And the question, still so much debated among Catholics, of how to reconcile this transition of the church from privilege to liberty with the pretensions of the Holy See so solemnly and tenaciously affirmed in the *Syllabus* and in later documents, some of them very recent, can have importance solely for the apologists

¹Of clericalism I have written at length elsewhere; see, for example, *La politica clericale e la democrazia*, Rome, 1909; and *Della religione, della chiesa e dello stato*, Milan, 1910.

of the Roman curia and the champions of its policy; it has none for him who looks to the future and investigates the signs of the times.²

III. THE RELIGION OF THE SPIRIT

On the other hand, the cause would certainly have been lost for Catholicism and for the Christian churches, if that conception of life had been destined finally to prevail which, invoking scientific principles and methods, gives a secondary and subordinate importance to conscience and spirit and moral law, and puts the human "soul" in direct, deterministic dependence on the biological and economic conditions of existence. While Christianity says, "What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" this view of life says, "Your soul is a by-product; win your place in the world of happiness, of riches, and of force, and a soul will be given you in addition." The former demands that a lofty ethical aim be set in the centre of the inner life and made the sun of the moral personality, redeeming itself from enslaving externals and ascending to the liberty that is sovereignty and dominion. The latter places the laws of life and human development outside of man, and finds the secret of success in adaptation to one's environment and joyous self-expansion.

It is true that a pantheistic interpretation of the universe has diminished in the eyes of many the brutality of this doctrine, declaring that the supreme and ineluctable laws of life fulfil deterministically and of themselves a kind of divine fate. But the interpretation is insufficient to cover the ruinous effects of materialism; and moreover it has not been understood or heeded by the majority. In practice, all that world of laws and ends which offers itself as a training for liberty and as a system of ideal and absolute values for the government of men's consciences, is here set aside.

In comparison with such doctrines and such advice, the old

²See the volume of P. Laberthonnière, *Positivisme et catholicisme*, in which a laborious attempt is made to soften the famous distinction between the thesis (the exclusive right of Catholicism) and the counter-thesis (religious liberty), in so far as it is justified by peculiar historical conditions and so made tolerable.

positive religions, with their fund of mystic experience accumulated through the ages, their methods of moulding the spirit, their sound idealistic doctrines, have appeared as the preservers of blessings without which human civilization would have encountered most serious losses and been in danger of exhaustion.

The attempts that have been made to devise a lay system of morality, a religion of duty, a human solidarity, and a virtue which should appear and be accepted as the finest consummation of an enlightened utilitarianism, have been the endeavor of but a few individuals or of limited groups, and have not passed current in the market of social values. In practice, this new doctrine brought spiritual impoverishment, dissipation of energy, the stifling of lofty purposes and responsibilities in the desire for positive and immediate enjoyments; and it was easy to verify the pernicious effects of this tendency in the young, in the classes, in the societies, which took it for their guide. The churches were therefore strengthened by the moral weakness of their adversary. Even the families of atheists and worldlings continued to send their children to the schools of the clergy, because they knew that there a powerful principle of moral education was at work and that at least the best years of youth would be sheltered from the disintegrating activity of the new principles. The Catholic or Christian youth who, even in the midst of the errors of an education in many respects defective and sectarian, had felt within them the desire for purity and moral energy, and had come to respect the seriousness and sanctity of life, became attached to the doctrines, the rites, the exterior discipline, in which their experience had shown them that substantial aid lay for this moral growth.

And this explains, even without having recourse to pragmatist doctrines, the religion of many young people. Once given a personal faith in a pure and lofty ideal of life, this faith spontaneously falls back upon the means which seem necessary to attain the end. In reflection, in cold investigation, in criticism, is seen the enemy lying in wait and seeking to penetrate the lines of defence which must be held. Better believe confidently and await, upheld by the old supports, the edification of one's own inner I. The witness of life, given to the ancestral worship,

becomes a witness of truth before which the presumption of the new doctrine falls. And this educative power is surely a great merit of the churches and of the Christian tradition, and opens up to us the way to judge of what is vital and permanent in them, and of the varying value of the accumulations which history, in the course of the ages, has superimposed upon the first teaching.

IV. THE DEFENCE OF PERSONALITIES

The Christian tradition has met of late years another and perhaps a more dangerous enemy in critical idealism. Much less fit than materialism to become popular and be transformed into a practicable doctrine, it had in its favor an admirable dialectical power and the fact that it was a great vindication of the spirit, valuable because achieved in the name, not of uncertain and miraculous revelations, but of human reason itself. Critical idealism in the fulness of its expression, having overcome the cautious reserves of Immanuel Kant, dissolved the exterior world into the ego and the ego into the universal Self, the Spirit which, as the All in all and in every concrete manifestation, transcends itself and so becomes. The moral precept of this doctrine is: Be the spirit; that is, transfuse your ephemeral and phenomenal will into the universal will which ascends by transcending itself and is evermore making itself clear and conscious in history. But the spirit is here not an absolute ideal and a full perfection, placed above, and therefore in a manner outside of, the concrete motives of our practical action, so as to be the cause as well as the end,—namely, through being joined to the concrete will as a norm that transcends it and forces it to come forth from itself. Moreover, this absolute becoming is all history and all praxis, and therefore justifies in its own way all history and all praxis as consecutive and dialectically determined moments of all becoming. For these reasons this coldly dialectical and in its way monistic and deterministic idealism does not contain moral teaching that can save men, nor can it be a religion. For in it perfection appears as immensely remote, being at the end of all history, while at the same time immensely near and within reach, but in minute forms which need to be transcended almost before

they are attained,—a process which only a state of continual becoming permits.

Some thinkers, whose influence is today on the increase, have sought to save personality, human and divine, from the insidious dialectic formalism of this doctrine; but their undertaking is naturally difficult because of the necessary subtlety of their reasoning, which can only with difficulty be translated into a practical rule of life.

Here also, then, we have one of the great merits of Christianity, the merit of preserving the postulates necessary for life and for training in spiritual and moral liberty,—namely, the belief in a divine personality as the measure and goal of perfection, and in human personality. In order that man may feel the moral responsibility that weighs upon him, and may feel the duty and ideal beauty of making himself and of possessing his soul, it is necessary that he feel himself capable of this, as being his own master; that is, that he feel himself able and in duty bound to withdraw his life from the coil of infinite possibilities which are developing around him and in him, and which are autonomous or victorious only if he know not how to direct them; that he place himself alone face to face with the Absolute, and feel as his own, irreducibly his own, this life which he is training and wills to master.

Great are the difficulties of these affirmations, if they be understood as philosophical positions; not indeed because dialectical metaphysics excludes them (and we cannot undertake here to show that it does not)—for then the cause would be lost; but through the subtlety of the concepts which it is necessary to employ and of the affirmations, with difficulty intelligible to our thought—thought moulded, as it were, of time and space, and incapable of recognizing intuitively the spirit as a concrete entity. And on this account faith is necessary,—faith, which theoretic reason must abstain from contradicting, and which practical reason justifies with all the weight of the demands of life.

Now this, let us repeat, is the great merit of Christianity: it places before us the divine personality and the individuality of our everlasting soul, whose “hope is full of immortality,” as fundamental doctrines and as objects of faith; and “faith is the

substance of things hoped for," that is, it *accepts* as much as it *wills*, and justifies itself by itself, in so far as it is already a lively adherence to the divine principles of the life that reveals itself within us.

How the absolute reality that escapes clear apprehension corresponds to this faith, how this hope is to be realized beyond time and beyond space, we know not; and it is possible for us today to wonder at the sobriety of the gospel message, which contents itself with a few popular images, and to laugh at the pretensions of the theologians and the devout, who know so much and have received so many messages from the dead, and who grant reductions of punishment and accelerations of grace and blessedness. And we must not forget, although the charge is often exaggerated, that the hope in the hereafter became a marvellous source of lucre and of power when religion was made the encourager of selfish fears and pretexts, accustomed as these were to hope from "good deeds" what they did not dare ask for from "doing good,"—which ought to be understood as an inner bent of mind towards purification and love. But, brought back though they be to their necessary sobriety, these two "dogmas" still preserve their fundamental character, and remain the fundamental basis of Christianity, which may be summed up in three principles: God the father; the absolute value of the individual soul; life according to the ethical teaching of the Christ as the soul's way to God.

V. CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY

We have alluded to Christ and the divine worth of his teaching; but just here arise in Christianity the greatest difficulties. For the Christian religion is not merely belief in the realm of spirits, but likewise faith in Christ, the revealer and intercessor, the way to truth and life. A Christianity without Christ, without a society in which faith in him is, as it were, the soul and the binding force, without the life in Christ, or the life of Christ in the soul, of which Saint Paul spoke, would be evidently quite another thing: no longer a positive, revealed, transcendent religion, and above all no longer this religion, with its characteristic tradition and doctrines and rites.

Now there is reason for asking ourselves if the idea of the historic Christ, as it emerges from the most recent criticism, can still support the weight of so much faith and of the venerable structures that rest upon it. With historical trustworthiness denied to the account of the infancy and of the resurrection, as they are narrated by the Synoptic Gospels, and to all the Fourth Gospel, with the miracles in large part gone, and the value of the testimony to all of them shaken, with the teaching of Christ stripped of the reflex influences of a later faith which had already in part transfigured the Master and his history, with the relation between the church and its founder changed, and with the eschatological character of the announcement of the Kingdom made prominent,—it seems as if the Christ fashioned by the theologians, their God incarnate, the Word of God made flesh, melted away. His message and work, at first enveloped in a divine nimbus, again strike their root deep into history,—into that history which preceded and prepared the way for them, and into that which has so quickly and so profoundly modified them.

It is obviously proper, then, to ask ourselves if the doctrine of the Christ may not owe its good fortune to a most singular historical coincidence; whether, that is, the pure flower of Jewish wisdom, matured in a grievous intensity of expression from the anguish of the Hebrew people, blooming at the moment when the Roman world was fusing together into one great circle of life all anxieties and all aspirations, and nourished by the best sap from oriental rites, from Hellenic thought, and from Roman discipline, did not cast its seeds upon a soil that absorbed them eagerly and was quick to make them germinate; whether the obscure and humble proclaimer of the Kingdom, slain by the Romans, exalted then in the glory of a marvellous unforeseen flowering-forth of the faith excited by him, did not almost by chance give his name to a movement which the religious consciousness of the age was carrying in its womb and which appeared at the opportune moment. Thus today we should have to rest content with the substance of that faith, vindicated by an immanent process of revelation of the divine to the religious consciousness, and leave to one side the wrappings, corroded by time and by criticism.

Some observations are here necessary.

And first this, that the divinity of the Christ is the work of faith itself. When his message is taken as the *absolute* of the religious consciousness, and the Christ as its proclaimer, and the mind abandons itself trustingly thereto, not as to an abstract doctrine, but as to a living thought of the Absolute palpitating in mortal flesh, and lives it out in its turn in faith, hope, and charity, then message and proclaimer become for faith one and the same thing, the latter being the very life of the former. *If the doctrine of Christ is true, Christ is God through faith.* And that which is of value here is no longer the details, nor even the particular form of expectancy or of historical illusion which the doctrine assumed in the thought of the Christ,³ but its fitness to become the living and operative norm for the religious consciousness; a fitness that is proved by faith, which then suffices of itself and asks no other proof.

If the first generations of believers knew not how to understand this living truth of the doctrine without the miracles of the nativity and of the stone rolled away from the sepulchre, if they were led to formulate so complex and artificial a christology, that was not their faith, but the effective reflection of their faith upon the minds and culture of the age. Nor is it permissible to declare the faith false because it formulated and took on certain transitory forms of expression; but it is expedient to investigate whether its vitality is indeed permanent and whether, with changed modes of thought, and with the corresponding change in the aptitude of the spirit to invent suitable expressions and in the aids which are at its disposal for this purpose, it still has the force and virtue to create for itself new, and more nearly true, forms of understanding and of representation, which shall be to the preceding forms as the spirit is to the letter. In other words, we do not deny the divinity of the message and of its proclaimer, even if the latter was not born of a virgin, and neither spoke nor acted in his mortal life as the Fourth Gospel says he

³I have shown elsewhere that the eschatological announcement of the Christ has no internal and necessary connection with his moral doctrine, and that it could be the spontaneous and necessary form of a religious announcement which desired to surmount the peculiar contingencies of time and space and to place the human consciousness face to face with the absolute and the eternal, with a vigorous withdrawal from the contingent and the occasional.

did, and does not correspond adequately to the Hellenic conception of the Logos, and so forth; but we shall seek—nor is it perhaps difficult to do so—to declare and understand the divinity in the way in which our historic culture and our philosophic thought permit, affirming the fundamental fact that his doctrine appears to us as the religious Absolute become man's living, throbbing thought. Nor, even when the history of the Christ is scrupulously reduced to its most certain data, is there anything in it which contradicts this interpretation.

In other words, we do not believe that the belief in the divinity of the Christ, in so far as it is the axis and basis of every Christianity which is truly such, adds any special philosophical difficulty to that which is contained in the two affirmations made above. Given the reality of the world of consciousnesses as distinct realities and as irreducible vital subjects; given the reality of the absolute spirit, complete in the possession of itself; given, finally, the immanent action of this spirit in the world of those consciousnesses, by acting in whom it truly becomes; given all this, and the function which, in the history of these relations, has been attributed to the Christ by faith, is not repugnant to any certitude, historical or philosophical.

VI. THEOLOGY AND ORTHODOXY

But as soon as we leave such fundamental positions and descend to details, it becomes much harder to advance. We shall certainly not indulge here in long discussions on this or that particular of doctrine or ritual in controversy between the Catholic and Protestant churches (we cannot say that outside of these there are any discussions about positions commonly admitted by all Christians) nor take up generally all the complex mass of doctrinal and ritual positions over which "orthodoxy" watches,—positions in which Christianity has come to embody and define itself. It may, however, be affirmed in general terms that the moment is a sad one, and the peril great, for every form of orthodoxy.

If Christianity, from the beginning and afterward, had been above all things the practice of the Christian precept of goodness

and love, and had developed more as a religion of the spirit and of liberty than as an ecclesiastical institution, doctrinal quarrels and heresies would have had much less part in it, and its vicissitudes would have been different. But whatever the causes,—and a prominent one was surely the rapidly increasing importance of the ecclesiastical element,—in practice the Christian communities soon began to give great importance, more and more rapidly increasing, to doctrine. Faith, a living soul, was changed into a body of doctrine, under favor of which was invoked the authority of tradition, as expressed by the fathers, by the liturgies, by the councils, by the *consensus ecclesiarum*.

As long as Christianity was young, and the doctrines deemed necessary were relatively few, dispute was based on documents and proofs. As time went on, an historical centre of reference and a peremptory authority became necessary, and the papacy took a hand in the game of this *unitas fidei*; but although with the progress of events an increasing obedience was rendered to Rome, nevertheless the theology of the classic age always harked back directly to the great fountains of doctrine in the universities, in the monasteries, in the councils; and the thought of Rome was valid only in proportion as it is trustworthily shown to be really the thought of the fathers, of the canons, of the churches. No one, therefore, held himself really bound to the thought of a pope; but every one felt himself one with a great historic tradition, going back to Christ, made illustrious by the fathers, confirmed by the councils, living in the teaching of the doctors, sustained by the *consensus ecclesiarum*. Hence it was not possible, and would not have sufficed, for Rome to have an official doctrine of its own,—it was not until a very advanced period that Rome had a university; if there had appeared officialdom, that is, subjection to absolute authority, the enchantment would have been broken. It was necessary that doctrine be in intimate accord with the culture of the age; that approach to the Roman theology be made by all the ways of the trivium and quadrivium, and that this theology be surrounded with all the prestige of a science, proceeding, indeed, by authority, but from a divine authority, the wonderful documents of which were at the dis-

posal of all and were only waiting to be seriously consulted. In this circle of intellectual life the authority of the pope is in its fit place as that of a prime minister of tradition and of culture; in this great historic unity of traditions, of norms, of interpretation, the *regula fidei* is transmitted throughout a whole world of culture.

Today matters are distressingly complicated through the deep schism made between theology and science as early as the seventeenth century. Against Protestantism and its chief doctrines it was still possible laboriously to pile up traditions, canons, doctors, by means of a vast deal of evidence that came, or seemed to come, from the entire church; it was the last time, and success was possible only amid tremendous difficulties. On the other hand, Protestantism could still determine the *regula fidei* from the Bible, in which was still seen the written evidence of a miraculous external revelation, to which it seemed irreverent to add external criteria of interpretation; the word of God, printed in visible form, was within the reach of every soul. Today, thanks to the extraordinary enrichment of our methods of critical and historical research, we read with a very different eye all the ancient evidences,—the Bible, the fathers, the councils, and the doctors. The evidence which to the eyes of the men of olden time sprang an integral whole from the system of a miraculous revelation appears as a slow process of historic formation, linked in a thousand ways to the complex development of human culture, into which flow from numerous sources both stimuli and forms. The labor of interpretation is strangely complex and difficult. The alteration is so profound, the human history of doctrines and rites at many points so clear, that upon almost no precise point of formulated, established doctrine is it possible to concentrate the harmonious light of the evidence, to establish the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*.

Official theology is in incurable discord with modern critical investigation, whose methods and results it ignores and, ignoring, condemns. And the pope is alienated from that world of culture and authority in which he was once in his fit place. His authority becomes either ambiguous—recall to mind certain documents of Leo XIII on the Biblical question—or ridiculous, as soon as

it loses its lordship over scientific methods and becomes a question, not of theses or counter-theses, but of shades of interpretation. The *consensus ecclesiarum* is meaningless, since all the bishops of Roman Catholicism have learned their slender stock of theology on the school-benches or in the manuals of Rome. Even practical reforms appear arbitrary, often anti-liturgical, and give rise to a vast chorus of recrimination.

Upon official theology are imposed, along with an oath to maintain certain reserves, definite restrictions of method, fixed conclusions even in matters which depend upon critical investigation: the *argumenta credibilitatis*, the proof of the *preambula fidei*, which at first were referred with confidence to reason, are today guarded, forced, maimed by a suspicious theology, which does not trust free criticism, but finds in it its most dreaded and dangerous adversary. Theological teaching is stricken unto death by the anti-modernist oath.

To these difficulties answer is made by exaggerating the pontifical authority beyond all credence; the more it becomes personal and arbitrary, through lack of traditional supports, the more it is imposed; and not merely in theological, but even in economical and political matters it is attempted to make the pope's personal thought and command an incontestable norm.

Thus in reality in the Catholic church,—and the same thing holds good in their degree with respect to the other churches,—the orthodox are no more, and orthodoxy is no more. Whoever blindly follows authority has no longer a guarantee against the caprice of one man; whoever studies, investigates, and forms judgments by personal effort, necessarily reaches conclusions which do not correspond to any pre-established type, and which modify and deform, or else elude, the old-time formula, since over the means of investigation the churches no longer exercise any effective control, while uniformity of doctrine becomes meagre with the slow rise and prevalence and decay of particular doctrines and of their various forms. The unity of the faith, if by the faith we understand theology, has therefore become definitively impossible; there will remain the *fides cum operibus*, faith as ethical guidance, the expression of a religious enthusiasm, a practical bond of action.

VII. THE CATHOLICISM OF CHARITY

The conclusion of all that we have just said is evident; and it is the forecast of the end of orthodoxies. It is becoming impossible to justify by the authority of a miraculous revelation of God any doctrinal points whatever which form part of theological systems and confessions, for these are now seen to have been formed in the vast, complex cycle of human culture by a logical process, and one which we can reconstruct.

So also it is perhaps impossible to wish to sanction by the prestige of immediate divine institution any part of the ritual, as it is now practised in the churches. Even in respect of the two or three rites through which we go back directly to the Christ, it is not difficult to show that they were different in the beginning, and had in the thought of the founder a different value. If orthodoxy, the unity of the faith as it has been inculcated by the official theologians, were a necessity of the churches, then, such orthodoxy being impracticable, the end of the churches would be near, and would arrive coincidently with the education and elevation of man's intelligence to the mastery of his own thinking and the government of his own inner life. The theologians will certainly be the last to be persuaded of this; but they should find food for reflection in the fact that they had to define modernism simply as the most baneful of all heresies, precisely because it was not possible to fix and define it as a determinate heresy. The entire theological system, torn from its base, afloat, an enormous rootless mass of parasitic vegetation, is going adrift.

But let us understand one another. This cannot mean that doctrine and ritual must now henceforth be abandoned. If the message of Christ lives, if Christ lives in the consciousness of those who follow him and in the united body of believers, if Christianity, sprung from the deepest recesses of the religious consciousness where the Spirit has its activity, is a religion that persists and renews itself, then doctrine and ritual are necessary in order that religion may not suffer interruption or arrest,—necessary as vehicles of substantial faith, as a pedagogic system

of religious training, as institutes and instruments of life and of collective action.

The difference will be this, that doctrine, instead of being the supreme criterion, will henceforth be—and for that matter always ought to have been—subject to another and a loftier criterion,—charity, the life in Christ. Formal orthodoxy will be practically renounced. The practical, proper aims of a religious community—purity of life, the elevation of consciences, the exercise of brotherly love—will acquire a dominant importance. Much will be forgiven those who love much. Those most fervid in faith, in good deeds, in sacrifice, will be adjudged the best. An attitude of fraternal sympathy will take the place of the actual theological hatred and the jealousies and rivalries of sects. Looking to the fruits of the doctrines more than to their formulas, men will give up entirely the vain attempt—a practical denial of God—to impose a faith or insidiously to suggest it, and will not use the fetters of interest to hold back men's consciences from changing a compromised religion. The professional importance of the clergy will diminish enormously, when religion shall cease to be the mechanical repetition of rites and formulas, but shall of necessity have sprung from the living breath of the Spirit, which "bloweth where it listeth." The church as teacher and the church as learner, today so sharply divided, will again be fused together, for teaching will be practised—in accordance with the principle which Christ indicated and which, later forgotten, is reappearing in all modern pedagogy—as a being again made little with the little children in order to lead them into the possession of the truth and of themselves, until teacher and teaching become unnecessary.

Christianity and Catholicism, as historic institutions, will thus have to be considered as the development and expression, in a form in many respects transitory, of an eternal doctrine of life. This doctrine endures and at the same time develops, and, in the progress of human culture, enters into profound and vital connection with all the active energies of civilization as a grand pedagogic system for the formation of the divine life in human consciousness. Respect for this living, profound soul will make us respectful toward the forms and institutions which have trans-

mitted it to us, and the desire for it will permit us to guide our experience among them, letting go what has lost its efficacy and value, revivifying and renewing the intimate significance of what can still be a way to the living Christ.

For the welfare of Christianity it would be good that Pius X were the last pope of orthodoxy, of excommunications, of syllabuses, of condemnations. A pope who was unwilling to continue and renew these errors would be bound to apply himself to calming theological contests, inducing men to forget the faults and errors of recent times, calling attention to the few most important and decisive points of doctrine and practice, to making Christianity avail and live through all that which can still be its strength and efficacy. With the slow detaching and falling away from the ancient tree of every leaf that is withered, many hostile prejudices and many reasons for dissension would disappear, and Christianity, a spontaneous and living union of free churches, could aspire to be the religion, not perhaps, for a long time to come, of multitudes or of entire peoples, but of elect souls, athirst for goodness and for sacrifice, desirous of aiding one another as brethren in a vast communion of purposes and endeavors, in a work of spiritual light and good.

*THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON
GENESIS, CHRONICLES, AND THE PSALMS*

KEMPER FULLERTON

OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

I. GENESIS¹

"What with Winckler, Jeremias, and Cheyne, and now Eerdmans, Old Testament scholars have a good many new eras dawning on them just now. Whether any of them will shine unto the perfect day, time will show." With these gently sarcastic words Dr. Skinner describes the situation which a commentator on Genesis must be prepared to face at the present time. But the dawn is the waking-up time. The reveille sounded by these various scholars is exhilarating. The war to which they challenge Old Testament investigators may not prove to be a world-war, the critical map of the Old Testament may not be materially altered; but it is a good thing that the dominant school of criticism which follows Wellhausen should be compelled to meet antagonists equipped with all the resources of modern warfare. So long as their opponents were armed only with the weapons of the old apologetics, these critics had an easy time of it. After the publication of the great *Prolegomena* it seemed as if the last word had been spoken. Canaan had been conquered anew. All that remained for the victors to do was to settle down in the land, appropriate the high-places to themselves, and reduce the ancient inhabitants to Nethinim. But no sooner had they entered into possession than the temptation of the settled life began to beset them as it beset the Hebrews of old. They had driven out the traditions that had occupied the land

¹ A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis. By John Skinner, D.D., Hon. M.A. (Cantab.), Principal and Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature, Westminster College, Cambridge. New York, 1910.

for millenniums, but the ancient inhabitants, as is so often the case, soon threatened to conquer the conquerors. Traditions began to assert themselves in new forms. A very pronounced exegetical tradition was developed, and a series of priests and prophets arose whose sole function it was to conserve this tradition. Any one who ventured to differ from the new critical orthodoxy did so at his peril. In these latter days, however, certain bold Rechabites have risen up to challenge the tenets of popular criticism, and in some cases they even dare to reassert the probability of an ancient Mosaic ideal of considerable ethical and religious significance. Welcome to all the Rechabites, to all the protestants, pan-babylonians, pan-egyptians, pan-jerach-meelites, or pan-amorites (the latest reforming sect)! Perhaps they will do again for the history of Israel what they did of old. It was only when the popular tradition was pressed from all sides by these various influences within and without that the new prophetic movement was born.

Genesis was the starting-point of the Old Testament criticism of the nineteenth century. But after all the scenes had been acted, and the plot had come to its conclusion, and the audience was ready to go home, suddenly the lights have all been turned on again and the play is resumed. In order to understand at just what point in the drama of criticism the commentary of Dr. Skinner makes its entrance, it will be necessary to give a brief résumé of the plot.²

The critical movement of the nineteenth century was predominantly a literary movement. That is, its attention was largely fixed upon the disentanglement and dating of the various sources within the Old Testament itself. The means with which it operated were primarily literary; and the language, the style, the subject-matter, of different portions of the Old Testament were its criteria. The most remarkable result of these literary operations was the analysis of the Hexateuch into three great and originally independent narratives, the Priestly Code (P)

² What follows was written before I had seen either Mr. Burney's article "A Theory of the Development of Israelite Religion in Early Times," in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1908, or Mr. Stanley A. Cook's review of "The Present Stage of Old Testament Research," in *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, 1909.

and the two histories of early Israel known as J and E. The critical analysis started from the peculiar use of the divine names in Genesis, and the most successful demonstration of its propriety and utility has been in Genesis. This movement culminated in the work of Kuenen and Wellhausen. Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* marks "the final and decisive turning-point in the history of the criticism of Genesis" (Gunkel). It was his distinctive merit, not so much to unravel the documents—that had largely been already done—as to date them, and thereby to construct a clear-cut and fascinating theory of the development of Israel's religion. The Priestly Code, which up to his time had been regarded as the oldest of the three main literary strands in the Hexateuch, was held by Wellhausen, and since his day by the great majority of Old Testament scholars, to be the youngest of the hexateuchal documents, and placed after the exile. Instead of "Moses and the prophets" we have been taught for upwards of a generation to say "the prophets and Moses." The rest of the Old Testament was examined through this readjusted binocular, and the various documents appeared to arrange themselves in three great groups: those which reflected a pre-prophetic stage in the religion of Israel, those which reflected a prophetic stage, and those which represented a final, legalistic stage. In the last two stages we are on fairly firm historical ground. There are a sufficient number of contemporary documents to enable us to sketch out with considerable accuracy the main features of the prophetic religion of the later monarchy and of the legalistic religion of the post-exilic period. But what was the character of the pre-prophetic religion? Here was the place where conjecture and speculation set in. And there was plenty of elbow-room for opinions. By the literary method nearly all the sources in the Old Testament had been brought down to later times. With the exception of some important sections in Samuel and Judges, it was held that only a few fragments of Hebrew literature had survived out of the period preceding the great literary prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries. The consequence was that these prophets, beginning with Amos, stood out as the real founders of the higher religion of Israel, the religion of ethical monotheism. In proportion as this view was held, the pre-

prophetic religion, which *ex hypothesi* was largely without documents, was regarded as on a much lower level. Those documents which expressed higher ideals having been removed by the critical process to later times, there were left to the pre-prophetic period only those passages which reflected a rawer, more barbaric type of religion, and it became the fashion to associate with the pre-prophetic period those phases which characterize the most primitive forms of worship—animism, totemism, fetishism, poly-daemonism. The pre-prophetic religion was considered to have two clearly marked stages, a nomadic stage of a very primitive type, when Israel was only a group of loosely connected tribes wandering through the desert, and an agricultural, or peasant, stage in which Israel, after its settlement in Canaan, was strongly influenced by the agricultural baal-worship of the Canaanites. In the formulation—Nomad Religion, Peasant Religion, Prophetic Religion, Legalistic Religion—sketched out with remarkable lucidity by Marti³ and implied in the latest exposition of his views by Wellhausen himself,⁴ the theory of the literary school of criticism corresponded with beautiful nicety to the theories of the development of religion in general which grew up in the nineteenth century in connection with the evolutionary hypothesis.

This great construction is without doubt one of the most remarkable achievements of historical investigation in the past century. In the process of its development the absolute untenableness of the old orthodox conceptions of the Bible was demonstrated. It is as impossible to return to them as it is to return to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. The minute examination to which the Old Testament was subjected and the new angle from which it was surveyed revealed a vast mass of hitherto unsuspected material to be studied and classified. For this, future students of the Old Testament can never be too thankful. It must not be forgotten, furthermore, that it is due to Wellhausen and his followers, more than to any other students of the Old Testament, that the prophets first came to their own. Here again these scholars have

³ The Religion of the Old Testament, 1907.

⁴ "Die israelitisch-jüdische Religion," in Die Kultur der Gegenwart, 1906 (2nd ed., 1909).

laid all future investigators under lasting obligations. And the formula itself, "the prophets and Moses," is likely to stand the test of time, so far as its essential meaning is concerned. While it is probable that a large part of the legal material in the Hexateuch will be found to be much older than many have been willing to admit, yet the vital thing in their contention is not likely to be overthrown,—namely, that the Law in its present systematized formulations, and as the constitutive principle of the national life, in other words, Moses as a written authority, as a code, follows the Prophets.

But within the last few years this critical school has been attacked at two vital points. First, its analysis of the documents has been questioned; and secondly, its views of the pre-prophetic stage of the religion of Israel have been challenged. The analysis started from the variation in the use of the divine names, Jahveh and Elohim, in Genesis. In general the correctness of the massoretic text in which these variations occur was assumed. But a number of scholars, among whom may be mentioned Dahse (1903), Wiener (1909), and especially Eerdmans (1908), have attacked this assumption. They raise the previous question. Is the massoretic text to be trusted? They point in particular to the differences in the occurrence of the divine names in the Septuagint. It is not my purpose to enter into this debate. Whether it is to be only an episode, a mere skirmish without importance, or is to develop into a general attack in force, remains to be seen. Its principal significance at present is as a symptom. In passing, however, attention may be called to Skinner's discussion of this newest phase of criticism in his introduction (p. xxxv). The discussion is a model of the pregnant brevity in which the limitations, evidently imposed upon the author by the publishers, have often compelled him to express himself. It is unfortunate that Mr. Wiener has seen fit to import the *rabies theologorum* into the debate, and to impute bad motive to Dr. Skinner and even to the general editors of the *International Critical Commentary*.

The attack from the historical side upon the current critical conception of the pre-prophetic period is a far more serious affair than the literary skirmish just alluded to. It is at this point that

these critics seem to be placed distinctly on the defensive, and it is here, if anywhere, that the positions occupied by them will have to be abandoned.

There are three serious weaknesses in Wellhausen's construction, which are revealed most clearly when one comes to his treatment of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel. The first is the tacit assumption that the first appearance of an idea in extant literature is its first appearance in history. There is a tendency to make this assumption all along the line, and it is for this reason among others that the name of the "literary school" of criticism is appropriate. There is a certain amount of justification for this assumption, since the primary sources for the historian are the written documents, and it is proper for him to cling to these as long as he can. Nevertheless, where only fragments of a people's literature are left to us, as is the case with the Hebrews, the assumption is peculiarly unsafe.

The second weakness, closely connected with the first and really growing out of it, is the inability of these historians adequately to account for the prophetic movement. Their attitude toward the prophetic movement is similar to Marcion's attitude toward Christianity. For them it comes as something entirely novel. It is sudden, historically unaccountable, organically unconnected with the past. But the prophetic movement is far too permanent a growth to belong to the genus *cucurbitaceae*; it must have had a tap-root. And they have failed to discover an adequate tap-root. When one turns from the traditional view of the Old Testament to the *Prolegomena*, the latter presents a view relatively so intelligible and convincing that at first it seems to satisfy every demand. As a sanctuary of refuge after the impossibilities of the old positions, it appears to be immune to attack. Yet I think one cannot read dispassionately the latest expositions of the development of the religion of Israel which have come from these writers (for example, the sketches of Wellhausen and Marti mentioned above) without realizing that the bridge which they throw over the gulf between the pre-prophetic and the prophetic religion is of the most flimsy character. Wellhausen tacitly recognizes this when he falls back upon the mystery of the prophetic personality to account for things that his view of the evolutionary

processes cannot explain.⁵ In a construction that is avowedly evolutionary this is a fatal defect.

In the third place this reconstruction is in the main an intra-canonical reconstruction; it has built primarily upon the literary analysis of the Biblical sources. In this direction it has accomplished wonderful results, and yet the strictly intra-canonical method is always in danger of arguing in a circle. When outside sources have been drawn on for the interpretation of the earlier periods of the history, these have been mainly taken from present or pre-islamic conditions in Arabia, or from peoples no farther advanced than the Bedouin in civilization. Since it is held that the early Hebrews were nomads, it is maintained that their religion must be interpreted by Bedouin analogies. The result is that the early religion of Israel, the Mosaic religion, appears as distinctly primitive.

But discoveries have been made in the past twenty-five years which show us that an intra-canonical induction is not broad enough, if we are to understand the religion of Israel. The traditional dogmatic orthodox view explained the Old Testament out of itself by following the surface indications, which were really due to its latest revisers. The orthodox critical view explained the Old Testament out of itself by following those indications which lay beneath the surface and which the latest revisers had not succeeded in altogether obscuring. This was an advance. But the period has now arrived to consider all the Old Testament material anew in the light of the ancient oriental civilization in and out of which it originated. The first edition of Wellhausen's *Prolegomena*, under the title, *History of Israel*, was published in 1878. This was only six years after George Smith's publication of the Babylonian deluge-tablets and only two years after the publication of the creation-tablets. Since that time the cuneiform material has been accumulating with such rapidity that the decipherers are almost overwhelmed by it. The really epoch-making discovery, however, which constitutes the watershed of Biblical criticism, was made in 1888, when the Tell-el-Amarna tablets were found in Egypt. At one stroke the veil was torn away from Moses' face. The Mosaic period, instead of being seen

⁵ "Die israelitisch-jüdische Religion," in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, p. 15.

in the dubious light of the dawn of history, or rather in the gloom of the prehistoric period, could now be examined in the broad daylight. A new school of investigators has grown up, called by their opponents the pan-babylonians, who have been endeavoring to reinterpret the Old Testament (and for that matter the New Testament also) in the light of the new material now accessible. Winckler is the head of the new school but his work has been brought to the attention of the general public principally through the more popular, though equally authoritative, exposition of it by Jeremias.⁶

Whatever exaggerations and unsound speculations Winckler and his followers may be guilty of in their natural enthusiasm for the new discoveries, the new premise in Biblical research from which they start, and which Winckler emphasizes and re-emphasizes in his pamphlet, *Religionsgeschichtlicher und geschichtlicher Orient* (1906), must hereafter be reckoned with. The pre-prophetic stage in the history of the religion of Israel can no longer be examined simply from the point of view of primitive religious conceptions. We are not dealing with primitive man in the Mosaic period, nor even in the patriarchal period. In those early days we are already confronted by advanced civilizations with millenniums of history behind them. This is true of Babylon, of Egypt, and of Arabia as well. The Bedouin of today are not necessarily replicas of the tribes out of which Israel emerged. In Arabia itself there were also great civilized kingdoms. In a word, Wellhausen's theory of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel is that it was primitive, that is, prehistoric in its general features; but we now know that it emerged in a late historic period, when civilization had reached a high degree of development. And not only so, we know also that Israel was not isolated from the great seats of ancient culture, but was closely connected with them, and has preserved in a remarkable degree a consciousness of this close relationship in its traditions of the migrations of Abraham from Mesopotamia, and of Joseph into Egypt, and in its recollection of Moses' connection with Egypt and through Jethro with Midian (that is, with the Minaean civilization). This is the

⁶ *Das alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, 2nd ed., 1906; English translation, 1911.

first great new consideration with which the theory of the early religion of Israel must reckon. It can no longer be assumed that we are to construe the early religion of Israel in every respect as a primitive religion because it may have had nomad antecedents. There may well have been higher conceptions in it even in those early days. But as a matter of fact were there such elements? At this point we arrive at a discussion of the stories of Genesis, and these furnish the second important point of which account must be taken.

Genesis is the Biblical book primarily involved in the debate between the older literary school of Biblical criticism and the new pan-babylonian school. Commentaries on Genesis, therefore, excite uncommon interest at this time. Four commentaries which have appeared in recent years require special mention. Holzinger's commentary (in Marti's *Kurzer Hand-Commentar*, 1898) still represents in the main the older critical position. The newer points of view make themselves felt here and there, for Gunkel's remarkable book *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit* had already appeared in 1895; but the new ideas in no sense dominate the commentary. The *Westminster Commentary* on Genesis by Driver (8th edition, 1910) occupies a somewhat different field. It is written for a more popular audience. Its aim is not to solve the more difficult scientific problems of Genesis, but to give an interpretation of the book from the generally accepted positions of criticism. It discusses at length the old debates between dogma and science,—for example, the relationship of Genesis to the physical sciences; and this is done with the thoroughness, candor, and lucidity which make Dr. Driver the most successful guide among English and American scholars to all those who are seeking to effect a change of base from the old positions to the new. Gunkel's commentary (in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, 2nd ed. 1902, 3rd ed. 1910) is a different sort of work. It is epoch-making, as distinctly so as Wellhausen's *Prolegomena* itself. Those who accept its views would probably be inclined to say that it is the greatest commentary that has ever appeared on an Old Testament book. And with all its learning it yet reads like a novel; the style is as happy as that of Robertson Smith. In one way Gunkel has made it hard

for his successors; it is difficult for those who agree with him not to copy him by the page.

The fourth commentary is that of Dr. Skinner in the *International Critical Commentary*. The author does not give much attention to the old debates on Genesis and geology. For him these are dead issues, and his interest is in the problems of the present time. His commentary, therefore, forms an excellent supplement to Driver's work, and the two together will give the English and American student an adequate acquaintance with the problems of Genesis, past and present. In form Skinner's commentary is a model. The critical apparatus is not allowed to interfere with the easy flow of the exposition. The less advanced student is thus enabled to learn the leading positions of the commentary without difficulty, and the masterly way in which the more technical material is handled and the really important and decisive facts pushed to the front makes the work a joy to the advanced student. Skinner has the true expositor's faculty of knowing where a reader of Genesis needs enlightenment. He is a master of condensed and at the same time lucid argument. Altogether it is a genuine satisfaction to have at last a commentary on Genesis in English that is at once thorough, up with the times, and classic in form. In what follows, the positions of Gunkel and Skinner are treated together, and the attempt will be made to show wherein these commentaries mark an epoch in the history of the criticism of Genesis.

The stories of Genesis fall into two main groups,—the stories of the dawn of the world, found in the first eleven chapters, and the stories of the patriarchs, found in the rest of the book. Now all these stories are mainly found in the JE documents of Genesis, and the JE documents are assigned by the various representatives of the critical hypothesis to the eighth or ninth centuries B.C. at the earliest, with of course larger or smaller accretions from a later period. In other words, the documents in which the stories of Genesis are found have been brought into proximity with the prophetic movement. But do they reflect this movement or did they anticipate it? The dates hitherto assigned to J and E show that this problem was not wholly solved. The contrast between Holzinger, on the one hand, and Gunkel and Skinner, on the other, is instructive.

In Holzinger the question whether J and E are prophetic or pre-prophetic is not definitely formulated. The dates (J *ca.* 850-700; E *ca.* middle or third quarter of the eighth century) suggest that these writings are prophetic in the sense that they reflect more or less accurately the views of eighth-century prophecy. In the case of E it is expressly stated that "the thoughts of the prophets are normative." In the case of J, Holzinger is perplexed. On the one side he discovers ideas closely allied to those of the literary prophets. On the other side he is "astonished" to discover ideas not at all consistent with these more developed conceptions. The position of Gunkel and Skinner marks a significant departure from that of Holzinger. Gunkel, followed by Skinner, lays down the proposition that the only way to fix the dates of J and E without becoming involved in an argument in a circle is to raise the question of their relationship to written prophecy. Both argue that the two documents as a whole (E as well as J) are pre-prophetic. This they do on grounds of which the cogency can scarcely be denied. But in this conclusion the first step has been taken toward the modification of the current critical views of pre-prophetic religion; and the step is a conscious one, as is shown by the following statement of Gunkel:

No doubt there are in Genesis many points of contact with this [written] prophecy. But the supposition of many moderns that this affinity is due to the influence of written prophecy is in many cases anything but certain. We do not know the religion of Israel adequately enough to be able to maintain that certain ideas and feelings first entered the world through the men whose writings we now possess, that is, since the time of Amos. . . . Such feelings can have existed long before "the prophets." Indeed we must assume that they did so in order that we may understand the appearance of the prophets.

In ²⁷this paragraph we have very clearly expressed a consciousness of what we have seen to be two of the weaknesses of the general position of Wellhausen. Skinner expresses himself to similar effect, and adds a sentence of still greater significance:

We must bear in mind that the 9th century witnessed a powerful prophetic movement which, commencing in N[orth] Israel, extended

into Judah; and that any prophetic influences discoverable in Genesis are as likely to have come from the impulse of that movement as from the later development which is so much better known to us. But in truth it is questionable if any prophetic impulse at all, other than those inherent in the religion from its foundation by Moses, is necessary to account for the religious tone of the narratives of Genesis (p. li).

In the matter of fixing more exact dates for J and E, Gunkel and Skinner are exceedingly cautious. Gunkel contents himself with arguing at length for their pre-prophetic character. He then concludes with the brief statement that J may be assigned to the ninth century and E to the first half of the eighth; but he gives no arguments for these dates, and says expressly that "they must remain uncertain." Skinner is somewhat more definite. The date of E lies between the two limits, 750 on the one hand (the rise of written prophecy) and 930 on the other (the disruption of the kingdom), "if it be the case that 37 8 in E presupposes the monarchy of the house of Joseph. . . . Between these limits there is little to guide us to a more precise determination. General considerations, such as the tone of political feeling, the advanced conceptions of God, and traces of the influence of 9th century prophecy, seem to point to the latter part of the period, and in particular to the brilliant reign of Jeroboam II. (785-745) as the most likely time of composition" (p. liii). But in the passage previously cited Skinner had said that ninth-century prophecy need not be taken into account in order to explain the religion of JE. As to the suitability of the reign of Jeroboam, Holzinger had urged the pessimistic tendency in E as a reason for bringing the date down to the time when North Israel was rapidly disintegrating. On the date of J, Skinner remarks, "In J there is no unequivocal allusion to the divided kingdom and nothing absolutely prevents us from putting its date as early as the reign of Solomon." But he does not accept this date (now advocated by some critics) on the ground that "it is improbable that J and E are separated by an interval of two centuries; if E belongs to the first half of the 8th century, J will hardly be earlier than the 9th." It is quite evident that there is nothing fixed here. The selection of the eighth and ninth

centuries respectively is really hardly more than an adherence to a traditional formula, and when once the step implied in the assertion of the pre-prophetic character of the JE documents is taken, the whole question of a date earlier than the eighth and ninth centuries is thrown open.⁷

But an even more important departure from the older treatment of J and E than the definite assignment of both of them to the pre-prophetic period must now be noticed. For many years the documents J and E had been largely treated as homogeneous works, due to authors and not simply to compilers. The older characterizations of J and E make the impression that we are dealing in these documents with the work of two remarkable and dominant personalities. But Wellhausen himself had laid the foundation for a different conception, for in the J-sections of the primitive history (chaps. 1-11) he distinguished several strands; and the disintegration of J was carried still further by Budde. But how little the ultimate consequences of these observations were at first realized is illustrated from the introduction to Holzinger's commentary. In this he speaks in one short paragraph of "the gradual origin of this stratum [J] so that J must be regarded as derived not from one narrator, but from a circle or, *cum grano salis*, from a school." The composite character of E is barely referred to, and the characterization of both documents is in general in the old terms. What Holzinger admits *cum grano salis* is strongly emphasized by Gunkel, and lies at the basis of both his exegesis and his historical criticism. According to him J and E are not homogeneous works of two authors, but collections of stories arising gradually in different schools. Our present documents are only the literary deposit of a long oral tradition. In this view of the JE material Skinner is at one with Gunkel. The result of this changed conception of J and E is shown in a characteristic way when the arrangement of material in the introductions to the commentaries of Holzinger on the one

⁷ In an exceedingly interesting essay in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1910, Gressmann maintains that "the time of Saul furnishes the *terminus ad quem* before which the legends of Genesis were in general complete, though individual traits were added later. . . . Prophetic influence nowhere makes itself felt" (p. 31).

hand, and of Gunkel and Skinner on the other, is examined. Holzinger starts with a history of the literary criticism of Genesis in the nineteenth century, and ends with a discussion of the documents J, E, and P, their peculiarities and dates, in a thoroughly conventional fashion. Consequently the interest is concentrated upon J and E as documents. Gunkel and Skinner, on the other hand, begin, not with a history of the criticism which culminates in the recognition and chronological definition of these documents, but with the definition and analysis of the legend and its probable history in the oral tradition which was finally precipitated in J and E. With Holzinger J and E, as documents, are the all-important thing. With Gunkel and Skinner they are the least important thing. The final collections are now regarded only as the literary receptacles for the oral tradition, and as such are of minor importance for the purposes of historical interpretation. The interest is shifted, and the emphasis now falls, not on J and E, but on the oral tradition before it was stored away in J and E. This means that a new and fascinating perspective is opened up into the pre-prophetic religion of Israel. The J and E documents themselves are pre-prophetic, and the tradition behind them, upon which all the emphasis now falls, is still earlier. The stories of Genesis thus become the key to our understanding of the pre-prophetic religion of Israel.

Having definitely assigned the J and E documents to the pre-prophetic era, and having next assumed a long history of the stories in the oral tradition prior to their deposit in the J and E collections, the next step is the attempt to trace, if possible, the history of the oral tradition itself. At this point we are largely thrown back upon conjecture. As might be expected, the brilliant, speculative German is much more sure of what happened than the cautious, matter-of-fact Englishman. Hence a more precise sketch of the earlier history of the stories is attempted by Gunkel than Skinner ventures to give. Gunkel distinguishes three stages in the history of the stories: (1) the period of their formation, (2) the period of their transformation, and (3) the period of their more or less official compilation. In following their history, two groups of stories must be kept distinct: (a) those contained in chapters 1-11, which, as a whole, have to do

with the beginnings of universal history, and (b) those contained in the rest of the book, which deal with the patriarchal history. The former stories are intimately connected with similar stories in Babylonia, the latter show little Babylonian influence. In the first group of narratives the peculiar nature of the similarity to the Babylonian myths and legends points, according to both Gunkel and Skinner, to a dependence upon these latter. At this point Gunkel attaches the results of his studies in Genesis to the doctrines of the pan-babylonians. He adopts their theory that in the pre-mosaic period the soil of Palestine was saturated with Babylonian culture. On the other hand, the Genesis narratives of chapters 1-11 also show traces of what seem to be Phoenician influence. Accordingly Gunkel propounds the exceedingly interesting thesis that the Hebrews adopted these stories ultimately from the Babylonians, but through a Phoenician medium. Of course this could only be done after the conquest of Canaan, and hence a date after the settlement in Canaan is set for the formation, or rather, in this case, for the appropriation, of the stories in Genesis 1-11.

To this view Skinner will not commit himself. He discusses briefly the arguments for and against Gunkel's position, and arrives at the negative conclusion that it is impossible to determine the precise channel or the approximate date of this infusion of Babylonian elements into the religious traditions of Israel. But in the course of his discussion of the theory he lets fall one statement which shows which way the wind is beginning to blow. In arguing against Stade's view that the monotheistically colored myths of chapters 1-11 could not have been adopted by Israel before ethical monotheism had been established by the prophets, Skinner observes, "Monotheism had roots in Hebrew antiquity extending much further back than the age of written prophecy, and the present form of the legends is more intelligible as the product of an earlier phase of religion than that of the literary prophets" (p. x).

With regard to the patriarchal legends, which are of such fundamental importance for the interpretation of the beginnings of Israel's religion, Gunkel defends the thesis that the core of them was already in possession of the Hebrew tribes before the conquest.

The scenes of these stories are mostly laid in the steppes to the east and south of Canaan, and not in Canaan itself. The life described in them is nomadic, not agricultural. All these traits are urged in favor of a very early date for the rise of the stories. The latest of them, it is maintained, do not, in the substance of their contents, reflect conditions later than the earlier part of the period of the Judges. The period of the formation of the legends is therefore held to have been closed about 1200 B.C., at which time the period of their transformation began. Finally, since scarcely any reflection of events later than the period of the early monarchy is to be found in these narratives, the period of their transformation in the oral tradition is defined by Gunkel to be 1200-900 B.C. There were some additions after this time which are prophetic in the strict sense of reflecting later written prophecy (for instance, Abraham's plea for Sodom), but, as we have seen, the gradual changes which were introduced into the stories are held by Gunkel to be in general pre-prophetic.

Skinner proceeds by somewhat different and more general lines. He emphasizes the long interval which must have elapsed between the inception and the final compilation of the stories in J and E. But here two questions are raised. First, were these stories transmitted unofficially, "cast adrift upon the stream of popular talk," or was there more or less of an official transmission of them? On general principles Skinner inclines to the latter view, and though he does not finally decide between the theories that regard the local sanctuaries as the custodians of the traditions and those that ascribe this function to the prophetic guilds or (Gunkel) to professional story-tellers, he favors Gunkel's theory (pp. xxxi, xlvi). Secondly, what relation does this whole process of transmission bear to writing? Was the history of these legends altogether oral, before their final deposit in J and E, or were there written collections antecedent to them? Skinner strongly favors the latter view. The fact that the written documents J and E run so nearly parallel suggests that there was a great national epos already "codified" before them, and it is held that "we have no reason for placing the unification of the traditions later than the founding of the monarchy. From the age of Samuel at least all the essential conditions [for such a codification] were present."

But when the J and E collections have been definitely assigned to the pre-prophetic period, and when the attention has been shifted from the documents themselves to the long tradition, both written (probably) and oral, that lies behind them, a new question of the greatest importance presses upon us. What is the historical significance of these views of the JE material? If the stories of Genesis are pushed so much farther back than was for a long time supposed to be possible, may they not have a far greater historical value, and reflect more accurately the patriarchal period, than has generally been admitted by critics?

At the outset the literary character of the legends is to be considered. In a masterly manner Gunkel has analyzed the stories of Genesis and has demonstrated the fact that they are legends. This part of his commentary has already become classic. He points out convincingly how the frank recognition of their legendary character is the indispensable prerequisite for the correct historical and religious estimate of the value of the narratives. Gunkel covered the ground so thoroughly in this connection that Skinner has been able to do little more than give a résumé of the main facts as he had pointed them out. It is not my purpose to review the arguments used by these writers to establish their point of view, but two sentences from Skinner will serve to show that these views are not advanced in any destructive interest:

It is no question of the truth or religious value of the book that we are called to discuss, but only of the kind of truth and the particular mode of revelation which we are to find in it. . . . As a vehicle of religious ideas, poetic narrative [that is, legend] possesses obvious advantages over literal history.

Now the legend, as distinct from the myth, originated on the plane of history, and therefore generally cherishes in its heart of hearts some historical reminiscence. The original fact which gave rise to the legend cannot always be discovered, but it is always worth while to attempt to discover it. In the case of the legends of Genesis it would seem to be peculiarly worth while in view, as both Gunkel and Skinner emphasize, of the highly conservative attitude of the story-tellers with respect to their mate-

rial. If we could adopt Skinner's suggestion of a semi-official, "professional" oversight over these stories, the chance of discovering true historical reminiscences in them would be still stronger.

In considering the historical value of the legends of Genesis, there are, as Skinner points out, two distinct questions. The first is as to the historical character of the persons and fortunes of the patriarchs. The second relates to the age of the religious ideals attributed to them. May not the prophetic ideals in the stories of Genesis, which have led earlier critics to bring them into the closest possible chronological contact with eighth-century prophecy, be after all centuries older? The first of these two questions can be analyzed into the further questions: Are the figures of the patriarchs to be interpreted as persons? and, if so, are they to be regarded as historical persons?

In the treatment of these questions it is again interesting to observe the important departure from the original position of Wellhausen. Gunkel points out expressly how, on the assumption that the documents J and E belonged to the eighth and ninth centuries, Wellhausen denied all historical value to the legends of Genesis as reminiscences from an earlier period. The assumption was that no historical recollections could have persisted through so many centuries,—an *a priori* consideration, it is true, but one of considerable force. Accordingly Wellhausen sought to interpret the legends as reflections of events in the period of the monarchy. For example, the struggle between Jacob and Esau is a reflection of the wars between Israel and Edom, the struggle between Jacob and Laban a reflection of the Aramaean wars, and so on. But this method of interpretation has been thoroughly discredited in recent years,⁸ and in consequence a step backward was taken. Since the legends could not be explained as reflections of the period of the monarchy, they were explained as reflections of the earlier tribal relations. The patriarchs are tribal eponyms,⁹ and their journeys, marriages, and other adventures are supposed to be figures

⁸ Cf. especially Eerdmans, *Alttestamentliche Studien* II. 1908. Gunkel goes so far as to cite a statement of B. Luther that "the logical application of the method used by Wellhausen would speedily lead to absurd results."

⁹ Cf. especially the constructions of Cornill and Steuernagel.

for tribal migrations, relationships, and the like. Undoubtedly there is a certain element of truth in this view. Moab, Ammon, Israel, Edom, are tribal names as well as personal names, and in some cases the legends themselves expressly state this view (cf. Gen. 25 23 ff.; 31 44 ff.). The legends have thus been regarded as furnishing information of the greatest historical value, but of "ethnographic," not personal, kind. This theory better satisfies the ancient character of the legends than does Wellhausen's theory, but it fails to do justice, as Skinner points out, to "the wealth of detail" in the stories. It is here that "the breakdown of the ethnographical method becomes complete" (p. xxi). Skinner lays down the canon that the ethnographic interpretation must be confined to those incidents where it is either expressly indicated by the narratives or confirmed by external evidence (p. 357). In these views Skinner is in line with recent criticism. Gunkel warns against the "pedantry" of the exclusive application of the ethnographic method of interpretation. Eduard Meyer, after apologizing for having sinned in this direction, describes Steuernagel's treatment of the legends of Genesis as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the method.¹⁰

Gunkel and Skinner are equally opposed to the mythologizing interpretation of the patriarchs, by which they are regarded as faded divinities. Two different lines of investigation have been followed by the mythologizers: that which sees in the patriarchs Canaanitic local *numina* and that which sees in them reflections of astral divinities. The former view has been supported by no less an authority than Eduard Meyer in the work above mentioned, in reliance mainly on the evidence of the patriarchal names. His views, however, have been subjected to a searching criticism by Eerdmans¹¹ and Gressmann,¹² and they are rejected by Gunkel and Skinner, at least so far as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are concerned. Skinner says with justice that Meyer's earlier arguments for the tribal interpretation of the patriarchal names are more convincing than his later arguments for their

¹⁰ Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme, 1906. This work has had a great influence upon recent criticism of Genesis.

¹¹ Alttestamentliche Studien II.

¹² Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1910.

mythological significance. "That names of this type frequently denote tribes is a fact; that they may denote deities is only a hypothesis."

A much more plausible theory of the legends of Genesis is propounded by Winckler and his followers. They start from the premise that the ancient Orient was dominated by an astral doctrine, the great thesis of which was that earth corresponds to heaven. Theoretically, everything that happens in the heavens has its counterpart on earth. Practically this means that everything that happens on earth has its counterpart in the heavens. But the movements of the heavens are described in mythological terms. For example, it is the god Marduk who overcomes the powers of winter and darkness when the sun arrives at the spring equinox. So it comes to pass that what happens on earth, as a counterpart of what happens in heaven, may also be described in mythological terms. According to Winckler's school of criticism this astral doctrine dominated all the ancient civilized world, and the Biblical writers thought in terms of it just as we today think in terms of evolution. The legends of Genesis cannot escape the influence of the stars. They too are supposed to be shot through with astral *motifs*. Thus Winckler regards Abraham as "the heroic precipitate of the moon-god."¹² The name Abram (the Father is exalted) is pointed to. It reminds us of the moon-god of Harran who was preferably called Father. Abraham was connected by tradition with Ur and Harran, the two great seats of the ancient moon-worship. Sarah, Abraham's wife, and Milcah, his sister-in-law, correspond to the Babylonian *sarratu* and *malkatu*, the titles of the moon-goddess of Harran and of Ishtar. The number 318 in Genesis 14 is the number of the days in the year in which the moon is visible. This method of interpretation is not so absurd as it might seem. The legend of the birth of Moses would appear to be a convincing illustration of its propriety in certain cases. Nor does the method do away entirely with the historical nucleus of the legends of Genesis, as might be supposed at first sight. There has been considerable misunderstanding of Winckler's real position at this point, though his mode of presenting his views is probably largely

¹² *Geschichte Israels*, vol. ii, 1900, p. 23.

responsible for it. In reality, the formula that earth corresponds to heaven allows the adoption of a very generous attitude toward the reliability of the tradition, as may be seen in the pages of Jeremias. Something did actually happen on the earth, although, according to Jeremias, the Biblical writers used mythological formulas in describing it, just as a poet writes in metre or an artist paints in colors.

But against the main principles of this astral mythologizing of Genesis Gunkel objects that the legends originally existed independently of each other. Hence we could hardly expect to find a system in them. Moreover, the spirit of the legends is popular, not scientific, as it would be if they were dominated by astral doctrine to the extent which Winckler's school supposes. Here Gunkel has decidedly the best of the argument. That J and E are to be compared with Manetho and Berossus, as Winckler actually compares them, is ridiculous. It implies an utterly impossible literary judgment upon these simple narratives. But "without previous aesthetic analysis of the sagas," as Gunkel correctly observes, "this entire method of investigation hangs in the air."

But if the patriarchs (and by the patriarchs must be understood primarily Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not Israel) are neither tribal eponyms nor faded deities, they must be persons. This is the only other possibility, as Skinner points out. Are they, then, historical or unhistorical persons? Siegfried, as Gunkel says, is an individual, but he is not historical. At this point a new factor enters into the discussion. In favor of the historicity of the patriarchs is urged the background in which they are set. Thus Jeremias contends that "the background of the patriarchal narratives agrees in all details with the ancient oriental conditions of civilization to which the monuments bear witness for this particular period." Gunkel himself, in arguing for the pre-mosaic origin of these legends, makes the strong statement that "the conditions of the nomad period are here described with such freshness and vividness that one cannot avoid admitting a real, even though of course idealized, reminiscence of the conditions in which the patriarchs lived." Jeremias frankly concedes that the truth of the historical background does not of itself prove

the historicity of the patriarchs, but he urges with force that it undermines the assumption that the legends are historically impossible.

There is, however, another important element in the stories which must be reckoned with. While they agree in the main with the historical situation in which they are set, on the other hand they idealize the situation in a way that belongs to legend rather than to exact history. This point is strongly urged by Skinner. "It seems to us," he says, "that the remarkable thing about these narratives is just the absence of background and their general compatibility with the universal conditions of ancient Eastern life." He refers in this connection with great appositeness to the Egyptian tale of Sinuhe, which describes the adventures of an Egyptian courtier in Palestine at about 2000 B.C. In this tale everything is concrete and specific. In the patriarchal narratives there is "a washing out of the historical background." To the present reviewer this seems to be a just and significant contrast. In other words, a literary estimate of the stories of Genesis again compels the admission that they are legendary, not historical. We cannot, therefore, successfully argue to the historical character of the patriarchs from the cultural background of the stories, for that is an idealized background. Still, when real, even though idealized, reminiscences of the ancient past are admitted, and the distinction is remembered between a legend, which starts from the plane of history and presumably embodies some historical nucleus, and a myth, the question whether Abraham was a real person becomes not unreasonable.

At this point Gunkel and Skinner part company. Gunkel, for his part, wholly rejects the historicity of the person of Abraham. "It is difficult to understand," he says, "what importance the contrary view has for religion or for the history of religion. For even if a man by the name of Abraham once lived, yet for every one who knows legendary history it must be certain that, after so many centuries, the legend cannot preserve a picture of the personal piety of Abraham. The religion of Abraham is in reality the religion of the narrators, which they ascribe to Abraham." Skinner, on the other hand, while admitting that in

the nature of the case only subjective considerations exist to guide us, contends that "in the absence of external criteria a subjective judgment has its value, and one in favour of the historic origin of the tradition is at least as valid as another to the contrary effect." He then proceeds to narrow the question down from the patriarchs generally to Abraham alone, whose name "represents no ethnological entity and occurs historically only as the name of an individual." Here he lays all the emphasis on the character of Abraham. "The character has been idealised in accordance with the conceptions of a later age; but the impression remains that there must have been something in the actual Abraham which gave a direction to the idealisation." Therefore Skinner ventures, "in spite of the lack of decisive evidence, to regard him as a historic personage, however dim the surroundings of his life may be." The difference, however, between the position of Gunkel and that of Skinner on the question immediately at issue is not vital, since Skinner is willing to admit a considerable amount of idealization. A few pages earlier, in discussing Genesis 14, he remarks, "To us the Abraham of oral tradition is a far more important religious personality than Abram the Hebrew, the hero of the exploit recorded in ch. 14." This can only mean that the idealized Abraham of the tradition is more important than any possible historical nucleus. In that case Skinner would be occupying substantially the same position as Gunkel, who identifies the religion of Abraham with the religion of the narrators.

While the difference between Gunkel and Skinner is thus seen to be of minor importance, the cause for the difference is of considerable importance. Gunkel has been influenced at this point by Gressmann, who had attempted on the basis of Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* to carry one step further the analysis of the stories in Genesis. Back of the legend which attaches itself to some historical fact he posits the *Märchen*, or simple tale, told only to amuse. The originals of the stories of Genesis are *Märchen*. The absence of the definite and concrete details which Skinner attributes to later idealization is explained on Gressmann's theory by the original literary species of the narratives. On this view there is no "washing out of the historical

background," because there was no historical background to wash out. Abraham was originally only a figure in a tale. The name is assumed to be a typical story-name like Hänsel or Gretel in the German folk-tale. The theory is presented by Gressmann with great attractiveness, yet I cannot feel that it has the inherent probability of Skinner's view. While the name Abram has been found in Babylonia as a personal name, it is found in Israel attached only to the one person. If it had been a current story-name among the old Hebrew tribes, would its use in later times have been so concentrated upon one particular *Kindlein*? There is also the undoubtedly historical name "field of Abraham," in the list of Sheshonk I., to be accounted for. The name here would seem to suggest a figure altogether too substantial to be originally woven out of the moonshine of a tale.

It is of no great importance that a man by the name of Abraham should once have lived. But did the religion for which Abraham stands exist as early as the time of Abraham? This is the second question raised by Skinner, and it is the vital question.

"The central idea of the patriarchal tradition," according to Skinner, "is the conviction in the mind of Israel that as a nation it originated in a great religious movement, that the divine call which summoned Abraham from his home and kindred, and made him a stranger and sojourner on the earth, imported a new era in God's dealings with mankind and gave Israel its mission in the world." Can this conception be adhered to? In answering this question, Skinner falls back upon two *a priori* considerations. (a) If Abraham really "had the importance assigned to him, the fact is just of the kind to impress itself indelibly" upon the tradition. (b) "The appearance of a prophetic personality, such as Abraham is represented to have been, is a phenomenon with many analogies in the history of religion . . . and nothing forbids us to see in Abraham the first of that long series of prophets through whom God has communicated to mankind a saving knowledge of himself. . . . It is difficult to think that so powerful a conception has grown out of nothing." These considerations are interesting, but unless some foundation in historical fact can be secured for them they are unable to support a belief in the Abraham of the tradition. At this point a serious omission would

appear to be revealed in Skinner's argument. Can a religious movement of such epoch-making character be understood in the historical situation in which the tradition places Abraham? To the question as to what that historical situation is, Skinner adverts at the outset of his discussion of the historical value of the tradition, but he does not discuss the real points at issue. Granted that the patriarchs were nomads, what kind of nomads were they? Were they exposed to influences from a higher civilization? If so, from what kind of a civilization? The first of these questions is not formally treated by Skinner anywhere in his book, so far as I have been able to observe, though incidental statements indicate his general views. The last two are discussed, but in a distinctly skeptical spirit.

That the patriarchs are nomads in the tradition is clear. But there were nomads and nomads; and Eduard Meyer has pointed out two distinct classes.¹⁴ There were the nomads proper, the Bedouin, the wandering desert tribes that never settled down anywhere. There were also the semi-nomads who occasionally settled down for a time at this place or that, and thus formed a class between the Bedouin proper and the peasants, or settled agricultural communities. The Hebrews belonged to the latter class. This view has been adopted by Gunkel and Gressmann. But it makes some difference, as Eerdmans has remarked, upon which connection of the semi-nomads with the other two classes the emphasis is laid, whether upon their connection with the Bedouin (as in the view of Gunkel and Gressmann, following earlier critics) or (as by Eerdmans) with the peasants. The point is that if the Hebrews, being semi-nomads, are thought of as more closely connected with the settled population than with the Bedouin, their religious ideas are to be interpreted in the light of what we know about the religion of the settled peoples of pre-mosaic time, as well as in the light of conditions in the desert. In that case it is easier to assume that they were exposed to influences from foreign civilization, although these influences are by no means to be excluded even in the case of the pure Bedouin themselves.

Gunkel and Gressmann, on the other hand, interpret the legends of Genesis in their original forms by the light of strictly nomadic conditions. These are, indeed, reflected with remarkable fidelity

¹⁴Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme, p. 301, ff.

in the stories of Genesis (after later deposits of thought have been removed). The stories reveal neither an agricultural religion (note the absence of the name Baal in Genesis as the name of a god) nor a religion of Jahveh (the name does not occur in the personal names of the patriarchs) but a religion of El, which Gunkel distinctly characterizes as "extra-israelitic or at least pre-jahvistic in its origin." This nomadic religion is not influenced by Babylon, and the patriarchal stories differ remarkably in this respect from the international myths which underlie Genesis 1-11. Thus far it might seem as if Gunkel and Gressmann had returned to the original theory of Wellhausen, which starts with the nomads. But, if I understand them, this is not the case. In the first place they insist upon the great historical importance of these legends as actual reflections of the ancient nomad life and thought. Wellhausen, by bringing them down to the monarchical period, was led to deprive them of all historical value. In the next place, and this is of especial importance, Gunkel, at least, does not propose to interpret early Israelitic religion necessarily in terms of the pre-israelitic nomadic religion. This would seem to be the implication of the following very important passage, which I venture to quote at length:

Just at this point [in the history of the religion implied in the Genesis stories] it is important to remember the extra- and pre-israelitic origin of these narratives, and not to explain off hand that view of God which stands lowest as the oldest faith of historical Israel, transferring the higher idea of God, seen in the primeval history, to a late period. Rather, as Gressmann has properly observed, is it true that the religion of Genesis is not simply the religion of Israel. . . . If we would recognize what is peculiarly Israelitic, we must not look to the bare material of the sagas, but to what Israel has made out of it, or to the history that it has undergone in Israel. But for this the observation is decisive that Israel has stamped its Jahveh upon all the manifold ideas of God that have been handed down in the legendary material, and has thus harmonized the inner differences. How developed its idea of Jahveh was, is seen in the fact that Israel was able to subsume under it the Canaanitic-Babylonian gods of the primeval history. It is Jahveh, as the most ancient Israel was able to maintain, who brought the flood upon the whole earth and scattered all peoples in Babylon. Universalistic ideas, accordingly, must have belonged to the earliest

religion of Israel. But beside these the ideas of an earlier stage of religion were not entirely forgotten. Otherwise the old legends would not have been retained, but would have been destroyed. Genesis shows us how the higher ideas struggled with the lower material and gradually reshaped it.

This remarkable paragraph was not found in the second edition of the commentary, but it illustrates how the principles adopted in the second edition have in the third worked themselves out to their logical conclusion. In this conclusion the break with Wellhausen's view of the earliest stage of the religion of Israel is complete. Instead of interpreting that stage by nomadic conditions, the religion of Israel is sharply distinguished from the religion of the desert. The Israelitic forms of the legends of Genesis must be differentiated from the primitive nomadic forms. The Israelitic forms contain a much higher type of religion.

The question then arises, What was the occasion of this difference? It would seem to the present writer logical to deduce from the premises of the above paragraph a pretty substantial Moses.

But if Moses, as the personal symbol of the early religion of Israel, is not to be explained out of nomadic conditions as these are sketched by Gunkel, but rather represents a contrast to them, how can we account for him? Were these universalistic conceptions his peculiar property? Is he as entirely inexplicable as Amos is on Wellhausen's theory? Has Moses' religion no historical substratum? It is at this point that the pan-babylonians undertake to enlighten us. They refer to the tradition of a connection of Moses with Egypt on the one hand and with Midian (through Jethro) on the other. They also point to the really remarkable fact that Mount Sinai, the scene of the revelations to Moses, is almost certainly to be connected with the moon-god Sin, who was worshipped at Ur and Harran. But in all the religion of these regions there are fairly distinct monotheistic tendencies which grow out of the ancient oriental astral conceptions. These tendencies, as Baentsch¹⁵ pointed out in the remarkable pamphlet in which he broke with Wellhausen's construction

¹⁵ *Altorientalischer und israelitischer Monotheismus*, 1906.

after having been one of its ablest defenders, would form just the basis required to make Moses historically intelligible. But were these tendencies entirely unknown among his own Hebrew tribes, at least among the higher spirits in those tribes? Here the tradition must be recalled which associates Abraham with Ur and Harran, that is, with great civilized centres where an astral (lunar) monotheism seems to have been recognized. How does this tradition agree with Gunkel's and Gressmann's view of the purely nomadic conditions of the patriarchs? Can the tradition be trusted?

We are now able to appreciate where the weakness in Skinner's argument for a nucleus of truth in the tradition of Abraham lies. Meyer denied the trustworthiness of the tradition that Abraham was associated with the great civilized cities of Mesopotamia. He gave more weight to the genealogy of Gen. 22 20-24, in which Abraham's brother Nahor is the father of the Aramaean nomads of the Syro-arabian desert, than to the tradition that connected Abraham's family with the Aramaeans of Mesopotamia. The latter tradition was held by Meyer to be due to J, who misunderstood the reference to Aramaeans. In that case the connection with Babylonia and Babylonian thought suggested by the tradition would be broken, and we should be thrown back on an undiluted nomadic theory of the old Hebrew tribes. Skinner follows Meyer (p. 394), and in so doing robs himself of the one piece of evidence that would give support to his *a priori* arguments for the historical significance of Abraham. If Abraham, or the religious movement for which he stands, can be connected with Mesopotamia, that movement is not to be interpreted solely in the light of conditions in the desert. The ancient oriental doctrine must come into consideration. Skinner is very skeptical of those lines of connection which have been worked out by Winckler, Jeremias, Baentsch, and others, although he recognizes the "ingenuity and breadth of conception" of Winckler's interesting pamphlet *Abraham als Babylonier, Joseph als Aegypter* (1903). He remarks, "It is not unfair to suggest that it rests mostly on a combination of things that are not in the Bible with things that are not in the monuments." This may be true of specific details of Winckler's theory; indeed Eerdmans had

already dealt certain details of it some staggering blows. But these criticisms leave untouched the essential thing in Winckler's construction.

If it should be satisfactorily established that there was such a thing as an ancient oriental *Weltanschauung* in which there were latent monotheistic tendencies (and this appears to be more and more recognized), the tradition of the connection of Abraham with Ur and Harran would become of signal importance as an historical basis for belief in the possibility of a higher form of religion among the pre-israelitic Hebrew tribes. That this tradition can be eliminated in the way proposed by Meyer is seriously to be questioned. Gunkel, at this point more circumspect than Skinner, admits that the whole problem is not yet ripe for settlement, but suggests the possibility of a double tradition of the origin of the patriarchs. This is interesting; and especially if the semi-nomadic theory of the Hebrew tribes is admitted, and a consequent connection more or less close with civilized communities is recognized, it is easily conceivable that a strain of higher thought and religious experience could enter into and elevate the ordinary low levels of the nomadic mind. To hold with Jeremias that Abraham is a kind of *mahdi* and his journey from Harran a *hijra* is to give to his figure a tangibility which is unwarranted, but the connection between the Hebrew tribes and Babylon which is vouched for by the tradition of Abraham's journey from Ur does justify the supposition that there may have been in these tribes tendencies toward higher thought than has commonly been ascribed to them.

With this we arrive at the last observation which I desire to make upon the present disposition to break away from the tradition of Wellhausen and the earlier critics. As late as 1906 Wellhausen said: "Deep and thoroughgoing contradictions are present [in the Old Testament] and they compel the assumption of a development of the religion of Israel, more especially of the Mosaic cultus. They cannot be understood as coexisting phenomena, but only as successive phenomena, as phases of an historical process in the history of civilization."¹⁶ As a general statement this is of course true. But the proposition has too

¹⁶ "Die israelitisch-jüdische Religion," in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, p. 4.

often been construed to mean that there is a regular progress from lower to higher throughout the history. Such a conception smacks too much of the study and too little of real life. We are again indebted to Winckler for emphasizing another consideration, namely the distinction between the Biblical religion—the higher, prophetic religion—and the religion of the common people, which is every day revealed more clearly by the excavations in Palestine. The higher religion was present in a tolerably pronounced form from the beginning of the national life. How far it reached back into the pre-mosaic period it is impossible now to say with any certainty, though the considerations advanced above show that a pre-mosaic higher religion among the Hebrew tribes is by no means inconceivable. But that it was there when the tribes became a nation, the combined results of a study of the cuneiform texts and of the legends of Genesis are making every day more probable. This fact is recognized in express terms by Gunkel in the last sentences of the paragraph cited above, and is also hinted at as possible by Skinner when, in speaking of the higher conceptions of E as compared with J, he says, "We cannot tell how far such differences are due to the general social *milieu* in which the writers lived, and how far to esoteric tendencies of the circles to which they belonged." I would strike out the word "esoteric," for the champions of the higher religion of Israel, unlike the priesthoods of other nations, did not seek to keep their higher conceptions to themselves, but made them the common property of all the people.

If I have presented fairly the tendencies in the recent criticism of Genesis, especially as represented in the work of Gunkel and Skinner, it is clear that there is more basis for the traditional view of the history of the religion of Israel than has been commonly admitted by critical scholars of the past generation. But to urge this as an earnest of ultimate complete vindication for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and of rehabilitation of the dogmatic conception of the Old Testament is to pervert the results of scientific investigation. It seems to me that this is the mistake which such good fighters as Professor James Orr are making. Granted that Moses should be proved by

historical evidence to be more of a prophet as well as more of a law-giver than Wellhausen allowed him to be, and that we may in time see the patriarchs as trees walking, these would be important and interesting historical facts, and every candid scholar ought to be glad to recognize them. The mistake of Dr. Orr lies in supposing that he can vindicate the dogmatic view of the Bible by shoring up the traditions at this or that point. This is impossible, and so keen a critic of others as Dr. Orr should be able to discover the weakness in his own position. The critical movement of the nineteenth century, as it culminated in the reconstruction of the history of Israel, was incidentally a refutation of the old dogmatic conception of Scripture and a completely successful one. But because of this conflict the partisan of the victorious side is at times chary of conceding points to his old enemies. He is tempted, also, to be unduly skeptical of new truth which conflicts with his old theories, and this attitude is less excusable in a critical scholar than it is in an apologist. Happily, the commentaries of Professors Gunkel and Skinner show that with these scholars historical facts have more weight than academic traditions.

II. CHRONICLES¹⁷

When we turn from the first to the last book in the Hebrew Bible, we are conscious of a different religious climate. In Genesis we are in the uplands. The fresh air of the early dawn is blowing freely, and springs of living water are bubbling all about us. In Chronicles we seem to be in a low, flat land. The air has lost its tonic qualities, and the waters are stagnant and rather brackish to the taste. In Genesis religion is in the making; there is about it all the freedom and flexibility and joy of a new experience. In Chronicles religion is made, labelled, boxed, and

¹⁷ A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Books of Chronicles. By Edward Lewis Curtis, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of the Hebrew Language and Literature in the Divinity School of Yale University, and Albert Alonzo Madsen, Ph.D., Pastor of the First Congregational Church at Newburgh, N.Y. New York, 1910.

[Professor Curtis's lamented death occurred after this review was in the editor's hands.—Ed.]

preserved as an heirloom. The story-tellers of Genesis are serious, but they are poets. The Chronicler is serious too, but he is a pedant. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Chronicler's work has never proved a very attractive subject for study, and that the literature upon it, especially in English, is meagre.

Yet these strictures upon the Chronicler tell only half the story. With all his literary infelicities, with all his theological pedantries and ethical platitudes, the Chronicler, or the school which he represents, has exerted a profound influence upon subsequent generations. It is his view of the ancient history of his people that has prevailed in synagogue and church down to the nineteenth century. His work has been a corner-stone of the dogmatic, as contrasted with the historical, interpretation of the religion of Israel. When one considers the poverty of expression and lack of originality of this writer, the influence which he has been able to exert is truly astonishing. The fact of his influence furnishes an interesting criterion for appraising the intellectual level of popular Judaism and popular Christianity.

But it is only within comparatively recent years that the full significance of the Chronicler as the historian of dogmatic Judaism has begun to be appreciated. Since the translation (1876) of Zöckler's commentary in Lange's series, the commentary of Professor Curtis is the only one in English which undertakes to treat in full the textual, critical, and historical problems of Chronicles; for the commentaries on Chronicles in the *Expositor's Bible* (1894), the *Cambridge Bible* (1900), and the *Century Bible* (1906) are much more restricted in scope. The commentary of Dr. Curtis stands by itself, and is likely to retain this unique position for years to come. It is of importance, therefore, to understand the attitude which this commentary assumes toward the problems of Chronicles and the nature of the contribution which it makes to the solution of these problems.

The great problems of Chronicles are the problems of its sources and of its historical trustworthiness. The problem of sources is twofold: the relation of the Chronicler to his known, canonical sources, and to his unknown, non-canonical sources. The question of his trustworthiness will largely depend on his relation to these two groups of sources.

We are happily in possession of certain of the Chronicler's sources, notably the books of Samuel and Kings and the memorabilia of Ezra and Nehemiah. We are thus enabled to observe his methods in using sources. From the beginning of the critical movement the comparison of Chronicles with these sources occupied much attention, and it soon revealed the fundamental difference between the Chronicler's representations of the pre-exilic history and the picture that we find in Samuel and Kings. In the earlier period of investigation the war was waged about the question whether these two pictures could be harmonized. Since Wellhausen's brilliant chapter on Chronicles in his *Prolegomena* the impossibility of reconciling Chronicles with Samuel and Kings has been generally recognized, and the inevitable corollary to this conclusion was the further recognition of the unhistorical character of Chronicles taken as a whole. This result has formed an important part of the foundation in the critical reconstruction of the history of Israel and of Israel's religion. Wellhausen's work, which investigated primarily the relationship of Chronicles to its known sources, may therefore be considered to mark the end of the first great stage in the interpretation of the book. In the present commentary the conclusions of Wellhausen are unhesitatingly accepted, and the student will find in it no attempt to bolster up by harmonistic devices the Chronicler's picture of the pre-exilic history. But when the apologetic study of Chronicles has been discarded, the way is open for the true estimate of the work. Useless for throwing any additional light of importance upon the ancient history of Israel, the book becomes of the greatest value as a record of what those who lived in post-exilic times thought about that history. Its interest lies in its unconscious contribution to our knowledge of the beliefs and practices of post-exilic Judaism.

At this point a new critical problem emerges, namely, the relation of the Chronicler to other, unknown sources. Are the beliefs and practices reflected in his pages consistent or not? In other words, is the Book of Chronicles homogeneous, the work of one man, or does it betray chronologically different points of view such as to imply a composite origin? For the purpose that Wellhausen had in view it was necessary only to compare

Chronicles as a whole with Samuel and Kings. As contrasted with these books, Chronicles may be treated as a unity. At first sight, also, the markedly uniform and individual style that prevails in those sections of Chronicles not found in Samuel and Kings was most naturally explained as due to unity of authorship. Accordingly, Wellhausen and many since his day, notably Driver, and in our own country Professor Torrey of Yale, have maintained the essential unity of Chronicles.

But meanwhile another critical movement set in. It started from the Chronicler's own claim that he had used various sources which are not to be identified with our canonical sources. It is at present conceded on all hands that the imposing critical apparatus which the Chronicler purports to have had at his command (he cites some twenty works by name) is illusory, and that all may be reduced to two or three at the most. Of these residuary sources the main one would seem to be a history of the kings of Israel and Judah, not to be confounded with our canonical Kings, but a work of distinctly midrashic character. Did the Chronicler simply refer to this uncanonical work as an authority or did he actually copy out of it as he did out of Samuel and Kings? In the latter event can any of this work be identified in the present book of Chronicles?

In 1834 Movers advanced the view that most of the matter peculiar to Chronicles came from this midrashic source. His theory did not seem to attract much attention until in 1899 it was revived in a new form by Büchler in two articles of great suggestiveness in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* entitled "The History of the Temple Music and the Temple Psalms." Benzinger in Marti's *Kurzer Hand-Commentar* (1901) and Kittel in Nowack's *Handkommentar* (1902) carried the investigations of Büchler still further. They eliminated some of his more extreme contentions, but adopted his view that the main extra-canonical source or sources could be distinguished with tolerable certainty. They also thought that they could point out a good many glosses, or even accretions of greater length, to the Chronicler's own work.

The difference between the position of Wellhausen and his followers and the position of Büchler, Benzinger, and Kittel is

of far more importance than one might at first suppose. The former critics see in the *Chronicler* an author. The latter see in him a compiler. The first position, paradoxical as it may sound to say so, is the more radical position. If the *Chronicler* is an author, and if it is impossible to distinguish any sources in his work apart from the well-known canonical sources, the tendency is to regard his work as pure invention. Torrey carries out this view to its logical limit. For him the *Chronicler* is one of the most famous novelists in literature, a veritable Defoe in his ability to give the air of reality to imaginary history. Further, on the supposition that the work is a literary unity, the internal discrepancies and discords which have been urged in favor of its composite character become so many additional charges against the trustworthiness and literary ability of the author. On the other theory of the book, a far longer historical perspective is opened up. The work is given a deeper and richer background. It becomes a living organism whose growth covers a considerable period of time. On this theory, the lack of coherence in the book is not chargeable so much to the want of literary skill in the writer as to the constantly fluctuating conditions of the post-exilic period which his various sources reflect. On the compilatory theory, provided it can be established, it is evident that the good faith of the *Chronicler* can be more easily vindicated and his work made to yield a richer harvest of historical results than on the theory of the unity of his book. It is quite conceivable that, if the *Chronicler* is relying on written sources, some of the things which he contributes may have floated down out of the past; and though they may be only the wreckage of veritable history, it might still be worth while to attempt to rescue them from the current of tradition in which they are found. Flotsam cast up by the tide sometimes has real interest and value. In other words, the way is opened to do for the legends of *Chronicles* what Gunkel and his school are doing for the legends of *Genesis*. This attempt would be justified even if nothing but oral tradition were behind the present form of the narratives, but the existence of preceding written documents would tend to give more solidity to the tradition. The theory of Torrey would in principle seem to deny

all right to try to discover any nucleus of historical fact in the Chronicler's stories. In this connection it is interesting to observe how much more inclined to find historical reminiscences back of the Chronicler's narratives Benzinger and Kittel are than was Wellhausen.

The position of Curtis on these controverted topics, which governs all his exegesis, is best stated in his own words:

In regard to the literary structure of 1 and 2 Chronicles I cannot follow the view of those who regard the author throughout as a mere copyist, nor yet of those who hold that apart from his Old Testament quotations he composed freely with no recourse for information to other written sources. I have given the view of a free composition but allowed a recourse to non-canonical written sources.

Theoretically, this is certainly the most reasonable position to adopt. Practically, the all-important question is, upon which element in the last sentence quoted the emphasis falls, upon "free composition" or "written sources." In fact, the emphasis certainly falls upon "free composition," and the consequence is that the yield of historical material is comparatively poor. It is somewhat more abundant than Wellhausen's gleanings, but not so large as Kittel's or Benzinger's. Historical reminiscences are found at 2 Chron. 26 (Uzziah), 28 17 ff. (invasion of Edomites and Philistines in the reign of Ahaz), 2 Chron. 33 (the captivity, but not the repentance, of Manasseh), and a few passages elsewhere. I am inclined to think that somewhat more pre-exilic history, admittedly of the conjectural sort, may possibly be elicited from these stories in the future. For example, in the Chronicler's treatment of the reign of Ahaz we have a classic illustration of midrash. But in addition to the historical reminiscence preserved in 28 17 ff. I would suggest that there is an historical background even in vss. 9-15. At first sight this description of the return of Jewish captives on the suggestion of the prophet Oded seems to be pure *Tendenz*. But the so-called Syro-ephraimitic war was an anti-jewish demonstration intimately connected with the anti-assyrian policy of Israel and the pro-assyrian policy of Judah. When Tiglath Pileser came on

the scene, Hoshea seized the throne with the support of the Assyrian king, slew Pekah, and gained the upper hand in Israel. This meant that a pro-assyrian party now controlled the politics of Israel. It would be very natural for such a party to attempt to re-establish friendly relations with pro-assyrian Judah, and vss. 9-15 may well be a distorted reminiscence of such a change in the politics of the northern kingdom.

But the historical significance of the Chronicler does not lie in the few kernels of historical fact that he may have preserved out of the period of the monarchy in addition to what is already found in Samuel and Kings. It rather lies in the way he has served up these kernels to us. He has disguised them by a kind of levitical sauce which seems to have been greatly relished in the post-exilic period. This garnishing is the thing of real importance in the Chronicler's work. The levitical revision of the old material and the genealogies which introduce it reflect more or less accurately the politico-ecclesiastical organization of the post-exilic community and are therefore of the greatest historical interest. But it is just at this point that the problem of sources, especially the relationship of the Chronicler to his uncanonical sources, becomes acute. Have we in Chronicles a homogeneous work, and is the picture of the post-exilic period which we find reflected in its pages a consistent picture? Or have we before us a compilation, and is the picture which it reflects a moving picture, changing with the changing times in which its various sources were composed? In order to illustrate the method and results of Curtis's work, I shall take a cross-section out of his commentary in which the passages bearing on the history of the musical guilds are discussed. These passages furnish, perhaps, the strongest evidence for the composite character of Chronicles.

(1) One of the linguistic evidences for a source adduced by Büchler is in the varying use of the word "trumpet." The word is found nineteen times in Chronicles (three instances in Ezra-Nehemiah being included), and regularly these instruments are assigned to the priests, while cymbals, psalteries, and harps are assigned to the levites. The Chronicler is scrupulous in distributing the musical instruments always in the same way and evidently attached much importance to this exact distribution. In

three passages¹⁸ the Chronicler is obviously glossing his known sources. In the sources the reference is to lay music. But the Chronicler, as the contexts show, modulates it into a levitical key. Here, then, are two fixed facts, first, the consistent view of the trumpet in Chronicles as a priestly instrument and, secondly, the demonstrable glossing in a levitical interest of a known source which originally referred to lay music. From these premises Büchler argues that in the two passages in Chronicles where "trumpets" are found in the hands of the laity, we really have the Chronicler's source and not the Chronicler himself. If the position of Büchler should be accepted, a point of considerable importance in its bearing on the history of the temple music would be established.

In the first of these passages (2 Chron. 20), if vs. 28 is interpreted by vs. 27, the reference is to lay music. But at vs. 19 there is a reference to levitical musicians¹⁹ which tends to reflect a different meaning upon what follows. Verse 19, however, is a parenthesis, the subject of vs. 20 going back to vs. 18. Büchler argues that parenthesis is here equivalent to interpolation. In other words, we have at 2 Chron. 20 an analogy to the passages cited above,—a source (this time the uncanonical source) in which the original reference was to lay music, glossed by the Chronicler in a levitical interest. This conclusion is corroborated by the word *rinna* translated "sing" at vs. 22, a word found but once again in Chronicles and there copied from the source (2 Chron. 6 19=1 Kings 8 28). Since the Chronicler is most consistent in his use of musical terms, the occurrence of this word only here outside of the passage copied from Kings is held to

¹⁸ 1 Chron. 15 28 = 2 Sam. 6 15; 1 Chron. 13 8 = 2 Sam. 6 5; 2 Chron. 23 13 = 2 Kings 11 14.

¹⁹ In the commentary at p. 7 the "singers or musicians" are mentioned but I have observed no discussion of the exact force of the Hebrew word (*meshōrēr*) regularly translated in the R. V. by "singer." I am persuaded that a more accurate translation would be "musician." The question has a bearing upon the history of temple psalmody. If we translate by "singer," we naturally think of psalms; if by "musicians," we think more of instrumental music, though psalmody is not necessarily excluded. But the emphasis of the Chronicler's evidence for psalmody would be quite different if "musician" were substituted in each case for "singer." Especially at 2 Chron. 29 28 there is no discussion of the very doubtful translation of *hashshir meshōrēr* by "the singers sang."

betray a source. In the second passage where "trumpets" are found in the hands of the laity (2 Chron. 15 14) they are associated with "cornets." Now the word "cornet" is found again only at 1 Chron. 15 28, where it is borrowed from Samuel. This suggests that at 2 Chron. 15 14, where lay trumpets and cornets are combined, we are also dealing with a source.

Curtis treats this argument of Bûchler as follows. (a) The introduction of levites at 2 Chron. 20 19 is held to be "natural in connection with the praise to Jehovah, since the assembly is in the court of the temple." No notice is taken of the parenthetical character of vs. 19. (b) The peculiar construction of *rinna* at vs. 22 is discussed, but not the singularity of its occurrence. (c) The use of "trumpets" at 2 Chron. 15 14 is cited as one evidence among others of the Chronicler's style, whereas the point of Bûchler's argument is that the use of the word here is in striking contrast with the Chronicler's use of it elsewhere.²⁰

(2) 2 Chron. 5 11b-13a is an obvious interpolation between 1 Kings 8 10a and 10b. The source speaks of no levitical music. The scene here described occurs before Solomon's prayer of dedication. Then follows the prayer (1 Kings 8 12-53 = 2 Chron. 6 1-42). At the end of the prayer the scene at the beginning is repeated in Chronicles (not in Kings), that is, 2 Chron. 7 1-3, which follows the prayer, is the equivalent of 2 Chron. 5 11a, 13b-14 = 1 Kings 8 10-11 which precedes the prayer. The duplication is unnatural; the two consecrations of the temple by the cloud negate each other. Bertheau long ago suggested that in 7 1-3 the Chronicler was following another source, and a new confirmation of this view was found by Bûchler in the fact that at 2 Chron. 7 1-3 it is the laity, not the levites, who take part in the music. But at 7 4-6 = 1 Kings 8 62-63 the levitical music

²⁰Curiously enough on p. 30 where the word "trumpets" is cited as a characteristic of the Chronicler, and all the cases of its occurrence are supposed to be given, 2 Chron. 15 14 is unfortunately omitted. In the same list the use of the word at 2 Kings 11 14 = 2 Chron. 23 13 is set off by itself as a "general use" (lay music?). This is true in the case of Kings but it is not true in the case of Chronicles. The relationship between the two passages in their use of the word "trumpets" is precisely the same as at 1 Chron. 15 28 = 2 Sam. 6 15, where the trumpets are properly classified in the list as priestly, in spite of the fact that in Samuel the reference is to lay music. The analysis of the usage at this point must be considered misleading.

is again interpolated (vs. 6). The distinction between sources, which either did not refer to music at all (Kings), or only referred to lay music (2 Chron. 7 1-3, an uncanonical source), and the Chronicler, who emphasized levitical music, would here seem to be obvious.

Curtis replies that "the Chronicler could have invented this narrative (7 1-3), even as he added the miraculous fire at 1 Chron. 21 26=2 Sam. 24 25." The resort to "invention" at this point in order to avoid the admission of sources is not convincing. If 1 Chron. 21 is also ascribed to the Chronicler, he must be held to have invented the same scene twice, and in the second instance he would have brought himself very unnecessarily into conflict with the narrative in Kings which he was following. This procedure, which would be most artificial if the Chronicler were inventing, would be quite intelligible if he were following sources and wished, so far as he was able, to preserve all the traditions, even when they varied. The argument of Curtis might be reversed and 2 Chron. 7 1-3 might rather be utilized as evidence that 1 Chron. 21 with which it agrees is also a source. For this view a new consideration may be urged. When the Chronicler transcribes Samuel and Kings, he usually does so almost verbatim (cf. 2 Chron. 10=1 Kings 12), the variations being almost always in the nature of tendency-glosses. But at times he varies considerably from these sources, when *Tendenz* is not so noticeable. Benzinger reasserts the canon of Movers that where the Chronicler departs from Samuel and Kings in a parallel account without the *Tendenz* of the differences being obvious, he is probably following a source intermediate between the canonical source and himself. 1 Chron. 21 is an excellent illustration of such a variation.

In the above instances we are dealing with narrative sections. In these and similar instances, where sources are inferred by Büchler, Benzinger, and Kittel, Curtis falls back upon the argument from style in opposition to the argument from content. But the argument from style in the present discussion is a double-edged weapon. On the one hand it must be freely admitted that the style of the Chronicler is uniform. No evidence for sources can be drawn from it except in a few cases like the use of the

word for trumpets. On the other hand, if the Chronicler is a compiler, and the main portion of Chronicles is really taken from his uncanonical source, then the style of the Chronicler is resolved into the style of his source. Curtis expressly admits this difficulty (preface, pp. vii ff.). It is probably because of the tentative character of the entire discussion that he has regularly quoted the statements of Benzinger and Kittel in full in each important case where the assumption of sources is made by these writers. This fulness and fairness in the treatment of the views of those who differ from him is one of the greatest merits of Curtis's commentary. The student is thus aided to an impartial judgment.

(3) It is when we turn from the narrative sections to the genealogical sections that the failure of our author to recognize fully the composite character of Chronicles seems to the present reviewer most unfortunate.²¹ It is in the discussion of the genealogies that the resources of a commentator on Chronicles are put to the severest test. These lists of names, which fill so large a part of the Chronicler's work, and which at first sight seem so unpromising, can often be made to yield most interesting historical material. This is especially true if the composite character of the genealogies is admitted. As an illustration of what is involved in the study of these genealogies and of the consequences of Curtis's failure to recognize the sources, I have selected his treatment of 1 Chron. 6. This chapter furnishes the key to the history of the temple musical guilds, and is of the greatest interest and historical importance. The chapter falls into the following divisions:

(a) Vss. 1-15, a genealogy of high priests from Aaron to the Babylonian exile.

(b) Vss. 16-30, a genealogy of the levitical families, Gershom, Kohath, and Merari.

(c) Vss. 31-47, a genealogy of the three eponyms of the musical guilds, Heman, Asaph, and Ethan.

²¹ According to the preface, Professor Curtis's co-worker, Dr. Madsen, has contributed especially to the genealogical sections of the commentary, the treatment of 1 Chron. 21-29, in particular, having formed the subject of his doctor's thesis.

(d) Vss. 48, 49, the duties of priests and levites.

(e) Vss. 50-53, a genealogy of high priests from Aaron to Ahimaaz (a contemporary of David).

(f) Vss. 54-81, a list of levitical (including priestly) cities, taken from Josh. 21.

The first thing that strikes the attention is the unnatural duplication of the genealogy of high priests (*a* and *e*). Both of these lists cannot be original. Benzinger and Kittel reject the first list as the later accretion; Curtis rejects the second.²² Benzinger and Kittel appeal to the formal infelicity of vs. 1 before vs. 16; Curtis, to the formal infelicity of vss. 50-53 in their present context. This has not been sufficiently recognized by Benzinger and Kittel, but it is certainly not so obvious as is the awkwardness of vs. 1 before vs. 16. Benzinger and Kittel suggest as a motive for the later insertion of the first list the desire to carry down to the exile the genealogy (vss. 50-53), which originally only ran to the time of David. Curtis suggests as a motive for the insertion of the second list the desire of a scribe to incorporate it because he thought it proper that a list of priests should follow a statement of their duties. The motive suggested for the later insertion of the first list is far more intelligible. By eliminating list (*e*) instead of list (*a*) from the original genealogy, one of the important clues to the interpretation of the chapter is lost. This clue is the fact that list (*e*) ends with a contemporary of David.

The next thing that strikes the attention is that the genealogies of levitical families, Gershom, Kohath, and Merari (vss. 16-30), are repeated and enlarged in the genealogies of the eponyms of the musical guilds, Heman, Asaph, and Ethan (vss. 31-47).

²² Curtis argues that if vss. 50-53 were omitted, we should have a sort of chiasmic arrangement, which he holds to be characteristic of the Chronicler elsewhere, e.g. genealogy of priests and genealogy of levites, duties of levites and duties of priests, cities of priests and cities of levites. This arrangement assumes that vss. 54-81 stand in the order originally intended by the Chronicler. This cannot for a moment be admitted. A glance at Josh. 21 shows how senseless is the present order of 1 Chron. 6 54-81. This chiasmic arrangement of the material is also supposed to be followed in chaps. 23-27 (cf. p. 260). It is assumed at this point in order to avoid the admission of the composite character of these chapters, but the assumption is most artificial and unsatisfactory.

The following tabular arrangement of the chapter, based on Kittel, in which the *guild* genealogies (B, D, F) are placed in parallelism with their corresponding *family* genealogies (A, C, E) will make this clear.

A. GERSHOM (6 20 f.) Gershom Libni Jahath Zimmah Joah Iddo Zerah Jeaterai	B ¹ . ASAPH (6 39-43) Gershom Jahath Shimei Zimmah Ethan Adaiah Zerah Ethni Melchiah Baasiah Michael Shimea Berechiah Asaph	C ¹ . KOHATH (6 22-24, 25-28) Kohath Amminadab (Izhar) Korah Assir Elkanah Ebiasaph Assir Tahath Uriel Uzziah Shaul Elkanah Ahimoth Elkanah Zophai Nahath Eliab Jeroham Elkanah Samuel [Joel]	D ¹ . HEMAN (6 33-38) Kohath Izhar Korah Ebiasaph Assir Tahath Zephaniah Azariah Joel D ² . Elkanah Amassi Mahath Elkanah Zuph Toah Eliel Jeroham Elkanah Shemuel Joel Heman
E. MERARI (6 29 f.) Merari Mahli Libni Shimei Uzza Shimea Haggiah Asaiah	F. ETHAN (6 44-47) Merari Mushi Mahli Shamer Bani Amsi Hilkiah Amaziah Hashabiah Malluch Abdi Kishi Ethan		

Into all the intricate text-critical questions of these lists it is unnecessary for our purposes to go, but, when certain necessary emendations²³ have been made, the following equations are accepted by Curtis as well as by his predecessors: B¹ = A; D¹ = C¹,

²³ The most important of these, which are generally accepted, are (a) the transposition of Jahath and Shimei in B, thus showing that there was a variation in the tradition as to which of the sons of Gershom (Libni or Shimei, cf. vs. 17) stood at the head of the pedigrees A and B; (b) the deletion of Assir and Elkanah in C; (c) the substitution of Izhar for Amminadab in C, the error being due to a reminiscence of Ex. 6 23 (cf. the context); (d) the emendation in vs. 26a to "Elkanah, his son," i.e. son of Ahimoth, instead of the present text. The genealogy represented by C² (vss. 25-28) is really a second genealogy traced back to Elkanah and down to Joel, the son of Samuel the prophet, and not a continuation of C¹.

and $D^2 = C^2$. (For the relationship of F to E, see below.) Now the crucial point in the interpretation of the family genealogies, A, C, E, lies in the answer to the question, Why do these genealogies leave off where they do, at Jeaterai, Shaul, and Asaiah? The answer to this question will depend on our answer to the preliminary question, Are Jeaterai and Shaul original at the end of A and C^1 ?

In place of Jeaterai (A) we find Ethni in B^1 . Ethni is certainly a corruption of Ethan. Benzinger, Kittel, and Curtis all refuse to decide between Ethni-Ethan and Jeaterai, though they all hold that there is corruption here. But as Jeaterai is a wholly unintelligible name, occurring only here, the chances are that it is a corruption of Ethni-Ethan rather than the reverse. But it is not probable that Ethan itself was original in A. It is noticeable that Ethan has once before in B taken the place of Joah in A. It might be possible that Ethan was again substituted, in the second case of its occurrence in B, either for Joah or for a name that looks like Joah and that could easily be confused with it. At 7 3 we actually find a certain Joel the son of Izrahiah (another form of Zerah).²⁴ This would suggest that Joel was the original name at the end of A. Joel then became corrupted to Joah, and Ethan was substituted twice for Joah in list B. In the second case Ethan (Ethni) worked back into A in the corrupted form of Jeaterai, a complicated but entirely normal instance of progressive corruption of the text, every step of which is intelligible.²⁵

In C^1 Uziah is undoubtedly the same as Azariah of D^1 , the same king being called by these two names, 2 Kings 15, Isa. 6 1. Shaul is usually equated with Joel. This leaves Uriel = Zephaniah unaccounted for. But Uriel is even more easily confused with Joel than is Shaul. I would suggest that there has been an accidental transposition in C^1 , and that the last three names in this list should be read in the order Shaul (?),

²⁴ That 7 3 is dealing with Issacharites, not Levites, is of no consequence when one remembers how these names are shuffled about in Chronicles. Cf. 7 7 with 25 4.

²⁵ Benzinger conjectures that an original Joel at the end of A has been omitted. This would be less probable.

Uzziah, Uriel (Joel).²⁶ These suggested emendations are remarkably confirmed, and at the same time the clue is furnished to the interpretation of the family genealogies (A, C, E), by 1 Chron. 15. This chapter is nearly related in several ways to 1 Chron. 6. Benzinger pointed out that the Asaiah who is the representative of Merari at the transportation of the ark (15 6) must be the Asaiah at the end of E. At 15 5, 7 Uriel is the representative of Kohath and Joel of Gershom. These names correspond exactly to the names which we have conjecturally placed at the end of C and A.

If the reader has threaded his way through the above argument, his patience will be rewarded, for the aim of the family genealogies in chapter 6 now becomes clear. They seek to bring down the levitical pedigrees to the time of David, in harmony with what we have seen to be the more original list of high priests (vss. 50-53). Each list closes with the name of a contemporary of David (Ahimaaz the priest, Joel the Gershomite, Uriel the Kohathite, and Asaiah the Merarite).²⁷ In other words, these family genealogies have an independent significance. When this is once recognized the critical relationship of the guild genealogies (B, D, F) to the family genealogies (A, C, E) is also perceived. It is the purpose of the guild genealogies to establish the levitical descent of the musical guilds. This they do by attaching themselves to levitical family genealogies already in existence. This means that the family genealogies are older than the guild genealogies. But the chronological difference in the two sets of genealogies naturally means a difference in literary origin. This conclusion is borne out by the further fact that the guild genealogies are based, not on the exact form of the family genealogies found in chapter 6, but on a variant tradition of these genealogies. This is clearly seen (a) in the fact that A traces the genealogy through Libni, while B traces it through

²⁶ 2 Chron. 29 12 has the Azariah-Joel of D¹. But as Uriel is the rarer name, it is much more likely that it was original and that the more usual Joel was substituted for it.

²⁷ By accepting with Curtis the first list of high priests, which brings the pedigree down to the exile, as the more original, the aim of the chapter would seem to be violated.

his brother Shimei; (b) in the fact that F does not correspond at all to E, as we should expect it to do; and (c) in the very different chronological implications of the two sets of genealogies. While the family genealogies imply only eight or nine generations between Aaron and David, the guild genealogies put from thirteen to twenty-one generations into the same period. (d) Finally, when the subject of the general section, chapters 1-9, is examined, the guild genealogies are seen to be out of topical connection with the context. From every point of view, therefore, vss. 31-47, which contain the guild genealogies, are to be considered an accretion.

Now it is conceivable that the Chronicler himself, who is especially interested in the temple music, added the guild genealogies to the family genealogies which had come to him from tradition, written or oral. In that case we should find here another instance in which the Chronicler had interpolated his levitical music into his source. But two considerations are opposed to this view. (a) 1 Chron. 6 16-30 is an integral part of the great section, chapters 1-9. This section is in all probability the work of the Chronicler. It follows that if vss. 31-47 are an addition to vss. 16-30, they must be later than the Chronicler. (b) This is confirmed by the position assigned to Heman in the guild genealogies. Here we arrive at a very interesting fact revealed in these genealogies. Everywhere else in the Bible, except at 1 Chron. 15, Asaph either stands alone or is placed first in the references to the singers. In chapter 6 Heman stands first.²⁸ Not only so but he traces his descent from the priestly family of Kohath, and even claims the great prophet Samuel as his ancestor. These facts combine to push Heman into the position of greatest prominence. This is not accidental but intended; the artificiality of the guild genealogies, admitted on all hands, proves motive. If these genealogies were real genealogies, motive could not be imputed to them, but we can see how the Hemanite genealogy, D¹ and

²⁸ It is true that Kohath, the priestly as well as levitical family from which Heman claims descent, sometimes precedes Gershom, the oldest-born, but this is not the regular order, notably not in vss. 16-30 (another evidence of their critical distinction from vss. 31-47), and, as stated above, only here and at chap. 15 does the Kohathite guild of Heman precede the Gershomite guild of Asaph.

D², is formed by simply adding the parallel genealogies C¹ and C² together, so that Samuel is appropriated at the same time as an ancestor of Heman. Artifice that results in a certain definite thing, namely, the exaltation of Heman, must be purposed, and the guild genealogies of chapter 6 therefore reflect a time in which Heman had superseded Asaph. But a study of Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles shows very clearly that whether the Chronicler knew of these three guilds or not, he certainly did not regard Heman as the chief guild. Here, then, would seem to be proof of the strongest character that vss. 31-47 are later than the time of the Chronicler. This conclusion is at once seen to have the most important bearing upon the history of the development of the musical guilds.²⁹

If the above criticism of chapter 6 is accepted, the treatment of the chapter in Curtis's commentary must be regarded as wholly inadequate. At three points in particular the positions adopted in the commentary seem to the present reviewer to be irreconcilable with the real significance of this chapter. (a) The elimination of the second list of high-priests, from Aaron to David, instead of the first list. (b) The failure to bring out the independent significance of the family genealogies, which almost certainly were intended to carry the pedigrees down to the time of David. These genealogies are treated as the equivalents of the guild genealogies. The Gershomite genealogy is actually called a fragment of the Asaphite genealogy. The break in the Kohathite genealogy at vs. 25 is observed, but the fact that we are here dealing with a parallel line is not brought out, and the Kohathite genealogy is treated as a unit on the basis of vss. 33-38, and hence regarded as a duplicate pedigree of Heman. In reality it is a double genealogy of Shaul-Uriel (C¹) and of Joel the son of Samuel (C²). The difficulty of Curtis's method of treating the family genealogies is fully revealed in the geneal-

²⁹ In the above the criticism of Benzinger and Kittel has been followed in the main, but the attempt has been made to formulate their positions somewhat more precisely and to strengthen them at certain points. The difference between the name Ethan for the third guild in chaps. 6 and 15, as contrasted with Jeduthun elsewhere, properly enters into the discussion, and furnishes another argument for the later date of 6 31-47. But the treatment of this point would lead us too far afield.

ogy of Merari. "This pedigree," he says, "should present a line of descent of Ethan, but a close similarity of names is wanting. Still they have been held sufficiently alike [by Bertheau] to warrant this inference." This is anything but convincing. The fact is that the family genealogies when construed as guild genealogies are entirely meaningless. Twice Curtis seems on the point of recognizing what the present reviewer thinks is the true situation. On page 132 the identification of Asaiah at the end of list E with the Asaiah of 1 Chron. 15 6, suggested by Benzinger and in reality the clue to these genealogies, is tentatively allowed. Again on page 134 it is said that the guild genealogies are probably dependent upon the family genealogies, "which originally may have been of Levites not classified as singers," and on page 135, "the Chronicler may have utilised some current genealogies of the singers to supplement the Levitical tables of 6 20 ff." But these clues are not followed up, and are really in no organic connection with the general interpretation given of the chapter (pp. 130-135). (c) In the third place the intention to exalt Heman is denied. It is urged that Heman is not called chief, that Asaph's descent is traced from Gershom, who is the oldest son, and that he is given a place of honor on the right hand. But unfortunately it is at the right hand of Heman! The fact that Asaph is traced to Gershom is an interesting reminiscence of the original position of Asaph. Since Heman is placed first, it is not necessary to speak of him as chief. This attempt to deny the pre-eminence of Heman is probably due to the desire to save the passage to the Chronicler, whose authorship is urged on the basis of the names in the guild genealogies which are frequently found elsewhere in the Chronicler's writings, and on the ground of the style at vss. 31-33a, which point to the conclusion that "these genealogies of the singers were composed by the Chronicler or in his day." I should certainly choose the latter alternative; only I would stretch the term "day" so as to cover a somewhat longer period of time than Curtis probably intended.

The same aversion to the admission of a composite structure in Chronicles stands in the way of an adequate interpretation of 1 Chron. 25 (the musical courses) and of 1 Chron. 15-16. In

the latter case a harmonistic method is employed in the interpretation of the chapter which might be justified if it were not for the testimony of the other musical passages, especially 1 Chron. 6. Curtis accepts, indeed, interpolation at 15 19-21, 23, 24b, yet holds that the difference between vss. 18b and 24 on the one hand, in which Obed-Edom and Jeiel are gate-keepers, and vss. 21 and 23 on the other, in which Obed-Edom and Jeiel are singers and Berechiah and Elkanah are gate-keepers, is due to a misunderstanding of vs. 18 by the interpolator. Benzinger and Kittel hold that the difference is due to the changes in organization in the temple musical guilds.

It will be seen that the present reviewer strongly inclines to the compilatory theory of Chronicles, and therefore has felt compelled to express his dissent from the positions taken in the commentary in a number of crucial passages. But he would not leave the impression upon the reader's mind that this work, which was completed with heroic perseverance under the most trying circumstances, is of relatively small importance. On the contrary, in its exhaustive text-critical apparatus, in its wealth of material, archaeological, exegetical, and critical, in which it far surpasses its two recent German competitors (Benzinger and Kittel), in its clear presentation and scrupulous objectivity, giving to views of the school of criticism it opposes a fair and full presentation, the commentary of Professor Curtis will remain for years to come the standard English commentary on Chronicles, and will worthily take its place among the most indispensable volumes of the *International Critical Commentary*.

III. THE PSALMS³⁰

The problems connected with the Psalter are endless, but those most assiduously discussed during the past twenty-five years may be grouped under four heads: (1) the historical question of the origin of the Psalter as a collection, (2) the question of the origin of the individual psalms, (3) the literary question of the nature of Hebrew poetry, with its necessary accompaniment of problems in textual criticism, and (4) the exegetical question concerning the speaker in the psalms, whether the "I" of the Psalter has an individual or a collective reference. The scholar who can answer these questions successfully must be possessed of an historical sense, a literary feeling, and an exegetical tact of a very high order. Since the psalms are hymns, and as such for the most part deal only with generalized or idealized experiences, the problem of their date and place in the development of the religion of Israel is a singularly complicated one. The dating of the psalms must rest on established dates in the rest of Hebrew literature, and one who undertakes the criticism of the Psalter must have a very clear and well-balanced conception of the problems of the religion of Israel. Without it the attempt to discuss, for instance, the tradition of the Davidic authorship of the psalms, or even their pre-exilic origin, would lead to no secure results. Again, the question of the nature of Hebrew poetry and its bearing upon textual criticism is one of the most vexed questions of Old Testament study. Few combine a gift for textual criticism with a fine literary sense. Finally, the problem of the nature of the speaker in the Psalter is one of the most fascinating and important, but at the same time one of the most delicate of exegetical problems.

The literature upon these various subjects, unlike the literature upon Chronicles, is enormous; but the recent commentaries, with which the work of Dr. Briggs would naturally be compared, are

³⁰A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Theological Encyclopaedia and Symbolics, Union Theological Seminary, New York, and Emily Grace Briggs, B.D. Two volumes. New York, 1906, 1907.

those of Baethgen in the *Handkommentar*, Duhm in the *Kurzer Hand-Commentar*, and Kirkpatrick in the *Cambridge Bible*. The first of these is marked by solid learning, clear exposition, and a commendable agnosticism in the matter of dating the psalms, but is perhaps too cautious in its textual criticism, and it is in no sense a creative work. Kirkpatrick's commentary belongs to the more elaborate and ambitious commentaries in the *Cambridge Bible*. It is clear and informing on its exegetical side, though largely an echo of Baethgen, but seems to be distinctly defective in its historical criticism. Attempts to find suitable situations for the psalms in David's life (compare, for example, the remarks on Ps. 41) should be abandoned. Duhm's commentary is the work of an expository genius, compact, clear-cut, illuminating, marked by a speculative daring that often throws a flood of light upon obscure passages or gives to what had become a platitude the interest of a newly discovered truth. But it has the defects of its author's other work. It is very one-sided, and maintains a theory of the origin of the Psalter in the late Maccabean period which conflicts with the external evidence and involves serious intrinsic improbabilities.²¹ Nevertheless, if the reader does not allow himself to be dazzled by Duhm, he can probably learn from his pregnant pages more about the crucial problems of the Psalter, and in a shorter space of time, than from any other commentary.

As compared with the three works just mentioned, Briggs's commentary is a vast thesaurus of statistical facts. In its learning it is like one of the post-reformation Biblical treatises rather than a modern work. One can well believe that the labor of forty years, as the author informs us, has been crammed into its more than one thousand closely printed pages. As an example of erudition, this commentary is likely to remain a monument to one of the most learned American scholars of this generation. But is it an illuminating commentary? Does it make stimulating and suggestive contributions to the solution of the problems above referred to? This, if the present reviewer may be permitted to

²¹ For instance, the view that we have whole series of violently polemical psalms, both Pharisaic and Sadducean, incorporated in our Psalter. How both these hostile groups of psalms could have been inserted into the Psalter in the short space of time which Duhm allows for its compilation after they were written, is not made clear.

express himself with absolute candor, it does not always appear to do. It is possible that Briggs's positions have not all been fully understood. The book is no easy reading. Its style is not infrequently opaque; the author's "buts" and "fors," when he provides them, often refer (like those of the Johannine gospel and epistles) to something in his own mind rather than to anything actually expressed, and the student is left to infer as best he can the connections which the writer may have had in mind. But those parts of the commentary which will be most severely criticised in what follows have been studied with care, and the effort honestly made to understand the positions to which exception has been taken.

Briggs's introduction treats at length of the Text, the Higher Criticism, the Canonicity, and the Interpretation of the Psalter. Under the caption "Higher Criticism" (pp. liv-xcii) are discussed the origin and growth of the Psalter as a collection, and an entirely new theory on this subject is advanced. Briefly, it is as follows: There was first an early collection of six *miktam* psalms (the word being explained after the rabbinic etymology as "golden" or "choice" psalms) made in the early Persian period. There was also a collection of thirteen *maskil* psalms (explained as "meditative poems") made in the late Persian period. About the same time (late Persian) the Davidic collection of psalms was formed, originally sixty-eight in number, although in the present Psalter we have seventy-four. This was the first of the minor psalters, and into it were inserted all the *miktam* psalms and six of the *maskilim*. Next in order came the two originally independent collections of the Korah and Asaph psalms (late Persian or early Greek period). The Asaph collection adopted two of the *maskilim* not appropriated by the Davidic collection, and the Korah psalter adopted four others. The next stage in the evolution was the collection (early Greek period) of fifty-seven *mizmorim* (the technical word for "psalms"), which was a selection from the existing collections of certain of the Davidic, Asaph, and Korah psalms with the addition of a few others. This was apparently followed by the elohistic psalter (Pss. 42-83), a group of psalms in which the name Elohim is regularly used for God, although in their original form many of these psalms used Jahveh (middle

Greek period). It is inferred from the use of the divine name Elohim that this psalter was composed in Babylonia (a very precarious inference). The elohistic psalter also was made up of selections from David, Korah, and the *mizmorim*, and included all of Asaph. About the same time there came into existence in Palestine another psalter, containing fifty-five psalms, and known as the "director's psalter," this being Briggs's interpretation of the phrase which the English Bible renders "for the chief musician." Then arose the groups of *hallel*s and pilgrim psalms, which were mainly compiled in the Greek period. In the Maccabean period the Psalter received its final shape, being divided into the five books which we find at present.

Both from the method and the results of this section of the introduction a thorough-going dissent must be recorded. In the first place, it seems to the present reviewer that the subject is approached from the wrong angle. The treatment is dominated by the chronological point of view, and an attempt is made to indicate the gradual growth of the Psalter out of preceding minor collections. This is all very well, but first of all it should be proved that such preceding minor collections existed. This is not done: we have merely the statement, "This is the way the Psalter grew," and the reader is left to guess which of the multitudinous facts presented in the course of the discussion would have been used to support the theory, if the author had chosen to state his argument. The complaint is not that the facts, or at least the more important ones, in support of a critical decomposition of the Psalter are not given, but rather that because of the chronological arrangement of the material facts which naturally go together and throw light upon each other and upon the critical structure of the Psalter, are violently separated and thus lose a large part of their evidential force.

In order to illustrate the confusion which arises from the chronological arrangement of the material, it may be well briefly to indicate the evidence commonly employed in the critical analysis of the Psalter, and then to show how this material is utilized by Dr. Briggs.

Criticism has usually started, and with obvious propriety, from the division of the Psalter into five books, a division plainly

indicated by the doxologies that stand at the end of the first four books. The doxologies, therefore, give us our first clue. On nearer inspection this fivefold division is seen to have been superimposed upon a more fundamental threefold division, the key to which is the alternation in the use of the divine names. Book I is a homogeneous collection of Davidic psalms, in which Jahveh is regularly used; in Books II–III, Elohim is regularly used; in Books IV–V, Jahveh is again used. Thus the elohistic redaction of the middle books of the Psalter furnishes our second important clue to the analysis. It will be observed that the doxology at the end of Book I coincides with a critical line of cleavage. If we turn to Books II–III, in which the elohistic psalms are found, four very distinct groups emerge: (a) a Korah Elohim-group (Pss. 42–49); (b) a Davidic Elohim-group (Pss. 51–72); (c) an Asaph Elohim-group (Pss. 73–83); (d) a Korah Jahveh-group (Pss. 84–89).²²

The first thing that strikes the attention in this analysis is that the elohistic redaction does not quite coincide with the division into books. We should expect the dividing line, marked by the doxology, to fall at the end of the elohistic psalms (that is, after Ps. 83), and that Psalms 84–89, which are Jahveh psalms, would be combined with the Jahveh psalms of Books IV–V. On the other hand, this little group is principally a Korah group with close affinities to the elohistic Korah-group. The suggestion has been made that Psalms 84–89 are an appendix to the elohistic psalter. If so, the doxology at the end of Book III (Ps. 89 52) is again seen to have critical significance. Further, it would seem proper to postulate a somewhat different literary history for the two groups of Korah psalms. Otherwise, it is difficult to see why they did not all suffer an elohistic redaction.

In the second place, the elohistic redaction is unexpectedly broken in two by the division between Books II and III, again marked by the doxology, Ps. 72 18 f., and also by the remarkable editorial note, Ps. 72 20. Because of this division the Korah and Davidic Elohim-psalms are classed together and, with one Asaph psalm (Ps. 50), are separated from the group of Asaph

²² Psalm 50 is an isolated Asaph psalm inserted between the Korah and Davidic psalms. The significance of its position is discussed below.

Elohim-psalms. The anomalous position of Ps. 72 20 has always been recognized; but the very peculiarity of its position gives it an unusual critical significance. It points to the necessity of a critical analysis both of what precedes and of what follows. It proves that the Davidic group (Pss. 51-72) must have once existed apart from the Korah group (Pss. 42-49), for this note is only appropriate at the end of a *homogeneous* Davidic collection. And we may go a step further with considerable probability. The Korah group (Pss. 42-49) and the Asaph group (Pss. 73-83) are the psalms of the two great levitical singing-guilds. They would naturally, therefore, be grouped together. The fact that this is not the case, but that the Korah group is illogically combined with the Davidic group to form Book II, strongly suggests that a collection of Korah and Davidic psalms was made before these were combined with the Asaph psalms to make up the Elohim psalter. Probably, then, the homogeneous group of Asaph psalms also had at one time an independent existence. It thus appears that the collections of the Davidic, the Korah, and the Asaph elohistic psalms all had once an independent existence; that the Davidic and Korah psalms were then grouped together in our present Book II; and, finally, that these two groups were combined with the Asaph psalms into the present Elohim psalter (Pss. 42-83).

But the editorial note, Ps. 72 20, enables us to draw still another inference. The writer of this note could not have known of any of the Davidic psalms that follow it in the present Psalter. Consequently, the scattered Davidic psalms in Books III and IV and the groups of Davidic psalms in Book V probably had a different literary history from the homogeneous Davidic Elohim-psalms of Book II. On the other hand, the relationship of the Davidic Elohim-group of Book II to the Davidic Jahveh-group of Book I is an unsettled question. Did these two groups originally form one collection, of which Ps. 72 20 was the conclusion, or are they independent parallel collections? To the present reviewer the latter view has always seemed more probable on general principles; but the relationship between the two Davidic psalters is further complicated by the fact that Psalm 16 is found, as Psalm 53, in an elohistic redaction—a positive proof that in the elohistic psalms we are dealing with a distinct psalter.

It will be seen from the above that the doxologies at the end of Books I, II, and III indicate correct critical divisions of the Psalter. The case is different with Ps. 106 48, the final doxology of Book IV. It is admitted on all hands that this division is critically unsound. Psalms 105–107 form a very closely connected group of psalms. Their separation by the doxology into different books is unfortunate, and the division evidently artificial. Books IV–V are therefore generally regarded as in reality making up one collection. Within it, however, the pilgrim psalms (Pss. 120–134) stand out very distinctly and can most probably be regarded as forming a minor psalter.

In the above analysis, which sums up in general outline the evidence for a critical structure of the Psalter as it has been developed in the last twenty-five years, the following collections emerge with distinctness: (1) a Davidic collection constituting Book I; (2) the Davidic collection of Book II (probably originally distinct from the collection of Book I); (3) the Korah and Asaph collections of Books II and III; (4) the elohistic psalter, which represents a combination of the second collection of Davidic psalms with the Korah and Asaph psalms, together with a Korah appendix; (5) a great collection of miscellaneous psalms (Books IV–V); within which (6) the pilgrim psalms stand out as a homogeneous collection, also no doubt originally a minor psalter.

Let us now turn to some illustrations of the way in which Briggs makes use of this material. In the first place, the discussion of the doxologies, which we have seen to be the natural starting-point of the investigation, is deferred to the end of the analysis. This is due to the chronological arrangement of the material. Briggs believes that the doxologies were inserted by the final editor of the Psalter. Hence they are discussed last. Even granting that they are due to the final editor (though this is very much to be doubted in the case of the first three), they have been shown to mark lines of critical cleavage. Hence, if the object is to show how the Psalter should be analyzed into earlier minor psalters, the postponement of all mention of the doxologies to the end of the discussion is most unfortunate; it prevents any use of this first clue to the analysis.

In the next place, the treatment of the elohistic psalter stands

midway in the discussion, after the reader has already had to accept largely on faith the *miktam*, *maskil*, Davidic, Korah, Asaph, and *mizmorim* psalters. The discussion of the elohistic psalter (§ 32) is entirely separated from the discussion of the threefold division of the Psalter (§ 38), with which it would naturally be connected, because the compilation of the elohistic psalter preceded in point of time the present threefold arrangement.³³

Again, the critical use made of Ps. 72 20 must be regarded as wholly inadequate. It is used only to confirm the supposition of a Davidic psalter (§ 27). It is not used to disintegrate the elohistic psalter into its original elements. One might as well pass a current of electricity through water and say that the result was two parts of hydrogen, with the oxygen totally ignored. The domination of the chronological point of view would again seem to be responsible for this failure to make full use of Ps. 72 20. Each of the groups—Davidic, Korah, and Asaph—is treated by itself in the supposed chronological order of their origin and without reference to the other groups. As Ps. 72 20 is attached to the Davidic group, it is mentioned only in connection with that group, and the indirect bearing which its position gives it upon the separation of the Korah and Asaph groups is not mentioned. Thus the doxologies, the peculiarity of the elohistic psalter, and Ps. 72 20, which, taken together, are the clues to the critical analysis of the Psalter, lose almost all their evidential force through the chronological disposition of the material adopted by Briggs.

But what, then, it may be asked, is the evidence which Briggs adduces in favor of the existence of minor psalters previous to

³³ The threefold division of course implies the artificiality of the doxology at the end of Book IV (Ps. 106 48). But in discussing the threefold division, nothing is said as to this implication. The artificiality of the doxology as the closing doxology of Book IV is, indeed, implied at § 35, where the attempt is made to show that there was a *hallel* psalter, and at § 40, where the connection of Ps. 106 48 with 1 Chron. 16 36 is discussed. But the bearing of Briggs's view of this doxology upon the book divisions is not brought out where we should expect it to be. Briggs further holds that this doxology was arbitrarily inserted by the final editor. This is by no means so probable as the view that the doxology originally belonged to the psalm, and that the unfortunate division into books was made at this point because the doxology already stood here.

our present Psalter? Strictly speaking, none whatever. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not mean to convey the impression that no facts which might have been used as evidence are mentioned. I only mean that their evidential value is not pointed out. The nearest approach to an argument for a minor psalter is found in § 27, which treats of the Davidic psalter. Briggs starts from the phrase in the title of these psalms *le-david*, ambiguously translated in the Revised Version, "*Of David.*" Until comparatively recent times it has been commonly held that the preposition *le* denoted authorship, and was to be translated "by." Briggs departs from this traditional view, saying:

The *le* is not the *le* of authorship, as has generally been supposed. The earliest collection of Pss. for use in the synagogue was made under the name of David, the traditional father of religious poetry and of the temple worship. The later editors left this name in the titles, with the preposition *le* attached, to indicate that these Psalms belonged to that collection. This explains all the facts of the case and the position of these Pss. in the Psalter. This view is confirmed by Ps. 72 20, which states that this Ps. was the conclusion of the prayers of David, and implies that the collection was a prayer-book.

The argument of this paragraph would seem to be that the preposition *le* implied a Davidic psalter, and that this is confirmed by Ps. 72 20. But this begs the whole question. The correctness of the interpretation of the *le* is assumed, not proved. Briggs's view of its meaning is a favorite one at the present time, and may be correct, but it is distinctly debatable, and has a number of weighty arguments against it. One of the objections to the assumed interpretation of *le* is found in the very passage cited in its support, Ps. 72 20. The editor who appended this note must certainly have thought that David was the author of the preceding psalms. But if so, the title *le-david* must already have stood at the head either of each psalm or of the collection, and must have been understood to imply authorship. As this editorial note would seem to be regarded by Briggs (and quite correctly) as appended to the original Davidic collection, it indicates that the theory of the meaning of *le* which he rejects existed as early as the first stages in the evolution of the Psalter. Since Briggs's interpretation of the *le* plays so large a part in his theory of the Psalter,

surely it ought to have been exegetically and linguistically justified, and not simply assumed.³⁴

Whether the phrase *lamenasseh* usually translated, "For the chief musician," indicates a director's psalter, is again a debatable question. The statement is simply made that the *le* has the same meaning in this phrase which Briggs assigns to it in the phrase *le-david*. But whether the *le* in these psalm-titles always has the same significance is just the problem which requires discussion. When, for example, in the title to Ps. 51 we find both phrases, *lamenasseh*, *le-david*, the question presses as to whether we have a right to interpret *le* both times in the same way. What we want is proof, not assumption. Yet it is not impossible that there really may have been a director's psalter, and this theory was also advocated by Beer. One piece of evidence for it is found in the fact that the obscure musical or liturgical directions are only found in these director-psalms, though they by no means occur in all of them. Briggs notices this fact, but as usual fails to point out its evidential force. So far as the *miktam*, *maskil*, *mizmor*, and *hallel* psalms are concerned, where the preposition *le* does not appear, no attempt whatever is made to prove that they once formed independent collections. It is simply asserted that they did so. There is a possibility that the *hallel* psalms which appear in certain groups in Book V may have formed a psalter, but the contrast

³⁴ When it is said in the above citation that the meaning of the *le* adopted "explains all the facts of the case and the position of these Pss. in the Psalter," we have an instance of one of those sovereign dicta which are altogether too frequent in this commentary, and whose effect is irritating rather than reassuring. In this connection it may be noted that from the theory that the *le* does not imply authorship the conclusion is reached that all the psalms are anonymous except Psalms 72, 88, 89, 90, and (strangely enough) 102. These are all held to be pseudonymous. Even in the thirteen cases where historical notices are attached to the title *le-david*, it is denied that the editor understood the *le* of authorship, on the ground that "it is altogether improbable . . . that an editor of the middle Persian period could have thought that his references to experiences of David were historical." Briggs's theory is that by means of these historical notices the editor simply wished to illustrate the psalms, and not to express an opinion as to their author, a theory already tentatively suggested by Beer (*Individual- und Gemeinde-Psalmen*, p. lxxxviii), but which is distinctly improbable in view of the strong Davidic tradition which is known to have existed at the time when most of the psalms were composed (cf. the Chronicler).

with the very clearly defined pilgrim songs in the same book rather suggests the opposite view. The *miktam* psalms also form a little group (Pss. 16, 56-60); but there is no critical reason, apart from the fact that they stand together, for holding that they formed an independent collection. The *maskilim* are, to be sure, mainly concentrated in Books II-III (eleven out of the thirteen *maskilim* are found in these two books), but they are scattered through these books in a haphazard manner, while the *mizmorim* are shuffled through all the five books in a way that is now wholly unintelligible. There are no critical indications of psalters in the case of these psalms, which are not even clearly grouped, and the question presses whether in these cases Briggs is not following phantom psalters.

At this point we meet with another of Briggs's assumptions. The objection just raised, drawn from the unmethodical distribution of the psalms in the psalters, is met by the assumption that all the psalms which had a common element in their titles once stood together, and that their present distribution through the Psalter is due to various revisions. So far as I have been able to observe, no evidence for this view is offered, and the unorganized character of the *maskilim*, *mizmorim*, and even the *hallel* psalms, where there are no critical evidences for the existence of independent psalters, as contrasted with the Davidic, Asaph, and Korah psalms, where there are such evidences, makes strongly against the theory. When the same theory is applied to the Korah and Davidic psalms, it is equally gratuitous. Briggs assumes that the elohistic Korah-psalms and the Jahvistic Korah-psalms once stood together, but that the present position of the Jahvistic Korah-group (Pss. 84-89) was due to the final redactor. Why all the Korah psalms were not adopted into the elohistic psalter, if they once stood together, he does not tell us.³⁵ In the same way, he assumes that the Davidic Jahveh group of Book I and the Davidic Elohim group of Book II once stood together, though it is again difficult to see why only a part of the Davidic psalms were selected from the original psalter for elo-

³⁵ We have seen that the greater probability is that the two groups of psalms had a different literary history, and that the Jahveh group was an appendix to the Elohim psalter, not an insertion by the final editor.

histic redaction.³⁶ He further assumes that the Davidic psalms of Books III-IV also stood in the same general collection, and therefore transfers them in imagination to a place before the editorial note, Ps. 72 20. This procedure would of course overturn the argument advanced above from this note, that the Davidic psalms in the later books were unknown to the editor who was responsible for Ps. 72 20; but at the same time it calmly ignores what has usually been held to be one of the best clues to a true analysis of the Psalter. As a matter of fact, as we shall see, Briggs himself distinguishes certain Davidic psalms in Book V from the other Davidic psalms in the later books, and denies that they stood in the original Davidic psalter.³⁷

If a true presentation of Briggs's method of discussion has been given thus far, it is clear that the student who wishes to find any formal justification of the critical analysis advocated in the commentary will be disappointed. Briefly stated, the argument can be reduced to the following: In the titles to a number of psalms the name of David occurs. Therefore there was a Davidic psalter. In another series of psalms *mizmor* is found in the title. Therefore there was a *mizmor* collection. Sometimes both the name of David and *mizmor* occur in the same title; in such cases the editor of the *mizmor* psalter took over the psalm from the Davidic psalter. If, in addition to *le-david* and *mizmor* the phrase

³⁶ The fact that Psalm 16 appears, as Psalm 53, in an elohistic redaction, and the bearing of this upon the right to assume an independent elohistic psalter, is not even referred to in the chapter on Higher Criticism, though it is noted in the chapter on the Text. This omission shows how oblivious our author is of the necessity of first proving the existence of independent minor psalters in the present compilation.

³⁷ Much labor is given to the establishment of the supposed original order of the Davidic Psalms (p. lxiv), but the results are far from convincing, and do not seem to throw any light either upon the critical analysis of the Psalter or upon the interpretation of the psalms. It may also be noted that Psalm 50 is supposed to have originally stood with the other Asaph psalms (Psalms 73-83). This is possible; its present position is at first sight anomalous. It is variously explained by our author as due to the desire of an editor "to make an appropriate concluding Ps. to the first division of 50" (p. lxvi), and as "giving an appropriate liturgical close [in what respect is Psalm 50 liturgical?] to this [Korah] group before the penitential Psalm 51" (p. lxxii). The propriety of the word "appropriate" in these citations may be questioned. The real reason for the present position of the psalm would seem to be its topical connection with the present form of Psalm 51. Both psalms are anti-sacrificial.

lamenasseh is found, this means that the psalm was first in the Davidic, then in the *mizmor*, and finally in the director's psalter (cf. Psalm 62), and so on indefinitely. All this is stated as if it were self-evident; no proof is given for the theory advocated. The discussion is so formulated as to show, not that there were original minor psalters behind our present Psalter, but, such psalters being assumed, their chronological relationships are stated, and thus is indicated the growth of the present Psalter from its first beginnings to its final form.

The criticism thus far made has been upon this chronological method of approach. This method does not allow the evidence for the existence of previous psalters to be marshalled in any adequate way. But has not our criticism after all been somewhat captious? Is it fair to judge a writer by what he does not set out to do, rather than by what he actually undertakes? Briggs sets out to show what he believes to be the chronological stages of the growth of the Psalter. This he does very clearly. The reader can easily follow the orderly sequence, *miktamim*, *maskilim*, David, Korah, Asaph, *mizmorim*, and the rest. May not the advantages of this method of presenting the subject, by which the student is enabled to grasp without difficulty the theory propounded, compensate for the disadvantages which have been noted?

But even if we thus consider this chronological mode of treatment simply on its positive side, and judge it by what it does do and not by what it fails to do, we immediately encounter a grave difficulty. Turn again to the title of Psalm 62. The three elements in this title are chief-musician, *mizmor*, David, arranged in this order. On Briggs's theory of the titles these represent three minor psalters. But this order is not the chronological order of the psalters. Briggs adopts the order David, *mizmor*, director. What are the principles upon which he bases his view of the chronological relationship of the various psalters?

It is noteworthy that only once in Briggs's entire discussion does he make use of any external evidence. In discussing, namely, the date of the director's psalter, he refers to the fact that the term *lamenasseh* is found again in Habakkuk 3 19. This,

he says, was taken from the director's psalter, though he gives no proof of this statement. Hence Habakkuk 3 is subsequent to the director. But since the prophetic canon was closed by the time of Ben Sira (219-198 B.C.), therefore the director's psalter also must have been composed before this time, that is, in the middle Greek period.

This almost total neglect of the external evidence in determining the date of the Psalter is in the present reviewer's estimation a very serious omission.³⁸ The formula for the use of internal evidences of date is a simple one: the date of the latest psalm in an assumed collection is the *terminus ad quem* of the compilation of that collection.

But at this point a new difficulty emerges. The Davidic psalter is held to have been closed in the late Persian period, because on grounds of internal evidence no Davidic psalms were composed later than this period. But there are psalms with *le-david* in their titles which are assigned by Briggs himself, again on the basis of internal evidence, to the Greek period. How is this contradiction avoided? By supposing that the Davidic titles in the Greek psalms are not genuine old titles. Attention is also called in this connection to the tendency present in later times, as is evidenced by the versions, to ascribe psalms to David. Now if evidence independent of the internal criteria of the psalms themselves had been advanced for the completion of the Davidic psalter in the Persian period, it would perhaps be legitimate to exclude psalms of the Greek period from the original Davidic psalter of the Persian period. But if the dates of the minor psalters are regularly determined by the dates of the latest psalms in them, it seems distinctly fallacious, to put it very mildly, to assign the Davidic psalter to the Persian period in spite of the fact that some psalms with Davidic titles admittedly date from the Greek period.

The entire theory of the evolution of the Psalter as elaborated

³⁸ It is not treated even in the section on Canonicity, where the omission of any reference to external evidence is even more striking. The whole section on Canonicity is, it may be remarked, rather elementary, and is mainly taken up with a defence of the imprecatory psalms. The discussion seems to move upon the old assumption that the canonicity of a Biblical book can be vindicated by means of its religious, doctrinal, and ethical contents.

in the introduction thus turns out to be built exclusively upon the criticism of the individual psalms which compose the several subsidiary collections. But, unfortunately, the discussion of the dates of the psalms is rigorously excluded from the introduction. Only the tabular results of the conclusions reached in the body of the commentary are presented. It is a pity that the reader could not have been apprised at the outset of some of the general landmarks by which the attempt is made to date the psalms in the ensuing detailed discussions. If only a few words could have been said, for example, on the relation of the Psalter to the Law or to Second Isaiah or to Job, to the development of Individualism or ethical monotheism, if it could have been shown toward which of the two poles, to the JE narratives of Genesis or to Chronicles, the Psalter inclines, the student could have formed some idea of what to expect in the following pages. As it is, he must plunge unprepared into the swollen stream of detailed criticism that flows through the nine hundred and sixty-seven pages of the commentary proper. It must be said that the very important section on the Higher Criticism of the Psalter is thoroughly unsatisfactory. The method of presentation adopted results in a complete disorganization of the proofs of the evolution of the Psalter in the interest of a formally clear presentation of the assumed chronological stages of evolution. But when the chronological theory thus propounded is examined, it is found to be based on a mechanical principle, which the author himself does not always adhere to, and for proof of which the reader is referred to the body of the commentary. The process is nothing short of bewildering to one who is not already acquainted with the criticism of the Psalter, while to one who is acquainted with this the result carries no conviction.

With regard to Briggs's actual theory of the dates of the psalms, only the results of his investigation and one or two tests of his method can be here given.

Briggs assigns seven psalms to the early monarchy before Jehoshaphat, seven to the middle monarchy, thirteen to the late monarchy (altogether twenty-seven pre-exilic psalms, a goodly proportion as modern critics go), thirteen to the exile, thirty-three to the early Persian period, sixteen to the times of Nehe-

miah, eleven to the late Persian period, fourteen to the early Greek period, forty-one to the later Greek period, and eight to the period of the Maccabees. These results seem precise. But for that very reason they awaken suspicion; can the psalms be so accurately distributed over all these centuries of development? This suspicion is strengthened when one observes that the *miktam* psalms (Pss. 16, 56-60) are distributed over several centuries. If any group of psalms bear on their face the marks of homogeneity, it is these. Duhm assigns Psalms 56-59 tentatively to one author, certainly to the same period.

The attitude which a commentator assumes toward the question of Maccabean and pre-exilic psalms is one of the surest touchstones of his critical ability. On the one hand, the fact that only eight Maccabean psalms (Pss. 33, 102b, 109b, 118, 139c, 147, 149, 129) are accepted represents a wholesome and timely reaction against Duhm and his followers, who would bring the larger part of the Psalter down to the Maccabean period, and much of it to the latter part of the period. On the other hand, the assignment of twenty-seven psalms to the pre-exilic period, and seven of these (Pss. 7, 13, 18, 23, 24b, 60a, and 110) to the very early monarchy, is most precarious. A few illustrations of the method of dating these earlier psalms will show what weight is to be attached to some, at least, of Briggs's conclusions. On Psalm 7, which the conservative Baethgen assigns to the Persian period and Duhm to a very late period, Briggs observes that there is nothing to prevent its being as early as David. In this particular case his judgment seems to be somewhat influenced by the title, though in general he rejects the titles as authoritative. Regarding Psalm 13, which Baethgen and Duhm make no attempt to date exactly but which is closely related to the other psalms of persecution or martyrdom in Book I, it is stated that there is no internal evidence against a date as early as David, and the claim is actually made that "the author of 2 Sam. 1 19-27 might have written it." The attempt to fix the date of Psalm 23 must be regarded as a peculiarly striking instance of ineffective argument. "The language and syntax of the Ps.," says Dr. Briggs, "and all its ideals are early. There is not the slightest trace of anything that is post-deuteronomic. The his-

torical circumstances of the poet must have been peaceful and prosperous." On the basis of this characterization of the psalm, the possibility of its composition in the prosperous Greek or late Persian periods is denied. The exile and early restoration are ruled out because they are times of sorrow and because the singer is able to resort to the temple.³⁹ The reference to the temple also rules out David, and properly so. The troubled times of the Assyrian and Babylonian periods are dismissed for the same reason as the exile. Hence the psalm is assigned to "an earlier and simpler period, the days of the early monarchy, not earlier than Solomon, or later than Jehoshaphat." So far as the language of the psalm is concerned, this does not prevent Baethgen from assigning it to the post-exilic period or Duhm from regarding it as Maccabean. Apart from the argument from language, is it really to be supposed that no pious Israelite or Jew could have spoken with the quiet confidence of this psalm except in the period between Solomon and Jehoshaphat? As to its ideals, Briggs expressly admits that "the three figures, shepherd, guide, host, are all simple, natural, and characteristic of the life in Jerusalem and its vicinity at any period in Biblical history." As a matter of fact the figure of the shepherd is especially prominent in Second Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, and might suggest that the psalm was subsequent to these writers. That a psalm of only six verses should be dated before Deuteronomy because it lacks any post-deuteronomic characteristics, is surely a most fragile argument from silence. In fact Psalm 23 cannot be dated by itself alone. The only safe method of procedure is to attempt to fix the approximate date of the group of psalms with which it is most naturally associated.⁴⁰ These illustrations do not awaken much confidence in the principles of historical criticism underlying them, and doubt becomes despair when we find Psalm 110 tentatively brought into connection with the victory of Jehoshaphat recounted in 2 Chron. 20. Moreover, many of Briggs's results are only obtained by the assumption of more or

³⁹ The reading of the LXX at vs. 6b is adopted, cf. R. V.

⁴⁰ Psalm 23 is very closely related to Psalm 27, so closely in fact that it is not impossible that they had a common author (cf. Duhm). But Briggs ascribes Psalm 27 to the middle monarchy.

less extensive glosses or accretions.⁴¹ Psalms which in their present form are shown either by language or by religious and other ideas to be late, may be dated earlier if these modernisms can be eliminated as glosses. The assumption of the possibility of glosses is theoretically entirely legitimate. Hymns are notoriously tinkered with, and it can be demonstrated in the case of the duplicate psalms that the hymns of the Psalter are no exception. The question is whether the glosses and accretions can be successfully detected. It is at this point that we touch Briggs's metrical analyses of the psalms. It is poetical considerations, metre and strophical arrangement, that are most often used as clues to the detection of glosses. It will therefore be necessary to turn our attention for a few moments to the next great problem which confronts us in the Psalter, the problem of Hebrew poetry.

Hebrew metrics forms one of the most technical and most vexed questions in Old Testament study. Briggs has been for a generation a valiant champion of the existence of Hebrew metre, and has contributed perhaps more than any other American scholar to the advancement of this particular subject. It has been more and more recognized that in Hebrew poetry we have on a *priori* grounds every right to expect some sort of a metrical system. The difficulty has been to determine what are the exact principles of that system. Briggs long ago adopted the principles of the German scholar, Julius Ley, in which the accents or tone-syllables are laid at the foundation of Hebrew metre, and he has lived to see these principles, which were at first regarded with great skepticism, adopted by a steadily increasing number of scholars. Yet there is a weakness in the so-called accentual system of Ley and Briggs. If accents or tones alone are counted, we do not get any real metre. This defect was pointed out by Sievers, who insisted that the falls and pauses, as well as the accents or rises, must be counted in. Ley himself, in articles published since his death in 1901, seems finally to have

⁴¹ So, in the case of Psalm 110 just cited, and most notably in the case of Psalm 18. The two other parts of psalms assigned to the early monarchy, Ps. 24 7 ff. and 60 6 ff. have perhaps a more defensible claim to antiquity than those which have been noticed.

recognized this defect, but Briggs seems to be still skeptical of the value of Sievers's supplement to Ley's system (p. xli).

Our author does not go into the technicalities of this subject beyond giving a few general rules for counting the tones.⁴² He holds that there are four measures in the Psalms: trimeters or three-toned lines (these being the most frequent), tetrameters, pentameters (a measure particularly investigated by Budde, and with great success), and hexameters. The existence of two-toned lines is denied (against Duhm). All the psalms are stretched or contracted to fit these measures.

Briggs also holds to a strophical arrangement of most of the psalms. The strophes are primarily determined "by a more decided separation in the thought of the poem," and by noting the relationships of the several poetical parallelisms. In other words, while the metre of the different lines is closely connected with textual criticism, the determination of the strophe is intimately allied with exegesis.

The present reviewer cannot claim to be an expert in the department of Hebrew metres; his judgments are those of a layman. But his impressions are that a very large amount of truth must be admitted in Briggs's metrical system. Many of the psalms lend themselves with but little emendation to a consistent metrical scheme. In many the emendations which are supported, independently of the metre, by purely text-critical or exegetical considerations enable the student to recover the strophical analysis, and therewith restore the original beauty and meaning of the psalm. In such cases the result justifies the process. In seeing the psalm assume shape and color the student finds the same pleasure which a critic of paintings might take in watching the gradual restoration of an old masterpiece of which the lines and colors had become confused and dulled by the grime of ages. The exegetical and aesthetic value of such successful restorations can scarcely be overestimated. But there are a large number of instances in which it does not seem as if the accentual system

⁴² For instance, monosyllabic words are not usually to be accented. Words of four or more syllables have a secondary accent, which is counted in the measure. The insertion of the conjunction *we* before a monosyllable will justify giving to the latter the force of a tone.

or any other had as yet solved the metrical problem, and in which the strophical arrangement is correspondingly obscure. The hammering and sawing of the lines which at times Briggs finds necessary in order to bring his metres into accord, makes such a tremendous din that the music of the reconstructed psalm is fairly drowned out.⁴³

What Smend says in reference to the interpretation of the psalms generally has a particular application to their metrical reconstruction and strophical analysis: "Every expert knows that many a psalm is like a fortress which defies a regular siege and can only be conquered by a lucky chance." In the present uncertainty in the field of Hebrew metre successful restorations or emendations depend more on deftness of exegesis, soundness of judgment in textual criticism, and poetic divination than on the system of metre adopted. In the two illustrations which I shall give of Briggs's poetical analyses, the criticisms will be made from the exegetical point of view. In the one case his siege-works seem to me to have utterly failed to reduce the fortress. In the other he has captured it with brilliant success.

Psalm 18 has always been a touchstone of the commentator's principles of historical criticism and of his exegetical tact. Upon it all those fall back who wish to defend the Davidic authorship of any of the psalms. At the present time no scholar who has been at all influenced by historical criticism will undertake to defend the psalm as it stands. Those who defend its Davidic authorship can only do so at the expense of its integrity. This is the course adopted by Briggs. The psalm is Davidic, but only after all that in his judgment is non-davidic has been eliminated. The question is whether these eliminations can be exegetically and text-critically justified. By the battering-rams of metre and strophe Briggs proposes to break through the outer bastions and get back to the old Davidic wall.

The metre of the psalm is the trimeter, and forms one of the most obvious examples of this measure to be found anywhere. It is in general so clear and consistent that departures from it

⁴³ As an example, note the carpentry-work that must be done on the *miktam* psalms. Psalm 59 has practically to be rewritten in order to bring it into a metrical scheme. Whether the result is poetry is another question.

at once arouse suspicion. In the majority of the emendations necessary to preserve the metre, considerations of textual criticism and exegesis enable us to cut out intruding elements with considerable assurance.⁴ But these metrical emendations have little direct bearing upon Briggs's reconstruction of the psalm, except as they affect the structure of the strophes. It is the strophical analysis which is made the basis of Briggs's critical process.

We have seen that the strophical analysis depends primarily upon the understanding of the course of thought in the poem. In Psalm 18 there are two very clearly marked divisions: Part I, vss. 1-26, and Part II, vss. 32-50. Part I describes the deliverance of the singer from some great danger; the description is highly figurative and the precise nature of the danger is not revealed. Part II treats of the equipment for war of the singer by his God and his complete triumph over his enemies; the theme of Part II recalls Homer. Between these two sharply distinguished parts stands the obscure passage vss. 27-31.

If we examine Part I more attentively, it is found to break up into three clearly marked sections: (1) vss. 1-3, gratitude to God for deliverance; (2) vss. 4-19, the description of the singer's danger (very rhetorical and ornate); (3) vss. 20-26, the religious and ethical significance of the deliverance. This last section is an amplification of the closing thought of the second section (vs. 19b). In Part II the equipment of the warrior, his pursuit of the enemy, his triumph, and thanksgiving for victory follow in natural order; the whole, however, is woven more closely together, so that the transitions of thought are not quite so distinct as in Part I.

Is it possible to take one further step and discover a strophical analysis which will coincide with the logical analysis just made? If the student will turn to the second section of Part I (vss. 4-19), and read vss. 4, 5; vs. 6; vss. 9, 10; vss. 11, 12; vss. 13, 14 (omitting 13c, with LXX, as an accidental repetition of vs. 12b); vs. 15; vss. 16, 17; and vss. 18, 19, he will find that the subordinate divisions of the section naturally make little stanzas of four

⁴ In the case of Psalm 18 we are happily in possession of four different recensions, Psalm 18, 2 Sam. 22, and the translation of both in the LXX.

lines each (quatrains). Only at vss. 7, 8, is this regular scheme interrupted. In these verses we have six lines; and it is not at all impossible that originally there was a quatrain here also.⁴⁵ Again, if the third section (vss. 20-26) be examined, and the reader count backward from the very perfect final quatrain (vss. 25, 26), it will be seen that vss. 23, 24, and 21, 22, will also give two excellent quatrains (the symmetry is still more evident in the Hebrew). This, to be sure, leaves vs. 20 hanging in the air; but vs. 20 is almost an exact duplicate of vs. 24, and may safely be rejected altogether. With the elimination of this verse the division into quatrains in vss. 4-26 becomes the most obvious division; and when it is once observed, it is also exegetically illuminating. The thoughts of the psalm are now seen to be chiselled out with great care, and their outlines are sharp and distinct. In the introductory section (vss. 1-3) we do not find the quatrain which we certainly should expect there; but a comparison with 2 Sam. 22 2-4 again shows that the text of the section is greatly corrupted, and the conjecture is entirely proper that it originally harmonized strophically with what follows.⁴⁶ In passing, the completeness of Part I, taken by itself, should be noticed. It is a rounded whole, composed with much artistic skill.

Now let us turn to Part II (vss. 32-50). If for the moment we omit vs. 32 from our reckoning and examine vss. 33-42, a beautiful quatrain division can be recognized: vss. 33-34, God's training of the feet and hands (participial construction in the Hebrew); vss. 35, 36, God's further equipment of the hero (second person; vs. 35 is admittedly corrupted and one line must be omitted, cf. 2 Sam. 22 36); vss. 37, 38, the warrior's pursuit (first person); vss. 39, 40, God's assistance in the pursuit (second person again; vs. 40b probably to be emended to second person with LXX [codices A and B] and Jerome); vss. 41, 42. With

⁴⁵ In the Hebrew there is metrical difficulty also at vss. 11, 12. But the text at this point is notoriously corrupt, as its inherent difficulties and a comparison with 2 Sam. 22 12, 13, testify.

⁴⁶ Whether the exact wording of the introduction can be recovered is another question. Emendations thus far proposed are not very convincing. Duhm's suggestion that there were originally eight lines (two quatrains) here would seem to be in the right direction.

the extra line omitted at vs. 35, for which there is warrant on other grounds, nothing could be more smooth, regular, and obvious than the division into quatrains in vss. 33-42. Yet this arrangement leaves vs. 32 hanging in the air just as the obvious arrangement of vss. 21-26 left vs. 20. But, curiously enough, just as vs. 20 was seen to be a duplicate of vs. 24, so vs. 32a is a duplicate of vs. 39a. Further, the thought and phraseology of vs. 32b are in well-marked antithesis to vs. 30a, that is, to a verse which we shall find to be a very suspicious element in a very suspicious passage. There is therefore good critical warrant for suspecting that vs. 32, at least in its present form, is not to be taken with what follows, although its thought is in keeping with the succeeding verses.

The strophical arrangement of vss. 43-50 presents considerable difficulties, which cannot be overcome without resort to the knife. The verses fall into two clearly marked sections: vss. 43-45 and vss. 46-50. If quatrains are found, they must agree with this division into sections, and the sections themselves be kept strophically distinct. In the case of vss. 43-45, verses 44 and 45 give a good quatrain; while vs. 43 contains only three lines. Is there any way to recover the missing line? To answer, we must turn to the other section.

In vss. 46-50, verses 46 and 47 will give a quatrain. Verse 49 is exegetically suspicious, for its spirit is wholly inconsistent with the context. In the context the speaker is distinctly hostile to the nations. Verse 49 is animated by benevolence toward the nations. Further, verses 48 and 50 are closely connected in the Hebrew by their grammatical construction. Those two facts suggest that vs. 49 is an interpolation. But even if verse 49 is eliminated, six lines still remain, whereas only four are desired. Accordingly, the suggestion has been made that the extra line at vs. 48 (either 48b or 48c) should be transposed to a place after vs. 43a, where it would fit admirably. The only other line that can be lopped off is vs. 50c; and there is justification for rejecting it, for this clause may well be an interpretative gloss by some editor who thought that David was the author of the psalm. Critically, this clause is on a level with the title.

The arrangement here suggested for vss. 43-50 is of course con-

jectural. Yet each step of the process has its own good reason, and the result is attractive, even if not entirely convincing. Part II of the psalm thus falls into a consistent series of quatrains, which, as in Part I, correspond admirably to the thought. But we cannot call Part II a consistent *whole* like Part I. It cannot originally have begun with vs. 33. The introduction must therefore be found in vss. 27-32, or else we must suppose it to be lost.

This leads us to the consideration of vss. 27-31 (32). These verses are exegetically unintelligible, and strophically impossible. Verse 31 is a formulation of the doctrine of monotheism in no organic connection with the context, which, whether we look at Part I or Part II, treats of God's relation to the singer, not of what God is in himself. Verse 30 might be regarded as a generalization based on the singer's experience, though why "the *word* of Jahveh" should be emphasized in Psalm 18 does not appear, and it is suspicious that clauses b and c are also found in Prov. 30 5. Moreover, difficulty has always been found with the text and the relation of vss. 27 and 28 (cf. 2 Sam. 22 28, 29). Verse 27 tells what God does for an afflicted people; vs. 28 what he does for the speaker. In what relation do these two thoughts stand? Again, vss. 27, 28, taken together, seem to be an application of the ethical principles embodied in vss. 21-26; but such an application is entirely unexpected and unnecessary, since vss. 20-26, as we have seen, fully explain what goes before. Verses 27, 28, thus form a sort of limping appendix. Of all these verses only vs. 29 seems in its picturesque concreteness to have any connection with Part II. Strophically also, this passage is hopeless. Verses 27, 28, might form a quatrain, if we could suppose that the speaker identified himself with the afflicted people; but vs. 29 is an isolated couplet, vs. 30 a three-line stanza, and vs. 31 a tetrameter couplet.

What, then, is the significance of this passage? Observe that vs. 27 unexpectedly refers to "the afflicted people"; vs. 30 is also a generalization (note the plural, "all them that take refuge"); and at vs. 31 we actually meet with the first person plural. Light at once dawns upon the passage if it is interpreted as a bit of liturgical padding inserted between the two main parts

of the psalm. But when this is once recognized, a further consequence is seen to follow. Since the introduction to Part II cannot be found in vss. 27-31 (32), it must be lost, and vs. 29 is probably a fragment of it. Further, when we ask ourselves what is the relation between the two main parts of the psalm, we fail to find any. The last part is usually taken as the interpretation of the first part, but in that case all real progress and movement must be denied to the psalm. We have seen that Part I is a self-consistent and artistically perfect whole, and so is Part II, with the exception of the missing introduction. The subject, spirit, and style of the two parts are entirely different. We have, therefore, two originally distinct psalms, and the liturgical passage vss. 27-31 was inserted when they were united.⁴⁷

Let us now examine the analysis proposed by Briggs.

He also recognizes two parts, but they do not coincide with the two outlined above. His first part is found in vss. 1-19, his second in vss. 27-50. The intervening verses, 20-27, are eliminated, being themselves broken up into two little sections, (a) vss. 20-23 (eight lines), a legal gloss from the Persian period; (b) vss. 25-27 (eight lines), an ethical gloss from the Greek period. The elimination of these verses would appear to have no exegetical or strophical justification. Exegetically, they attach themselves immediately to vs. 19b, and amplify that clause in a way to round out the whole poem. Strophically, Briggs's view requires that vs. 24 go with what follows it, and vs. 27 with what precedes it. Since vss. 25, 26, form a perfect quatrain, we then have to suppose that it was preceded and followed by a couplet,—a supposition which we have seen to be not only unnecessary but improbable.⁴⁸

The motive for the elimination of these verses is clear. They are, as Briggs says, inconsistent with the Davidic authorship of the psalm, hence they must go out. But another conclusion

⁴⁷ There have been many attempts to explain the critical difficulties of this psalm. I have used the scaffolding which others have reared, but I hope to have pointed out the real architectural outlines of Ps. 18 somewhat more clearly than has previously been done.

⁴⁸ Why Dr. Briggs should characterize one gloss as legal and Persian, and the other as ethical and Greek, when both begin with exactly the same sentence (vs. 20=vs. 24), is hard to understand.

would seem to be the more natural one. Verses 20-27 are intimately connected with what precedes; and therefore at least the first part of the psalm cannot be by David. The only way this argument can be met is by showing that vss. 1-19 are so clearly Davidic that the rejection of vss. 20-26 becomes a necessity. Briggs accordingly argues for the primitive character of vss. 1-19, and compares the theophany in these verses to Judges 5. The comparison suggests to me just the opposite view. Verses 1-19 are good poetry, but only in the sense of being good conventionalized poetry; they are too formally correct to be primitive; Part I is in no sense creative. This, however, is a judgment of taste, and as such may or may not have argumentative value.

Briggs further breaks up each of his two parts into three fourteen-line (!) strophes. Without following this analysis into all its details, some of its more conspicuous infelicities may be pointed out. His first strophe of Part I combines vss. 4-6 with vss. 1-3. This is bad, for the description of the distress is then blended with the initial thanksgivings, whereas in reality there is a sharp break between vss. 1-3 and vss. 4 ff. Again, his first strophe of Part II combines vss. 28-32 with vss. 33, 34. This is worse, for the liturgical generalizations of vss. 28-31 should not be combined with the highly concrete and intimate descriptions which begin at vs. 33. But even in the form which Briggs gives to it this first strophe cannot be hewed out without resort to the most improbable suppositions. For example, vs. 30b is rejected while 30c is accepted. Yet both clauses are found together in Prov. 30 5; and why should they be torn apart here? So vs. 31 is admittedly a tetrameter, and admittedly monotheistic and as such out of relation with the context and inconsistent with Davidic authorship. If there was ever a good case for a gloss, one would think it would be found here. But Briggs emends the line into a trimeter, and turns its monotheism into henotheism in the couplet:

For who is a God (like) Yahweh?
And who is a Rock (like) our God?

It is difficult to follow such a procedure. Is it really responsible criticism? Furthermore, out of vss. 43-50 Briggs makes one of

his long stanzas. This is accomplished by the elimination, not only of vs. 49, for which there is good reason, but also of vss. 44b and 45. On the other hand, vs. 50c is retained, and thus the necessity of the transposition suggested above is avoided. The greater simplicity of this theory is an advantage, but the propriety of eliminating vss. 44b, 45, rather than vs. 50c, may be doubted, and we have already seen that the division into fourteen-line stanzas has broken down completely at two crucial points. Elsewhere it is so awkward as compared with the division into quatrains that no adequate justification for attempting to find a fourteen-line stanza in vss. 43-50 can be drawn from the fact that the rest of the psalm is so divided. To the present reviewer Briggs's poetical analysis of Psalm 18 appears to have no exegetical basis in the text, but on the contrary is opposed to all the exegetical probabilities of the case. The attempt to save the Davidic authorship by the supposition of glosses and accretions is in the present instance a failure.⁴⁹

It is a pleasure to turn from Briggs's analysis of Psalm 18 to his restoration of Psalm 73. Psalm 73 is one of the greatest of the whole collection; it is the hymn of an original religious genius. In his work upon this psalm we see Briggs's poetical analysis at its best, and we cannot be too grateful to him for the thorough and convincing way in which he has restored to us this masterpiece in all its rugged grandeur.

Psalm 73, like Psalm 18, falls into two parts: Part I, vss. 1-12, the recognition by the poet of the prosperity of the wicked; Part II, vss. 13-28, the effect of this recognition upon the poet's faith. Can these two parts again be broken up into exegetically justified strophical divisions? In the present instance this question is complicated with that of the identification of the speaker. From vs. 1 it might be argued that the "I" of the speaker is collective, and refers to the personified congregation of the godly. On the

⁴⁹ The only portion of the psalm which might lay claim to Davidic authorship is Part II. Here there are a number of details which would seem to fit David, or an idealized David, better than any other character in Israel's history, but here language and literary connections (compare vss. 44, 45, with Micah 7 17, especially in the peculiarities of the Hebrew) make the Davidic authorship very dubious, even if the authenticity of this psalm were treated solely by itself and apart from considerations of the growth of the Psalter as a whole.

other hand, an examination of the rest of the psalm would suggest that if there is an individual speaker anywhere in the Psalter, it is here. The feeling in the psalm is poignant and personal to the last degree. Briggs rightly feels this, and accordingly holds that vs. 1 is a liturgical gloss. The strophical analysis will therefore begin with vs. 2. A division into quatrains can be readily followed through the rest of Part I (vss. 2, 3; vss. 4, 5; vss. 6, 7; vss. 8, 9) until we reach vss. 10-12. Here there are two lines too many. Verse 10 is eliminated by Briggs, and on good grounds. The verse is very obscure (it would seem to be promissory); and it interrupts the connection, since vs. 11 naturally tells what the wicked men of vs. 9 say. With vss. 1 and 10 thus eliminated on entirely intelligible grounds,⁵⁰ Part I is seen to fall into five quatrains.

In Part II there is an exegetical difficulty. The "for" at vs. 21 does not attach itself readily to what immediately precedes, and would seem rather to refer to vss. 15, 16. Thus the syntax suggests that vss. 17-20 may be an interpolation. The verses contain a description of the final lot of the wicked in terms of the theology of Job's friends. If they are retained, the poet, though cast down by the thought of the present prosperity of the wicked, yet takes comfort in the belief that they will ultimately be punished. After this he is ready to cast himself upon God, vss. 23 ff. But how much the psalm gains in power when vss. 17-20 are omitted! The psalmist realizes the great theological difficulties which the prosperity of the wicked presents, and has no solution for them. All he can do is to make the great venture of faith, and unreservedly trust in God. How the wonderful glow of the living faith, created by the friction of doubt, which finds expression in vss. 23 ff., is chilled into a formal dogma by vss. 17-20! But if these verses are removed, it is probable that vss. 27, 28, are also to be pruned away. In them the same doctrine emerges as in vss. 17-20. Also, the psalm reaches its radiant climax in vss. 21-26: vss. 27, 28, are only embers. It is prob-

⁵⁰ Briggs's assumed glosses are not always so convincing. When he says, for example, of Ps. 59 14, "A prosaic editor made the couplet into a prose sentence," one can but ask what the editor's object was in doing this. This sort of explanation that does not explain is found again and again.

able that here again we have liturgical accretions, and the LXX adds still another line, "In the gates of the Daughter of Zion," which indicates that the present end of the psalm, like the beginning (vs. 1), was adapted to congregational use. If vss. 17-20 and 27, 28, be rejected, Part II will also be found to have exactly five quatrains (vss. 13, 14; vss. 15, 16; vss. 21, 22; vss. 23, 24; vss. 25, 26). In this reconstruction the psalm stands out in all its original perfection of form and nobility of thought.

I have thought it more instructive to show the reader in detail in the case of the two important psalms just discussed how Briggs applies his metrical and strophical theories to the restoration of the psalms rather than to make bare reference to a larger number of examples. What is true of his exposition of these psalms is true for the others. In some cases he takes the fortress, in some he fails. The interesting thing to observe is that even an approximately correct theory of Hebrew metre does not guarantee convincing results in criticism. These depend after all very largely upon skilful exegesis and textual criticism. Without these a metrical theory is a dangerous tool, as apt to do damage as to be serviceable. With them a metrical theory can often be used with excellent effect when other tools fail.

It will be interesting, therefore, to look at Briggs's treatment of questions which are fundamentally exegetical rather than historical or critical. For this purpose I have selected his discussion of certain typical "I-psalms," because, while criticism often enters into this discussion, yet in the main the definition of the "I" is a distinctively exegetical question; and it is here that the exegetical skill of a commentator can most readily be discerned.

It will be well at the outset to give a brief sketch of the history of this problem, and to indicate its signal importance. The tendency to explain the "I" collectively of the Jewish people is already to be seen in the Septuagint, for instance in the title of Psalm 56. The Targum interprets in this way Psalms 23, 38, 56, and 88. In the Talmud the problem was clearly formulated: "R. Eliezer says: David spoke all the psalms in his own interest; R. Joshua thinks: In the interest of the congregation. The Wise on the other hand explain: He spoke some in his own interest,

some in the interest of the congregation.”⁵¹ The church fathers, notably Theodore of Mopsuestia, at times adopted the collective theory, and the great Jewish commentators of the Middle Ages maintained it, although in varying degrees. On the other hand, Calvin, an exegete greater than them all, interpreted the “I” individualistically, no doubt because of his hostility to everything that savored of the allegorical method of exegesis. But it was reserved for the nineteenth century to discuss the problem of the exact identification of the speaker in the Psalms at length and in all its bearings. Only then did the fundamental significance of the problem for the interpretation of the Psalter fully reveal itself. Passing over Olshausen’s commentary on the Psalms (1853), in which the Psalter was regarded as the song-book of the Second Temple, and the Psalms treated as hymns primarily designed for public worship, the “I” being therefore collective, attention must be called to the epoch-making essay of Smend, “Über das Ich in den Psalmen” in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1888). Since the appearance of this paper, and largely because of it, an extensive literature on the subject has developed. The monographs of Beer (1894) and Coblenz (1897), already mentioned, and the discussion of the subject in Cheyne’s *Historical Origin and Religious Ideas of the Psalter* (1891), are among the main contributions; but since Smend’s essay every Old Testament scholar has had to define his own attitude toward the problem. How far-reaching this exegetical question may become may be briefly illustrated.

(1) Smend argues on *a priori* grounds that the “I” of the Psalter must be collective, because the Psalter is a temple hymn-book. But was it so? At least, was it *only* a temple hymn-book? Briggs holds that it was used in the synagogue also; Duhm believes that it was designed for private as well as public devotion. The so-called “anti-sacrificial psalms” certainly do not favor the idea of exclusive use in the temple service. The identification of the “I” is thus closely related to the question of the

⁵¹ Cited from Coblenz, *Über das betende Ich in den Psalmen*, p. 2. [Coblenz has not quoted the whole passage; it continues: “Those which are expressed in the singular number refer to himself, those in the plural to the community” (Pesahim 117 a).—Ed.]

purpose of the Psalter, and so we are led into a new series of problems.

(2) In by far the largest number of the "I-psalms" the speaker is surrounded by enemies. Who are these enemies? Are they private enemies of a private individual, or public enemies of a public individual, or the public enemies, whether foreign or domestic, of the community? Have we, that is, in these psalms reflections of private quarrels, or of wars, or of party contests? It will readily be seen what importance the answer to these questions may have for the dating of these psalms.

(3) If the speaker should prove to be a collective person, the religion of the speaker is the religion of the community. Then, since the religion of the Psalter is in general of the same type throughout, the natural inference is that the psalms originated in the same general period, and a community-religion of that type can only be understood in the conditions of the post-exilic period. The identification of the "I" is thus brought, as Smend expressly urges, into direct connection with the dating of the psalms.

(4) The ethics of the Psalms assumes a very different complexion according as the "I" is interpreted individualistically or collectively. The difficulties of the imprecatory psalms, for example, are relieved, even if not altogether removed, if it is held that the curses are not expressions of individual hatred against other individuals but rather of community feeling against other parties or nations. Community hatred may be very bitter, and yet be coupled at times with generous consideration for individuals of the opposite party; and thus the fierceness of these psalms may not always represent personal hatred.

(5) The same question enters in a crucial way into some of our judgments upon the religious significance of the Psalter. For example, under the individualistic interpretation Ps. 16 10, 11, probably refers to personal immortality. On the collective interpretation it refers only to the preservation of the community. Again, under the individualistic interpretation, the sense of sin in Psalm 51 would be a sense of personal sin, and would approximate to the Pauline conception. On the collective theory it would be the confession of the sin of the community.

(6) Finally, the interpretation of the "I" is of great importance for the proper interpretation of the Messianic passages in the Psalter. On the usual patristic theory it is Christ himself who speaks in the Psalms. Thus Psalm 22 becomes a direct description by Christ himself of his own passion. On the collective theory such an interpretation of Psalm 22 is impossible. On the other hand, passages which would have no messianic significance under the individualistic interpretation may acquire such significance under the collective view. The confidence expressed in Psalm 6, if the speaker is Israel, is a confidence in the messianic future. On the individualistic interpretation there is no messianic reference whatever in this psalm.

It will be seen that the problem of the identification of the "I" is really the fundamental exegetical problem in the great majority of the Psalms. Does this problem stand out clearly in our present commentary? Far from it. In the introduction no allusion is made to it. Even in the section on Interpretation it is not mentioned, though this would have been a fitting place for some information upon the subject. The student stumbles upon the problem for the first time at Psalm 5, in which the "I" is interpreted collectively by Briggs. The omission of any preliminary discussion of so important a topic puts the student at a serious disadvantage. Not even when Briggs comes to the detailed exposition of the "I-psalms" in the commentary does he make good the omission by enlarging upon the subject. At Psalm 5, where the question of the identification of the "I" is first raised, the collective theory which is adopted is not proved, but is simply assumed. Inasmuch as there are no very clear individualizing traits in the psalm apart from the use of the first person, this might be allowed to pass, but when we come to Psalm 6 and its kindred "invalid psalms" (Psalms 38, 41, 22, 30, 69, 88, and 102) we are confronted with an exegetical problem of the most delicate description. In the interpretation of these psalms failure to set forth the reasons for the theory adopted is fatal.

Take for example Psalm 6. In vss. 1-7a the speaker describes himself as a sick man, in vs. 7 specifically referring to his bed, and prays that God may deliver him from his sickness. On the

other hand, in vss. 7b-10 all reference to sickness is dropped, and enemies take the place of sickness. Further, in these last verses there is no prayer for deliverance, but an assurance that God has already heard the psalmist's prayer and will deliver him from his enemies; the past tenses in vss. 8, 9, are "perfects of assurance." At first sight it seems as if the two parts could have nothing to do with each other and as if the psalm were composite. If unity is to be brought into the psalm, the most natural method is to hold that the sickness described in the first part is a figure for the persecution implied in the second part. Then the prayer for deliverance from sickness in vss. 1-7a becomes the prayer which is answered in vss. 7b-10, where the figure is dropped, and unity of subject is introduced into the psalm. But if the "I" is an individual, the poet has in the first part needlessly hidden his meaning. The reference certainly seems to be to actual sickness, and the sudden change in the last part to enemies is unmediated and confusing, and therefore bad from a literary point of view. If, on the other hand, the "I" is collective, it would be understood at once that sickness is only a figure, and hence the transition from the figure in vss. 1-7a to the thing figured in vss. 7b-10 would be natural and easy.

But there is another exegetical difficulty in this psalm. How can the sudden change from almost despairing entreaty in vss. 1-7a to confidence in vss. 7b-10 be accounted for? Why is the speaker so sure that God will stand by him as against his enemies? Why is he so certain that he is in the right? On the individualistic theory this is hard to explain. It is usually supposed that in the very expression of his despair the speaker induces a reaction and finds relief. Hope takes the place of agony. Of course this is psychologically possible, but it would seem far simpler to hold to the collective interpretation of the "I." In that case the community can be easily thought of as persuaded that the cause of the religion of Jahveh was so bound up in its own redemption that God must deliver it from its enemies. Thus, under the collective interpretation of the "I," the hope in vss. 8-10 becomes messianic.

The collective interpretation of Psalm 6 is strongly confirmed when we turn to Psalm 38. Here we meet with the same curious

difference between the first and last parts of the psalm. In vss. 1-11 the speaker describes himself as sick, but in vss. 12-22 (except vs. 17b) only persecution by enemies is referred to. In Psalm 38 there is not the change from despair to assurance which is found in Psalm 6, but there are several new and important factors which bear upon the interpretation of the "I." The description of the sickness is given in such varied terms that it can hardly refer to a real sickness, and the phraseology of verses 3, 5, and 7 seems to be consciously reminiscent of Isaiah 1 6, where the nation is described as sick. Most important of all, there is a remarkable, and at first sight unaccountable, paradox in the psalm. In the first half the singer acknowledges his guilt; it is because of his sin that all his troubles have come upon him. But in the second half (with the exception of vs. 18) he appears to be innocent and wrongfully persecuted by his enemies. It is hard to explain this paradox if the speaker is an individual, but simple if the "I" is collective. A community, especially if it be the community of the pious, can acknowledge its guilt, since it is a part of the nation, and can explain its sufferings accordingly. But as against the nations or the ungodly among the Jews themselves the congregation of the pious can maintain its innocence.

These, in outline, are the arguments which have been advanced to prove a collective "I" in these two very interesting, but at first sight perplexing, psalms. Does Briggs use any of these arguments or contribute anything new to the discussion? On Psalm 6 he merely remarks in the introductory note, "The Ps. was composed for the congregation, and there is no trace in it of the experience of an individual." In the exposition proper the collective theory is assumed, no exegetical argument being advanced for it.

No reference whatever is made to the peculiar relationship of the two parts of the psalm, and on the abrupt change from despair to assurance at vs. 8 we have the merely passing note that the congregation's "prayer receives its answer while they are making it." This would seem to imply the psychological explanation of the transition offered by the advocates of the individualistic interpretation,—an explanation which is unneces-

sary and even unnatural on the collective theory. The comment on the sympathetic relationship between the singer's trouble and his aching bones also agrees with Beer's individualistic interpretation of the psalm, but is hardly pertinent on the collective view. Again, vs. 5 must be interpreted figuratively if the "I" is collective, but no explanation of its figurative significance is forthcoming. To the statement that there is no trace of the experience of an individual in Psalm 6 an advocate of the opposite view might urge vs. 6; so Coblenz, though sympathetic toward the collective interpretation in many of the psalms, holds to the individualistic interpretation of Psalm 6 mainly on account of this one verse. Briggs ignores the difficulty which it presents to his theory.

On Psalm 38, again, there is not an argument advanced for the collective theory. On the contrary, our author robs himself of a very strong confirmatory argument furnished by this psalm, namely the paradox of the simultaneous confession of sin and the assertion of innocence by the speaker. On metrical grounds vss. 2-5 and vs. 18, in which the confession of sin is found, are rejected as accretions, and the paradox is thus removed; but at the same time the interesting argument from it for the collective theory is lost. On vs. 18b the suggestion is made that a later editor inserted this verse, "in order to adapt the psalm to public worship." But if the "I" is collective, the psalm must have been originally designed for public worship; the comment is really inconsistent with the view taken of the "I." On the collective theory some attempt should be made to identify the lovers and friends of vs. 11 and the enemies of vs. 12, but the comment on vs. 11 is simply the paraphrase "those upon whom I could ordinarily rely for sympathy and aid."²² Nothing is distinctly said on the identification of the enemies. One might infer from

²² A considerable portion of the exposition printed in large type is devoted to just such tautological paraphrases of the Biblical phraseology. For instance, in the present psalm, vs. 6, "*I am bent || bowed down*], by a weight of care, anxiety, and suffering, and this, *exceedingly*, to the utmost degree of intensity"; vs. 8, "*I am benumbed and crushed*]. Strength has so departed from him that he has become, as it were, paralysed and incapable of effort"; vs. 10, "*The light of mine eyes*], the light that illumines the eyes, enabling them to see what is to be done, giving confidence and courage."

the time at which the psalm is dated (in the restoration before Nehemiah) that foreign enemies were thought of, but this is not certain. As a matter of fact, in the comment on Psalm 6 the enemies are explained as "workers of trouble in Israel itself."

In Psalm 41 the various factors that entered into the identification of the "I" in Psalms 6 and 38 are again all present, but this time the concreteness of expression is so striking that the psalm would be almost unintelligible did we not have the two former psalms to guide us. Sickness and persecution are again found, but intermingled in a most confusing way. The enemies are represented as gathered around the bedside of the dying man, malignantly slandering him and devising evil against him (vs. 8). There is also the confession of guilt (vs. 4) and the assertion of innocence (vss. 11, 12) already found in Psalm 38, and the sudden transition from despair (vss. 1-9) to hope (vss. 10-12) found in Psalm 6, though in Psalm 41 an additional vengeful cry is sent up to the Lord for recovery in order that the speaker may requite his enemies. The individualizing traits of the psalm are especially pronounced. Smend says of it, "One can learn from this song how far the personification of the community can go." Duhm, on the other hand, who follows the individualistic interpretation throughout, draws a repulsive picture of the state of society reflected by this psalm,—with the sick man on his death-bed, surrounded by hypocritical friends who, like Job's comforters, argue from his sufferings to his wickedness and, dominated by their wretched dogmas, fairly gloat over his condition, while the dying man himself with his last breath cries to God for recovery so that he may avenge himself upon them. It is a lovely death-bed scene of one of the people of God!

Surely in the case of such a psalm there ought to be some discussion of the identification of the "I," with a defence of the collective theory, if that is adopted. But as usual there is simply the statement, "The Ps. is national . . . and there is no reference to an individual." This time Briggs seems to have felt that some explanation of vs. 9 on the collective theory is due. It is interpreted (in all probability correctly) of "nations in covenant, who have treacherously broken covenant and become bitter enemies," but unfortunately there is no reference to Obadiah 7

which supports the nationalistic interpretation, at least if the text of that passage can be trusted.⁵³ As in Psalm 38, the clause in which sin is confessed (vs. 4b) is rejected. It may be noted also that vs. 10b is dropped on metrical grounds.

An equal obliviousness to the need of any exegetical defence of the collective theory of the "I" is found in the exposition of Psalm 30, though here Sheol in verse 3, cf. verse 9, is interpreted of national exile, with reference to Ezekiel 37. This is the explanation which we looked for at the parallel passage Psalm 65. It was just as much needed there, but was not given.

On Psalm 88 there is a somewhat clearer exposition of the details of the psalm on the basis of the collective theory, and at vs. 15 there is the first exegetical argument for the collective "I" to be met with anywhere in the comment on the five psalms thus far reviewed. It is urged that the reference to "youth" in this verse cannot be satisfactorily explained if the "I" is an individual.⁵⁴

In the case of Psalms 22, 69, and 102 the identification of the speaker is complicated by the serious critical problem of the integrity of these psalms. Psalm 69 I shall pass by, since the analysis of this psalm, both logically and poetically, is too uncertain to allow of a clear formulation of our problem. Attention need only be called to the fact that it is analyzed by Briggs into two distinct psalms, in one of which the "I" seems to be an individual prophet, and in the other the ideal community. The grounds for the analysis are metrical, and of doubtful cogency. Duhm, for example, has a different metrical theory of the psalm. Briggs makes no attempt to explain why the "I" is interpreted differently in the two parts which he thinks he can distinguish in the psalm.

⁵³ The crucial objection to the collective interpretation of Psalm 41 is found in vss. 1-3, a didactic observation and strongly individualizing. Briggs notes that these verses are "in a strange sort of isolation"; he adopts a new translation in order to connect them with what follows, but the translation is more than doubtful. If the collective theory is adopted, it is probable that vss. 1-3 will have to be eliminated. It is difficult to connect them with the rest of the psalm, even on the individualistic interpretation.

⁵⁴ The only meaning it could possibly have on the individualistic interpretation would be that the speaker had been all his life a chronic invalid. Duhm seeks by emendation to avoid this objection to the individualistic interpretation.

In the case of Psalms 22 and 102 the bearing of the critical problem upon the identification of the "I" can be much more readily grasped by the reader. Psalm 22 1-21 contrasts strikingly with vss. 22-31, and even the Revised Version separates the two parts by a space. On the supposition of the unity of the psalm, the praise for the deliverance of the afflicted in vss. 22-31 can be naturally interpreted only as praise for the deliverance of the afflicted speaker in vss. 1-21. Now this deliverance not only has a national significance (vs. 23), but has a world-wide application (vs. 27), in fact a messianic significance in the largest sense. The nations are to be converted to Jahveh because of this deliverance, and its effects will be felt upon nations yet unborn, vss. 27-31. If we allow vss. 22-31 to govern our theory of the personality of the speaker in the first part of the psalm, he must be either a most extraordinary individual, who yet cannot be identified with any person known in Jewish history, or he is the personified community.⁶⁶ The advocates of the collective "I" urge vss. 22-31 as one of the strongest arguments in support of their theory. This is said to be corroborated by the fact that in vs. 4 the personification is dropped for a moment and the actual "we" of the congregation appears ("Our fathers trusted in thee"), and by the further fact that the present condition of the "I" in vs. 6 (very emphatic in the Hebrew) seems to contrast with the previous condition of the nation in vss. 4, 5, which would be unnatural except on the collective theory. It might be thought that at vss. 22 and 25 the speaker separates himself from the community and is accordingly an individual. There is a difficulty here for the collective interpretation, but it is by no means fatal. We may explain it with Smend by the theory that "Israel is distinct from the Israelites, cf. Hosea 1 and 2," or we may suppose with Coblenz that in verses 22 and 25 the individual members of the congregation are speaking.

In our commentary the collective theory of the speaker seems to be adopted, but the unity of the psalm is denied, and of the last part only verses 22 and 25 are admitted to belong to the original. Herein is a marvellous thing. That part of the psalm which

⁶⁶ Even Calvin did not venture to identify the speaker in this psalm directly with Christ.

can be urged most forcibly for the collective theory is rejected, but those verses which bear most strongly against the theory are retained. Yet the collective theory is adopted without one word of explanation as to the bearing of either of these points upon it. In this psalm, however, we meet with the second instance thus far observed of an exegetical argument for the collective theory of the "I." In the introduction to the psalm it is said that "the description is too varied for any individual experience." But no inference as to the nature of the "I" is drawn from the first person plural in vss. 4, 5.⁶⁶

Finally, with regard to Psalm 102, if its unity is accepted, the case for the collective "I" may be considered to be proved beyond peradventure. In vss. 13 ff. Zion stands out in her own proper person. If there is any connection at all between these verses and what has gone before, the "I" of the first part of the psalm must be collective. As for Psalm 22, the collective theory is maintained ("the author wrote in the person of afflicted Israel"), but the unity of the psalm, which is the strongest support of the theory, is denied. It must be confessed that the argument for the composite character of Psalm 102 is particularly strong, but the point is that our author seems quite oblivious of the bearing of the critical question upon the exegesis.

The present reviewer cannot pretend to have examined the treatment accorded to all the "I-psalms" in the present commentary. But a typical group of them has been selected in which the exegetical problem of the identification of the "I" is peculiarly acute and demands at least an attempt at solution. For not one of these psalms is there anything that can be called a discussion of the question. Only two exegetical arguments in favor of the collective "I" have been found in the sixty-two

⁶⁶ The unity of Psalm 22 is a fairly debatable question. The transition from the first part to the second is certainly abrupt. Yet it has its analogy in Psalm 6, the integrity of which is universally admitted. Further, the relation of the last part to the first corresponds so strikingly with Isa. 53 (cf. Beer's illuminating exposition) that it seems hardly due to chance compilation. But even if the original unity of the psalm is denied, the present combination of the two parts can hardly have been made on any other than a collective theory of the "I" (unless we hold that it is due simply to accident), and hence it may be argued that at the time of the redaction of this psalm the collective theory of the "I" was prevalent (a point not noticed by Briggs).

pages devoted to the exposition of these psalms. The theory is regularly assumed, but the arguments for it are either ignored or are actually invalidated, as by the critical theories adopted in the case of Psalms 22, 69, and 102. The difficulties in the way of the theory, especially those presented by the detailed personifications which must be assumed, are largely passed over without a word of explanation. This means that the really vital problems in the interpretation of these interesting and important psalms are scarcely touched, for they can only be revealed in a discussion of the identification of the "I."⁵⁷

It is unnecessary to sum up the general results of our review. The dissent from the methods followed in this commentary may seem to some to have been emphasized too strongly; yet I trust that the discussion has made it evident that the dissent is an honest and not a captious one. Of the four topics which have been reviewed, the interest and permanent value of the commentary, apart from the vast collection of material, word-studies, and discussions of the literary relationships of the psalms, lie in the treatment of the poetical form of the psalms. The establishment of the original poetic forms of the psalms is the one dominant interest of the commentary. Here many valuable suggestions have undoubtedly been made of which the professional student of the future will make grateful use. But in the nature

⁵⁷ In the above discussion as to the nature of the speaker no notice has been taken of the light which the Babylonian penitential psalms may throw upon the problem. These psalms would seem to have been originally individualistic, though afterwards adapted to liturgical purposes. In many respects they are very similar to the Hebrew "invalid psalms" (compare the end of the truly remarkable psalm cited in Jeremias, "Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients," pp. 210 ff., with Ps. 41), and might suggest that after all the "I" in the latter psalms was originally individualistic, though its exegetical argument is strongly in favor of a collective theory. Briggs does not refer to the Babylonian analogies in his comments on the psalms which have been examined above. In general, the analogies between the Hebrew Psalter and other ancient Oriental literature do not seem greatly to interest him. He does not once mention the great hymn of Chuenaten in his exposition of Ps. 104. He alludes to the Babylonian Tiamat-myth in connection with Ps. 89 10 ff., but unfortunately explains the very similar passage Ps. 74 12 ff. of the redemption from Egypt, whereas it almost certainly refers to the creation-myth. On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that Briggs inclines to an original mythological background for Ps. 19. In this view he agrees with Gunkel, though the two scholars arrived at it quite independently of one another.

of the case those results are not exact or final, but are necessarily conjectural. The lay reader or minister or theological student who may use this book must constantly keep in mind the tentative nature of the poetical analysis, and always test the reconstruction by the requirements of exegesis. Unfortunately, on the side of exegesis the commentary does not inspire confidence.

MEDIAEVAL GERMAN MYSTICISM

KUNO FRANCKE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The German mysticism of the fourteenth century was one of the most remarkable manifestations of that individualistic trend of thought and feeling which set in during the thirteenth century with the height of chivalric culture, developed under the influence of the growth of civic independence in the great municipal republics, and finally, in the religious Reformation of the sixteenth century, overturned the whole corporate system of the mediaeval church and state.

The fundamental thought of the German mystics of the fourteenth century was nothing new. It was a revived and christianized Neoplatonism. Throughout the Middle Ages more subtle thinkers had been fascinated by the neoplatonic conception, that the world is an incessant and gradual differentiation of the originally undivided and undifferentiated Divine; that man, however, and man alone, possesses the power by a free act of will to reverse this incessant process of differentiation, and thus to return from the diaspora of manifold phenomena into the oneness of the undivided Divine. The so-called Dionysius Areopagita, Scotus Erigena, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux—these all see the essential goal of human life in this return from the many into the one; they all love to dwell on the different stages of inner concentration by which man approaches this goal; they all praise enthusiastically the state of highest self-surrender where man is completely welded into one with the Divine—as the waterdrop is resolved into wine; or as iron, melting in the fire, seems to become fire, or as the air, illuminated by the sun, seems itself to become sunlight. It is, however, no exaggeration to say that this ideal of complete self-surrender of the individual to the infinite has seldom produced such a variety of individual life as in the German mystics of the fourteenth century. Three of the most pronounced personalities

produced by this mystic longing for the merging of personality in the Divine I shall try briefly to characterize: Master Eckhart, Heinrich Suso, and Johannes Tauler.

A wonderful solemnity and impressive harmony is spread over the thought of Master Eckhart, the intellectual head of the German mystics. The whole universe, from the highest state of purest spirituality to the lowest worm in the dust, is to him the emanation and revelation of one mighty and eternal will. In its most elemental and fundamental form this will is apparently without willing; it is pure, undifferentiated being, uncreated nature; the naught, that is, the negation of all contrasts; the synthesis of all life; the godhead by itself. This infinite and unmodified eternal being, tranquil and unmoved, is, however, at the same time the source of all motion and of all the variety of finite beings. It eradiates without losing its substance; as the sun—according to mediaeval physics—sheds light without losing it. The highest form of this self-manifestation of the godhead is the Trinity, which Eckhart conceives of as a constant process of self-realization of the complexity of the infinite and as its constantly renewed awakening to full consciousness. In the Son the Father comes to know himself, and Father and Son create out of their common love the Holy Spirit—a strange mythical birth of divine forms going on unceasingly in the highest regions of spiritual existence. To this transcendental process of a continual divine birth the visible world forms a lower counterpart. Into the visible world the Divine is also constantly discharging itself; yes, only in the fulness of the world, with its countless forms and contrasts, does the Divine find its fullest expression. "All things are God; God is all things. God may not understand himself without me. Before there were creatures, God was not God." These are some of Eckhart's sibyllinic formulas to express the divineness of the world. But by the side of this fact of the divineness of life there stands the other fact of its earthiness. We cannot get away from the tragic conflict pervading all life, the conflict between the naught and the aught, between the infinite and the finite, between spirit streaming from above and matter pressing on from below. And thus, after all, in its scale of forms from the most highly organ-

ized beings to inanimate objects, the world presents the spectacle of a gradually diminishing admixture of free spiritual power and a gradually increasing admixture of dead material weight.

Man alone has the faculty of freeing himself from matter, of giving himself fully over to the divine spirit and of thus rising above the conflict which enthralls all creation. "In dumb creation there is something of God, but in the human soul there is God divine. The eye with which I see God is the same eye with which God sees me. My eye and God's eye are one eye." It is only a question of man's becoming fully conscious of his high estate, of his divine nature. "We are to turn the eyes of our reason upon ourselves, and contemplate the nobility of our spiritual being, and recognize that we have been so formed as to be by divine mercy united to the eternal spirit. And if we thus come to know our own riches, we should find such transcending joy in them that we should care no longer for any outward pleasure and satisfaction." Inwardness, then, is the great goal of life. Through descending into the innermost recesses of the soul, through retiring from the distracting senses into the oneness of the mind, through complete absorption in the spiritual, do we rise above the dualism of life, do we reach the Divine. "When the soul has reached this state, it loses its own self, and God draws it into himself, so that it is entirely absorbed in him, even as the sun draws the morning red into itself so that it is entirely absorbed by light."

He who thus has fully entered into the *unio mystica* with the Divine has become immune against the perils of circumstance and chance; he has freed himself from the blind superstitions of the multitude; he has emancipated himself from the need of ecclesiastical conventions; he has come near the state of human perfection in which the good will be done for its own sake. "The highest that the spirit may attain in this mortal clay is this: to live in such a manner that virtue is no longer an effort, that is, that all virtues have become so natural to the soul that it not only purposely practises virtue, but makes all virtues shine forth from itself unconsciously, even as though it were virtue itself."

It is certain that Master Eckhart, the doctor of divinity, Domini-

can prior at Erfurt, professor of theology at the school of his order at Cologne, would have inwardly revolted against the idea of harboring unorthodox thoughts. Indeed, a short time before his death he publicly denounced such accusations as misunderstandings of his teaching and explicitly accepted the supreme authority of the church. That, however, the principle of his thought was diametrically opposed to orthodox Christianity, that it tended toward the dissolution of the hierarchical system and toward complete religious freedom, would be clear, even if two years after his death the Roman See had not officially condemned the majority of his teachings and thus formally acknowledged their revolutionary character. Eckhart is indeed a forerunner of modern pantheism. His conception of the world as a continual transition of the godhead from naught to aught, from the potential to the actual, from the formless one to the multiform many, is a clear anticipation of the Hegelian principle of the self-unfolding of the Idea. His ideal of losing oneself in the abyss of the Divine suggests Goethe's "*Weltseele kommt uns zu durchdringen*," and "*Sich aufzugeben wird Genuss*." And his description of the highest state of perfection, in which duty has become an instinct, brings to mind Schiller's definition of the Beautiful Soul as that state "where the moral sentiment has taken possession of all the emotions to such a degree that it may unhesitatingly commit the guidance of life to the instinct without running the risk of conflicting with its decisions."

If Master Eckhart points toward the great classic German writers of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, his pupil Suso transports us into the emotional world of Romanticism. And as the intense subjectivity of the Romantic poets has led to a curious oscillation in their works between the two extremes of symbolism and naturalism, so we find these same extremes side by side with each other in the effusions of this mediaeval monk. Suso belongs to those over-refined, erratic personalities, like Amadeus Hoffmann, Poe, Ibsen, Hauptmann, who express themselves only in extremes, who rush from the airiest visions to the grossest materialism, who revel now in ecstatic flights of imagination and now in painful reproductions of crass actuality.

In Suso¹ the emotional tension of German mysticism reaches its climax. The whole strife of a time torn by tremendous conflicts seems to vibrate sympathetically in his soul. It seems as though large and wide-reaching popular disturbances—the struggle between Empire and Papacy, the revolution of the guilds against the city patriciate, the religious reform movements of the “Friends of God” and similar sects, the horrors of the Great Plague, the cruelties of Jew-baiting, the fanaticism of the Flagellants—as though all this had been crowding in upon the contemplative mind of this solitary monk, setting in motion its innermost chords and calling forth therefrom sounds of dark passion and fierce power and then again of sweetest purity and transcendent beauty.

With what knightly courteousness and grace does he, the scion of a patrician family of Constance, describe the chivalric love-service which he offers to his chosen one, Eternal Wisdom, in his cloister cell. “As in Swabia,” thus he narrates in his autobiography, “the young men at New Year ask for a favor from their sweethearts, so he also on New Year’s night turned to his love. Before daybreak he stepped in front of the image where the divine mother holds her lovely child, Eternal Wisdom, on her lap and presses it to her bosom, and he knelt down and began to sing a sequence to the mother, praying that she permit him to receive a wreath from her child, and he was so deeply stirred that the hot tears welled forth from his eyes. And then he turned to Eternal Wisdom, bowed down to the ground, and greeted his love, and spake: ‘Thou, dearest, art my Easter day, my heart’s summer delight, my joyous hour. Thou art the sweetheart whom alone my soul is wooing and craving and for whom it scorns all other loves. Oh, reward me this night, and let me win a wreath from thee.’”

He invites Eternal Wisdom as a guest to his table, and offers her bread and fruit. He sees her in manifold forms. “She hovered,” he says, “high above him on a throne of clouds, she twinkled like the morning star and shone like the sun. Her crown

¹ The following nine paragraphs have already appeared in an article, “A Religious Romanticist,” published in the *Outlook* for December 3, 1910, pp. 785–788. Until recently, Suso’s writings were accessible only in modern German adaptations. Now, however, we have an authenticated edition of the original text: Heinrich Seuse, *Deutsche Schriften*, herausgegeben von Karl Bihlmeyer, Stuttgart, 1907.

was eternity, her garment was bliss, her mantle all joys' fulfilment. She was far and near, high and low, she was present and yet hidden. She reached above the highest of the heavens and touched the deepest of the earth's abysses. At one moment she appeared as a beautiful maiden, and then suddenly changed into a proud squire. She inclined herself toward him and greeted him kindly and spake lovingly: *Praebe, fili, cor tuum mihi.*"

All this sounds like an echo of chivalric minnesong. How little, however, these feelings had, after all, to do with courtly love, from what a cruelly harsh and hideous reality these ethereal visions came forth, is proved by the narrative of revolting naturalism in which Suso describes the fearful chastisements by which he tried to subdue his rebellious body. "He had himself made an undergarment of hair-cloth, and in the garment straps in which there were inserted fifty and a hundred pointed nails, made of brass and filed sharp on the point, and the points of the nails were turned against his flesh. And he made the garment tight and held together in front, in order that the nails should penetrate the flesh, and he made it so high that it came close up to his face. Herein he slept at night. In summer nights, when it was hot and he was tired from walking and ill, or when he had bled himself and lay exhausted and the vermin pestered him, he would betimes feel as though he were lying in an ant-heap; and would weep and gnash his teeth and say: 'Good God, what kind of death is this! Whom murderers kill or the wild beasts, he is done with it quickly. But I am lying here among this horrible vermin and am dying and yet cannot die.'" And with a similar delight in the repellent, with a similarly gruesome naturalism, he makes Christ describe the horrible disfigurements of his body which he suffered when hanging on the cross. "My right hand was pierced by nails, my left hand was hammered through. My right arm was stretched out of joint, my left arm was drawn out of shape. My right foot was sore with open wounds and my left foot was cruelly mangled. I hung in faintness and exhaustion of all my limbs. The blood was breaking forth from all over my body, making it a gory mass and a horrible sight. I was covered with sores and ulcers."

In the ecstasy of enthusiasm Suso often loses control of himself. He would melt away in rapture when Eternal Wisdom initiates

him into the mysteries of the transubstantiation. Like a mediæval Werther, he would embrace the universe with the arms of love when singing in holy mass the *Sursum Corda*.

This same man, however, experiences all the different matter-of-fact episodes of his life with such an intensity and relates these episodes with such a power and precision of actual observation that they impress the modern reader as scenes of present-day life, and often make one hold one's breath from excitement. Some of these scenes stand before us with a truly marvellous distinctness. How a little girl accuses Suso of having stolen a crucifix, and thereby incites a great tumult against him in the town; how in another village he is accused of having poisoned the wells, and barely escapes death at the hand of the raging mob that has gathered there for the fair; how his sister runs away from the nunnery, and thereby plunges him into the depths of despair until he succeeds in leading her back to her vow; how a lewd woman whom he had tried to convert charges him with being the father of her child and succeeds for a time in making his name despised and rejected; how in a forest on the banks of the Rhine he meets a highwayman and his paramour and is frightened by them out of his wits,—these and similar happenings are told in a manner reminding one of Zola or Tolstoi.

No painter of the Cologne school has represented the idyllic bliss of heaven with more delicate and rosy colors than Suso. "Look upon the beautiful heavenly heath: here summer's delight, here May's festive meadow, here the vale of true bliss. Here you see joyful glances go from love to love; here harping and fiddling; here singing, dancing, and ever rejoicing; here all wishes' fulfillment; here love without sorrow, in everlasting security. Now look upon the countless multitude, how they drink from the welling fountain of living waters; how they gaze upon the clear pure mirror of the godhead in which all things become known to them. Steal still farther forward and look, how the glorious queen of the heavenly land, clad in joy and dignity, hovers above all the heavenly host, how the divine mother of mercy turns her eyes, her mild, merciful eyes, so benignly upon you, how her miraculous beauty gives joy and bliss to the whole heavenly host."

If we contrast with this idyllic vision the fierce, passionate

wailings of a dying man whose voice Suso hears calling for help, we are indeed reminded of the contrast between the Ghent altar of the brothers van Eyck and a Last Judgment scene by Breughel. "O God in Heaven, why was I born into this world? The beginning of my life was crying and weeping, and now my leave-taking is bitter wailing and lamenting. I strike my hands over my head, I wring them feverishly, I turn my glance to all the corners of the world, whether some help or comfort may be found. But it cannot be. I am like a bird that is lying under the claws of a hawk and has lost its senses from fright. My hands begin to wither, my face to grow pallid, my eyes are breaking. Ah, the thrusts of grim death strike my chest! I am heaving heavily, the light of this world grows dim. I am looking into the other world. Great God, what a sight! The gruesome forms of the black Moors are gathering, the hellish beasts have surrounded me, they are lying in wait for my soul. O God, I see the wild raging flames shoot up, hideous monsters pass hither and thither, like sparks in the fire. And thus I depart."

From what has been said it is obvious that the traditional view of Suso as a spiritual minnesinger is far from being adequate. His personality was far too complicated to be a mere reflex or afterglow of the age of chivalric culture. The chords of his soul were so high-strung and vibrated so quickly that the whole fullness of life re-echoed in them. He and his compeers—for he had many kindred and followers, especially in the convents of South Germany—do not point backward to the age of chivalry, they point forward to the great epoch of Flemish and German painting in the fifteenth century. The extraordinary combination of deep religious feeling, of rapturous delight in the mysteries of a divine universe, with minute and often harsh and painful reproduction of the smallest detail of every-day reality which mark fifteenth-century painting from the van Eycks to Dürer, cannot be fully understood without taking into account the intense subjectivity and emotionalism of that phase of the mystic movement which Suso represents.

In Johannes Tauler,² the great Strassburg preacher, German

² Only within the last few months has there appeared the first authenticated text of Tauler's sermons: *Die Predigten Taulers* herausgegeben von Ferdinand Vetter, Berlin, 1910.

mysticism of the fourteenth century reaches its fullest popular influence and its sanest and most rational form. Of all mystics, Tauler is the least eccentric; more earnestly than either Eckhart or Suso does he strive for a reconciliation between the absorption of the individual by the Divine and the duties of the individual toward society.

For Tauler, as for his teacher Eckhart, man is originally a part of the godhead. Like Eckhart, he laments the alienation of man from his origin and sees the goal of man in his return to it. But he is less abstruse than Eckhart; he does not revel so much in contemplation of the "formless and shapeless abyss" of the infinite; he lays more emphasis on the striving of man for perfection. In the analysis of the various stages which shall lead man to this perfection, Tauler shows affinity with Suso. But he is separated from Suso by his clearer sense of the attainable, his soberer view of human limitations. With all his predilection for asceticism and renunciation of the world, he is without a trace of fanaticism.

He openly protests against the morbid exaggerations of monkish discipline; he preaches self-control, not self-elimination. In the fine comparison of the human soul with the vine, he represents human nature as an essentially sound and hardy plant whose growth is to be furthered by rational pruning and must not be stunted by senseless mutilation. He asserts that a life of honest labor and faithful fulfilment of every-day tasks is more pleasing to God than eccentric revelling in high inspirations. "Many a man is busy in the world and works for his wife and children, and many a man sits in his shop and makes shoes to get a living, and some poor people go from village to village to earn their bread with great trouble; and, I tell you, all these may fare a hundred times better before God than some would-be prophets." "I know one of the greatest Friends of God, who all his life has been a farmer and is it yet. And he once asked the Lord whether he should give up farming and sit in church. And the Lord said, No; he should rather go on earning his bread by the sweat of his brow; that was the best service he could give to Him." Tauler, then, believes in the divine origin and the divine mission of every calling and every kind of activity; with truly demo-

cratic conviction he praises work as the truest title to nobility; in the right conception of work he sees the way to social peace. "One can spin, another can make shoes, and some have great aptness for all sorts of business, so that they can earn a great deal, while others are altogether without this quickness. These are all gifts proceeding from the Spirit of God. If I were not a priest, but were a member of a guild, I should take it as a great favor that I knew how to make shoes, and should try to make them better than any one else, and would gladly earn my bread by the labor of my hands." "So let every one see to *his* appointed office, and all work thereby for the common good."

In all this we recognize an individualist in the best sense, a man who, standing in the midst of life, has an open mind for the needs and the duties of all classes and of each individual, and who has before his eye the ideal of a democratic society resting upon the mutual acceptance and free co-operation of each and all. The fullest significance, however, of Tauler's individualism comes to light in his utterances on the last and highest questions, on the relation of the individual to God. None of the mystics has conceived of the *unio mystica*, the sinking of deified man in the infinite, in so genuinely human a manner, or in terms so far raised above all exclusively ecclesiastical views. With what a deep, manly earnestness does he oppose to external conventional churchliness the inner self-scrutiny and self-discipline of the individual. "Behold, dear friend, if thou shouldst spend all thy years in running from church to church, thou must look for and receive help from within, or thou wilt never come to any good; however thou mayest seek and inquire, thou must also be willing to be tormented without succor from the outward help of any creature. I tell you, children, that the very holiest man I ever saw in outward conduct and inward life had never heard more than five sermons in all his days. Let the common people run about and hear all they can, that they may not fall into despair or unbelief; but know that all who would be God's, inwardly and outwardly, turn to themselves and retire within." With what a glow of sacred conviction does he describe the necessity of ever deeper scrutiny, ever higher striving, ever purer knowledge, ever freer and fuller surrender, until at last man, without the interposition

of any external institution, finds himself indissolubly welded into one with the Divine. "And if such a man were dragged into the bottom of hell, then there would be the kingdom of God and eternal bliss in hell." And what a truly grand exaltation, what a wonderful vision of human possibilities, is there in the picture which Tauler draws of this state of ideal humanity. "When through all manner of exercises, the outward man has been converted into the inward, reasonable man, and thus the two, that is to say, the powers of the senses and the powers of the reason, are gathered up into the very centre of the man's being,—the unseen depths of his spirit, wherein lies the image of God,—and thus he flings himself into the divine abyss in which he dwelt eternally before he was created, then, when God finds the man thus simply and nakedly turned towards him, the god-head bends down and descends into the depths of the pure, waiting soul, and transforms the created soul, drawing it up into the un-created essence, so that the spirit becomes one with him. Could such a man behold himself, he would see himself so noble that he would fancy himself God, and see himself a thousand times nobler than he is in himself, and would perceive all the thoughts and purposes, words and works, and have all the knowledge of all men that ever were."

Here, we may say, the individualistic tendency of mediaeval German mysticism has reached its consummation. Here the conception of personality has been heightened and deepened to such an extent that it seems impossible to heighten and deepen it further. Certainly the Renaissance, which has so often and so mistakenly been called the classic age of Individualism, has added nothing to it.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SIN

EDWARD L. SCHAUB

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, KINGSTON, ONTARIO

I

In no other respect, perhaps, are the unity and kinship of the human race more apparent than in the development of the religious rites and beliefs of the various peoples. Even in the case of their myths, where interpretation is so difficult, where there appears to be so much chaos and so little law, and where we seem at times to have merely the product of imaginative spontaneity and of the play of fancy, there is nevertheless striking similarity. Just because of the contrasts and differences that often impress one at a surface reading, the identity of the spiritual life that shimmers through these diverse manifestations becomes the more significant. As a result, added significance is reflected back to the differences themselves. Not only are these seen from the point of view of their connection with those characteristics and temperamental peculiarities which have influenced particular interpretations of life and of the world, but this knowledge in turn sheds light on the principles that are universally operative in the minds and lives of all peoples. We are thus enabled to gain a clue for the interpretation of facts which, considered by themselves, might have remained quite unintelligible.

The practical bent of the Hebrew mind with its political interests and its concern in the affairs of the temporal world stands in strong contrast with the fanciful and imaginative life of the Hindoo, as well as with that aesthetic temper of the Greek which led him to humanize nature and to find there a world of gods whose lives and struggles he delighted to portray. In comparison with these mythologies, therefore, that of the Hebrews is neither extensive nor rich in its appeals to the imagination. But this is not altogether deplorable, for where there is no luxuriant growth there can be no overshadowing thicket to retard the development of the rational and ethical phases of the religious

consciousness. If we consider that the Hebrew has genuine poetical thought and feeling—a fact that is often overlooked—and that he combines strong objective interests with a tendency to reflect on the experiences of man rather than on the beauties of nature, we can readily understand why he should have left us a mythology of a nobility and virility and of an ethical and rational import that surpasses not only that of the Aryan peoples but also that which the cuneiform writings of his Semitic kindred or the hieroglyphics of Egypt reveal to us. The accounts of the creation of the world, of the dispersion of the peoples, and of the origin and development of religious and political institutions are all illustrative of this; and so in a remarkable degree is the description of the primeval age of humanity when suffering and hardship and pain and fear had not entered into the life of man. Accounts of such a golden age are indeed common to many tribes and peoples in all parts of the earth, but nowhere do we find one having such loftiness of tone, such artistic perfection of form, and such significance of content as in the story of paradise in Genesis.

In the story of paradise several mythical motives are skillfully and artistically woven into one sublime narrative. But that which gives life and significance to the whole is a strain that we find nowhere else so explicitly emphasized. The tree whose fruit is forbidden to man is called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, for, the serpent says, "God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods knowing good and evil." And when they did eat, "the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked," and "the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us to know good and evil."

It is this characteristic of the story of paradise, its unique emphasis on moral distinctions and the consciousness of sin, that stands as a monument to the keen spiritual and introspective insight of the Hebrew mind, from whatever source the setting or the incidents may have been derived. The story does more, however, than bear witness to the clear vision of a particular people: it furnishes us with a clue to the underlying motive that has entered as an important factor into the formation of

all myths regarding a golden age. Its emphasis on the fact of the attainment of a knowledge of good and evil indicates that the consciousness of sin was essentially bound up in the mind of the writer with his reflections concerning the originally perfect state of man. But in that which was here focal to an intensely keen ethical and spiritual vision, and therefore present as an explicit motive, we may find, I think, the principle that has been operative more or less implicitly in the case of all similar myths. The principle present *to* the consciousness of the Hebrew writer is the principle operative *in* the consciousness of all peoples.

For while moral criteria and the extent and nature of the particular acts that are considered sinful naturally vary with differences in intellectual and spiritual development, the consciousness of sin itself, in some form or other and to some degree, is, anthropology seems to teach, universal to all peoples of whom we have definite knowledge. There is always a more or less explicit consciousness of a discrepancy between our actual life and conduct and those ideals and postulates which urge themselves upon us as objectively valid, or at least as the ultimate expression of our rational and moral nature. Indeed, the consciousness of sin, meaning by it the consciousness of such non-conformity or transgression, is inextricably bound up with the very nature of human experience. Man has imagination as well as mere perception, and thought as well as mere recognition. As a rational being, moreover, he necessarily transcends the immediate data of consciousness, for to know a limit is already to have passed beyond it, and to know an object is already to have made progress toward the knowledge of other objects. Just so man has ideals as well as sentiment for the actual; and every normal moral consciousness distinguishes the actual from the possible and realizes the discrepancy between attainment and the fullest capacity and potentiality of attainment. As a thinking and moral being, man can never resolve the ought-to-be into the is, the ideal into the real. It is this more or less explicit recognition that present existence does not correspond to man's real estate that has led early peoples to the thought of a golden age in the past history of mankind in which such a dualism did not exist.

This presents to us two important considerations. Imperfection, let us notice, is regarded as degeneration from a state of perfection,—an interpretation which seems almost inevitable on the early level of thinking with its meagre scientific background, yet a doctrine which invites criticism and to which we return below. And secondly, the doctrine is stated in terms of imagination rather than of reason, of picture rather than of concept. Indeed, in the first stages of mental development all attempts to interpret experience, or to give expression to what inner consciousness reveals, necessarily occur in terms of actual existence. Truth and meaning, to some degree always present wherever there is mind, are not as yet grasped in their universal significance but are given the only form which such a consciousness explicitly possesses, namely, that of sense perception. Thus it is that principles become incarnated into incidents and are given a place in the world of space and time. In spite of the clearer vision of the Hebrew writers, essential characteristics of the spiritual life and of human experience were reduced in their hands to the level of the facts of the objective, empirical world; the universal assumed the aspect of the particular and, as such, acquired an accidental nature, or at least became dependent for its existence on causes external to itself. It behooves us, therefore, to be on our guard lest we overlook the high value and significance of such religious myths. They do not, it is true, give us the truth of historical fact, yet they do give us a much higher and more universal truth,—the truth of principle and of the experience of self-conscious beings.

Unfortunately, however, this deeper significance of the story of paradise was long shrouded from the eyes of its readers, and it was regarded as giving expression to fact rather than to principle. It is strange that this distinction does not seem to have been entirely clear to one who had the penetrating insight into the historical development of the religion and culture of the human race and the keen discernment of the deeper implications of man's moral and spiritual experience that was characteristic of St. Paul, for it was he who freed Christianity from its exclusively Judaic expression and liberated its spirit from the historical trammels that might otherwise have confined it to spatial and temporal

bounds. In Origen and St. Ambrose, indeed, we find tendencies to allegorical interpretation, and Philo had assumed a much more extreme position. St. Augustine, however, ascribes to the story of paradise significance of historical fact, and in this many have followed him even to the present day, believing that its value would be lost if historicity were denied. The significance of this story, however, lies precisely in the fact that it is the statement of a universal principle, an eternal truth. If we commit the fallacy of *hysteron-proteron* and regard the action of our first parents as the cause of our characteristic form of experience and of our consciousness of sin, instead of our experience as the cause of the story of paradise, we become involved in all sorts of difficulties which have troubled theologians for ages. How, for example, could a single act and the sin of one man pollute the lives and affect the destinies of all generations in the sense that such a point of view must necessarily maintain? Such difficulties vanish of themselves if we give the story its higher significance of apprising us of a universal aspect of experience, for it is precisely the nature and function of the myth to portray some law of nature or regularly recurring phenomenon, such, to use a more familiar example, as the movement of the heavenly bodies or the succession of day and night, as incidents or actions performed once only at a certain definite time.

II

If we fail to understand the principle that was operative in the minds of those who have given us the story of paradise and similar myths, and interpret these as the statement of historical fact, as is so commonly done by the defenders of traditional notions, we implicitly reject the hypothesis of evolution and all views of the world-process which find in it development and progress. The story of man, we must then say, is a story of weakness, of failure, and of degeneration; it records a genuine and unmitigated physical, moral, and spiritual loss. In our age no doctrine can rest on mere authority, or on the statement of writings whose very date and authorship are under dispute. It has therefore

become necessary to attempt a formulation of the logical grounds for the view that runs so counter to the procedure of present-day science and to its results in the fields of biology and anthropology. Thus the attempt has been made to reach conclusions that may justify the traditional view of the golden age and of the fall of man by means of an argument based on a given and indisputable fact of consciousness. The conscience of all ages and of all peoples, it is pointed out, bears witness to the fact that man's relations to that which he regards as the highest reality of the universe are not what they ought to be; and it is this consciousness of sin which, properly understood, nullifies every attempt to trace an historical progress in man's views concerning God and in his relations with him.

The argument, in many cases at least, as, for example, in the clear exposition of it that Dr. Kellogg gives in his volume, *The Genesis and Growth of Religion*, is directed solely against the purely naturalistic, or so-called scientific, interpretation, without taking into consideration the point of view of an idealistic philosophy. Mankind, we are told, has universally testified that there is something in life and in experience that must be rectified, and it is just this rectification which has ever constituted one of the most essential functions of religion and which alone can explain many of its rites and ceremonies. To neglect or underestimate this factor of the consciousness of sin, as many of the "scientific" school have done, is therefore of necessity to invalidate the conclusions of the investigation. For the consciousness of sin is significant of the pathological character of man's spiritual life; it testifies that our relations to God are not of a normal but of an abnormal character. Those who do not take the consciousness of sin into their reckoning, therefore, are led to results as fallacious as those of the psychologist would be if he studied exclusively the inmates of an asylum and interpreted his results as a description of mind, or those of the morphologist who should examine diseased tissue without knowing that it was unsound. Now, if conscience reports to us a serious disorder in man's moral and spiritual constitution, must we not assume that the history of humanity shall be a record of degeneration, of moral corruption, and of a loss of intellectual power and discernment? It is

a characteristic of sin, wherever we find it, that it weakens the ability to draw fine moral distinctions, and tends to modify for the worse all religious feelings, beliefs, and conceptions. Sin is a factor, which, only too often unconsciously to ourselves, robs us of our power, just as, in the old story, through Delilah's agency Samson's "strength went from him" while even he at first "wist not that the Lord was departed from him." So, gradually the voice of conscience became hushed, and man's eyes blinded to the spiritual realities of the world, until he wandered far from the path of righteousness and truth upon which he had been set by his Creator and which he had trodden until the day when he allowed sin to enter into his life. Sin, moreover, inevitably begets fear and thus leads man to grasp at any anaesthetic which may suggest itself as able to relieve the mental anguish and pain. Thus the lofty conception of a righteous and all-wise God who holds man responsible for acts that he, as a free agent, performs, gradually became blurred, and man embraced instead the doctrines of determinism which seemed to relieve him from responsibility, of atheism or agnosticism which freed him from the haunting idea of moral retribution, or of pantheism which allowed him to believe that sin and evil have no reality but are mere *entia imaginationis*.

We thus find repeated in certain modern thinkers the same general movement of consciousness that originally gave rise to the story of paradise; conclusions, too, are unchanged except in so far as they are clothed in the forms of reflection and logical argumentation instead of in those of the poetic imagination. The consciousness of shortcoming, of imperfection, of the discrepancy between the actual and the potential in man's nature, leads to the postulation of a state in which all capacities are enjoying full and normal realization; and this state of perfection is represented as having prevailed for a longer or shorter period in the dim past of man's history. The consciousness of sin, once the principle giving birth to those theories of the golden age which are expressed in the myths of various peoples, becomes the explicit basis for a doctrine of degeneration and for the belief that man's relations to God were once pure and unstrained and his conceptions of God and of his purposes absolutely true, even though simple and elementary in character.

Thus to emphasize the consciousness of sin is, indeed, a very important corrective to those theories of religion which assume a purely naturalistic point of view and leave out of account all deeper psychological considerations. The awareness of shortcoming, together with the frustration of purposes and the resistance met with in the realization of ideals, are, indeed, factors which have ever driven man to God, as well as sources of religious ritual and ceremony, and even, as we have seen, principles underlying myth and dogma; and the form which the conception of a deity takes and the way in which he is worshipped vary with the stage of development of peoples, that is to say, with the character of their ideals. But while we do well in our study of religion to take serious account of the consciousness of sin, its true significance is not revealed either in the myth or in the argument that we have reproduced above. The objection to the story of paradise regarded as statement of actual historical fact (aside from the purely scientific difficulties, with which we are not here concerned) is that, in violation of true philosophical method, it resorts to transcendent principles,—its explanations are in terms of external facts which break in *ab extra* to produce effects that have no logical warrant in, or rational connection with, the nature of the experience in question. The objection to the attempted logical formulation of the doctrine of degeneration is that, although it assumes as its basis an undeniable fact of experience, the consciousness of sin, it altogether neglects to develop the inner implications of this consciousness or to bring it into relation with other factors and principles of experience. While the consciousness of sin is not explained in terms of some wholly external and therefore accidental factor, as in the case of the myth, it is regarded as something abnormal that has interfered with the regular order of things, as something pathological, and therefore as itself accidental. Instead of considering carefully the significance of the consciousness of sin, it is merely assumed that this is foreign to man's true nature and his progress and that it can have no place in the regular course of spiritual development. Before, however, we can assert that this consciousness testifies that man's relations to God are in an abnormal state, must we not consider just what the normal relation of a rational being to

God is, and what it implies, as well as how it can become possible? The very thinkers who insist most strongly on a degeneration theory give in other connections an interpretation of the consciousness of sin that is quite different from that set forth above. The state of holiness and of closest spiritual communion with God, we are told, are reached by the way of repentance, and to this no one can enter save through the gateway of the consciousness of sin. In further objection to the general argument it may be urged that the consciousness of sin tells us only that man has failed in his endeavors to realize the highest ideals of which he knows, or that he has acted in a manner contrary to them; it cannot tell us that mankind is suffering from spiritual degeneracy and that history is the record of moral failure. This could be proved only if it were shown that the propagation and growth of sin had not been interfered with or its fruits destroyed by other agencies. And finally, we may ask, does not the very fact of the universality of the consciousness of sin, which the argument so strongly emphasizes, seem itself to indicate that there is at least one very important sense in which this cannot be regarded as abnormal? It is certainly bound up with every experience of which we have any knowledge, if we leave out of consideration, as we may for present purposes, the nature of Jesus' conscious experience.¹

III

No account of experience can be true that recognizes only pessimistic elements. The spiritual perception of the Hebrew writer was too acute not to realize that the story of paradise was not complete merely with an account of the coming of sin into the world. He recognized that in a sense sin was doomed from the moment of its conception, that its power was not to be forever

¹ The question of the nature of Jesus' will presents to orthodox theology an even more complicated problem than that with which philosophy has to cope regarding the relation of man's actual or empirical willing to his real will, that is, to his deepest nature brought to a self-consciousness of itself. We must not, however, overlook in our speculations such passages as Matt. 26 39, "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt."

supreme over man but that one would arise who would bruise its head. Likewise those who give the story a factual interpretation or who find logical grounds for their theory of degeneration, nevertheless maintain that the true end of man is not death but life, not hopeless misery but everlasting happiness. Their argument, it is true, seeks explanations not in terms of principles immanent in human experience or in the history of man but in terms of external and transcendent factors. Salvation from sin is based, not on any principle that God had put into the soul of man when he fashioned it after his own image and breathed into it the breath of life, but on a power from without divinely appointed to redeem mankind. This power alone, we are told, can break the shackles that bind the individual and humanity, and elevate mankind to its former high estate. That Jesus is, as he seems at times to have referred to himself, the son of man, tends to be overlooked; he who led men to the consciousness of their true relation to God is called, in distinction from all others, Christ, the Son of God. As it was an accidental factor that brought about the fall of man, so it is a power equally foreign that achieves his salvation. Objectionable as such a formulation of the doctrine may be, this connection in story and argument between the fall of man and his redemption, between the consciousness of sin and the assurance of salvation, expresses a very significant truth. Latent in every experience there is a basis for optimism, and it is this that becomes the rallying-cry of every striving soul.

While it is true in a sense, as the story of paradise tells us, that before man attains to a knowledge of good and evil he lives a sinless existence, it is equally true that coincident with the consciousness of sin there is the consciousness of a power that may be turned against sin. For while the consciousness of sin rests on the antinomy between the real and the ideal in human experience, on the contradiction between that which man actually is and that which he recognizes as what he ought to be, it is important to notice that the ideal is not a mere figment of the imagination but is the ideal of the experiencing person; it is the expression of his deepest nature, that with which he identifies his real self and with which he feels himself in unity and accord. It is in these deeper recesses of his own heart that man not only finds

the revelation of the need for a better and a truer life, but it is here also that he receives the inspiration to strive for the highest that he knows, and the strength to follow after until he shall have attained.

It thus appears that the consciousness of sin is really the first step in the overcoming of sin, the guarantee that the better land of which we have a glimpse is not one from which we are forever excluded but one which we are already on the point of occupying. Though man is prone to contrast that which is actual in his experience with an ideal, he is in some sense and to some extent already in possession of this ideal. Unless, indeed, his real nature were already higher than the actual state which he deplures, he could not be conscious of the fact that he has not exercised his spiritual capacities to their fullest extent. The power of an object is limited by something to which this power merely extends, but the activity of consciousness, if a mechanical phraseology may be pardoned, has also a reflective movement or aspect. If the object shall be a limit *for* it and not merely *to* it, if, that is, it shall be conscious that there is a limit, its activity must extend not merely to the limit but beyond it, otherwise it could not know that it was limited but only that it had expended the full extent of its power. Thus it is not until man has taken self-conscious possession of himself and of his ideal that he can become aware of the fact that the moral power which constitutes him a rational being has not come to its full expression. From this point of view, the consciousness of sin does not mean that man has fallen from any height of development to which he had attained, but that he has risen ideally above his former level in such a way as to estimate and criticise it. It means that man has arrived at a stage when he has become conscious of ideals that he is striving by very nature of his being to realize. And this consciousness, indeed, is the first and the necessary step toward the realization of these ideals and of man's true nature as a self-conscious being.

If, then, we regard sin as the negation of that which ought to be, we may say that the consciousness of sin prepares the way for the negation of sin and thus for the higher affirmation of the moral and spiritual ideals that underlie our world of reality.

Suggestions of this interpretation may be found as early as in the writings of Augustine, even though his statements are often open to all the objections that may be urged against the factual interpretation of the story of paradise and of the life and mission of Jesus. While contending that sin came into the world only in the original act of disobedience of our first parents, Augustine nevertheless recognizes that this act must have been preceded by certain impulses and desires that were not what they ought to be. For, "if man had not already begun to please himself, the devil would not have been able to bring him to a fall." It would be impossible, moreover, in the absence of psychological motives, to impute disobedience to Adam or to consider his action sinful. Now all these impulses and desires of man that run counter to God's will and to the god-nature of man must necessarily be transformed before man can be a son of God or reach the perfection that represents his goal. From this point of view, then, the fall of man was not so much the time when man became bad or the means of his becoming so as it was the bringing to light of the latent evil that was hidden in his sensuous nature. In so far, therefore, Augustine tells us, the fall was not an unmitigated evil, for in no other way than by becoming aware of evil could man have rid himself of it. Therefore, instead of saying that the consciousness of sin confirms the pathological spiritual condition of man, one ought rather to say that the consciousness is evoked by the sting that is occasioned by convalescence from a disease which, though painless while it ran its course, was none the less death-bringing.

But why, one might ask, should it be the convalescence and not the disease that is fraught with so much pain and unrest? Indeed, the mental anguish bound up with the consciousness of sin, contrasting, as it does, so sharply with the contentment and peace of mind that precedes it, is itself one of the motives which has led many to the hypothesis of degeneration, or has at least been believed to confirm such a view. But again a consideration of the case must lead to opposite conclusions. That act by which a man comes to recognize the sinfulness of actions is the same as that by which he comes to a consciousness of himself and of his true nature and mission. It is the act by which man becomes an

object to himself and recognizes that as the subject of such knowledge he rises not only above his objective or actually realized self but above all other objects of the world as well. Thenceforth he can no longer view himself as a child of nature; in coming to a consciousness of self, he necessarily separates himself from the natural order and asserts himself as a member of a kingdom of ends. Such a one loses the fresh and joyous spontaneity and naïveté that characterized him when he lived a life of nature or, if we will, when he regarded all nature as living his life. Turned in upon itself, as it were, his mind not only loses that feeling of oneness and of unity with the world but even comes into conflict with itself. The price of self-consciousness is strife between the spiritual and the natural elements in man. This is the experience which St. Paul has portrayed in so masterly a way when he says, for example, "But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Hence the cry, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" But the results are worth the cost. It is through such sincere questioning and through the moral endeavor to which it gives rise that St. Paul solves the riddle and is enabled to testify, "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

True freedom and complete selfhood are not a heritage into possession of which man comes at birth, but they are, as Fichte and Carlyle attest, things that must be achieved. It is only in the throes of ceaseless striving that the soul is born into the kingdom of God; its birthright is gained only through a struggle, and this struggle means pain and unrest. To regard this struggle, therefore, as something pathological or as significant of degeneration is as utterly false as it is to assert that living in the state of, and on the plane of, nature is living the life that is "natural" to man. Man is sent into the world with a spiritual mission. He has an appointed goal, the development of his own nature as a rational being, and this goal he can reach only by way of the cross. Striving and unrest, it is true, are not ends in themselves: they are not themselves the final goal. When Fichte interprets ex-

perience as an infinite or never-ceasing striving, this expression of his titanic spirit and of his earnest moral nature needs the corrective that is found in the philosophy of his more intellectualistically-minded successor. For, while man cannot remain on the plane of existence which he occupies on entering the world, the end of his development must, nevertheless, be the restoration on a higher plane of the peace of mind, the harmony with all nature, and the unity with God that he there enjoys. Nevertheless, as Hegel points out in his suggestive remarks on the story of paradise, it is important to remember that, while Jesus said that we must become as children if we would enter the kingdom of God, this is very far from saying that we must always remain as children. We must have the trust in God and the harmony with him that is characteristic of childhood, yet the relation ought not to remain the merely immediate one of blind, naïve confidence. We must live not only in the light of God but also in the knowledge of God; if spiritual things are to have real significance for us, we must become truly conscious of God and of the intimate bond of relationship between God and self. To attain to this, however, we must first come to a consciousness of selfhood, and this involves that cleavage between the natural and spiritual which is the basis in our experience of the consciousness of sin. Viewed, then, in their concrete setting and in the light of the whole development of experience, mental anguish and unrest assume an entirely different complexion from that which they bear when we consider them abstractly, or merely contrast them with the preceding state of satisfaction and contentment.

As the consciousness of sin is involved in the attainment of the consciousness of self, so also it is a necessary step in the process by which we come to know God and the deeper significance of spiritual things. Again we find it profitable to turn to St. Augustine. Sin, he tells us, must be conceived through an antithesis without which it never could have been. God did not allow man to sin in order that he might punish but in order that he might have an opportunity to save and thus to manifest his deepest and most essential nature, that of love, to man. Christ did not come because of Adam, but Adam because of Christ. Sin came into the world only that grace might the more abound.

Only by understanding the sacrifice that God was willing to make in order that man's relations with him might not be cut off, could man come to see God as he really is or to sound the depths of his love; only when man learned to know the God who suffers with him and for him, could he come to know the true God. And, we might add, man must first have experienced that loneliness of heart which comes from feeling himself shut off from the objective world before he can appreciate in any measure the sweetness and delight of communion with God.

But there is also another important sense in which the knowledge of God is bound up with the consciousness of sin. A conception of the highest realities, Kant has helped us to see, can be gained only by one who rises above the causal nexus of the natural order and those desires, instincts, and impulses which drive him blindly on to action, and lives in the light of the freedom that characterizes him as a rational being. To acquire, then, any adequate conception of the nature either of man or of God, man must distinguish himself from all objects of nature and recognize and assert himself as a subject who wills and who knows. Thus to know one's self, to come to an explicit consciousness of freedom and of rationality, is essential for a knowledge of Him who is revealed in all that is but whose highest and truest revelation is in the human heart. The true God is found not by looking without but by looking within, for the true God is not an object of perception but is spirit and is truth. Elijah, therefore, could not find God in the strong wind that rent the mountains, or in the earthquake, or in the fire, but only in the still small voice of his own heart. To learn the nature of spirit, however, man's spirit must return from its objective interests back upon itself; by such a recoil alone can spirit differentiate itself from the external order of nature and come to see itself in its own true character. And it is this occupation with one's own inner life, this reflection on self, that occasions the realization of the contradiction between one's deepest and most essential nature of freedom and that causal bondage of sensuous being which prevents the complete attainment at any time of all one knows and really wills. It is through the consciousness of sin, then, that we are led to a truer knowledge of God because the

very conception of God as universal spirit, and not as merely a particular object among other objects, must be gained through a consciousness of our own essential nature. Only he who knows the self and its implications can conceive of a God who is not limited by external forces and the restraints of the space-time order but who is truly infinite and Lord over all. Confirmations of this may be found wherever we look in the history of religion. It was Jesus who revealed to mankind a universal God of love whose relations to man are expressible only in terms of the relations of spirit to spirit, of self to self. But the time for Jesus' coming was not fulfilled until Jahveh had passed beyond the stage of a naturalistic god who needed to be nourished and strengthened by food and drink, or a political god struggling for the supremacy of his people and for the extermination of rival gods and their worshippers, a god who delighted in the blood of goats and of calves and who could be appeased by sacrifice alone. Suffering and misfortune must have intervened to direct man's mind from the external world with its goods and pleasures back to the greater world within, to the realities of self and spirit. Israel needed first to know the God who requires righteousness and obedience, who delights in heartfelt praise and thanksgiving, and who delivers in times of spiritual trouble and distress, before it could understand the import of a spiritual kingdom and of a God whose throne is in the hearts of men, or before it was prepared for the fuller revelation of God in the life and teachings of Jesus.

But just as the consciousness of sin is inevitably bound up with the development by which man comes to the consciousness of self and to the knowledge of God's true nature, so also is it a necessary step in the progress by which self comes to know other selves, and man his fellow-man. And, furthermore, until man breaks the ties that confine him to the causal nexus of nature, and ceases to regard himself as a natural object, he cannot know of any other kinship between men but that of blood, or realize that any duties can be binding beyond the limits of such relationship. Man must rise above the level of nature, the state in which he is a mere part interacting with other parts, swayed hither and thither by the response of desire and impulse to the

forces of environment, before he can conceive of that spiritual bond which unites man to man and all to God. Whoever fails to distinguish between himself and the objects of his consciousness or the order of nature cannot enter the "City of God," but remains shut up in the seclusion of clan or tribe, together with a small body of related individuals and a finite, naturalistic God. It was only, for example, after the Greeks had lost their joyous, naturalistic temper, when misfortune had turned their thoughts to the inner life, that the Stoic, in shutting himself up in the seclusion, as he believed, of the self, first discovered that he was a citizen not of Greece but of the world. Similarly, the religion of India overcame caste distinctions and proclaimed a message of salvation for all men only in so far as it was successful in directing the attention from God as an existent object to be worshipped by elaborate ritual and sacrifice to the inner principle in the recesses of man's consciousness. And while the further development of Brahmanism and of Buddhism was checked by its too extreme subjectivistic emphasis, so that it never attained to the conception of a universal God who is the source and preserver of all that exists, yet the advance from the naturalistic to the subjectivistic level of thought, even though attended by intense mental anguish and unrest, was yet the stepping-stone to the conception of the kinship of all men and to a religion which was universal in its nature and in its appeal.

The consciousness of sin, then, is not a pathological state that signifies moral degeneration: it tells us rather that man is created not as part of nature but as lord over it. It means that man not merely has a place in a concatenated order of things but that he is the source of ideas and of ideals to which he attempts to give embodiment. Man does, it is true, start from the stage of innocence, and as long as, and in so far as, he lives on this plane and is devoid of ideals and of rational ends with which he identifies himself and which he aims to impress upon the world, he occupies a place within a mechanical system and may, in a sense, be said to be in harmony with the universe round about him. As a rational being, however, it is impossible that man should rest here. He must not only be in harmony with the universe but he must will to be, and know himself as being, in harmony with

the best that he knows. It is the nature of a thing to be part of a rigid causal order, but it is the nature of a self freely to determine itself to become and to be a member of a kingdom of ends. If, however, it is the mission of man not only to be part of a world which the Creator pronounced good but to determine himself to goodness and to grow in spiritual strength by the effort actively to impress his ideals upon the world, he must first of all take conscious possession of himself. It is true, of course, that when man arrives at this stage he may, and often does, betray his own interests and, in acting contrary to his ideals, fall out of harmony not only with the natural order but with the spiritual order as well. Nevertheless, the consciousness of sin is significant of progress in the spiritual life of man and of development in the history of religions, because it ushers in the birth of selfhood and the knowledge that God and man are spiritual and not natural beings; because it is bound up with the self-determination of the individual under the guidance of rational ideals; and because it affords the only basis for regarding man as a being who has ultimate value and significance in the eternal kingdom of God.

HARVARD HYMNS

WARREN SEYMOUR ARCHIBALD

PITTSFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS.

I

Most readers of this article have sung, and many have learned by heart, a noble Christmas hymn whose music is now heard in more than one continent:—

It came upon the midnight clear,
That glorious song of old;

but few of those who sing and love it know that it was written by a country minister who graduated from the Harvard Divinity School. Fewer still are aware that a series of men have proceeded from this department of Harvard University who, for now almost a hundred years, have maintained this succession in sacred song. What may properly be called a school of religious poetry constitutes a worthy part of the contribution to literary culture which Harvard has made and which through many generations formed the peculiar and greatest distinction of New England.

In this matter Harvard may claim to have carried on the tradition of the English universities. One of the circumstances which lend dignity and honor to Oxford and Cambridge has been the presence there from time to time of men who are truly called religious poets, because they have had a genius for expressing in lyric and epic verse that interior mystery which gives our humanity "her kindred with the stars." Such men at the English universities occupy no inconspicuous place in the records of English literature. No description of the seventeenth century, for example, could be complete without mention of Herbert, Crashaw, and Vaughan. Nor, indeed, could the temper of that intensely religious period in the first part of the seventeenth century be understood without this lasting expression of that devout piety, pas-

sionate love, and high thought, which in various ways made the period so tumultuous. In Herbert we see the moral earnestness and sincere piety which have always characterized a large element in the English-speaking race. In Crashaw can be studied the ecstatic and mystical spirit of Roman Catholicism which found in his time a visible expression in the religious brotherhood gathered about Nicholas Ferrar at Little Gidding,—a spirit which has received renewed and beautiful utterance in the religious romance of *John Inglesant*. In Vaughan, the poet in the Welsh valley of Usk, the legendary home of Arthur, appears that Celtic strain which in our English race has been a highway for visions and the visitation of dreams. And the name of Milton, who was the contemporary of these more quiet souls, needs only to be mentioned in order to recall his relation to the religious strain in our inheritance. These traits and these traditions have had a certain parallel here at Harvard; for if no harvest of song was among the first-fruits of New England,—no one will be so patriotic as to include Michael Wigglesworth's *Day of Doom* among religious lyrics,—nevertheless the seed was planted which in good time brought forth, if not an hundred fold, at least a reasonable thirty or forty.

The list of these Harvard poets includes O. B. Frothingham, Emerson, H. H. Furness, Henry Ware, Jr., E. H. Sears, James Freeman Clarke, Samuel Longfellow, Samuel Johnson, J. W. Chadwick, F. L. Hosmer, William C. Gannett, and others,—men whose names are many of them less familiar than are their hymns, but who possessed a certain unity and fellowship of deep spiritual feeling which makes it right to call them a school of writers of hymns. It is a striking fact that verses which have since travelled “over the hills and far away” among books and people were written by men while they were still students in the Divinity School, and frequently for the old Divinity Commencement, called Visitation Day, at which, as in other institutions, a hymn written by a student was a prominent part. One of the best of these was written by Edward Rowland Sill, whom most of us know as the Californian poet, not as a student of divinity at Harvard. His hymn is a lyric invocation for the gifts of the spirit.

Send down thy truth, O God!
Too long the shadows frown,
Too long the darkened way we've trod,
Thy truth, O Lord, send down!

Send down thy spirit free,
Till wilderness and town
One temple for thy worship be,
Thy spirit, O, send down!

Send down thy love, thy life,
Our lesser lives to crown,
And cleanse them of their hate and strife,
Thy living love send down!

Send down thy peace, O Lord!
Earth's bitter voices drown
In one deep ocean of accord,
Thy peace, O God, send down!

II

A particular description of all these men would be tedious. So let us select some typical ones, whose work possesses special interest. We may divide the writers of the school into three groups. The first dates from about 1820, and includes Henry Ware, Jr., Frederic H. Hedge, Andrews Norton, Stephen G. Bulfinch, James Freeman Clarke, Theodore Parker, Edmund H. Sears, Horace H. Furness, and C. A. Bartol. All these men attained distinction. Ware, Hedge, and Norton occupied professorships at Harvard. Bartol was for fifty-two years minister of the old West Church in Boston. Clarke was for almost half a century minister of the Church of the Disciples in Boston. Theodore Parker speaks for himself. Sears is well known not only as a hymn writer but as the author of a book of rare spiritual insight, *The Fourth Gospel the Heart of Christ*. Furness was an active pastor in Philadelphia for fifty years, and as minister active and emeritus served his church for the amazingly long term of seventy-one years.

Perhaps the best-known hymns in this group were written by Clarke, Sears, Furness, and Parker. Clarke wrote a number of

hymns, but that which has travelled farthest is the one written in 1856:—

Father, to us thy children, humbly kneeling,
 Conscious of weakness, ignorance, sin, and shame,
 Give such a force of holy thought and feeling
 That we may live to glorify thy name,

That we may conquer base desire and passion,
 That we may rise from selfish thought and will,
 O'ercome the world's allurements, threat, and fashion,
 Walk humbly, gently, leaning on thee still.

Let all thy goodness by our minds be seen,
 Let all thy mercy on our souls be sealed.
 Lord, if thou wilt, thy power can make us clean;
 O, speak the word, thy servants shall be healed.

Among these men, the name of Sears is perhaps the least known, and yet, of all the hymns, his are probably the most famous. He preferred the life of a country parson in Wayland, Lancaster, and Weston, Massachusetts, because this gave him more leisure for study and writing. His two Christmas hymns are sung now in all churches in America and Great Britain. Almost every one knows the Christmas song:—

It came upon the midnight clear,
 That glorious song of old,
 From angels bending near the earth
 To touch their harps of gold:
 "Peace on the earth, good-will to men,
 From heaven's all-gracious King."
 The world in solemn stillness lay
 To hear the angels sing.

Still through the cloven skies they come,
 With peaceful wings unfurled,
 And still their heavenly music floats
 O'er all the weary world;
 Above its sad and lowly plains
 They bend on hovering wing,
 And ever o'er its Babel sounds
 The blessed angels sing.

And ye, beneath life's crushing load
 Whose forms are bending low,
 Who toil along the climbing way,
 With painful steps and slow,—
 Look now, for glad and golden hours
 Come swiftly on the wing:
 O, rest beside the weary road,
 And hear the angels sing!

For lo! the days are hastening on
 By prophet bards foretold,
 When with the ever-circling years
 Comes round the age of gold,
 When Peace shall over all the earth
 Its ancient splendors fling,
 And the whole world give back the song
 Which now the angels sing.

Another hymn of his is almost as well known, and appears in most collections as a companion of the first one:—

Calm on the listening ear of night
 Come heaven's melodious strains.

Furness wrote an unusually large number of religious lyrics. They have a simplicity of phrase and clearness of thought which remind one of many of the hymns written by Keble and Faber. Of them I venture to think that his vesper hymn will compel the hearts of the largest congregation. I think I have read somewhere that Emerson called it the finest hymn in the world. At any rate it holds a high place.

Slowly, by thy hand unfurled,
 Down around the weary world
 Falls the darkness. O, how still
 Is the working of thy will!

Mighty Maker, ever nigh,
 Work in me as silently,
 Veil the day's distracting sights,
 Show me heaven's eternal lights;

Living worlds to view be brought
 In the boundless realms of thought,
 High and infinite desires,
 Flaming like those upper fires;

Holy truth, eternal right,
Let them break upon my sight,
Let them shine, serene and still,
And with light my being fill.

Attention has frequently been called to men who have reached and held a high distinction by virtue of one book or of one poem. Gray, for example, is practically known only through his "Elegy in a Country Churchyard." The same remark can be made of Theodore Parker as a religious poet. He is known only, and yet very widely and justly, through his hymn beginning,—

O thou great Friend to all the sons of men.

It is interesting that this originally appeared as a sonnet, of which the hymn gives the first three quatrains. As a hymn, it was first published by Longfellow and Johnson in their *Book of Hymns*.

III

The second group dates from the years following 1840, and includes Samuel Longfellow, Samuel Johnson, T. W. Higginson, O. B. Frothingham, and Jones Very. These were an interesting group of men, both because of their high work in religious poetry and because of their connection with Transcendentalism. Samuel Longfellow and Samuel Johnson may be spoken of together, because they were friends who found a happy partnership in writing and thinking. As seniors in the Divinity School, they compiled an anthology of religious poems of unusual value. "They read, criticised, and compared literally thousands of hymns, ransacking the collections of all denominations, and the poetry of other languages besides our own; gleaning even in the newspapers, and utilizing portions of poems by skilful adaptation. . . . It is probable that Mrs. Adams's 'Nearer, my God, to thee,' here first appeared, at least in an American collection. Beautiful hymns from Sears, Furness, Clarke, H. B. Stowe, Emerson, H. W. Longfellow, Trench, Very, Lowell, and others still fresh, if not wholly new, enriched the volume. They diligently gathered material, also, from private sources, and did not fail in

the courage it then required to invite contributions from Theodore Parker. A number of the hymns were original, written by the compilers themselves or by their friends, partly with a view to the particular aims of the new collection. Most, if not all of these, they published as anonymous, and not all have ever been credited to their authors; but among them were some of the finest, which have remained among the treasures of our hymnology."¹

One hymn in this collection deserves particular mention. They found it in an American newspaper. It was anonymous, but they felt at once its lofty mood and exquisite phrasing. They recognized its nobility, and placed it in their book. It was Newman's "Lead, kindly Light." That discovery speaks well for the editors' range and insight. It must be noted, however, in all honesty, that they made several changes in the phrasing of the hymn, which were decidedly no improvement, and which they had the good judgment to remove in a later edition. This tendency to make alterations in the poems, unfortunately present in the *Book of Hymns*, was even more conspicuous in the revised edition which appeared in 1864 under a new title, *Hymns of the Spirit*.

T. W. Higginson, one of the contributors to the *Book of Hymns*, writes, "My sister, an intimate friend of Mr. Longfellow, satirized this propensity in one of the nonsense stanzas then so prevalent. It must be premised that as both of the editors were named Samuel, their book was often characterized the 'Sam-Book.'

'There were two Sams of America
Who belonged to the profession called "clerica."
They hunted up hymns
And cut off their limbs,
These truculent Sams of America.'

Longfellow entered heartily into this joke, and illustrated the verse with a pen-and-ink sketch, representing two young men with large shears cutting up rolls of paper. The likeness of Johnson, who was very handsome, with the air of a high-caste Parsee or Assyrian, was unmistakable."²

¹ Samuel Longfellow, by Joseph May, p. 50.

² Ibid., p. 54.

The chief interest of these two, and that of all this group, lies for us in their connection with Transcendentalism; for their hymns are spiritual ballads in that border-land of idealism. Most of these men lived in the glory of that movement, for in 1843, the year that Longfellow and Johnson entered the Divinity School, Emerson printed *Nature*. The work of these two men is very likely the best representative of this group and period. It is hardly too much to say that in their religious poetry Transcendentalism is seen at its best, because in these lyrics was uttered the finer spiritual character of that movement without exaggeration and fantastic obscurity. Their poetry emphasized and expressed the spirit in man answering to the spirit in God, the divine in humanity calling to the divine in the Infinite Father. All their poems have a common spirit and a classic beauty, a passion for simplicity and the universal. We shall search far before we find a nobler utterance of that truth that "God is through all and in you all" than is given in this poem by Samuel Longfellow:—

God of the earth, the sky, the sea,
 Maker of all above, below,
 Creation lives and moves in thee;
 Thy present life through all doth flow.

Thy love is in the sunshine's glow,
 Thy life is in the quickening air;
 When lightnings flash and storm-winds blow,
 There is thy power, thy law is there.

We feel thy calm at evening's hour,
 Thy grandeur in the march of night,
 And when the morning breaks in power,
 We hear thy word, "Let there be light."

But higher far, and far more clear,
 Thee in man's spirit we behold,
 Thine image and thyself are there,—
 The indwelling God, proclaimed of old.

A fine enthusiasm, a militant faith, chants in the lines on the Church which both men wrote. It is very striking to find two

poems written by two friends on the same theme, in the same period, both attaining distinction and yet remaining quite dissimilar. The hymn by Samuel Johnson on the City of God is as truly positive as if it had come from the mediaeval "ages of faith":—

City of God, how broad and far
 Outspread thy walls sublime!
 The true thy chartered freemen are,
 Of every age and clime.

One holy Church, one army strong,
 One steadfast high intent,
 One working band, one harvest-song,
 One King omnipotent!

How purely hath thy speech come down
 From man's primeval youth!
 How grandly hath thine empire grown
 Of freedom, love, and truth!

How gleam thy watch-fires through the night
 With never fainting ray!
 How rise thy towers, serene and bright,
 To meet the dawning day!

In vain the surge's angry shock,
 In vain the drifting sands;
 Unharmed upon the eternal rock,
 The eternal city stands.

And few religious poets in Oxford or in Cambridge have with any more truth, simplicity, and spiritual ardor given utterance to their century's vision of the Church than has Samuel Longfellow in the cadence of these lines:—

One holy Church of God appears
 Through every age and race,
 Unwasted by the lapse of years,
 Unchanged by changing place.

From oldest time, on farthest shores,
 Beneath the pine or palm,
 One unseen presence she adores,
 With silence or with psalm.

Her priests are all God's faithful sons,
 To serve the world raised up;
 The pure in heart, her baptized ones;
 Love, her communion-cup.

The truth is her prophetic gift,
 The soul her sacred page;
 And feet on mercy's errands swift
 Do make her pilgrimage.

O living Church, thine errand speed,
 Fulfil thy task sublime,
 With bread of life earth's hunger feed,
 Redeem the evil time!

IV

The third group dates from about 1860 and the following years, and includes E. R. Sill, F. L. Hosmer, W. C. Gannett, J. W. Chadwick, and S. C. Beach. They are connected by inheritance with the Transcendentalists, and they maintain the lyric strain which characterized Samuel Longfellow and his friends. Sill is known to most of us as a poet who belongs to the same circle of thought as Emerson, Arnold, Tennyson,—a man whose message is always ethical, touched with gracious dignity and wistful visions. Doubtless few think of him as a religious poet or hymn writer. But like Theodore Parker he has written one hymn which is widely known and conspicuous for its spirit of devotion:—

Send down thy truth, O God.

Another member of this group, John White Chadwick, has the distinction of having written a hymn for the old Visitation Day which, like Sill's, promises to endure. One stanza will indicate its quality:—

Eternal Ruler of the ceaseless round
 Of circling planets singing on their way,
 Guide of the nations from the night profound
 Into the glory of the perfect day,
 Rule in our hearts, that we may ever be
 Guided, and strengthened, and upheld by thee.

This exalted invocation is a modern psalm in its ease, clearness, and emotion.

Of this group, the two men who seem most prominent, and who continue the work of Longfellow and Johnson, are William C. Gannett and Frederick L. Hosmer. Both have the lyric quality, the ability to express religious feeling in simple and unencumbered lines. Both are in a large measure unfettered by the weight of commonplace, unburdened by heavily gilded words or phrases of an ancient symbolism. It is wholly proper, of course, to employ the older metaphors and epithets, but in that case, if the hymn is to possess a real and honest distinction, the language must be confessedly archaic. It is legitimate, and in many cases profitable, to be pre-raphaelite, but then the work must be signed "P. R. B." These poets are not pre-raphaelite. They are men of their own time. And they are also, as every poet must be, men who write in the light of the Eternal. The feeling which they express is of the eternal Spirit in man, which is from everlasting to everlasting; the utterance is distinctly colored by the thought of their own time.

Gannett's poetry has a singular felicity, a sharp, clear, New England tone and atmosphere. His words are as distinct as green trees in a snow-covered field; they have the clearness and sharpness which in a New England winter on a bright sunny day the hills, the boundary lines, the solitary trees outlined against the sky impressively possess. For example, these lines, which have for their text the familiar words "Consider the lilies, how they grow," show both this clearness of thought and felicity in expression:—

He hides within the lily
 A strong and tender care,
 That wins the earth-born atoms
 To glory of the air;
 He weaves the shining garments
 Unceasingly and still,
 Along the quiet waters,
 In niches of the hill.

We linger at the vigil
 With him who bent the knee
 To watch the old-time lilies
 In distant Galilee;

And still the worship deepens,
And quickens into new,
As brightening down the ages
God's secret thrilleth through.

O Toiler of the lily,
Thy touch is in the Man!
No leaf that dawns to petal
But hints the angel-plan.
The flower horizons open!
The blossom vaster shows!
We hear the wide worlds echo,—
See how the lily grows!

Shy yearnings of the savage,
Unfolding thought by thought,
To holy lives are lifted,
To visions fair are wrought;
The races rise and cluster,
And evils fade and fall,
Till chaos blooms to beauty,
Thy purpose crowning all!

Hosmer's poetry reminds one very much of Samuel Longfellow. It has the same lucidity, the same skilful employment of common words in such a way that they assume noble and dignified phrasing. Words are very much like people. The Great Master of men could out of fishermen and publicans make the noble army of martyrs. And a master of words, like Lincoln, can out of very common words construct the immemorial prayer of a nation. This is difficult. It is seldom achieved, yet the achievement is the goal of all who strive to utter the thought of God in the words of man. Whenever it is done, whether in large or small degree, we see the best work. Something of this achievement is found in Hosmer's religious poetry. He can express exalted thought in single and intelligible words, the clearness of which does not detract from their felicity. There is no thought more exalted than that of the mystery of God, and few expressions of that mystery have more sweetness and light than these lines:—

O thou, in all thy might so far,
In all thy love so near,
Beyond the range of sun and star,
And yet beside us here,—

What heart can comprehend thy name,
Or, searching, find thee out,
Who art within, a quickening flame,
A presence round about?

Yet, though I know thee but in part,
I ask not, Lord, for more:
Enough for me to know thou art,
To love thee and adore.

O, sweeter than aught else besides,
The tender mystery
That like a veil of shadow hides
The light I may not see!

And dearer than all things I know
Is childlike faith to me,
That makes the darkest way I go
An open path to thee.

V

'The men whom we have considered in these three groups constitute, as I have said, a school in religious poetry. For almost one hundred years they have expressed in lyric verse, much of it enduring, much of it beautiful, one phase of the choice religious life of New England. This is significant, if one said no more; but we cannot help remembering that New England, with her theology and her conscience, her religion and her ancient parishes, with her godly men and women strengthened by the austerity of that theology, ennobled by the vigor of that conscience, and given a gracious sweetness and dignity by that spiritual religion,—this New England has been no inconsiderable part of America. At her best she and her ancient college at Cambridge have stood for idealism. Some have asked what centre is there at Harvard around which her activities may gather? The answer is, this

idealism. The ideal for which scholars in old Cambridge fled to a wilderness, for which the college was founded, which has nurtured and bred her poets, her scholars, her divines, her men of affairs and of simplicity of heart and life. The college has endured only because it has by faith seen the invisible. And again some will say, "New England theology has collapsed; what standard is there to which New England Puritanism can repair?" And again the answer is, idealism. That was the life of the New England theology. It has never passed away. It is indestructible. It can build once more a noble mansion for the mind; can rear once more its systems of divinity, its intellectual homes. This faith is established in the knowledge that the soil where fine religious poetry grows is good soil. If the soil has hitherto brought forth these flowers, it promises a yet richer harvest in song and thought.

Of this idealism, this faith, these poets of religion have given noble and true expression. They have kept alive from year to year the sacred fire which burns below all systems of thought and bodies of divinity, which glows in the heart of man and flames in the centre of the universe. They have found the common faith below the sectarian superstructure, the deep foundations on which every spiritual edifice is reared. These poems have survived the controversies and divisions, and they have entered into the rest even of hymn books foreign to their authors' creed.

The most significant remark, therefore, which can be made about this school of poetry is this: these men have expressed that spirit of idealism which is after all the very essence of our New England theology, the fibre of New England character, the common faith of the ancestral order. They have given utterance to this idealism in lyric verse, set to the music of old tunes, —the truest and most permanent tabernacle for a spirit so fragile and so indestructible.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE GREAT PROBLEM. *By Ivan Howland Benedict.* pp. 8+190. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1 net.
- ALEXANDER VIETS GRISWOLD ALLEN. 1841-1908. *By Charles Lewis Slattery.* pp. 12+296. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1911. \$2 net.
- TRUTH AND REALITY. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. *By John Elof Boodin.* pp. 10+334. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.75 net.
- THE REASON OF LIFE. *By William Porcher DuBose.* pp. 6+274. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST. *By Edward Scribner Ames.* pp. 4+123. Chicago: The Bethany Press, The New Christian Century Company. [1911.]
- INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE OF CHRIST. *By William Bancroft Hill.* pp. 10+226. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. \$1.25 net.
- EVERYMAN'S RELIGION. *By George Hodges.* pp. 6+297. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THE FIVE GREAT PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE. *By William DeWitt Hyde.* pp. 10+296. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THE PEDAGOGICS OF PREACHING. BEING THE SUBSTANCE OF LECTURES GIVEN AT THE HARTLEY COLLEGE, MANCHESTER, IN 1910 AND IN 1911. *By Thiselton Mark.* pp. 92. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1911.] 50 cents net.
- GOD IN EVOLUTION. A PRAGMATIC STUDY OF THEOLOGY. *By Francis Howe Johnson.* pp. 8+354. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1911. \$1.60 net.
- THE HIGHER CRITICAL QUANDARY. A CORRESPONDENCE WITH DRS. BRIGGS AND DRIVER. *By Harold M. Wiener.* pp. (23). (Reprint from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, July, 1911.)
- GREAT RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF THE EAST. *By Alfred W. Martin.* pp. 10+268. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.25 net.
- THE AUTHORITY OF MIGHT AND RIGHT. *By A. v. C. P. Huizinga.* pp. 40. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. 50 cents net.

- DOES PRAYER AVAIL?** *By William W. Kinsley.* pp. 157. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$1 net.
- THE ORIENTAL RELIGIONS IN ROMAN PAGANISM.** *By Franz Cumont. With an Introductory Essay by Grant Showerman.* pp. 26+298. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1911.
- DAS APOSTELDEKRET (ACT 15, 28, 29). SEINE ENTSTEHUNG UND GELTUNG IN DEN ERSTEN VIER JAHRHUNDERTEN.** (PREISCHRIFT.) *Von K. Six.* (Veröffentlichungen des Biblisch-Patristischen Seminars zu Innsbruck, 5.) pp. 20+166. Innsbruck: Verlag von Felizian Rauch (L. Pustet). 1912. Unbound, 2 marks, 55; bound, 3 marks, 20.
- THE EARLIER EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL, THEIR MOTIVE AND ORIGIN.** *By Kirsopp Lake.* pp. 12+466. London: Rivingtons. 1911. 16 shillings net.
- A WAY OF HONOR AND OTHER COLLEGE SERMONS.** *By Henry Kingman.* pp. 210. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1911.] \$1 net.
- A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON MICAH, ZEPHANIAH, NAHUM, HABAKKUK, OBADIAH AND JOEL.** *By John Merlin Powis Smith, William Hayes Ward, Julius A. Bewer.* (The International Critical Commentary.) pp. 20+364+28+146. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. \$3 net.
- THE MINISTER AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE.** *By Frank W. Gunsaulus.* (Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1911.) New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1911.] \$1.25 net.
- THE MAKERS AND TEACHERS OF JUDAISM FROM THE FALL OF JERUSALEM TO THE DEATH OF HEROD THE GREAT.** *By Charles Foster Kent.* (The Historical Bible.) pp. 14+323. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. \$1.25 net.
- THE WAR WITHIN, BEING A FEW ADMONITORY THOUGHTS UPON SOME MODERN TEMPTATIONS.** *By John Edwards LeBosquet.* pp. 6+135. Boulder, Colo.: Published by the First Congregational Church. 1911.
- AUTHORITY. THE FUNCTION OF AUTHORITY IN LIFE AND ITS RELATION TO LEGALISM IN ETHICS AND RELIGION.** *By A. v. C. P. Huizinga.* pp. 10+270. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1911. \$2.25 net.
- THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES.** *By Henry Churchill King.* pp. 18+393. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. \$1.50 net.
- THE CHURCH IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES. A HISTORY OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE CONFEDERATE STATES.** *By Joseph Blount Cheshire.* pp. 10+291. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1912. \$1.50 net.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V.

APRIL, 1912

NUMBER 2

RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF MORAL EVOLUTION

JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Ethical writers, like biologists, are no longer concerned with the mere fact of evolution. They are dealing with more specific questions of causes and methods. And, as with biology, two stages in the study may be expected. Biologists were at first interested in the historical question: What was the origin of species? They were temporarily satisfied with the answer: Natural selection, operating in conjunction with heredity and variation. Now, however, a clue to the specific method of heredity has been found in Mendelism, the causes operative in producing variation are being discovered by experimentation, and biology is entering upon a constructive stage which promises great results for agriculture, and perhaps also for human health and well-being. Ethics is as yet almost entirely in the descriptive stage. Perhaps we are staggered at the complexity of present problems, and timidly leave to the practical reformer or politician the responsible task of making positive suggestions. But, when the past evolution has been thoroughly analyzed, it may be hoped that social reform and moral education will be more intelligent. The interest of these problems for the student of religion is also obvious. For, to illustrate by one suggestion out of many, we ask: What causes the difference in the ideals of different ages and races? Is it religion, or philosophy, or economic needs and conditions solely? And shall the religious teacher who would hasten the Kingdom of God appeal to the conscience or to the legislature, or, in the conviction that neither

of these avails, shall he stand still and wait for the inventor and the inevitable social revolution? It would be absurd to say that we are yet in a position to answer this old question conclusively, but it is not too much to say that no one can now afford to give dogmatic answers without first considering the complexity of the interaction which is increasingly coming into view between religious, political, economic, aesthetic, and ethical factors.

The important literature in this field which has appeared within the past five years¹ may be conveniently treated by noting what it has to say on one or more of four questions: (1) What is the origin of the idea and feeling of moral obligation? (2) In what respects has there been evolution and what are the chief stages in the process? (3) What are the causes or occasions of changes in morality? (4) What criterion shall be used in judging the evolution, to determine whether a given change is moral advance or the reverse? More particularly at present, this is apt to take the form: Is moral evolution an increasing knowledge of one true standard of right and good *plus* an increased willingness to follow this, or is there an increasing change in the good itself? This is the question of absolutism *versus* pragmatism.

I

In seeking the origin of moral ideas and sentiments, the most significant tendency is the increased importance given to custom. It has long been recognized that custom was the antecedent of conscious moral conduct, but the precise significance of this is

¹ The following books are referred to in the text, although some of them deal only incidentally with the genetic questions which we are considering:

Edward Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. i, 1906; vol. ii, 1908.

Leonard T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 1906.

William G. Sumner, *Folkways*, 1907.

John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics*, 1908.

Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, 1908.

William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1908.

C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909.

Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 1908.

Hugo Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, 1909.

John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, 1910.

Addison W. Moore, *Pragmatism and its Critics*, 1910.

now emerging more clearly. No such comprehensive survey of customs as is afforded by Sumner and Westermarck had previously been available. The very mass of the material undoubtedly brings a certain impression not produced by a presentation less fully attested by documents. But the various studies of social psychology by Tarde, Baldwin, Cooley, Giddings, Wundt, and others had also prepared for a better interpretation of this material. Formerly, too, custom was thought of as belonging chiefly, if not solely, to savage life. We thought of taboos and lucky rites, of "cleanness" and sacrifices, of initiations and the ban upon speaking with a mother-in-law. Westermarck gives us a wealth of such material. But Sumner presents no less impressively the dominant influence of customs as a factor in present civilization. Under the guise of "mores" they shape our thinking and conduct in all except the tiny sphere in which we may be able and willing to do some thinking for ourselves. Ross and Cooley have thrown light upon some of the laws at work in the formation and transmission of such customs. It may be expected that special studies on special manifestations of such group standards and local standards will appear. Instead of viewing our fellows abstractly, and appealing, often with complete futility, to the supposedly unbiassed conscience of an everywhere equal man, we shall recognize the complexity of motives, and though we may not accept the economic or sociological determinism which makes all moral standards the bare resultant of economic and sociological forces, we shall yet appreciate more clearly what may be expected in immediate response, and what may come only as a result of a changed habit of mind. Furthermore, the instructive comparisons made by Westermarck and Hobhouse between the attitudes of various times and peoples inevitably tend to awaken a questioning temper toward many current usages which are now unthinkingly or complacently accepted. To show the likeness between present and savage morality on this and that matter tends alike to increase our respect for the savage and to prevent satisfaction with ourselves.

What, then, is the meaning of custom? How does custom establish itself, and under what conditions? By what agencies is it changed or replaced?

Custom has in it two well-marked factors, somewhat differently phrased by various writers, namely, (a) habit, (b) valuation of a general, or at least non-personal, sort. Thus Hobhouse says:

It is not merely a habit of action, but it implies also a judgment upon action, and a judgment stated in general and impersonal terms.

Similarly, Westermarck holds that all morality rests on disinterested retributive emotions (kindly or the reverse). But some retributive emotions are not moral. Why is it then, he asks, that disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and the flavor of generality have become characteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive emotions? The solution of this problem, according to Westermarck, lies in the fact that society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness; that the first moral judgments expressed, not the private emotions of isolated individuals, but emotions which were felt by the society at large; that tribal custom was the earliest rule of duty. Customs have been defined as public habits, the habits of a certain circle. But custom is also a rule of conduct, and as such it is a generalization of emotional tendencies. The most salient feature of custom is its generality. It is fixed once for all, and takes no notice of the preferences of individuals. By recognizing the validity of a custom I implicitly admit that the custom is equally binding for me and for you and for all the other members of the society. This involves disinterestedness; I admit that a breach of custom is equally wrong whether I am myself immediately concerned in the act or not. It also involves apparent impartiality. And though a certain rule may have a selfish or partial origin, it becomes a true custom, a moral rule, as soon as the selfishness or the particularity of its makers is lost sight of.

Sumner has used two distinct words to emphasize the two aspects. By "folkways" he thinks of customs chiefly under their aspects of uniformity, repetition, and wide concurrence. But when popular usages and traditions include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare, and when they exert a coercion on the individual to conform to them, although they are not co-ordinated by any authority, he calls them "mores."

Doubtless the term "customs" suggests but slightly any moral element, and to bring out strongly the factor of control and emotional approval it is desirable to use a term less neutral. The name "mores" promises to gain acceptance. Sumner, indeed, in his emphasis upon the mores denies that there is any other morality or ethics worthy of study:

The modern peoples have made morals and morality a separate domain by the side of religion, philosophy, and politics. In that sense morals is an impossible and unreal category. It has no existence and can have none. The word moral means what belongs or appertains to the mores. Therefore the category of morals can never be defined without reference to something outside of itself.

Out of the mores grow institutions and laws, and from time to time philosophers attempt to formulate the ideals found in the mores, and use them as moral standards, supposing that they derive them from some source above experience. But the mores are really the only standard. They are as such true and right for their age and place.

After all, the peculiar character of custom which makes it so close to the moral consciousness has never been better stated than by Grote:

"Nomos, king of all" . . . moulding the emotions as well as the intellect, according to the local type . . . and reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies.²

All the more significant, if customs, or mores, are so important alike for the origins of morality and for its present continuance and variation, become the questions: How are customs or mores formed? Does the habit explain the authority? or was there some sort of value which gave rise to the habit? or is neither of these explanations adequate? Let us then ask, first, How did the habit get formed? and, secondly, What gives certain habits their peculiar value and authority?

First, on the origin of habits it is not safe to speak too positively, for the most important customs go back into unknown ages. But there are several things to be borne in mind. Ex-

² Cited in Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 173.

planations tend to emphasize either (a) the instinctive, impulsive, or emotional aspect of action, or (b) the intelligent adaptation of means to ends. Blood revenge, for example,—is this a sort of blind response to injury, analogous to winking the eye or striking out with the fist for protection? Or is it a useful means of protecting the tribe? Or in the case of marriage customs and taboos, does the custom of taking a wife outside the group rest on supposed advantage, or merely on emotional response to novelty? Students of religion have discussed a similar alternative. Does a ritual rest on some idea, or does the idea, the myth, arise after the ritual? As the tendency is toward the belief that the ritual is usually older than its myth, so the general tendency is to regard customs as arising largely in relatively unreflective fashion. Comparative psychology has some data which at least are in accord with this. Modern studies of animals show that they learn largely by the method of trial and error. A rat or squirrel seems to learn his way through a maze, or how to open a door, not by a study of its construction and a resort to general principle (the method of the expert scientist), nor by accidentally finding the correct way, and thenceforth discarding completely all false movements. His “curve” of learning does not change so decisively at any one point. The process appears to be rather a gradual discard of fruitless efforts, and a retention of the successful elements. Experienced pleasure may help to fix the latter, pain to eliminate the former. Similarly, it may be argued, men had to get food, defend themselves, reproduce their kind. They either succeeded or failed, and the successful ways survived.

But it is evident that most of the customs which are morally significant cannot be explained solely as the results of habit. For ceremonies which are performed once a year for the returning spring or ingathering of harvest, or at irregular intervals, as upon occasion of births, marriages, and deaths, cannot be based merely upon the physiology of repeated acts. The structure which carries these customs is not the individual's nervous system considered by itself: it is the social organization.

This operates in part just by its mass. If a number of persons are to do the same thing, such as dancing, or singing, or carrying, or if they are to act jointly in hunting, or in co-operation, as

in converse, there must be uniformity. And imitation is constantly operative in passing down ways, once used. The emotional enhancement due to mass or concerted action deepens the impression, especially when the aesthetic charm of order is involved.

Moreover the general notion is common that certain ways of acting are "lucky" and others unlucky. This is not so rationalistic a method as a scientist's calculation of the practical utility of various agencies, and still it is none the less a philosophy. Sumner makes much of this tendency to dwell on good and bad luck—especially bad luck:

Primitive men ascribed all incidents to the agency of men or of ghosts and spirits. Good and ill luck were attributed to the superior powers, and were supposed to be due to their pleasure or displeasure at the conduct of men. This group of notions constitutes goblinism. It furnishes a complete world-philosophy.

The four elemental needs or interests out of which folkways sprang, in Sumner's view, are hunger, love, vanity, and fear.

The use of the term "vanity" to cover the whole sphere of social recognition, reminding us, as it does, of Mandeville, is one of many traces of Sumner's refusal to take account of modern social psychology. McDougall, starting with a psychological analysis based on the various instincts and their corresponding emotions, offers a wider and, I think, a more satisfactory list of primary activities. In any case, resentment or anger can hardly be omitted, and Westermarck makes this, in its special form of public or sympathetic resentment, the source of all the moral customs. In his opinion, custom is a moral rule only on account of the indignation called forth by its transgression. In its ethical aspect it is nothing but a generalization of emotional tendencies, applied to certain modes of conduct, and transmitted from generation to generation.

But, while the simplest form of acts may become habitual without any great degree of reflection, it is obvious that few acts, even of those required to satisfy hunger, are performed without a considerable amount of thought. All such conceptions as good or bad luck, and such customs as those of initiation, lucky rites

to insure rains, birth and death customs implying belief in spirits, involve some look ahead, and often some conception of group welfare. Hence it is comprehensible that we find the Australian old men deliberating at great length over the details of initiation and totem customs. Ross shows how customs radiate from certain leaders or classes to the masses. It may be impossible for you or me to start a new custom, but it is easy for royalty to set a fashion, and, for a time at least, wealth can make success the dominant note in the mores of American society.

To sum up, customs, while seemingly analogous to habits in the individual, cannot be explained by physiological repetition. They embody a philosophy, and depend for their transmission not only upon the simpler process of imitation, but upon the more positive method of training.

Secondly, whence comes the binding quality, or the value, in custom? If we suppose that the custom arose because of its practical utility, then, of course, we have already answered our second question, and this would be just as true even if such a custom as burying the possessions of the deceased with him is to our notion of economics an absurd or injurious practice. If people believed that to show this kindness to the dead was useful to the living, that would be enough. But there are many customs for which savages themselves give no reason, and for these a sanction has been sought either in the bare force of habit itself or in emotional reaction.

There is no doubt a considerable constraint exercised by habit itself. "Whatever be the foundation for a certain practice," says Westermarck, "and however trivial it may be, the unreflecting mind has a tendency to disapprove of any deviation from it for the simple reason that such a deviation is unusual. As Abraham Tucker observes, 'it is a constant argument among the common people, that a thing must be done and ought to be done, because it always has been done.'" Professor Ames in his *Psychology of Religious Experience* states the psychology of the process thus:

Habitual actions establish themselves as the lines of least resistance. They are familiar and put the object of them at ease. He is at home in them. So much is this the case that in moments of leisure the successfully thrilling events of the chase or battle are

often reenacted, and this is undoubtedly an important factor in the origin of ceremonial. They serve to reinstate the emotional experience of the real events.

As an illustration of a custom originating in emotional interests but now sanctioned by habit, Professor Ames cites dress:

The history of dress seems to show that it originated with amulets and ornaments and was fostered by the love of display which it favored, but its establishment resulted in the feeling that it was proper to conceal the body, that is, the habit of having the body covered must not be broken. This is the ground for saying that the custom of wearing clothes created modesty.

This position as to the positive power of habit is in the opinion of Ames strengthened by a consideration of taboo, which he would define as the "negative side of custom," the thou-shalt-not, as custom is the thou-shalt of primitive life. Taboo in many cases seems to signify just what is strange or unusual, and the psychology of this is that the very disposition to act in a certain way affords resistance to any deviation from that course. And he makes a highly ingenious application to the explanation of sex-taboo. Crawley in his work, *The Mystic Rose*, had collected a mass of material showing the wide range of sex-taboo and the fear entertained by each sex of certain functions, occupations, and objects associated with the other. A warrior, for example, fears to have a woman look upon him lest he be weakened. The separation of the sexes is due to such or similar fears. Ames would reverse this:

The more defensible position would be that the segregation of the sexes was due to natural causes, such as occupation, food-supply, capacities, and interests. The characteristic habits of each sex which thus arose brought their natural sanctions and restraints, or taboos. These taboos in turn exercised a reciprocal influence and contributed to emphasize the segregation from which they originally arose.¹

The other important taboos, attaching to leaders, strangers, and the dead, are explained in similar ways.

It is obvious that there is a large field of moral sentiments

¹ Psychology of Religious Experience, chap. iv.

in which it would be interesting to test this theory that habit creates binding force. A good part of our morals are class morals. Are, then, the sentiments sanctioning the gentleman's code, or the commercial code, or the laborer's code, due to the habits of these classes, which were in turn created by occupation? Leaving this for the moment, it is evident that in such customs as dress, or sex-taboo, there is a factor which can be called habit only in a metaphorical sense. This appears in the following quotation from Westermarck, who is arguing for the genesis of emotion from habit:

In the behavior of the Aleut, who "is bashful if caught doing anything unusual among his people," and in the average European's dread of appearing singular, we recognize the influence of the same force of habit.

But is "the dread of appearing singular" due in any sense to habit? This seems to be an extraordinary statement, to be explained only on the assumption that the social group is loosely conceived as a physiological organism, so that what is "unusual" is opposed to the habitual. In society, however, we constantly see illustrations where the habitual (in the proper sense of the term, meaning repeated action by an individual) becomes "singular" or "unusual," if measured by a group standard, and so is at once condemned. It is *failure to conform to the group*, not failure to repeat a past act, which excites the painful emotion. The tension is not primarily between habit and novelty, but between social self (used in James's sense as "what others think of me") and some other set of images. It is a case of mass phenomena rather than of repetition. This would seem to be the larger factor also in the case of dress. And, in general, conformity to custom does not primarily mean repeating; it means that the young conform to the old, the plastic to the well-organized. Ritual impresses its values not only by the practice it gives in doing, but by the strongly emotional conditions under which it is done.

Another criticism upon the conception that habit is adequate to produce a binding influence is made by Professor Sharp in *A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment*.⁴

⁴ University of Wisconsin Publications.

From a study of the moral judgments made by University of Wisconsin students upon certain questions of casuistry he finds no ground for supposing the basis of such judgments to be mere habit. He finds a teleological factor—some reference to the welfare of the agent or of others—in so large a proportion of cases as to convince him that this is generally present. Questions have been raised as to the adequacy of the method employed in this inquiry, but the necessity of having some account of our own actual moral judgments (as well as of the customs of savages) which Sharp forcefully presents, cannot be gainsaid.

To resume our query as to what gives binding force to custom, it should not be inferred from the quotation from Westermarck that he regards habit as the chief source of the binding force and value in custom. It is in the emotions that he discovers what gives value. Specifically, moral value is due to one kind of retributive emotions, namely, to those which are public and sympathetic. This is argued especially against the utilitarian conception. A crucial case is found in our attitude toward punishment. Why do we punish, and why does our moral sentiment approve punishment? The penalties of criminal law, Westermarck believes, have in all ages and among all peoples substantially expressed the amount of public indignation, though the purpose of protecting society has doubtless also been present. But if this latter were the determining factor, it might be plausibly urged that the more atrocious crimes, like parricide, are so rare that society needs little protection and that consequently the punishment should be light. Or, if reformation be the end, then the hopeless and hardened criminal should not be punished at all, since it is useless to try to reform him. Westermarck has several highly interesting chapters here, showing who are held responsible for acts, how far agents under intellectual disability have been treated as responsible, and how far motives are considered. Nothing but the will, he finds, is held to be morally good or bad; and this, he believes, confirms his view as to the essentially emotional origin of all moral distinctions.

Moral judgments are based on conduct and character, because such judgments spring from moral emotions; because the moral emotions are retributive emotions; because a retributive emotion is a reactive

attitude of mind, either kindly or hostile, toward a living being (or something looked upon in the light of a living being) regarded as a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and because a living being is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will.

A larger range of emotions which play an important part in moral valuation would be indicated by many. Thus Dewey, speaking of control over impulses as one of the elements in moral conduct, remarks that calculation of the utilitarian type is not adequate to deal with the temptation which tends to fling consequences aside and yield to the excitement of the moment.

With those who are carried away habitually by some mode of excitement the disease and the incapacity to take the proffered remedy or reflection are one and the same thing. Only some other passion will accomplish the desired control. With the Greeks, it was aesthetic passion, love of the grace and beauty, the rhythm and harmony, of a self-controlled life. With the Romans it was the passion for dignity, power, honor of personality, evidenced in rule of appetite. Both of these motives remain among the strong allies of ordered conduct. But the passion for purity, the sense of something degrading and foul in surrender to the base, an interest in something spotless, free from adulteration, are, in some form or other, the chief resource in overcoming the tendency of excitement to usurp the governance of the self.⁵

A further reason for assigning importance to the emotional factor is offered by Professor G. H. Mead.⁶ He points out the fundamental part of emotion in all attitudes toward persons. All my consciousness has its emotional tone. When I set apart certain of its contents as things, I divest them of this tone. But contact with persons evokes the emotional content, and when we think of our objects as personal, the emotional remains as a—perhaps as *the*—distinctive quality. The primary inference which the author draws from this is that social psychology, which deals with the personal antecedents of emotion, is as necessary a pre-

⁵ Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, pp. 409 f.; cf. also J. H. Tufts, "Moral Value," in *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, vol. v, 1908, pp. 517-522.

⁶ *Psychological Bulletin*, vol., vi, 1909, pp. 401-408.

requisite to psychology as is physiological psychology, which describes the antecedents of mental processes from another point of view. It is evident, however, that the consideration has important bearings on the genesis of moral sentiment.

Starting, then, with a question about the customs and mores, we have been led over into general considerations as to the moral consciousness which repeat in new form the question of Hume: "Are moral distinctions based on reason or on feeling?" And we find it no longer possible to decide for either alternative. The control and valuation of life involve habit, emotion, and reason. Earlier forms of control have more of the elements of habit; more developed types have more of the rational. The emotional element attends all the way up the scale; and even in custom the rational factor is present in some degree. So far as any practice or belief tends to sink into mere habit, it has little moral value. As attention is demanded, the moral possibilities increase. Customs which attend such important events or crises as birth, puberty, marriage, death, seed-time and harvest, new moon, quarrels, injuries, hospitality,—these customs pass readily into true mores. For they are in essence a control of life for important ends; and as glorified or enhanced by aesthetic elements of dance and song, of decoration, commemoration, or dramatic rehearsal, they constitute—not indeed the full personal morality of the highest level—but the morality which we all obey on many of the levels of conduct.

II

In what respect has there been moral evolution, and what are the chief stages in the process? This is the problem which Hobhouse treats, and he discusses it under the two heads of the standard, or rule of action, and of the basis or reason given for obeying it. The standard has been embodied in custom and law, in ethical institutions. The basis—the ideas underlying morality—is sought in a study of religions and of the great ethical systems. The institutions selected by Hobhouse to show evolution of the moral standard are the general social and political structure, law and justice, marriage and the status of woman, intertribal and international relations, class relations with especial reference

to slavery, property, and the treatment of poverty. This is a much less extended list of topics than is presented by Westermarck, and the treatment is less copious. But on the other hand the perspective is better, and the trends of progress are more easily noted. These trends as traced by Hobhouse in the various institutions show certain broad lines of resemblance. For the religious and social teacher or reformer, frequently discouraged by the slow movement of the particular cause he champions, it is well worth while to stand where he can take a survey of centuries rather than of years or decades. And I doubt whether any one can presume to discuss intelligently such current problems as divorce, equal suffrage, the administration of justice in our courts, property rights and responsibilities, until he has traced sympathetically the status of woman, the methods of judicial practice, and the queer mixtures of reason and unreason, of force and kindness, which are found in the various ages. With vision thus trained we shall be less likely to fall into a state of blind admiration for things as they are, but we shall also comprehend better the difficulties in the way of such a reform as that of the equal standard for morals between the sexes, or that of apportioning educational opportunities to children upon the basis of their capacities rather than upon that of the pecuniary status of their parents.

The general line of advance is "from status to contract," from kin-group, through force and authority, to organization in the interests of individual freedom and social co-operation; from looser family structure, through closer ties controlled by force or property conceptions, to unions giving at the same time greater personal freedom and greater responsibility; from blood-feud to public courts possessing greater authority yet securing better protection to the individual; from early communism, through property rights based on force and recognizing few restrictions, to a system of property involving in increasing degree a social control; and finally, in the treatment of the poor, "from simple communism through the paternal benevolence of a superior caste to the recognition of a mutual obligation as between the individual and the state." There is thus a double movement, and different theorists are apt to stress the one or the other aspect according to

their own interests. On the one hand there is growth in the powers and opportunities of the individual. On the other, the social control is both strengthened and extended. Liberty and order thus often clash. Yet in the conceptions of rights, both aspects are implicit, for the individual relies upon society to support him in these, and it will support him only if these "rights" are not against the social order. "In the higher form of social organization we have seen order and liberty drawing together again, the underlying truth which unites them being simply that the best ordered society is that which gives most scope to its component members to make the best of themselves, while the 'best' in human nature is that which contributes to the harmony and onward movement of society."

The reasons or motives for moral conduct likewise show an evolution. For Westermarck, since the moral attitude is always fundamentally one of retributive emotions, the evolution is chiefly either in the increase of rational elements or in the extension of the group included within the emotional sphere. Aversions and disgusts, sympathies and antipathies, are the earlier forms of moral emotions. When we realize that an act does no real harm, we can hardly—if we are sufficiently rational—give it moral censure. So a *deliberate* resentment is not likely to be felt toward a person who intended no injury. The other line of advance, namely, the extension of the group toward which duties are recognized from family or clan to humanity, is, in his view, consequent upon the expansion of altruistic sentiment,—an order of dependence which many would reverse.

Hobhouse has a more complex psychology, and essays a scheme of development which would relate the ethical to the general philosophy—or religion—of the age or people. As Westermarck's view might be called an emotional theory tempered by advancing intelligence, so Hobhouse's might be called rationalism. On this theory ethical evolution is the evolution of the ethical idea, of which the central element is obligation. Obligation is at first chiefly a matter of resentment, not founded on any general ethical principle. Life and property are defended by blood-vengeance, but not *because* life and property are clearly set up as ends to be guarded. Magic and taboo are strong sanctions. In earlier

stages of civilization a step in advance is taken when such rights as life and property are recognized by the community, and in many cases placed under the protection of some god. A god who punishes acts because they are wrong is very different from a god who merely avenges an injury. "His existence is recognition of the moral idea." But the divine world is long a blur of the just and unjust, so that an ethical ideal has to be worked out. This has been done in close connection with the spiritualized ideal of religion; and forgiveness, self-sacrifice, humility, find a place. Finally, philosophical criticism remodels ethical conceptions in accordance with the principle that every rule of conduct must be based upon the demonstrable needs of human life. "Obligation, resting at first on occult forces, or the resentment of vindictive spirits, and then on the wrath of a not unjust god, comes to be based on the nobler desire to be at one with God or to realize a higher spiritual life, and finally, extrinsic consequence being dispensed with, on the inherent goodness of the life which it renders possible."

It will be observed that, although neither Westermarck nor Hobhouse finds the origin of morality in religion, Hobhouse gives religion a highly important part in the process of moral evolution. Westermarck recognizes the enormous influence of religion, but balances the gains over against the losses.

Religion or superstition (as the case may be) has on the one hand stigmatized murder and suicide, on the other it has commended human sacrifice and certain cases of voluntary self-destruction. It has inculcated humanity and charity, but has also led to the cruel persecution of persons embracing another creed. It has emphasized the duty of truth-speaking, and has itself been a cause of pious fraud. It has promoted both cleanly habits and filthiness. It has enjoined labor and abstinence from labor, sobriety and drunkenness, marriage and celibacy, chastity and temple prostitution.

Similarly Hobhouse, in a passage too long for quotation, gives a careful consideration of the debits and credits of Christianity—especially of organized Christianity—in the accounts of moral progress. One can imagine nothing more helpful as a foundation for the candid and honest presentation of the place of religion and of Christianity than a study of this material.

III

What are the causes of moral evolution? During the period of Darwin and his contemporaries this question naturally took the form of asking, How far is natural selection active in the field of ethics? Darwin himself, Wallace, Bagehot, Spencer, all discussed the values of the several virtues for aiding survival. But just as biologists are at present not asking, Why do new characters survive? but, How do they originate? so the students of ethical evolution face the question, What forces, social and psychological, bring about the upward steps? Sumner is very positive in his answer as to what does *not* change the mores. It is not ethics. In fact he frequently condemns the attempts to change mores by moral theory. The actual causes to which he attributes such change are usually economic.

Wilberforce did not overthrow slavery, natural forces reduced to the service of man and the discovery of new land set men "free" from great labor, and new ways suggested new sentiments of humanity and ethics. . . . Witchcraft and trial by torture were not abolished by argument. Critical knowledge and thirst for reality made them absurd. . . . The notion of obscenity is very modern. It is due to the modern development of the arts of life and the mode of life under steam and machinery. . . . All the operations and necessities of life can be carried on with greater privacy and more observation of conventional order and decorum. . . . Pair marriage has swept all other forms away. It is the system of the urban-middle-capitalist class. It has gained strength in all the new countries, where all men and women were equal within a small margin and the women bore their share of the struggle for existence. . . . Democracy and pair marriage are now produced by the same conditions. Both are contingent and transitory. In aristocratic society, a man's family arrangements are his own prerogative. When life becomes harder it will become aristocratic, and concubinage may be expected to arise again.

Still more broadly,

There are no ethical forces in history. . . . A people sometimes adopts an ideal of national vanity, which includes ambition, but an ethical ideal no group ever has.

One might infer from these and numerous other citations which might be made that no conscious effort for improvement in morals had ever been, or could ever be, of any influence,—in other words, that morality is the only region in which there is no use in knowing what is wanted and then trying to get it. And yet this would be to make Sumner more consistent than he is. What he is really concerned to show is that it is only by careful study of the *ethos* and sentiments of a people that new ideals can be made to live, and that changes must be very gradual. Our own mores as regards sex-relations come down by tradition from the prophetic revolt of the tenth century before Christ in Israel. This was rooted in the hostility of primitive rustic mores to the luxury of commercial cities. But the experiences of various societies since then have confirmed the prophetic attitude toward sensuality and built up a strong conviction. In the case of amusements, especially, intelligent control is in place. "Amusements always present a necessity for moral education and moral will." And in one instance, that of slavery, moral motives have succeeded in getting themselves recognized as superior to other interests. "Slavery is now considered impossible, socially and politically evil, and so not available for economic gain, even if it could win that. It is the only case in the history of the mores where the so-called moral motive has been made controlling."

The truth in Sumner's contention doubtless is that men are only in part governed by purely rational motives. Just as the mores are a joint product of instinct and need, of habit and purpose, of fictitious belief and reasoned expedience, of emotion and idea, so individuals and peoples are moved by a complex of forces. The present moral awakening in business and public life is doubtless due in part to those whose economic interests were affected by the enormous powers of corporate wealth. And few modern moralists would question that a wrong course of conduct will in the long run injure some one. But the most effective appeal against any practice is not made until it is declared to be wrong or unjust. And this implies that the ethical aspect of the custom or practice is separated out from the merely habitual and brought to attention. It may be vain to cry when every one is satisfied, but when the pressure or collision of social or psychic

forces raises an issue, then the prophet and the reformer get their hearing. The socialist, who insists strenuously on the economic interpretation of history, nevertheless carries on a constant campaign for the triumph of his cause, and is far from being disposed to stand still and see the salvation of the social revolution.

Two questions then remain: What brings on such crises or collisions as to bring moral issues to attention? and Why is it that in such crises the human race—or at any rate certain strains of it—has risen to the new situation and constructed a higher standard?

The first question has had many answers. In general, however, the conflict between the assertive interests of the individual and the control exercised by the group will include a large number of special cases. Economic changes, the advance of the arts and sciences, military conflicts, afford external occasions; sexual passions, desire for property, for mastery or liberty, for esteem and position, are the internal strivings which create new forms of tension. And, beside the collisions between individual and society, the crash of whole peoples on a great scale may overwhelm the existing code. The Jewish view of the relation between virtue and prosperity seems to have been changed by the captivity. The influence of the frontier and its attendant democracy has largely superseded in many of its details such a class-code as that of the "gentleman." Professor Thomas C. Hall's recent *History of Ethics within Organized Christianity* shows the influence upon ethical ideals of the struggle by which a community organizes itself to resist hostile forces and to control its members. There is no more inviting field for the student of moral evolution than the more specific analysis of certain great ethical ideals within the history of civilization and an examination of the causes which have made them what they were, or are.

This leads us to consider the two possible methods for studying moral evolution, the one by topics, the other by regions or epochs or peoples. Professor Thomas makes a very clear statement on this point:⁷

Westermarck's work perhaps affords the best example of a method of presenting ethnological materials which is very useful, but which

⁷ William I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, 1909, p. 857.

has its limitations. It corresponds with the method of arranging materials in museums developed by Pitt-Rivers in England, a number of years ago. By this method all the knives, throwing-sticks, or other articles of a particular kind were brought together in one place, with a view to exhibiting the steps in the development of this article. But our great museums are now recognizing that it is on the whole better to arrange materials on the principle of presenting the culture of a given region as a whole. No object can be completely understood when separated from the whole culture of which it is a part, and no culture can be understood when separated from the whole culture of which it is a part, and no culture can be understood when its fragments are dislocated.

Applying this to our specific problem, the ethics of the Puritans, of the northern or the southern states, of modern business, of labor unions, can be understood only in the full setting of all the factors of English and American life.

The second question, What in the human consciousness enables it to rise to a new situation? takes us into the heart of metaphysics and theology. It is like asking, Why has protoplasm advanced to man, and man to such heights as are seen in heroes, artists, prophets, discoverers, and sages? Darwin taught how variations might be sifted; he did not know how they arise, though he supposed it to be by small fluctuations; DeVries shows that in some cases they start by sudden decisive steps. The advocates of an "orthogenic" theory hold that evolution moves, not in all directions, but by a right line of tendency. Bergson insists that all evolution is "creative," so that it is not merely futile but erroneous to seek for causes of the new. Just because the new is new, it has no explanation in the past. If consciousness "rises" to a situation, we cannot explain this higher level by anything else. The answer to our question must then read: When one is born of the spirit, we may not detect whence it cometh, but in dealing with the new situation the spirit shows its actual presence. Consciousness discloses its own creative character by its new ideals. And this, I think, comes near the truth which religion has always had at heart. The spirit is not limited by its constitution to what has been. It is not capable of complete statement in mechanistic terms. It may enter into life.

And yet the question may be very real, Why does man sometimes rise to a crisis and sometimes not? Certain civilizations have failed to meet crises in the past. Is there any indication as to whether our present civilization and moral consciousness will prove adequate to future crises? Without presuming to predict, it may be permitted to set down, without attempt at discussion, certain elements which at least offer hope. These are, first, the growing opposition to war, both for economic and for moral reasons. War in the past has wasted an incalculable amount of the best blood. Secondly, the increased strength of moral consciousness springing from the greater area of common discussion and common criticism. To Christendom, which represented a certain degree of moral unity, are now added Japan and China as peoples contributing their ideals and making demands for fair treatment while at the same time they submit their standards to discussion. Thirdly, the broader basis, within each community, which supports moral values. In other words, a democracy is in the long run safer than an aristocracy. This is not to deny that moral leaders are always few. But for available leaders it is desirable to draw upon the widest range, and leaders responsible to all sorts and conditions of men are in the end more likely to bring the whole community in safety through its perils. In the fourth place should be named the larger resources which intelligence now commands. Individual genius may reach no higher levels than at earlier times; but the method by which it can proceed successfully is more clearly seen, the collective wisdom is more available. On the one hand, education is more prevalent; on the other, research is more thoroughly organized and better equipped.

IV

The question of a standard by which moral latitude and longitude may be estimated leads at once to the issue between Absolutism and Pragmatism. At first blush there is no common ground. The absolutist sees in the pragmatist's "goods" only a welter of individual preferences, a chaos of temporary satisfactions. Over against these Münsterberg would set "eternal values" of an "over-self." These consist especially in finding iden-

tity—identity between purpose and fulfilment, between will and act. "Self-faithfulness, self-loyalty, is accordingly the only moral obligation and the only moral value." The essence of the "over-self," likewise, is the "will toward identical maintaining." In different language Royce maintains that loyalty—under which he subsumes the moral life—implies in the last analysis that the cause to which loyalty devotes itself is true and real. "'True' must mean 'eternally true,' if it means anything; 'real' refers to the 'whole of experience,' which, while including all temporal happenings, is itself an 'eternal truth.' Unity with all life is the ideal test of the partial aims." Conversely, the pragmatist or evolutionist sees in a mere identifying no very important value. He is suspicious of an eternal value as indicating something fixed, instead of something to be constructed, and argues that the supreme responsibility imposed by modern morality is that of working out new standards, as *versus* merely accepting or even finding something already made. He maintains that the "city out of sight" is of no help in actually directing our footsteps. He claims that ethics must follow modern science in renouncing "essences," and for the effort to define an absolute good must substitute the effort to locate particular goods and evils, in order to attain the one and remove or lessen the other. To the religious student it is suggestive to note that even the writers of the Bible used expressions which fit into both the absolutist and the evolutionist ideal. God is "the same," the "eternal"; but he is also the "living," and men are "workers together with God." And in this antithesis there is a more than superficial analogy to that between Calvinism and Arminianism.

As the "evolutionary" or "experimental" view is less familiar, it may need further statement. As it is presented by Professor Dewey,⁸ the fundamental change of attitude which it implies is this:

The classic theories all alike assumed the existence of *the end*, the *summum bonum*, the final goal; and of the separate moral force that moves to that goal. . . . The transformation in attitude is the growing belief that the proper business of intelligence is discrimination of multiple and present goods, and of the varied and immediate

⁸ John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*.

means of their realization; not search for the one remote aim. [What we need is] study of the conditions out of which come the obstacles and the resources of adequate life, and developing and testing the ideas that, as working hypotheses, may be used to diminish the causes of evil, and to buttress and expand the sources of good.

To the fear that such a removal of a transcendental good leaves men adrift and free to follow each his own inclination, he urges that the change may relieve men from responsibility for what they cannot do, but will promote thoughtful consideration of what they may do.

If we leave absolute goods in the background, we can neither evade nor escape the problem of making more sure and expensive the share of all men in natural and real goods.

And again:

Were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear, in the concrete would remain just what and where they now are. To improve our education, to ameliorate our manners, to advance our politics, we must have recourse to specific conditions of generation.

Professor A. W. Moore claims for this position that it is the democratic movement in morals; it is the demand for the full conditions of moral responsibility. It is the claiming of the moral franchise, the right to participate in the construction, as well as the execution of the ideal. "If there is to be such a thing as moral experience aboard our craft, we must have a real part, not only in hoisting sail and washing down the decks, but in laying the course of the ship." Nor does laying the course mean merely "running for a harbor already built from all eternity." It means "building new shores"—not building them out of caprice or individual dreams, much less out of private possessions and desires, but out of the organized habits and institutions of the world in which we live, and with the method of science. In this actual world of human nature we are not free to set up any and every goal we please. We must reckon with

our fellows' rights and claims, with the growing capacities and aspirations of man. Nothing will satisfy which does not challenge and evoke these.

Certain more definite characteristics of what Professor Dewey regards as moral progress may be found in the *Ethics* of which he is joint author, for the question of moral advance for the race is not separable finally from that of individual character. The criterion here set up is that the "true or moral satisfaction" is found in the exercise of powers which produce harmony, reinforcement, expansion of life. And what end fulfils these conditions? Only the social good. The only genuinely reasonable moral knowledge is sympathetic. The final problem of morality is to form, from a natural self of impulse and instinct, a voluntary self in which socialized desires and affections are dominant.

Perhaps it may have occurred to the reader by this time that there is not so absolute an abyss between the programmes as was at first suggested. "Loyalty to loyalty" may not indeed throw its emphasis so strongly upon justice and democracy, and yet it is not in antagonism with these. And, conversely, the evolutionist cheerfully admits that it is in a "catholic and far-sighted theory"—not in a temporary adjustment to the desires of the moment—that philosophy finds its task. In truth, the difference in point of view persists just because pragmatist and absolutist stand each upon a necessary element in moral judgment. Can there be an intelligent and thorough-going moral life without principles? Few since Socrates and Plato have attempted to say, "Yes, we need only impulse." Can principles be determined without reference to the impulses and affections, the daily needs as well as the more inclusive and permanent ends? The same Plato said frankly, "The knowledge which is only superhuman is ridiculous in man." One might say further that at one period in human development the value of definite principles has appeared to be of supreme importance, and at another the value or necessity of reconstruction, even as in theology transcendence and immanence have each made contributions. Just at present many believe that we have been standing too long upon the eighteenth-century conception of reason and the

early nineteenth-century conception of liberty. "Absolutists" in political science have admired greatly the fixity of the Constitution of the United States; "but it must be remembered," to quote Mr. Bryce, "that even the constitutions we call rigid must make their choice between being bent or being broken." We have bent our constitution several times, and just now it is believed by many that there must be much more bending if it is to serve as a supreme standard of justice in the changed conditions of modern commerce and industry. Ethical science may well ask whether it can afford to stand still. It has insisted—long and justly—upon the value of reason. It has hailed—and rightly—the worth of the individual, his happiness, and his rights. But eighteenth-century conceptions of reason and early-nineteenth-century conceptions of the individual and his happiness are not "eternal values." New goods are gaining recognition, new possibilities are given by the growth of scientific method, new claims of democracy challenge old ideas of justice. Ethical theory must rise to meet these new conditions, or be left on one side as scholastic theology was left by the world of the Renaissance.

ZOROASTRIANISM

GEORGE FOOT MOORE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

The religion whose adherents call themselves "Worshippers of Mazda," the Wise God, and which we commonly name after its founder Zoroastrianism, is in many ways of peculiar interest. It is the only monotheistic religion of Indo-European origin, as Judaism is the one independent Semitic monotheism.¹ Zoroastrianism is, further, eminently an ethical religion, both in its idea of God and of what God requires of men. It presents itself as a revelation of God's will through his prophet. His will is that men, renouncing the false gods, should serve the Wise Lord alone, obey his word, and contend on his side for the defeat of evil and the triumph of all good in nature and society and in the character of the individual. The prophet warns men that the day of the Lord is at hand, an ordeal by fire in which God will separate between those who serve him and those who serve him not, and of the endless blessedness or the unfathomable misery beyond. God has his allies not only among men but among the hosts of spirits; to the hierarchy of good powers corresponds a hierarchy of evil. In the endeavor to clear God of the responsibility for evil, Zoroastrianism recognized a powerful head of the evil spirits, a devil. But it had firm faith in the final triumph of good and the end of all evil. When that day shall come, all the dead will be raised to stand at the bar of God in the grand assize and receive the just recompense of reward. The main features of this es-

¹ The term "monotheism" is often loosely applied to monarchical types of polytheism, in which one god is raised to a sovereign rank among the gods, as well as to the pantheistic speculation which sees in all the gods only names, forms, partial manifestations, of one god; but, inasmuch as in both cases worship continues to be paid to many gods in their own name and right, such religions can only be classed as polytheistic. We may distinguish them as monarchical polytheism or pantheistic polytheism, but to call them monotheism, even qualified by a contradictory epithet such as "latent" or "esoteric," is a misuse of words. It may be added that no religion of these types has ever shown the slightest tendency to develop into *religious* monotheism. With monotheistic philosophies we are not here concerned.

chatology were adopted by the Jews and adapted to the premises of their own religion; through Judaism it passed to Christianity, where it was fused with elements of diverse origin; from Judaism and Christianity, and to some extent directly from later Zoroastrianism, Mohammedanism inherited it. The orthodox beliefs about the hereafter of the world and the individual entertained by the nations of Western Asia, Europe, and America, are thus ultimately derived in no small part from Zoroastrianism; only in the farther East, in India, China, and Japan, does another system prevail.

Zoroastrianism had its origin in a branch of the great Iranian race. It rose to power as the religion of the Medo-Persian empire, and while it spread widely among the subject peoples, particularly in Asia Minor, its strongholds were always the Iranian lands; the Sassanian revival proceeded from Persia. The prophet broke with the religion of his people and combatted it, his utterances are largely shaped by this antagonism; yet doubtless, if we knew more about it, it would be found that his own thought had historical antecedents in the faith of his fathers. When Mazdaism prevailed, it took back much which in its first zeal it had discarded—Iranian gods, forms of worship, and superstitions. It is necessary, therefore, to premise somewhat about the race and its old religion.

The ancestors of the Aryo-Indians and of the Iranians before their migrations lived side by side on the high plateau north of the Hindu Kush. Thence the former made their way into the valleys of Kabul and the Indus and southward to the Panjab, while the latter spread from their old seats westward into Media and Persia. The age of these movements is not certainly known. In the 15th century B.C., rulers of Mitanni, on the upper Euphrates and eastward, bear Iranian names, and names of the same origin appear about the same time in the Amarna despatches among the invaders of Palestine. At Boghaz Keui in Asia Minor, a Hittite capital, the names of Aryan gods, Mitra and Varuna, Indra and Nasatya, have been found in Mitannian documents dating from the beginning of the 14th century. The mass of the population in these countries was, however, plainly not Aryan. Be-

yond this fragmentary evidence of the presence of Aryans in the West in the great upheaval of nations between the 15th century and the 13th, the Iranians first appear on the stage of history in the 9th century, when the Assyrian king Shalmanassar made a campaign in Media (836 B.C.). His successors were frequently at war in the same regions, but evidently with petty princes and rulers of cities, not with a united Median kingdom. Such a kingdom, indeed, can hardly have arisen before the second half of the 7th century.

Though it suffered greatly from the Scythian inroads, it reaped the benefit of the more severe blow which the barbarians inflicted on Assyria, and in 606 Cyaxares took and destroyed Nineveh and made an end of the Assyrian Empire. In the following years he extended his sway over Asia Minor as far as the Halys, and to the east over a large part of the Iranian lands. In 553 the Persian Cyrus, a vassal king reigning at Anshan in Susiana, revolted against his Median overlord, Astyages, and made himself king in his room, the supremacy of the Persians succeeding to that of the Medes. In 546 Sardes fell, and in the next few years Caria, Lycia, and the Greek cities on the coast were subdued; Babylon was taken in 539, and its empire passed to the Persians; Egypt was conquered by Cambyzes in 525. Shaken to its foundations by the revolts which followed the death of Cambyzes and the usurpation of the Pseudo-Smerdis, the Persian power was re-established more firmly than ever by Darius Hystaspis. It surpassed the empires that preceded it not more in the extent of its dominion than in the strongly centralized organization which gave it a stability none of them had known.

The inscriptions of Darius display him as a zealous worshipper of Ahura Mazda, the "Wise Lord," the supreme god of the Zoroastrian faith, to whom he attributes his victories over enemies and rebels. That similar testimony is not borne by the inscriptions of Cyrus may be explained by their limited extent and different character.

The religion of the early Iranians was closely akin to that of the Vedic Indians. One of the greatest of the Iranian gods is Mithra, the Vedic Mitra; other Indo-Iranian gods are Zoroastrian devils, like Indra and Nasatya (Naonhaithya); the myth

of the dragon-slayer appears among both peoples, as do the first man, Yama (Iranian Yima), first to die and ruler in the realm of the dead, and the conception of the order of the world, natural, ritual, moral (Vedic *Rita*, Avestan *Asha*). The preparation and offering of a drink made from the expressed juice of a plant has the same central place in both religions under the same name, *Soma*, *Haoma*; the priests who kindle and tend the sacred fire bear the same title, Persian *Athravan*, Indian *Atharvan*. These agreements are all the more conclusive because Zoroastrianism did its best to efface every vestige of Iranian heathenism.

Apart from the changes thus purposely wrought, there are fundamental differences in the temper and spirit of the two religions that must be attributed to other causes, among which climatic environment and the conditions of livelihood were doubtless peculiarly potent. In India, from the Brahmanic period when speculative thinking sets in, the prevailing trend is toward monism, now metaphysical, now pantheistic. Even more universally the world is denied as unreal or renounced as evil through and through. Salvation, the end of all philosophy as well as of religion, is escape from the endless chain of bodily existences upon each of which man enters laden with the deeds of previous lives, a deliverance achieved by overcoming the ignorance or the blind desire which holds man bound on the wheel of rebirth. Abnegation of the world, withdrawal from society, repression of the body, meditation, methodical cultivation of trance-states, are the means by which transcendental knowledge may be attained and desire extirpated in all the orthodoxies and heresies of India. It is not strange that a people who thought so ill of the world should never have played a part in the history of the world, nor have developed a national consciousness in any other form than antipathy to their foreign masters.

For the Iranians, in vastly less favored lands, where man had to wring a meagre living from an unkindly nature, subject to violent extremes of cold and heat, perpetually on his defence against the predatory hordes of the steppes and the desert, life was an unceasing conflict with hostile powers, visible and invisible; watchfulness, courage, energy, were the virtues on which existence depended. In contrast to the metaphysical turn of the

Hindu mind, the Iranian genius was eminently practical; hard reasonableness marks its thinking, adaptability distinguishes its action. The race had not only the qualities needed to conquer an empire but the higher qualities that are required to organize and govern one in a degree matched only by the Romans, whom in other respects also they much resemble. All these traits are reflected in their religion. It, too, is a conflict with innumerable evil powers; but the Iranians do not for that reason despair of the world, for the good is mightier than the evil and shall prevail. Man's salvation is not to flee from the world, but to combat evil wherever he finds it and do a man's part to overcome it. This strenuous and militant type was not first impressed upon the religion by the Zoroastrian reform; it is rather a characteristic of the popular religion which is impressed upon the higher faith.

Zoroastrianism is the result of a prophetic reformation of the old Iranian religion which may be compared in various ways to the work of the Israelite prophets, and its sacred scriptures, containing prophetic utterances, liturgy and ceremonial, hymns, cosmogony, and the like, have many points of resemblance to the Old Testament. The comprehensive name of the scriptures is Avesta. Besides the canonical writings, there are many works of later date and in another language which are of value for the history of the religion in Sassanian and Moslem times.

The Avesta as we have it is only a part of a much larger collection made, according to a credible tradition, under the first Sassanian king (226-240 A.D.), and extant, it seems, even in the 9th century of our era. According to the Parsi tradition this collection consisted of twenty-one books, of which only one, the Vendidad, has been preserved substantially in the original form. The rest of our Avesta is made up of the remains of other books combined and arranged for liturgical purposes, not without some later additions. As now in our hands the Avesta consists of five parts: the Yasna, a liturgy recited by the priests at the offering to all the deities, with the Vispered, a supplement used on certain occasions; the Vendidad, dealing chiefly with the rules of clean and unclean, and with purifications and expiations, all from the point of view indicated by its title, "Antidemonic Law," since the

unclean is the sphere of evil spirits; the Yashts are hymns of various age and poetic merit in honor of particular deities; finally, the Khordah Avesta is a collection of prayers for the private use of the laity as well as the priests. Inserted in the Yana (chapters 28-54) are the Gathas, metrical texts in a different dialect from the rest, the oldest and most sacred part of the Avesta.

Zoroaster has not escaped the fate of other religious founders, including Buddha and Jesus, of being pushed off the earth into the sky; his story, like theirs, was interpreted as but another turn of the kaleidoscopic sun-myth or storm-myth. The life of Zoroaster, as it is written in late books like the Zerdusht Nameh, is completely legendary; some traits of this legend were known even to Greek authors. In the older Avesta, however, and above all in the Gathas, the prophet is an altogether human figure, and no modern Avestan scholar doubts that he was an historical person. The Mazdaean doctrine is plainly not the evolution of a popular religion: it is the work of a thinker and reformer who combats the religion of his people; its gods are his devils and its priests their servants.

It must be confessed that credible tradition has not much to tell us about the prophet. Concerning the age in which he lived there is wide diversity. The Greeks put him 5000 years before the Trojan war or 6000 years before Plato, probably in consequence of some misunderstanding of the Zoroastrian theory of the ages of the world. The Bundahish (9th century A.D.), followed by several Parsi and Moslem authors, offers a seemingly exact date for the beginning of the prophet's ministry, namely 258 years before Alexander the Great, from which, with certain corrections, it has been reckoned that Zoroaster was born in 660 B.C. The Bundahish gives, however, the list of kings on which the 258 years was computed, with the duration of their reigns, beginning with Vishtasp, the patron of Zoroaster, and ending with the last Darius (Codomannus) and Alexander. The succession does not correspond even remotely with the Achaemenian line; it gives two successive reigns of 90 (or, as West corrects the figures, 120) and 112 years respectively. Under these circumstances it is hazardous to assume that the total is a trustworthy tradition,

while the particulars are inexplicable. There remains the fact, already noted, that Darius Hystaspis was a Mazdaean; the religion had therefore taken root in Persia by the 6th century, and it is inferred from the name *Mazdaka*, twice occurring in Assyrian inscriptions in lists of Median petty kings, that it had adherents in Media in the 8th century.

Tradition, though not with unanimous voice, points to Bactria, in far eastern Iran, as the scene of the first triumphs of the new faith. Vishtasp (*Hystaspes*),² Zoroaster's royal convert and patron, came of a line native in Seistan; with this the horizon of the Gathas seems to agree. About Zoroaster's birthplace there is no agreement; the vicinity of Lake Urmia in Aderbeijan (*Atropatene*) and Rai (*Raghae*) in north-eastern Media are rival claimants, while some Greek authors made him a Bactrian. Several modern scholars harmonize the traditions by the hypothesis that he was a native of Media, who being, like other prophets, without honor in his own country, migrated to Bactria and there found better success. However that may be, it seems probable that the doctrine spread westward into Media and Persia from eastern Iran.

From the Gathas we learn that much of the success of the new faith was due to the support of Vishtasp, who seems in some passages to have stood model for a portrait of the good king. Zoroaster had other allies in high places in the wise counsellor Jamaspa and his brother Frashaoshtra; he married Hvovi, a daughter of the latter, and gave his own daughter by another marriage to the former. One of the first believers was his cousin, Maidyoi-maonha, and others of his family are known by name. A Turanian convert, Fryana, receives a high encomium from the prophet for his piety and generosity. The progress of the new faith was doubtless slow, and when it began to overcome indifference it was confronted by opposition. There were moments when the prophet himself could not repress his questionings: "Tell me truly, O Lord, who is the true believer and who the misbeliever? Art thou the wrong-doer, or is it the misbeliever who robs me of my blessings? How is it that he is not recognized

² It is perhaps not superfluous to remark that this Hystaspes is not the father of Darius.

as the evil-doer?" "To what land shall I flee, whither betake myself in flight? They put discord between me and my family and patrons. They who exalt the misbeliever make my life in vain, because they keep the householders and their wives from possessing the (heavenly) inheritance, those, O Wise One, who turn away believers from the Good Mind." His most persistent opponents, as might be supposed, were the priests of the old religion.

The allusions in the Gathas are from their nature obscure, but they have all the marks of historical verity. In the later Avesta the legend begins. The Vendidad tells of Zoroaster's temptation, at the instance of Ahriman, by the false demon Buiti³ and "insidious perdition," that is, unbelief. His miraculous birth and the miracles he wrought were narrated in lost books of the Avesta, and are retold with further embellishments in mediaeval writings; the wars between the believing king Vishtasp and the Turanian Arjasp are wars of religion, and fill a large space in legend and in the Persian epic. According to these sources, Zoroaster died at the age of seventy-seven, murdered, some say, by a heathen priest and sorcerer; slain with the priests in the fire temple by Arjasp's Turanians at the storming of Balkh, as the Shah Nameh narrates it.

In the Gathas, Zoroaster declares that Ahura Mazda, the Wise Lord, has revealed to him the word which he proclaims to men, and he tells at length of his calling to this ministry. It is his mission to teach men to obey Ahura Mazda and strive after the Right (Asha), through which they shall obtain the good things of this world and the other; no other man thus teaches the law of the Lord. His message is a way of salvation from destruction revealed by Ahura Mazda, who knows. He sets before men life and death, and every one must choose between them; even a Turanian who obeys the truth can be saved. In the day of the great affair, each will receive the reward of the teaching he has followed. The truth may now be hard to discern from falsehood, but one day Ahura Mazda will establish the faith by visible proof.

The fundamental conception of the Gathas is the irreconcilable

³ The demon of idolatry.

antagonism of the principles of good and evil, truth and falsehood, knowledge and ignorance—two primal spirits, of whom, according to their own declaration, the one is good, the other evil, in thought and word and deed. Between them the upright have made the right choice; not so the wicked. "I will proclaim the two primal spirits at the beginning of the world, of which the good spirit said to the evil, Neither our thoughts nor our teachings, our understandings, our creeds, our words and our deeds, neither our consciences nor our souls are in accord!" The demons (*daevas*, primarily the gods of the popular religion) chose not rightly between these two spirits, but were deceived into choosing the evil mind, and all ran to Aeshma, through whom they seek to poison the lives of men. They are all the brood of the evil mind; they deceive men, and so deprive them of their good in this life and of immortality beyond. The comprehensive name for evil is Druj, "the Lie," which is sometimes personified. Hell is the world of the Lie.

God is Ahura Mazda, the Wise Lord, often called only Mazda, the All-wise, or Ahura, Lord. He is the creator of the world and all things therein. "It was by thy thought that in the beginning, O Mazda, thou didst form us and the world and religion and the (spiritual) intelligences; that thou didst put life into the body, that thou didst create good works and true doctrine, and that thou dost inspire the desire of those who strive after them." The Lord knows all that men do, his eyes behold their secret deeds as well as those done in open day, he knows all that is and is to be. He requites men according to their deeds in this world and the other. No other gods are named in the Gathas. The polemic is aimed at the *Daevas* (false gods) in general, and against their priests as representatives of false religion.

What the true religion demands of men is that they should decide for Ahura Mazda, choosing the way of truth and goodness. Man must give himself to Asha, Vohu Mano, and Ahura Mazda; he must follow the Lord, be like him, and teach others to be like him; and must labor for the renewal of the world; one of the most effective means to this end is the faithful teaching of the true religion. The teaching of the evil (the old religion) is to be scrupulously shunned.

The ruling principle in dealing with fellow-men is to do good to the good and harm to the evil, for the evil are the foes of the Lord and his good world, the allies of the evil spirit and the Dævas; to do good to them would therefore be treasonably to give aid and comfort to the enemy in the great conflict. The evil are, first of all, those who reject the true religion and its distinctive morals and customs. Gifts to the bad are a sin; but to support the poor who live in holiness and good thought is a virtue. The same rule extends to the brute creation. The useful animals, especially cattle and dogs, are to be kindly treated, well-fed and cared for; cruelty and neglect are grave sins, wanton killing of cattle—under which head the animal sacrifices of the Dæva-worshippers fall—a crime. On the other hand, we shall see that the destruction of beasts of prey and noxious vermin is in later books a highly meritorious work.

So also the tilling of soil, the reclamation of waste land by rooting out weeds and thorns and extending irrigation to make grain and fruits grow, is a part of practical religion; it is in fact the conquest of a piece of the enemy's country for the Lord. No religion has set so high a value on agricultural labor as the service of God. The enemies of the Lord are the predatory Turanians who raid the settlements and carry off the husbandman's cattle; believers are bound not to harry Mazdaean villages. The conflict of religions is a struggle of agricultural civilization against nomadic barbarism, a situation which throws an instructive light on the beginnings of Zoroastrianism. From the first, Mazdaism was thus directly a civilizing force.

The Gathas give other glimpses of the conditions of the time. The prophet denounces unjust judges, the corrupt rulers who for gain put power into the hands of the wicked, the tyrannical and oppressive princes, and those who oppose the true religion—for a misbeliever cannot be a good king—the false teachers, deniers, and deceivers. He paints with affection the character of the good prince. The good king is he who practises the good in thought and word and deed, according to the teaching of the wise, "He, O Ahura, is the being who best embodies thee." He is generous, and nourishes the virtuous poor. Blessed of Ahura, above all, is the prince who adopts the Mazdaean faith and makes

it prevail. Like the Israelite prophets with their ideal king of the golden age to come, or like Plato with his royal philosopher, Zoroaster sets his hope of the triumph of the true religion on a good sovereign.

Zoroaster believed that God would vindicate the truth of his message in the great judgment which was near at hand. The deaf and the blind who will not be converted will be destroyed, the righteous are borne by two angels to the abode of Vohu Mano. "The sinners do not know the signal punishment that they are drawing upon them by their teachings, the punishment of the molten metal,⁴ but thou, O Ahura Mazda, knowest their evil deeds." In the other life long torture awaits the wicked. "For him who has tried to deceive the upright there will hereafter be groans, a long abode in darkness, foul food, and insulting words. This is the world, O ye wicked, to which your works and your religion are taking you." The dead must pass the trial at the judgment bridge: the good cross it without difficulty, the wicked fall into the abyss, to dwell forever in the world of the Lie, while for the righteous splendid rewards are in store. There is mention also of those in whom good and evil are evenly balanced, who in the later eschatology inhabit a kind of limbo. Whether the resurrection of the dead is alluded to in the Gathas is disputable; at least, it is not the prominent feature of the doctrine that it became when the judgment receded to a distant age.

The Gathas cannot be thought to contain anything like the full presentation of Zoroaster's teaching; in them he speaks, for example, in a standing phrase of good thoughts, words, deeds, but seldom defines what is good. The observances of religion, prayer, adoration, offering, are referred to, but nowhere prescribed. The sacred fire is a gift of Ahura Mazda; the Lord himself appeared to the prophet when he made the sacred offering on Ahura's fire; but of the Haoma offering, which has so large a place in the Persian worship, there is no mention. Zoroaster speaks as a prophet, not as a law-giver or a liturgist. A comparison of the Gathas with the rest of the Yasna, in which they are imbedded, makes this all the clearer.

⁴ A kind of ordeal by fire.

The character of the religion is well illustrated by the old Zoroastrian confession of faith (Yasna 12):

I repudiate the *Daevas*. I confess myself a worshipper of Mazda, a Zarathushtrian, as an enemy of the *Daevas*, a prophet of the Lord, praising and worshipping the Immortal Holy Ones (*Amesha Spentas*). To the Wise Lord I promise all good; to him, the good, beneficent, righteous, glorious, venerable, I vow all the best; to him from whom is the cow, the law, the (celestial) luminaries, with whose luminaries (heavenly) blessedness is conjoined. I choose the holy, good *Armaiti* (Humble Devotion), she shall be mine. I abjure theft and cattle-stealing, plundering and devastating the villages of Mazda worshippers.

It is my duty to grant to the inmates of the house freedom of movement and residence,⁴ and to the cattle with which they live on earth. With due reverence I vow this to Asha (Righteousness) by the consecrated water: I will henceforth nor plunder nor lay waste the villages of Mazda-worshippers, nor assail their persons and lives. I renounce fellowship with the wicked, lawless, evil-doing *Daevas*, the most deceitful, corrupt, and wicked of all, and with adherents of the *Daevas*, with sorcerers and those who follow them, with every bad man, whoever he may be, in thoughts and words and deeds and deportment, as I hereby renounce fellowship with the mischievous heretic.

As the Wise Lord, in all his communings with Zarathushtra instructed him, as he in all his communings with the Wise Lord renounced fellowship with the *Daevas*, so I also, as a worshipper of the Lord and follower of Zarathushtra, renounce the fellowship of the *Daevas*, as Zarathushtra, the representative of the true faith, renounced them.

Of the faith of the waters, the plants, the useful cow, the faith of the Wise Lord who created the cow and the upright man, the faith of Zarathushtra, of King Vishtaspa, of Frashaoshtra and Jamaspa, the faith of all the messengers of salvation and their helpers, and of every right believer—in this faith and in this promise I am a worshipper of Mazda. I confess myself a Mazda-worshipper, a Zarathushtrian, by vow and confession. I promise well-thought thought, well-spoken word, well-done deed. I pledge myself to the religion of the Mazda-worshippers, which makes an end of strife and lays down weapons and promotes kindred marriage, which is the highest, best, most beautiful of those that are or shall be, the religion of faith in Ahura, the religion of Zarathushtra. To the Wise Lord I promise all good. This is the profession of the Mazdaean religion.

⁴ Abolition of slavery?

The antecedents of this teaching are unknown. The title Ahura, which becomes in Mazdaism the name of the Supreme God, is the same word as Asura, which in the Vedas is the name of a group, or class, of deities among whom Varuna and Mitra are the foremost. Of all the Vedic gods, Varuna is the one whose character most nearly approaches that of Ahura Mazda, so that some scholars have been led to think that the latter is really a development of Varuna. Ahura (or the good spirit which is identified with Ahura) is clad with the solid firmament as with a vestment,⁶ as becomes a god of heaven. The Iranian Mithra, ignored in the Gathas, could not be kept in the background, and in the religion of later times became the first of the gods. He is closely assimilated in character to Ahura, being, as a god of light, the god of truth and good faith. The Dævas are the gods of the popular religion and of the tribes who did not embrace the Zoroastrian reform. The word is in India the prevailing name for the gods (*deva*), while there *asura* came in later times to be applied to demons. Among the arch-devils of the later Avesta are Indra, Sauru, and Naonhaithya, the Indian Indra, Çarva (Rudra), and Nasatya (a title of the Açvins). It is a tempting conjecture that the ancestors of the Iranian tribes among which Mazdaism arose were more intimately connected with the Aryo-Indian tribes whose greatest god was Varuna than with the Indra-worshippers who in the invasion and conquest gained for themselves and their gods the leading place; but the theory of Haug that a religious conflict between the Mazda-worshippers and those who adhered to the old nature religion preceded the separation of the two branches of the race and was one of its causes is not tenable, and even the modified form which Geldner has given it does not wholly commend itself.

At most, these relations only reveal the background of the Mazdaism, not the origin of the religion itself. That the latter is not the evolution of a natural polytheism is obvious, as has already been observed. The teaching of the Gathas is, as distinctly as that of the Upanishads, the outcome of reflection; much more distinctly it bears the stamp of an individual thinker. It may very well be that the problems which engaged Zoroaster

⁶ Yasna 30 5.

were not raised by him for the first time, but, however many others may have thought about these questions, he thought them through.

The monotheism of the Gathas is much more advanced than that of the loftiest Vedic hymns to Varuna; Ahura Mazda has no partner nor rival. The existence of the beings whom the people worship as gods is not denied, but they are false gods, demons, who, deceived, made choice of the evil spirit as their lord, and in turn delude men into following them. A similar conception is common in Judaism, and is expressed by Paul, "The sacrifices which the heathen offer, they offer to demons and not to gods."⁷

Zoroaster sees everywhere in the moral world good and evil arrayed over against each other: there are men whose head and heart are right, who strive to be good and do good, and there are others whose aims and conduct are just the opposite, and so it has always been. This difference is not accidental, every man has the character he has chosen. The types of these contrasted characters are two primal spirits, antagonists from the beginning of history, the good, or beneficent, spirit, or, as it might not improperly be rendered, the Holy Spirit, and the evil, or baleful, spirit. The good spirit sometimes seems to be Ahura Mazda himself, as the spirit in the Old Testament is sometimes distinct from Jahveh, sometimes identified with him; the evil spirit, the evil mind, is akin to the demon, Lie. The principles of good and evil are thus personalized, but the evil spirit is a much less concrete and dramatic figure than the Ahriman of later writings, who is not only a deceiver, but creator and ruler of the bad half of the world. The question of the origin of moral evil is followed back to the "primal" evil spirit; where he came from is left as a problem for later centuries. Whatever may be true of later developments of Zoroastrianism, the Gathas are not dualistic otherwise than as any system that tries to absolve God of the responsibility for moral evil is dualistic.

By the side of Ahura Mazda, ministers who do his will, are the "Immortal Beneficent Ones," the Amesha Spentas,⁸ Vohu Mano,

⁷ 1 Cor. 10 20.

⁸ The name is not found in the Gathas themselves, but occurs in a prose text of approximately the same age.

"Good Mind" (intelligence, purpose, disposition), Asha, Right (as conformity to the moral order), Kshatra, Sovereignty (the Kingdom of God), Armaiti, Devotion (humble piety), Hauvartat and Ameretat, Welfare and Immortality; with these six the genius of obedience, Sraosha, is sometimes joined. These are attributes of God, ideals of human character in the likeness of God, and spiritual blessings which God bestows on those who strive after them in the way of his appointment; they are not abstract ideas, but personified qualities, or spirits and genii of qualities. Among them Vohu Mano and Asha naturally hold the highest place. Here also penetrating and constructive thought is apparent. Asha (Arta, in Persian proper names; Vedic Rita), "Order" is indeed an Aryan conception and name, which in the Vedas sometimes appears as the will or law of Varuna, sometimes as an independent principle; but in the Gathas it is raised to a higher ethical plane as the law of righteousness in every relation. The other figures and the part they play are characteristically Mazdaean; they are as little a popular creation as the Atman of the Upanishads.

The religion of the Gathas is an ethical religion, not as that term may be applied to the higher nature religions of civilized peoples—the Greeks, for example—which make the gods the guardians of customary law or vindicators of an ideal righteousness, but in the sense that the nature and will of God are wholly moral. The human virtues are the divine attributes—the fact tells more than the direct moral injunctions of the Ahura Mazda. This explains the silence of the Gathas about worship. It is only by allusions that we learn that the cult of the sacred fire, the element of light and purity, belonged to primitive Mazdaism as it did to the older Aryan religion and to later Zoroastrianism. In all this we are reminded again of the ethical monotheism of the Hebrew prophets. There is, however, one noteworthy difference. In Israel ethical philosophy moves within the limits of a national religion: it is the national god who becomes in the hands of the prophets a righteous god, and consequently, down to the fall of the nation, the religious subject is the people, the retribution is national and historical. Zoroastrianism addressed itself in the beginning to individuals, bidding every man choose

between truth and falsehood, good and evil; the retribution is individual, not collective, whether it be on the day of the great affair or after death. By converting kings and people, it became the national religion of the Iranian people and the Achaemenian kings.

God's righteous rule involves the idea of retribution. He rewards faith and good works in this life, but on the other hand the good may be harried and persecuted by the bad. Zoroaster's mind is on the imminent crisis, when by the ordeal of molten metal God shall discern between the righteous and the wicked, between believers and unbelievers, or on the separation at the judgment bridge. This bridge, of which Zoroaster speaks as though it was a familiar notion, may have been a piece of popular eschatology—it has an interesting parallel among some North American Indians—and the glimpses of heaven and hell have nothing distinctive about them, but the standard is new in its moral rigorousness, and, above all, in that a man's religious confession is a decisive factor.

The conception of revelation, also, is characteristic. The Vedic Rishis were inspired poets, the gods put in their mouths the hymns they sang to the god's honor at the sacrifices; but Zoroaster's revelation is prophetic: what comes to him is not how the gods elect to be praised or worshipped, but what God will have man believe and how he will have him live. What Ahura Mazda thus makes known to him the prophet proclaims to his fellow-men.

Nothing is known of the way in which Zoroastrianism spread through the Iranian lands. We may surmise that the efforts of its adherents were directed, like the prophet's own, to the conversion of princes who should support the good religion and cause it to prevail over the Dævas and their worshippers. Like every other religion which is conceived as the only true and saving faith—like Christianity and Mohammedanism, for example—Mazdaism is in principle intolerant; in the Gathas believers are exhorted to chastise the misbelievers with the sword, and it is not improbable that forcible suppression of heathen worship at home and wars with heathen neighbors were from the beginning effective means of establishing the kingdom of God and expand-

ing its dominion—so much of truth there may be in the legends of the wars of the faith, however little of historical fact they may embody. How generally Zoroastrianism was the religion of the Iranian peoples before the rise of the Persian Empire, there is no means of determining; only about Media have we testimony that it was the dominant, if not the exclusive, religion of the country, whose priests, the Magi, were a powerful hereditary class.

In becoming the religion of rulers and people, Zoroastrianism took up again many features of the older religion which the founder had rejected or ignored, and its distinctive teachings were reshaped in forms more easily apprehended by the vulgar mind. Darius in his inscriptions names no god but Ahuramazda, though he speaks generally of the clan-gods, or genii of the clans—a conception not alien to the fundamental ideas of Mazdaism—and of “the other deities.” Artaxerxes Mnemon (404–362 B.C.), however, names Mithra and Anahita by the side of Ahuramazda, and Berossus reports that this king first set up images of the goddess Anahita not only in his capitals, Babylon, Susa, Ecbatana, but at Damascus and Sardes, from which it may be inferred that he was especially devoted to her worship. Darius Ochus prays, “May Ahuramazda and Mithra protect me and this land.” That the inscriptions make no mention of the evil principle is not evidence of unorthodoxy; ⁹ the inscriptions of Christian kings, it has been pertinently remarked, do not abound in references to the devil, however sincerely their authors may have believed that he was the instigator of rebellion.

The Achaemenian kings were buried in tombs, a mode of disposing of the dead abhorrent to the sacred law of the Vendidad, but seemingly not condemned in the Gathas. Herodotus affirms of his own observation that the exposure of the dead was practised by the Magi, but adds, “the Persians envelop the body in wax and bury it in the earth,” and Strabo makes the same distinction: the Magians alone leave the bodies to the birds of prey. The exposure of the dead on raised platforms is not infrequent among wandering tribes,¹⁰ and has of itself nothing to do with a

⁹ In the inscriptions of Darius Hystaspis, the Druj (Lie) appears, as in the Gathas, to be the comprehensive word for evil.

¹⁰ Examples are found in America as well as among the Mongols.

fear of polluting the earth, which might seem to be equally well attained by coating the body in wax. We can only infer that the former was no prescription of primitive Zoroastrianism, but a custom of a particular region or tribe which in Sassanian times succeeded in being made law.

In the Indian Vedas Mitra is the constant comrade of Varuna, so closely associated with him, indeed, that there are hardly any hymns to Mitra alone. It is possible that the worship of this god was more prominent among the western Iranians than in either India or in Bactria.¹¹ In character he is much like Ahura Mazda, but, as becomes a god of the old mythology, he is a more heroic figure. A champion of truth and right, a god who gives victory to the good cause, it is not strange that as a popular god he outshone his theological superior. His worship spread widely in the subject lands, especially in Armenia and Cappadocia, and he appeared to many Greek observers to be the chief god of the Persians. Anahita Ardivisura was a goddess of the waters, especially of the fructifying waters of heaven which pour down into the mythical lake Vourukasha and are thence distributed to the seven regions of the earth. She supplies the unfailing sources which revive vegetation and the herds; she creates in men and women the powers of reproduction, gives mothers easy childbirth and abundant milk. In the hymn to her praise (Yasht 5) the goddess is described as a fair and buxom maiden in rich attire, with a golden crown, perhaps as she was represented in art. As a goddess of fertility, she resembled a whole class of West Asiatic goddesses, and was in many places assimilated to them or identified with them, sometimes borrowing features of their cults—in Armenia, for example, religious prostitution—but there is no sufficient ground for the opinion that the goddess herself was borrowed from the Semites.¹² A male counterpart of Anahita Ardivisura is Apam-Napat, the Water Child, an old Aryan deity of frequent occurrence in the Veda.

¹¹ A Mithradates is named among the assassins of Xerxes.

¹² The Babylonian Anat, whose name has a superficial resemblance to Anahita, is never so much as named in Assyrian or New-Babylonian texts, that is, in the period in which the Persians might have heard of her, and apparently even in earlier times had a place in the pantheon only because it was proper for Anu to have a wife. The West Syrian Anath, a warlike deity, also disappears from view long before the Persian time.

The religion of the Persians seemed to Greek observers a pure nature worship. They had no temples or images—as Herodotus opines, because they did not, like the Greeks, conceive the gods to be of the same nature as men. They offer sacrifice, he tells us, on mountain tops to Zeus, by which name is to be understood the whole circle of heaven; they sacrifice also to the sun and the moon and the earth, to fire and water and the winds. The Avesta contains hymns to the Sun and the Moon and to the star Sirius (Tishtrya); of the divine fire and the sacredness of water and air there will be more to say in another connection.

By the side of these nature powers the Immortal Beneficent Ones become personal deities and receive divine worship. In Strabo's time Vohu Mano (*Ὀμᾶνος*) had fire temples in Cappadocia, and images that were carried in procession. Ahura Mazda is the father and creator of them all; he brought them into being that they might be his ministers, and what he does in the world is mainly done through their instrumentality. Each of them presides over a province of nature: Vohu Mano over the useful animals, Asha Vahishta over fire, Khshatra Vairya over the metals, Spenta Armaiti is the goddess of earth; Haurvatat and Ameretat are the genii of waters and plants respectively. In the ecclesiastical calendar of later times each of these Amshaspands is regent of a certain month of the year and of a certain day of the month. All these divinities (Yazatas, modern Persian Izeds) are subordinate to Ahura Mazda; the theology is so far forth consistently monotheistic. But they receive individually and collectively the same kind of worship as the supreme God, and from the practical side the religion may be described as a monarchical polytheism with a somewhat numerous and varied pantheon.

The great Yashts betray a consciousness of the inconsistency, or perhaps we should say the innovation, by making Ahura Mazda himself commend or prescribe the worship of the other divinities. The Mithra hymn begins: "Ahura Mazda said to Spitama Zarathushtra, When I created Mithra with wide pastures, I created him, O Spitama, as worthy of sacrifice and worship as I, Ahura Mazda, myself am." The hymn to Anahita opens similarly:¹³ "Ahura Mazda said to Spitama Zarathushtra,

¹³ Cf. also Tishtrya Yasht, 52.

Worship, O Spitama Zarathushtra, my Ardivi, rich in blessings, pure, copious, wholesome, foe of demons, believing in Ahura, to whom the bodily world owes sacrifice and praise." To Anahita Ahura Mazda himself first made the Haoma offering, and prayed that Zarathushtra might accept his religion, which prayer she granted. Yet she also is produced by the word of Ahura Mazda.

The ethical dualism, if it may be so called, hardened in time into a theological dualism, in which an evil being of supernatural power stands over against Ahura Mazda. Aristotle and Hermippus had heard that according to the Magi there are two principles, a good divinity (*δαίμων*) and an evil divinity, the former called Zeus, or Oromasdes, the latter Hades, or Areimanios. To Ahriman the later Zoroastrian writings attribute the creation of all evil things, and he has his ministers, with the Evil Mind as Grand Vizier, each standing over against one of the Beneficent Ones. The eschatology also underwent a change. The great crisis which the prophet expected in his time did not come, and to later generations it did not seem imminent. The result was that the judgment of the individual at death became a separate act. The general judgment of Zoroaster's original conception was postponed to the end of the age, and to appear at that final assize the dead of all generations were brought to life again in the resurrection. This doctrine also was known to the Greeks before Alexander: Theopompus reports that the Magi teach that men will come to life again and be immortal in a spiritual state in which they neither need food nor cast a shadow.

The Macedonian conquest signified much more than the overthrow of the Persian empire; it was the invasion of the East by western civilization. Greek colonies were founded wherever the armies penetrated, and many of them became flourishing cities, and centres of more or less exotic Greek culture. The division of Alexander's empire left the greater part of its territory under Macedonian or Greek rule. A Greek Bactrian kingdom which arose about the middle of the third century comprised the old East Iranian lands and reached into India; on the west it bordered on the Seleucid empire. Parthia, however, under the native Arsacidan dynasty, succeeded a little later in conquering

its independence (247 B.C.), and Mithradates (174–136 B.C.) united in his kingdom a great part of the Iranian lands, while the Greek Bactrian kingdom went down (139 B.C.) under an invasion of nomad tribes from the great Scythian steppes. From the middle of the first century B.C., the Arsacidans were repeatedly involved in wars with Rome. Trajan cherished the ambition of reclaiming for western civilization the empire of Alexander, but by the destruction of Seleucia in 164 A.D. the Romans themselves dealt a blow to Greek influence in the East which the Parthians had been unable to inflict. Meanwhile the Parthian kings, who in earlier times had proudly put "Philhellene" on their coins, showed themselves more and more averse to foreign culture; a national, or perhaps we should rather say an Oriental, reaction set in in the first century of our era, the knowledge of Greek declined, and from the beginning of the third century western learning was accessible only in Aramaic translations.

The history of the religion during these centuries is very obscure. It is probable that it suffered in the beginning from the withdrawal of the state support it had enjoyed under the Achæmenians, and in the period of "acute Hellenization," which apparently lasted for some generations, the would-be cultivated classes may have been as indifferent Zoroastrians as the upper classes in Jerusalem were indifferent Jews. The Parthian kings do not seem to have been distinguished for religious zeal, and the perpetual internal disorders of the kingdom and frequent changes of the ruling family were unfavorable conditions. The reaction of which we have spoken may have had its religious side; mediaeval Persian tradition which there is no reason for discrediting records that a king Valkash caused all that could be recovered of the Avesta from manuscripts and the memory of men to be collected and copied. It is uncertain whether Vologeses I (contemporary of Nero) or the third of the name (148–191 A.D.) is meant.

In Persia proper several series of coins show that native lines ruled over smaller or larger regions as vassals of Greek or Parthian kings or virtually their own masters. Early in the third century one of the Persian petty kings, who bore the historic name Artaxerxes (Ardashir I, acceded 212 A.D.), subdued the other

kinglets in the vicinity of Persepolis (Istakhr), and, when called to account by his Parthian overlord, beat him in a series of battles, the Persian Sassanian rule succeeding the Parthian much as seven centuries and a half before the Persian Achaemenian succeeded the Mede. The vassal states were subdued and incorporated in the kingdom, and Ardashir assumed the title, King of Kings of the Iranians. In Persia, on one side of the turbulent main current of history, Zoroastrianism had been preserved in greater purity than in regions where it was in contact with other religions, and it had evidently a stronger hold on both rulers and people. The rise of the Sassanian kingdom was both a national Persian restoration and a revival of the religion of the glorious Achaemenian times as a national religion. Ardashir includes "Mazdayasnian" (Mazda-worshipper) among his royal titles; at his order the priest Tansar prepared an authoritative canon and text of the Avestan scriptures. What we possess is, as has been already remarked, the remains of this Sassanian Avesta.

It is characteristic of the early Sassanian kings that Ardashir and Shapur I, during their occupation of Armenia, destroyed the images even of the Iranian gods and turned the temples into fire shrines, and there is a remarkable statement that Ardashir wished to suppress the venerable sacred fires in other centres, leaving only that in the capital—a singular parallel, if it be historical, to Josiah's reformation in Jerusalem. The inherent intolerance of Zoroastrian orthodoxy appeared in another way when Christianity, with its exclusive claims and its active propaganda, began to push into Sassanian territory. Political considerations also had a good deal to do with the treatment of Christians, especially after the Roman empire became Christian. Severe persecutions of the Christians occurred repeatedly; strict laws were made against heresy, and apostasy from the Zoroastrian faith was punished with death. The priesthood was an organized and powerful body, whose head had his seat at Rai in Media and was the first person in the state after the king.

The hundred years of wars between Rome and Persia, which began in 527 and was waged with great energy by Chosroes II (Parvez, 590-628), weakened both the decadent empires. The

Arabs wrested Syria from the Romans in 636 and Egypt in 639. By the battle of Kadesiya in 637 and that of Nehavend a few years later, the Persian empire passed into the hands of the Moslems. In a short time the armies of the Caliphs had subdued even the remotest East Iranian lands. Of the decline of Mazdaism under Mohammedan rule little is known. Doubtless many Zoroastrians embraced Islam, as multitudes of Christians did, to escape the disabilities or the oppressions to which they were subject. But systematic efforts to force them to change their religion were not made by the early Caliphs, the Zoroastrians being reckoned with Jews and Christians as "people who have scriptures," and therefore, according to the Koran, to be left undisturbed on condition of paying a head tax; only later were the Zoroastrians excluded from this protection. The extensive literary activity of the Parsi priests in original works as well as in Pahlavi translations and synopses of Avestan books, which lasted at least through the 9th century, shows that the religion still possessed some vitality, and even after that time less significant works were written in modern Persian. The number of Zoroastrians in Persia, however, steadily declined, especially, it may be surmised, after the more fanatical and intolerant Shiites came into power. Two hundred years ago they were estimated at 100,000; to-day they can count less than 10,000 souls, chiefly in Yezd and Kerman.

In the early centuries of Islam, Persian Zoroastrians established themselves in India; the descendants of these emigrants, now numbering about 90,000, principally in the Bombay Presidency, are very prosperous. They have always adhered pretty faithfully to the practice of their law, but in the decadence of the religion in Persia, on whose authorities they were dependent in matters of learning, the Indian community also suffered. Their sacred scriptures, which they could only read in translations twice or thrice removed from the original, became with every generation less understood. The interest of European scholars in these scriptures awakened that of the Parsis themselves, and in the last half century a revival of learning, and a revival of religion by a return to its sources, have been in progress among them.

In the foregoing pages the endeavor has been made to outline the fundamental ideas of Zoroastrianism as they are set forth in the Gathas and to indicate, so far as the sources permit, the directions of subsequent development. It remains to describe the religion as it appears in the Sassanian Avesta and in later Pahlavi writings. This more complete survey will show that, through all its development and the manifold vicissitudes of its fortunes, Zoroastrianism has preserved its original character substantially unchanged.

Ahura Mazda is the supreme God; he is "the creator, Ahura Mazda, resplendent and glorious, the greatest, best, most beautiful of beings, the most constant, wisest, most perfect of form, supreme in righteousness, knowing to do good, giving joy at his good pleasure; who created us, formed us, and sustains us; who is the most beneficent spirit" (Yasna, 1). He is the "omniscient Lord, the most beneficent spirit, the creator of the material worlds, the righteous one" (Vendidad, 2 1). There are representations of Ahura Mazda in relief from both the Achaemenian and Sassanian times, as God the Father is represented without scruple in Christian art, but there were no images in his worship.

Ahura Mazda is absolutely good, and therefore cannot be the author of any kind of evil, natural or moral. All the evil in the world is the work of a power hostile to God and his good creation. The Persians preferred to admit, for the present order of things, a limitation of God's power, rather than to leave room for doubt of his perfect goodness. The first chapter of the Vendidad tells how Ahura Mazda created in order the several Iranian countries with their various excellences, and how for each Angra Mainyu created corresponding plagues—the killing cold of winter, intemperate heat; serpents, locusts, ants; rapine and lust, foreign oppression; unnatural vice, magic and witchcraft, the interment of the dead, and the eating of carrion; pride, doubt, disbelief. Evil spirits and demons, men of devilish character—who are, in fact, demons on earth as well as after death—beasts of prey and noxious vermin, all belong to Angra Mainyu, and the 99,999 diseases the flesh is heir to are his invention. The first of Ahura Mazda's creations was Vohu Mano, "Good Mind" (both good

intelligence and good moral sense), in consultation with whom he produced all his other creatures, just as in Proverbs 8 Wisdom is the first creation of Jahveh, and stood beside him as master-builder when God established the heavens and the earth.¹⁴

In Philo the Logos commonly takes the place of Wisdom, and the language which is used about the Logos is sometimes strikingly similar to what is said of Vohu Mano in the Avesta. Darmesteter was led by this resemblance, among other things, to think that the Gathas (which he regarded, not as the oldest part of the Avesta, but as comparatively recent) were directly influenced by Jewish Alexandrian philosophy. The conception in the Avesta, however, is vastly simpler than in Philo. Ahura Mazda is no transcendental Absolute, but a living God, and his Good Mind is not a metaphysical link between unchanging Being and the manifold and changing world of becoming, but a hypostasis of the intelligence and goodness with which God created the world. Vohu Mano is in this world the special guardian of the faithful; Good Mind is in a way embodied in them, so that when one of them has contracted uncleanness and is purified by the peculiar disinfectants prescribed in the "antidemonic law," it is said that the Vohu Mano (i.e. the man) is purified. He is also, as has already been noted, the guardian of the flocks and herds, with which the religion is hardly less concerned than with human beings. He receives the righteous at the gates of Paradise; and the significant name of the state of the blest is "the blessings of the Good Mind," as hell is the abode of the Evil (or the worst) Mind.

The Bundahish (9th cent. A.D.) describes the creation of the world, doubtless following substantially the lost Avestan books. The first of Ahura Mazda's "mundane creatures" was the sky, from which Vohu Mano produced the cosmic light and the good religion of the Mazdaeans—true religion was pre-existent, like the Torah in Judaism. Then followed the Amesha Spentas, Asha and the rest. "Of Ahura Mazda's creatures the first was the sky, the second water, the third dry land, the fourth plants, the fifth animals, the sixth mankind." The work of creation filled just a year (365 days), and the six acts correspond to the

¹⁴ With these verses in Prov. 8 cf. especially Gatha 1.

six divisions of the year each ending with a festival of the religious calendar. The similarity of this scheme to the six days of creation in Genesis was early remarked, and some have thought it probable that the Persian cosmology was borrowed from the Jews. There is no external difficulty in such a supposition, for even the lost Avestan book on which the Bundahish depends was probably not as old as Genesis. On the other hand, the number and order of the creative acts are perfectly natural, we might almost say, inevitable: sky, sea, land; plants, animals, man. In fact the several acts of creation fit into the six days of Genesis so awkwardly that many Old Testament critics regard the latter as superimposed on the original cosmologic scheme. Aside from this, one great difference remains: in Genesis the sun and moon and other celestial luminaries are introduced after the plants, as the first of the animal creation, a point of view in itself quite in accord with ancient notions, but perhaps inspired here by Jewish antipathy to the worship of the heavenly bodies. In view of these facts the conjecture that the Persian Genesis is dependent on the Hebrew scriptures is superfluous.¹⁵

The Bundahish tells much in detail about the creation of the luminaries and the constellations; the different regions of the earth, with their mountains, rivers, and lakes; the families and species of animals, real and fabulous; the origin of mankind, and the races of men distributed over the earth. The three great races are called Airya, Tura, and Sairya (the Aryan Iranians, their hereditary Turanian foes, and the Greeks).¹⁶

If God made mankind, the question must arise, How comes it then that there are wicked men? The answer of the Bundahish is that in the minds of the first pair an evil thought arose, namely, that it was the evil spirit that had created the water, earth, plants, and animals; from this they went on to sins of act, until at last they became worshippers of the Dævas, just as in the Gathas we read that the Dævas themselves chose not rightly between the two primal spirits, but were deluded into choosing

¹⁵ The contrary theory, that the Jewish cosmology was derived from the Persians, is, on chronological grounds, not worth considering.

¹⁶ Cf. Dinkart, viii, 13, 9, from the lost Citradat Nask. Here, again, the three groups in Genesis, Shem, Ham (Canaan), and Japhet will suggest themselves, or the three Greek stocks, Æolians, Ionians, Dorians.

the evil mind. Reflection has gone a step farther, to the question how God could have permitted this. According to the Bundahish, Ahura Mazda bids the guardian genii of men (*fravashis*) say whether is better, that men should contend on earth against the fiend and overcome at last, the fiend perishing, or should always be protected against the destroyer. Christian theologians have reasoned similarly about the fall of Adam and Eve.

The Bundahish has much to tell of Ahriman's evil creatures with which he fills the world, and of the varied mischief they wrought. First of his creatures was Akem Mano, Evil Mind, the counterpart and antagonist of Vohu Mano, the Good Mind. For each of the other Amesha Spentas also he makes a particular deadly foe, but in the others there is no such obvious correspondence; they are, as has already been mentioned, ancient deities, Indra, Sauru, Naonhaithya, Tauru, Zairi—the catalogue is not so constant as that of the good powers. Occasionally Taromaiti, Arrogance, appears as the enemy of Armaiti, Humble Piety.

The Greeks in the 4th century B.C. were acquainted with the fact that the Magi divided the history of the world into periods of three thousand years, of which the present age of conflict is one. This scheme appears in the Bundahish. The cycle is 12,000 years. At the beginning Ahura Mazda produced his spiritual creation, and his creatures remained for three thousand years with intangible bodies, free from corruption. The second period of three thousand years is the period of material creation. In the third, Angra Mainyu breaks into the creation of God and causes the greatest distress; this is the age of human history prior to the revelation of the true religion. At the beginning of the fourth period (Anno Mundi 9000) Zoroaster appears; at its close will be the last judgment. Theopompus, if he is completely reported, seems to have said nothing of the age of the spiritual, or ideal, creation; according to him good and evil prevailed each for three thousand years, then for three thousand—the present—they contended and destroyed each other's works; at the end of this period Hades would succumb and the age of perfect blessedness would begin. It would be incautious on this ground to infer that the first period is a later addition to the scheme: the 12,000 years are plainly a great world-year, and Theopompus is concerned only with the idea of the conflict.

The ideal creation has striking resemblance to Platonic theories. Philo sets forth how God, "when he made up his mind to form this visible world, first produced the intelligible world as its type, in order that, employing a bodiless (immaterial) and most godlike pattern, he might fabricate this bodily world." But the parallel is less significant than striking, for the spiritual world of Ahura Mazda is not the ideal type of the material creation: it is simply the beginning, before the intrusion of the devil, when things were in that perfect state in which they will be at the end when he has been finally banished. The material creation is made necessary by the invasion of the enemy; the battle with him must be waged and the victory won in a real world, with carnal weapons as well as spiritual. Plausible as the hypothesis of Greek influence at first seems to be, closer examination does not sustain it.

According to the Vendidad, Ahura Mazda revealed the true religion in the beginning to Yima, son of Vivanhant, and invited him to proclaim it to men. Yima, however, excused himself: the task was beyond his powers. He accepted the humbler charge, to multiply the creatures, care for them, and rule over them. "In my realm there shall be neither cold wind nor hot wind, nor disease nor death." Ahura Mazda bestowed on him the regalia, a seal and sword. The good creatures multiplied so that thrice the earth had to be enlarged to make room for them. But at the end of this golden age of nine hundred years God announced to Yima the approach of a terrible winter, a kind of ice-age, and bade him make a great shelter in which to keep alive choice specimens of plants and animals and human beings to perpetuate their kind and repopulate the earth. This myth of the ice-age destroying plant and animal life, and of the preservation of a remnant in the Var of Yima, is the Iranian parallel to the wide-spread flood-myth, of which the Babylonian and Jewish forms are the most familiar. The arid Iranian lands were no climate for a flood; but of winter, "the worst of plagues, the creation of the demons," they had experience enough.

Long ages elapsed after Yima's "gran rifiuto" before God again designated a prophet of the true religion. The second of the Gathas represents the "soul of the kine" complaining before

him of the cruel wrongs it suffered at the hands of brutal men, and Zoroaster is commissioned to be its deliverer by converting men to the law which makes them merciful to beasts. The Vendidad tells how Angra Mainyu, foreseeing the discomfiture he and his creatures were to suffer at Zoroaster's hands, sent demon emissaries to kill him,¹⁷ but Zoroaster routed them by reciting the confession of faith, Ahuna Vairyu, not to speak of rocks as big as houses that he had ready to pelt the devils with, defiantly declaring his purpose to destroy the fiend's creation. Angra Mainyu begs him not to destroy his creation, and promises him that if he will abjure the good law of Mazda he shall have dominion as wide and long as that of the mythical Vadhaghana, "master of the countries."¹⁸ Zoroaster rejects the offer, and declares that he will put the devils to flight with the apparatus of worship and the holy words. Thereupon the whole host, with cries of terror, precipitately flee down to the world of darkness.¹⁹

The world is a great battlefield, on which beneficent powers ceaselessly contend with baleful, light with darkness, the vivifying waters with drouth and barrenness, the genial warmth with icy winter; the useful animals are beset by beasts of prey, the industrious peasant and herdsman by the marauding nomads, the civilized Iranians have ever to defend themselves against the wild Turanians. Religion teaches men to see in all this the age-long struggle of Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu, the good God and the demon of destruction, each with his hosts of allies. It teaches, too, that man is not a passive spectator of this war of gods and demons on whose issue his fortunes and his very existence depend, but a combatant in the thick of the fight. Every man is by his own choice arrayed under the one banner or the other, contending for the triumph of the good world or the bad. The whole conflict is moral: the strife of productive and destructive agencies in nature is not the play of physical forces guided by blind laws or blinder chance, but of benevolent and

¹⁷ For the age of this myth it is significant that the name of the demon of idolatry is Buiti (Buddha).

¹⁸ Cf. Matt. 4 8-11.

¹⁹ This attack and rout of the demons is apparently in the infancy of Zoroaster, not at the beginning of his ministry.

malevolent wills. Men, animated by Good Mind or by Evil Mind, battle for the truth and right and goodness or for falsehood and wrong, and their contending is not alone with flesh and blood, but with the "world-rulers of this darkness, the spirit hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places."²⁰ This conception of life as a war with the demons gives its peculiar color to the religion, morals, and customs. In many particulars these resemble the lower religions in which self-defence against evil spirits is the principal feature; but the central theistic and ethical ideas give them a different significance.

The individual believer does not engage in this warfare fighting for his own hand, but as a member of an army. Of the organization of the Zoroastrian state church we have little information. From the Avesta it appears that in Sassanian times the religious heads of the several towns, districts, and provinces constituted an ecclesiastical hierarchy, at the summit of which, the head of the church in the whole empire, stood the Zarathush-trotema, whose seat was at Rai in Media, the system thus corresponding to the political organization as did that of the Christian church in the Roman empire. The ancient name of the priests, the only name in the Avesta,²¹ was Athravan, "Fire priest." The Greeks call the Zoroastrian clergy "Magi," which according to Herodotus was the name of a Median tribe; and the Parsis use the same name, the modern Mobed being from *Magupat*, "Head Magian." The priesthood was probably from very early times hereditary in certain families, as it is now.

In heroic antiquity the Yashts tell of sacrifices for "a thousand stallions, a thousand bulls, ten thousand sheep," but in the Zoroastrian religion worship consists essentially in the tending of the sacred fire and the offering of Haoma. The Avesta which we have is the liturgy of the Haoma offering on ordinary and extraordinary occasions. Considerable parts of a lost book of the Sassanian Avesta, the "Instructions for the Priests," have been preserved in Nirangistan. The rubrics in modern copies of the Yasna and the traditional ritual of the Parsis doubtless perpetuate the important features of the ceremonies as they were

²⁰ Cf. Ephes. 6 10 ff., and with it Minokhired, c. 43, *Sacred Books of the East*, xxiv, 84.

²¹ An exception in Yasna 65 7.

in Sassanian times. Early reliefs and coins show the king standing before a fire altar under the open sky; the Magi, like the modern Mobeds, had portable altars for service in the houses; but there were also from Achaemenian times on, fire shrines, in which the sacred fire was kept burning on an altar, or, as at present, in a vase filled with ashes. Strabo tells how the priests in Cappadocia went daily into these temples and sang for an hour before the fire, holding a bundle of twigs, and wearing a head-dress which covered their mouths. The shrine is constructed so as to keep the sunlight from falling on the fire and dimming or extinguishing it, according to a wide-spread belief. The fire is guarded from every kind of pollution; it is fed with scrupulously selected wood—modern Parsis in Bombay use sandalwood—the priest wears a thick veil over his nose and mouth, that his breath may not fall on the fire;²² his hands are encased in long gauntlets, and the wood is handled with tongs. This service is performed five times a day, at the canonical hours.

No other ceremonies take place in this inmost shrine; the preparation and offering of the Haoma is done in other rooms in the temple. The similarity of these rites to those of Brahman Soma offering shows how tenaciously they have been perpetuated from a time before the forefathers of the Indian and Iranian peoples separated. The twigs of the sacred plant are pounded in a mortar, the expressed juice is mixed with milk and holy water, and strained. The draught thus obtained concentrates in itself all the virtues of plants, animals, and the waters; it is drunk sacramentally by the priests in the course of the service and is administered to the dying as a *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*. The "green Haoma" of this world is a type of the "white Haoma" of the *gaokorena* tree from which is obtained the draught of immortality. Besides the Haoma, the offering comprises small cakes peculiarly marked, with butter or fat to represent animal sacrifice; these also are eaten by the officiating priest in the course of the service.

In former times eight priests took part in the rite: the Zaothar recited the Gathas as the Hotar recites the Vedic hymns in the

²² A similar precaution is used by Shinto priests in Japan and by cooks in the Mikado's kitchen.

Brahmanic ritual; another pressed the Haoma, a third mixed it with milk, others tended the fire on the small altar and waited in different capacities on the principal ministers, while a master of ceremonies (corresponding to the Brahman) had general oversight of the whole. At present these various functions are concentrated in the hands of two priests, the Zot (Zaotar), who performs the essential parts of the sacrifice as well as the recitation of the sacred text, while the Raspi, who theoretically represents the three absent priests, assists him and makes the responses. The celebrant must be in the superlative stage of ritual holiness which is acquired by the great purification with cow's urine, the antiseptic for demonic infection; and every stage of the ceremony itself is marked by washings and the immersion of the apparatus in holy water. The principal service is addressed to Ahura Mazda and all the holy divinities of the celestial world; to Zarathushtra and all the holy divinities of this terrestrial world; to the Yazatas who preside in turn over the thirty days of the month, beginning with Ahura Mazda and the six Amesta Spentas, and including the genii of gods and of the pious dead. The central part of the liturgy is the recitation of the Gathas.

The whole cultus is a singularly arid ritualism, consonant with the practical genius of the race. The exact performance of the rite and the exact recitation of the long texts in an unintelligible language is the essential thing; so done, it is sure to be efficacious. It not only procures blessings from the gods, but reinforces the gods, and gives them power to overcome hostile influences and work for good. This is the plain lesson of the Tishtar Yasht, where Tishtrya (Sirius), the rain star, is worsted by the drought demon Apaosha until Ahura Mazda himself offers a sacrifice dedicated to Tishtrya by name; then the demon is ignominiously put to flight and the blessed rain descends. Here, as in many other religions, primitive notions of the magical efficacy of the cultus which seem for a time to be overcome in the development of the idea of the supreme power and goodness of God and the ethical nature of religion come back and intrench themselves impregnably in the ritual. God can be worked for man's advantage by offering, praise, and prayer; or, as theological re-

flection less bluntly puts it, God has appointed these means of moving him to bestow his favors and protection.

A large part of practical religion consists in the observance of the rules of clean and unclean, and in the purifications necessary to repair witting or unwitting infractions of them. Unclean-ness in the religious sense is a demonic contagion. The demons and all their ways and works are unclean, and persons and things that get into the infected neighborhood catch the contagion and may communicate it to others. The sphere in which the presence and agency of demons is most clearly seen is death, and here the greatest precautions must be taken. When death is near, a priest is called in; the dying man recites after him his confession of sin, and the priest puts into his mouth some drops of Haoma as a last sacrament. The demon of death is imagined to wear the form of a carrion fly; to drive him away, a dog is brought into the chamber when the body is laid out, if possible a dog with "four eyes," that is with spots of light color above the eyes, or a white dog with yellow ears, for the "glance of the dog" is a terror to demons.²³ Fire is then brought into the room and fed with sweet-smelling wood, the odor of which kills the demons wherever the wind carries it.²⁴ A priest, sitting at least three yards from the dead, recites Avestan texts until the funeral procession sets out.

This must take place by daylight, and should not be in rainy weather. The body is carried on an iron bier, by bearers whose business it is and who take professional precautions against infection, to the place where it is to be exposed. In ancient times this might be a dry and barren spot, far from the abode of men; but special structures for the purpose, the Dakhmas (now called in India "towers of silence"), are mentioned in the Avesta. The motive of this singular mode of disposing of the dead is to prevent the defiling of the elements; it is from a Zoroastrian point of view a mortal sin to burn a body or to inhumate it. The modern Dakhma is so constructed that the rain which may fall on the bodies is rapidly carried off in a catch-basin, and thence

²³ This performance is repeated at intervals so long as the body remains in the house.

²⁴ This seems to be the original motive for the use of incense in the worship of the gods.

through filters into cisterns. The vultures make quick work of the bodies thus exposed; the bones (which when dry are no longer unclean) are from time to time cast into the central pit.²⁵ Religious services for the benefit of the deceased are kept up for three days, partly in the house, partly in the fire-temple, directed especially to Sraosha, the psychopompos, and are observed with especial diligence on the fourth day, on which the soul confronts the judgment at the Çinvat bridge; during this time the mourners fast from flesh.

For those who have contracted uncleanness by contact with a dead body from which the devil has not been driven away by beasts or birds of prey, and who are therefore themselves possessed by the demon Nasu (*vérvs*), a purification is prescribed in the Vendidad. The active disinfectant is cow's urine applied by aspersion, whereby the demon is driven successively from one lodging-place to another, from head to foot, till at last he escapes from the left great-toe and rushes away, buzzing wildly, to the mountains of the north where the devils are at home. For greater assurance, this is gone through five times more. Then the man rubs himself down with dry earth, and finally washes in water at three depressions in the ground, at the first once, at the second twice, at the third three times. These purifications are repeated at intervals of three days, during which the man must remain in quarantine, and only at the end of the ninth day may he approach the fire or water or earth, or cattle or the faithful. If the demon had been expelled by dogs or birds of prey, washing of the body with cow's urine and water thirty times repeated suffices. A field in which the dead body of a dog is found lying must remain fallow for a year. To throw out on the ground any part of the body of a man or the carcass of a dog of the size of a joint of the little finger or larger is punishable by stripes in proportion, up to a thousand blows of the horsewhip. The ground in which a body has been buried is unclean for fifty years. Running or standing water in which a body is found is unclean; how far, and what to do about it, are subjects of long-drawn-out casuistry. A large part of the Vendidad is taken up with these

²⁵ The Dakhmas are the favorite haunts of demons who smite men with all manner of diseases.

matters. By a singular yet strictly logical theory, the body of an evil beast, creature of Ahriman, or of an idolator or heretic, is not unclean: the devil who was in him while he was alive has now gone off with his soul, leaving the body pure. Eating the flesh of a dead man or dog is an inexpressible sin.

Next to death the most redoubtable uncleanness is that of a menstruous woman. She is shut up in an isolated apartment, remote from fire and water, from the bunch of sacred twigs, and from believers, and receives her meagre allowance of food in a metal vessel; whoever brings this food must keep at least nine feet away from the woman. If menstruation is prolonged, it is because the demons have brought this scourge upon her; the cow's urine panacea is prescribed again, and revenge is taken on the demons by killing some hundreds of Ahrimanic insects such as ants. Needless to say, commerce with a woman in such a state is a deadly sin: it is as bad, the Vendidad declares, as if a man roasted the flesh of his own son and let the fat run into the fire. Childbirth is similarly unclean, and anyone who touches the mother catches the uncleanness. The same rigid quarantine lasts forty days, and is followed by a similar purification. Much graver is the case of a woman who has had a still-born child or a miscarriage. She is shut up in absolute seclusion for three days, without food or drink; then the Dakhma within her is disinfected by a draught of cow's urine and ashes, after which small rations of boiled milk, or gruel made in milk, or wine without water are allowed; only in peril of death may she be given water, and this profanation of the pure element must be penally expiated. We are familiar with the same notions and with similar, if less rigorous, religious regulations in the Jewish laws, but there the association of uncleanness with demonic influence is not so obvious.

Diseases were brought into the world by the malice of Angra Mainyu; some of them, like leprosy, are in a peculiar degree unclean, and demand the seclusion of the victim from the company of men and the proximity of the pure fire and water and the apparatus of worship. Some can be cured by the knife, others by healing plants which Ahura Mazda created as specifics for the demonic maladies; but the final resort is to the beneficent divine

word, the incantation in the Avesta itself, above all the potent formula Airyama Ishyo (Yasna 54), the prayer to Airyama, who puts to flight diseases, death, pain, and fever, every disease and every death, all the Yatus and all the Pairikas and all the evil Jains.²⁶

The ethics of Zoroastrianism bear the distinct impress of its fundamental religious conceptions. The good life is an unceasing conflict against evil within and without. Virtue, like purity, is a defeat of the demons. Morals have therefore a strenuous and militant quality. There is no place for saints who flee from the world; the saint is he who overcomes the evil in the world. Character lies not in overt act alone, but in the inner springs of conduct; "good thoughts, good words, good deeds," is the ever recurring formula.

Among the virtues of the Mazdayasnian, truth has the foremost place: the devil is a liar, and the father of lies. In the Gathas, as we have seen, the Lie (Druj) is the comprehensive name for the demon host and its head, and the world of the Lie is hell. It may well be that the false religion of the Daevas is here chiefly in mind, but in later times, when this phase of the conflict was past, the words bore a more general sense. The Greeks were much impressed by the value the Persians set on truth and by the prominent place they gave it in the education of well-born youths. They abhor falsehood above everything, Herodotus says, and next to that, making debts, for that leads to lying and fraud. A special form of this virtue is good faith in keeping promises and agreements. Mithra is the guardian and vindicator of oaths and covenants; the man who breaks his solemn word is a "Mithra-liar," and incurs the honest god's deadly wrath. "The miscreant who lies to Mithra brings death on a whole country, he harms the good world as much as a hundred malefactors could do. Never break an agreement, O Spitama, neither one that you make with a wicked man nor with an upright man of your own religion; for an agreement holds with both wicked and upright."²⁷ Perjury is as bad as a hundred heresies—an extraordinary triumph of ethics over orthodoxy!

²⁶ Names of classes of demons. See Vendidad 20.

²⁷ Mithra Yasht 1.

Justice and equity—righteousness in the widest sense in dealing with fellow men—has its ideal and presiding genius in Asha, personified Right. The unjust judge is denounced in the Gathas; it is related of Cambyses that he flayed a corrupt judge, and, for an effective reminder, covered with his skin the chair on which his son was seated to succeed him.²⁸ Justice, next to truth, was inculcated in the education of princes and noble youth.

What we should regard as moral offences in the relations of the sexes fall chiefly, from the Zoroastrian point of view, into the class of impurity, which, however, we do well to remember, is not merely physiological but moral. Paederasty and bestiality, unnatural vices, are crimes punished by death; the offender caught *flagrante delictu* may be killed on the spot by any man, without trial. They are also mortal sins for which there is no repentance or expiation; hell is the inevitable punishment in the other world. Such a sinner is wholly demonic in this life, and hereafter becomes one of the invisible demons (*Vendidad* 5 32). The prostitute is a dire affliction of gods and men, a human demon, whose look dries up the waters and withers the plants; such creatures should be killed sooner than vipers or wolves. Abortion is treated as homicide.

Since all barren land belongs to the devil, reclamation of such land by irrigation is a meritorious work; he who makes two blades of grass grow where one grew before is not only a benefactor of his kind but a faithful servant of God.

“Who most makes glad the earth? He who plants the most grain, grass, and fruit trees, who brings water to a field where there is none and draws it off where there is too much.” “How is the Mazdaean religion nourished? By zealously sowing grain. He who sows grain sows good; he makes the religion of Mazda progress, he nourishes the religion of Mazda as much as a hundred men’s feet could do, a thousand women’s breasts, ten thousand formulas of the liturgy. When grain was created the devils jumped, when it grew they lost heart, when the joints appeared they wept, when the ear was formed they fled away. In the house where grain perishes the demons abide, but when grain comes up in abundance it is like hot iron in their mouths.”²⁹

²⁸ Herodotus v, 25; cf. vii, 194.

²⁹ *Vendidad* 3 23 ff.

When the cock, before daybreak, calls men to arise and say their morning prayers, the long-armed Bushyasta, the lazy devil, assails them, "Sleep on, poor man! it is not time yet," but he who at cock-crowing first gets up will be the first in paradise.³⁰ Compassion and benevolence are also strongly commended in the Avesta; in the Ahuna Vairya, one of the most sacred formulas of the religion, which we may call an ethical confession of faith, charity is declared to be the foundation of the Kingdom of God, "He who succors the poor causes Ahura to reign."

Morals are in the later Avesta part of a sacred law, and that law includes in the same categories and under the same sanctions much that is not intrinsically moral at all, or to which religion gives fictitious moral values. This is one of the universal evils of nomistic religions: ritual correctness, ceremonial purity, sacerdotal casuistry, are raised to the dignity of moral obligations, with the effect of confusing the fundamental difference between them. The dog, especially the shepherd dog, is a very useful animal in a pastoral society, and it is not strange that killing or maltreating him should be a grave offence against the law; but the penalties in this world and the next which the Vendidad attaches to these offences make a dog's life more sacred than a man's. The hedgehog is a great destroyer of the creatures of the evil spirit; a man who kills one shall abide in hell for nine generations unless he expiates his offence on earth by thousands of stripes with the horsewhip. Still more sacred is the otter, probably because it is supposed to destroy noxious water vermin; a whole chapter is devoted to the expiation of the enormous crime of killing one, beginning with ten thousand strokes of the horsewhip. If nothing is more important in morals than a just sense of proportion, not much can be said for the Vendidad. It is fair to observe, however, that such extravagances have the air of priestly fantasias, like some of the incredible programmes of sacrifice of the Brahmanas rather than of serious chapters of legislation.

The legal spirit appears also in the system of penances by which offences are expiated. The commonest of these penances is horsewhipping, and the scale runs from five stripes up to ten thousand.

³⁰ Vendidad 18 37.

The flagellation was doubtless supposed to drive out the demons, a frequent motive of this pious exercise. A large class of more serious sins are expiated by two hundred stripes; so, for example, if a man give another a blow of which he dies, for the first offence the penalty is ninety stripes, for the second, two hundred. Wilful murder is rated at eight hundred; nocturnal emission ²¹ (i.e. intercourse with a succubus) at two thousand. The scale runs into such high numbers that the beating must either have been symbolical or commuted for a fine paid to the priests.

Other penances were the providing of materials for worship—a thousand loads of choice wood for the sacred fire, a thousand bundles of twigs (Baresman), a thousand libations of Haoma, for example. Works useful to the community, especially the digging of irrigation canals and the construction of bridges, are also prescribed in expiation of sins. The killing of noxious or demonic animals is another mode—serpents, tortoises, frogs, ants, worms, and the like, by thousands. Here, again, the priests probably had a tariff of commutation for money, but a system in which every offence has its fixed price cannot be regarded as favorable to morality. Not all sins, however, can be thus compounded for: there are inexpressible sins, such as the inhumation of the body of a man or a dog by a Zoroastrian who knows that it is forbidden by his religion, polluting water or fire by putting a dead body into the pure elements, eating the flesh of a dead man or dog, unnatural vice, and so on. It is to be noted that if a heathen who has committed a deadly sin embraces the Mazdaean faith, repenting of his fault and purposing never to sin thus again, the religion removes all his former sins, however heinous,²² precisely like Christian baptism. As in all religions which derive their authority from a prophetic revelation and have formulated the content of revelation in dogma, apostasy and heresy are the greatest of sins, for they are the rejection or perversion of the truth of God.

The hereafter loomed large in Zoroastrianism from the outset. The approaching crisis, the great judgment day when all the powers of evil (the Lie, Druj) shall be delivered into the hands of Justice (Asha), their whole army beaten down and shattered,

²¹ Cf. Leviticus 15 16; 22 4.

²² Vendidad 3 40 ff.

when the ordeal of molten metal divides between the servants of God and the worshippers of the demons, is one of the ruling ideas in the Gathas. The prophet knows but two kinds of men, those who are for him and those who are against him, on the side of truth and right or opposed to them, allies of god or of the devil. To these contradictory characters correspond their diverse destinies. The Zoroastrian heaven and hell are not primarily conceived as spheres of retribution, but as the places of God and of the devil, and every man, as he has chosen to serve the one or the other, goes to his own place; it is this that gives them their distinctive character. On the other hand, as the line of moral cleavage is run through the natural world, and even the kingdoms of plants and animals are divided between Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu, this very hardening of the dualism made the final and complete triumph of good over evil in every sphere a more vital article of faith. As has already been observed, these two aspects of the doctrine, the individual retribution and the end of all evil, are in the Gathas embraced in one great act of judgment. Time introduced perspective into the Persian eschatology as it did into that of the early Christians. The soul goes to its reward or punishment immediately at death; when the appointed time is fulfilled, the body will be raised from the dead and the last judgment will be held.

After death—so runs the simplest story in the *Hadokht Yasht*—the soul of the righteous lingers three days and nights near the head of the body, reciting the hymn that begins, “Good comes to him who does good to another; may Mazda, the Almighty, give him his gifts,” in bliss as great as the whole world of the living contains. At daybreak on the fourth day a perfumed breeze comes wafted to him as it were from the south, and with it comes to him a beautiful maiden, who, at his question, declares herself his own religion, fair with his virtues and pious observances. Through the three forecourts of good thoughts, good words, good deeds, the soul passes into the endless light, into the company of the good and the presence of Ahura Mazda. Other texts add more details. Sraosha and other good angels conduct the soul to the *Çinvat* bridge, protecting it from the assaults of demons by the way. There Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu sit in

judgment. Rashnu weighs a man's merits and demerits in the true balance, which does not deviate from justice by a hair's breadth and shows no partiality, but deals alike with the mightiest monarch and the meanest of mankind. Religion goes into the scale, it is needless to say, as well as morality: the good Zoroastrian profession of faith and the penitent confession of sins weigh heavily on the side of salvation, and the funeral mass which the friends of the departed cause to be celebrated is another good work put to his credit. Then he must make essay of the bridge itself, which stretches from the peak of Mount Daitya to the summit of the Elburz, spanning the abyss of hell. For the good it is nine spear-lengths wide, or even a parasang, and he passes with ease to the heavenly mansions on the other side; the wicked finds it narrow as a razor blade, and pitches headlong into the gulf below.

Beyond the bridge, the soul which has happily crossed it comes first to the limbo where those in whom good works and evil were evenly balanced abide till the day of the resurrection, suffering no other pain than the climatic changes of heat and cold. Then follow the three regions of good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, that is, according to Persian notion, of the celestial spheres, the sphere of the stars, of the moon, and of the sun, respectively. The older writings do not seem to have any permanent occupants of these regions; they are successive forecourts of the highest heaven. In the journey of Arda Viraf, however, he sees in them souls who on earth "made no prayers, recited no Gathas, contracted no consanguineous marriages," but through other good works came thither; in the highest are such as "in the world exercised good sovereignty, rulership, and chieftainship," as if they were limbos for good heathen.

The "infinite light" is the abode of Ahura Mazda with the arch-angels and the spirits of the just. When the soul arrives there, the pious dead throng around the new-comer inquiring, "How art thou come from the material world to the world of spirit, from the perishing world to that which perishes not?" but Ahura Mazda bids them not recall to the spirit the distressful journey, and commands that angels' food, butter made in the height of spring, be set before the traveller,³³ and that he be given a richly

³³ The spiritual world is, therefore, not without its creature comforts.

adorned throne. "Forever and everlasting they remain in all glory with the angels of the spiritual existences eternally."

Very different is the lot of the wicked. His soul lingers about the body in great perturbation for three days, murmuring the words of the Gatha, "To what land shall I turn, O Ahura Mazda, whither direct my prayer?" and suffering all of distress that the world holds. The fourth morning, a cold blast, as out of the demonic north, smites him, laden with foul stench. A demon lassoes the soul with his evil noose and drags him to the bridge, where Rashnu with his balances detects all his wickedness. His evil ways confront him embodied in a hideous witch, whose ugliness is the expression of his character. Hell has its vestibules, evil thoughts, evil words, evil deeds, through which the damned arrive in the "infinite darkness," where the wicked dead surround him, the demons mock him, and Angra Mainyu bids bring him loathsome and poisonous food. "And until the resurrection he must be in hell in much misery and torments of many kinds."

The book of Arda Viraf narrates how this pious man's soul was conducted by Sraosha through heaven and hell and safely reinstalled in his body to tell the tale, an Iranian parallel to Enoch, or still more closely to the Apocalypse of Peter and the mediaeval Christian vision literature, and a rude forerunner of Dante. The author's imagination does not succeed in giving much variety to heaven: golden thrones, fine carpets, rich cushions, gorgeous raiment, fragrant perfumes, and over all the glorious light, exhaust his resources. Hell is, as usual, much more vividly depicted. Its darkness is so dense that, though the souls are crowded thick together, each imagines himself alone, and when three days have passed he thinks the nine thousand years must be over and the hour of release at hand. Further on the voyager sees men and women subjected to all manner of ingenious tortures, often retaliatory, as when the man who talked at the dinner table, and said no grace over meat but greedily devoured his water and vegetables, is tormented by hunger and thirst, crying ever, "I shall die"; or the tradesman who gave short measure, and watered his wine and put dust in his grain, and sold his adulterated food-stuffs at high prices, has to spend the millenniums of his sojourn in hell measuring dust and ashes in a bushel and getting nothing

else to eat; or, again, a woman is condemned to lick a hot stove with her tongue because she answered back snappishly to her husband. The catalogue of sins is long and repetitious, and the writer's ingenuity in devising tortures runs out before he is through. Last of all Arda Viraf sees the fiend himself, who taunts the sufferers, "Why did ye ever eat the bread of Ahura Mazda and do my work, and thought not of your own creator but did my will?" Returning then to heaven, he is dismissed by Ahura Mazda with a parting injunction: "Say to the Mazdayasnians, 'There is only one way of piety, the way of the primitive religion; the other ways are no ways. Take ye that one way which is piety, and turn not from it in prosperity nor in adversity . . . and practise good thoughts and good words and good deeds . . . and keep the proper law, but abstain from the improper. And know ye this, that cattle are dust, and gold and silver are dust, and the body of man is dust; he alone mingles not with the dust who in the world praises righteousness and performs duties and good works.'"

The bliss of souls in heaven and their torments in hell are not the final state of mankind. When the appointed time comes, Shaoshyant, the Saviour, will appear, and the dead will be raised, beginning with Gayomard, the archetypal man, and Mashya and Mashoi, the first pair of human beings. All, righteous and wicked, will rise in the places where they died, the bones being demanded back from the earth, the blood from the water, the hair from the plants, and the life from the fire, to which they have respectively been delivered, so that the body is reconstituted of its original materials.³⁴ The risen dead will be assembled in one place and will know one another; the deeds of all will be manifest, so that the wicked man will be as conspicuous as a white sheep among black ones.³⁵ The wicked will reproach his pious friend for not turning him from the evil of his ways. Then the righteous and the wicked will be separated, the former going to heaven, while the latter are cast into hell, there to be punished in the body for three days, certain monsters of iniquity being subjected to exemplary sufferings. When this is over, the fire will

³⁴ This is Christian doctrine also. Cf. Athenagoras, *De resurrectione*, cc. 3. ff.

³⁵ Black being the common color.

melt the metal in the mountains till it flows like a river, and in its stream all are made pure. To the righteous it will be like walking in warm milk, to the wicked it will be molten metal. Father and son, brother and friend, will inquire, "Where hast thou been these many years, and what was the judgment on thy soul? Wast thou of the righteous or the wicked?" All men become of one speech, and loudly praise Ahura Mazda and the archangels. Shaoshyant then sacrifices the ox Hadhayos, and of his fat and of the white Haoma is prepared the ambrosia (*Hush*) which is given to all men, the food of immortality. Adults are restored as men and women of forty; children as youths of fifteen. Each man has his own wife and knows his own offspring; the life is like that of this world, but there is no begetting of children.

Finally, Ahura Mazda seizes the Evil Spirit, and each of the Amesha Spentas lays hold of his antagonist among the archfiends, Sraosha grappling with Aeshma. The devil flees back into gloom and darkness by the passage by which he first invaded the upper world; hell itself is purified by the molten metal, and is reclaimed for the enlargement of the world. Thus by God's will the restitution of all things is accomplished, and the world is immortal forever and aye. The mountains, which were created by the evil one, are levelled, even the summit which served as abutment for the Çinvat bridge; the earth becomes an even plain, never again buried in ice.

The Zoroastrian dogmatic chronology counts 12,000 years from the beginning of the spiritual creation to the renovation of the world, in four ages of three millenniums each. The revelation to Zoroaster and the founding of the true religion fall at the beginning of the last age, the appearance of Shaoshyant at its close. As in the preceding age each millennium has its salient figure, so the millenniums which lie between Zoroaster's appearance and the end are to have their heroes, bearing the significant names Increaser of Good and Increaser of Prayer, in the Bundahish, Hushedar and Hushedar-mah, who restore the good religion and deliver its oppressed people. Both these and the final deliverer, Shoshans (Shaoshyant), are in a miraculous way sons of Zoroaster.

These Messianic expectations, which are found in the Fra-

vardin Yasht as well as in the Bundahish, are worked up in a remarkable apocalypse, the so-called Bahman Yasht, in which are revealed to Zoroaster the successive periods of history (four or seven) down to the close of his millennium, the iron age when the myriad demons with dishevelled hair of the race of Aeshma (Wrath) invade Iran from the East, and leather-belted Turks and Arabs and Christians make a reign of terror. In this dark time, Hushedar will be born, and, with gods and heroes on his side, will destroy the heathen hordes and their demon allies in a veritable Armageddon.

Zoroastrianism is frequently described as a dualism. To the Gathas, as we have seen, the term is inapplicable, and for the religion of Achaemenian times it is not without significance that Aristotle,³⁶ though acquainted with the two principles, the good and the evil *daimones*, Oromasdes and Areimanios, yet in the *Metaphysics* classes the Magi with philosophers like Empedocles and Anaxagoras who made the supremely good the first principle and ground of being. The name dualism might seem more appropriate to the doctrine of later writings, such as the Bundahish, which make Ahriman the creator, not only of the demons, but of all that is bad in the natural world, from the wandering planets to the noisome insects. To Moslem controversialists, for whom creation was one of the chief attributes of deity, a creative devil was plainly an evil god; but this is only the logic of opponents, not Zoroastrian teaching or fair implication from it. The Bundahish itself contrasts in the strongest way the omniscience of Ahura Mazda with the limitations of the evil spirit's knowledge either of the present or of the future. It was through ignorance of the event that he accepted the conditions of the nine thousand years' conflict proposed by Ahura Mazda. He has no power to destroy the creatures of God or permanently to deprive him of them by drawing them to his side. However in the present age evil may seem to prevail, the outcome is certain: the works of the devil shall be destroyed, and he forever banished; the earth will be renewed, and hell itself purged by fire; men whom the evil spirit has seduced from their allegiance to God, after receiving the just retribution of their evil deeds,

* According to Diogenes Laertius.

will be purified and restored to the eternal life of holiness, and all evil will be forever done away. The triumph of God is in this respect more complete than in Christianity, which leaves hell, with the devil and his angels, and the wicked in torment forever, an unconquered realm of evil.

The "dualism" of Zoroastrianism, as has been said above, is an attempt to account for the evil of the present world, physical as well as moral, upon the premises of an ethical theism which cannot admit that God is the author of any kind of evil. But because God is almighty as well as perfectly good, it can as little admit that evil, even in hell, is a permanent factor in the universe. The Zoroastrian theologians were concerned with the solution of the ethical problem rather than with the remoter problems which their solution raised. The evil spirit appears on the scene like a *diabolus ex machina*; whether he was eternal they do not seem to have asked, nor would they probably have been much disturbed if their logic had carried them to that conclusion, for since they did not define God metaphysically as the infinite and the eternal, but as the good, an eternal devil would not thereby become God. Acquaintance with Greek philosophy or Christian polemics ultimately raised this question, however, and a school of Zoroastrian thinkers posited as the unitary first principle, space or time, from which were separated a good god and an evil demon.³⁷ The one undivided nature being thus divided, these form the dual system of higher powers, one headed by Ormazd, the other by Ahriman. Theodore of Mopsuestia reports that Zervan (Time), whom he calls also Tyche, was the origin of all things, and that, in the act of making a libation to produce Ormazd, by some error in the rite, he produced both Ormazd and Satan. Shahrastani, in his *History of Doctrines*, describes a sect of Zervanites who held that Ahriman was born of a doubt in the mind of the great Zervan. This theory seems to be controverted in the *Selections of Zad Sparam*, 1 24, where it is declared that Ahura Mazda produced the "creature Zervan" (Time). There is no reason to think that the Zervanite metaphysics ever had any religious significance.

³⁷ Damascius, ed. Kopp, p. 384.

The influence of Persian thought in the West was not confined to its eschatology, nor did it all pass through Jewish channels. It was long ago observed that in the Pauline Epistles the war with evil is not merely a conflict against sinful impulse in a man's self nor against evils in human society; it is a battle with cosmic powers, waged not with "flesh and blood," but "against the principalities, against the powers, against the universal rulers of this dark world, against the hosts of wicked spirits in the heavens," a hierarchy of evil spirits, at whose head is the Evil One, sovereign of the air (that is, of the heavens). The Pauline devil is a figure of commanding rank and of vast power in the universe: Paul calls him outright "the god of this age of the world" (2 Cor. 4 4). A similar position is accorded him in the Johannine books: he is the "ruler of this world" (John 12 31). Judaism never conceded so much independence to its Satan, or Belial. It is not to be imagined that the New Testament writers had any first-hand acquaintance with Zoroastrian literature or religion; but ideas ultimately derived thence may well have been current in Asia Minor. The marked fondness of John for the antithesis of light and darkness may have a similar explanation.

From Asia Minor, where, as has been already noted, his worship was especially popular, the religion of Mithra spread through the Greek and Roman world in the early centuries of our era. In the mysteries, Mithra was the divine Saviour; by initiation into them men sought the salvation of their souls. Mithra was for several generations the most serious rival of Christ in the West. It was Renan, I think, who said that, if the progress of Christianity had been checked in the third century, Mithraism might have become the religion of Europe. Speculations about what might have happened in history if something else had not happened are usually idle, but it is at least interesting to reflect that in Mithraism an Indo-European redemptive religion contested among the Western races of that stock the pre-eminence of Christianity, with its Semitic warp.

TWO BIOGRAPHIES OF MARTIN LUTHER¹

JOHN WINTHROP PLATNER

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Luther is a fascinating subject for the historian. Not only does the personality of the man himself offer exceptional attractions, but so too does the age in which he lived, for then society, politics, and religion were all in the melting-pot, out of which in time was to issue the modern world. Luther was a product of the old, but he was also in a very true sense the exponent of the new. "The world is not what it once was," said he to the German nobles,—knowing that again the fulness of the times had come. The favorite assertion of many German writers that Luther was the Reformation is often disputed, yet the statement is not half so exaggerated as it sounds, for if ever the spirit of a great movement which permanently affected the welfare of mankind got itself embodied in the person of one man, that movement was the Protestant revolution, and that man was Friar Martin.

The Empire, which theoretically controlled the western world, was politically unstable. Maximilian, to be sure, cherished vast dynastic hopes, cryptically expressed in his inherited Hapsburg motto, A. E. I. O. U., an acrostic of the vowels,—*Austriæ est imperare orbi universo*,—but both he and his successor, Charles V, found their self-imposed life-task so stupendous as to be impossible. Against their ambitious plan of imperial centralization was set the power of an aristocratic confederacy, represented by the seven Prince Electors, each of whom, quite naturally although perhaps inconsistently, sought at the same time to tighten his own hold upon the particular domain which he governed.

¹ Martin Luther, the Man and his Work, by Arthur Cushman McGiffert. pp. xi 397. New York, The Century Co., 1911. \$3 net.

The Life and Letters of Martin Luther, by Preserved Smith. pp. xvi 490. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. \$3.50 net.

Their exercise of power was checked in its turn by the varying degrees of territorial independence asserted by the German princes, while private warfare disturbed the peace, and turbulent *Bundschue* threatened the stability of social and political institutions alike. None of these conflicting elements gave promise of producing a strong and enduring German nationality. But through their confusion sounded the clear note of Luther's *Address to the German Nobles*, and that called the nation into life.

European society in the early sixteenth century presented the familiar spectacle of privileged classes, full-grown and in control, with the spirit of democracy as yet only struggling to be born. Occasional agrarian uprisings foretold the coming of Demos, but an adequate platform upon which Demos might stand was yet to be constructed. Popular demands, crude in themselves and cruder still in the method of their attempted enforcement, were not enough. Neither was uncontrolled radicalism adequate, nor any programme of social revolution devoid of moral restraints. The age called for constructive effort. The primary need was of some one who could search out and formulate the democratic principle; whether he applied it consistently and thoroughly was of less moment. Luther's masterly treatise, *On the Liberty of a Christian Man*, however paradoxical it might seem to a superficial reader, met the fundamental requirements of the situation. Indeed, it met them so completely that, in spite of all the intervening years, the world has not yet fully succeeded in carrying out the noble programme there laid down. Its merit consisted chiefly in this, that it offered to the forces of emancipation, set in action by the spirit of the Renaissance, a religious motive and a moral direction. To bring the world's life under the influence of this dominant motive was more than could be accomplished by any one man, however great.

The monk of Wittenberg unquestionably did influence the course of politics and of social life in modern Europe, but yet, when all has been said, it still remains true that his principal contribution to the world was not in either of these fields, important as they may be, but rather in the field of religion, which is the most important of all. To understand his profound influence here, it is necessary to call the historical imagination to our aid, since

otherwise it is extremely difficult for the modern secular mind to comprehend how completely the church dominated mediaeval Europe. It touched life at every point, literally from the cradle to the grave. The mysteries of the great Beyond were illumined by the light of its faith, and the severities of future punishment alleviated through application of the inexhaustible resources of the *thesaurus meritorum*. Kings and emperors had vied with each other in granting to churches and monasteries every kind of immunity and privilege, and under the feudal system bishoprics and abbeys had taken on the character of vast temporal domains, comparable in extent and power with those of secular princes, and often superior to them in actual influence. For the ecclesiastical prince bore a double character; he held the customary feudal sovereignty over lands, revenues, and men, and he also held the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven. Over all was extended the supreme authority of the Pope, who had ample beatitudes for his obedient children, but for the disobedient the ban, the anathema, and final excommunication. The papal system appeared to be thoroughly intrenched and hedged about with walls and bulwarks. Its arsenals were fully supplied with defensive and offensive weapons. The fold of the Good Shepherd had become an embattled fortress and a prison-house for many souls.

The Ninety-five Theses struck the first blow for freedom. Then came the treatise, *On the Babylonish Captivity of the Church*, which made a breach in the walls of Rome, and was like the opening of the prison to them that were bound. One hardly knows which to admire most, the audacity of Luther's attack or its effectiveness. That one of the foremost of the crowned heads of Europe undertook to reply to Luther's tract is the best evidence of its success.

The positive part of the Protestant programme was boldly adventurous and undeniably attended with hazard. In comparison with its severe demands upon the heart and will the mediaeval church offered spiritual ease and the narcotic of mental peace. Men were invited to commit themselves unreservedly to the church, whereby consciously and deliberately they transferred to the sacrosanct institution all responsibility for their

souls' future welfare, which was in a manner guaranteed to them. Protestantism on the other hand demanded from every one of its adherents that he somehow gain for himself the assurance of salvation. His responsibility was immediate, untransferable, and very pressing. The new individualism, with its glorious sense of personal liberty, had its perils and its tasks. It is easy to be a slave, but it is hard to be free. Upon the serious observer, whose spirit is at all sensitive to the moral issues of life, the sixteenth century cannot fail to make a profound impression, for in it one may behold humanity taking a momentous step forward, into the dark. Luther led the van,—light-hearted, courageous, confident,—a smile of gladness on his lips.

But there was a deep seriousness underneath it all. Once in the darkest days of the Civil War a man complained to Lincoln of his apparent levity, and received the touching answer, "If I couldn't tell these stories, I should die." A laugh sometimes keeps a heart from breaking. Something like this was doubtless true of Martin Luther. His profound seriousness cannot for a moment be doubted. When certain well-meaning friends urged him to adopt a policy of comprehension through compromise, such as Melancthon frequently advocated, Luther sternly said, "I see they think this is a comedy of men, instead of a tragedy of God and Satan, as it is." Such have the world's leaders ever found their task,—a battle,—tragic wrestling with powers which are not merely flesh and blood.

We may safely go a long distance with the enthusiastic German followers of the great Reformer, when they say that Luther was the Reformation. Nevertheless we must not hastily suppose that all the forces which were making the old world new were concentrated in his person. For one thing, the transformation of learning in western Europe had begun before him, and would have gone on without him. His primary interests were practical and moral, not intellectual or aesthetic. So far as the fresh intellectual life of the age is concerned, he felt comparatively little interest in it, apart from its bearing on the subject of religion. He spoke his word indeed, wherever there was opportunity. With particular zest did he denounce the long regnant philosopher Aristotle,—that "damnable, proud, cunning heathen,"

who "led astray and deluded many of the best Christians with his false words." But the philosopher's fate was sealed long before Luther penned his indignant and picturesque malediction. Friar Martin was not the apostle of the Renaissance, even for Germany. In the domain of pure learning Reuchlin, Melanchthon, and especially Erasmus contributed far more to the world's advancement than Luther ever could have done. "I was born," he once declared, "to fight with mobs and devils, and so my books are very stormy and warlike. . . . I am the rough woodsman who must blaze the trail and clear the path. But Master Philip comes along gently and quietly, builds and plants, sows and waters with joy, according to the gifts God has so richly bestowed upon him."

Nor was Luther primarily and of choice a leader in the cause of German nationality. He did no doubt make very substantial contributions to the growth of German national feeling, nor would it be right to say that these contributions were indirect. Without him it is certain that that feeling would have been much slower in development. Simply to have pointed out the need of it was much. "We are a gigantic mass but lack direction," was his own diagnosis of the case. Echoing Luther, the humanist Melanchthon called Germany "a blinded Polyphemus." If the first step forward is to know with certainty just where one stands, then Luther may fairly be said to have led his countrymen in their national advance. But one may recognize this aspect of his work without drawing the mistaken inference that he first propounded the important political principle of the autonomy of the state. Elsewhere in Europe forces of an entirely different kind had been working towards the same end,—in France, for instance, through the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, and in England through the Acts of Provisors and Praemunire. Probably the Germans themselves would not have advanced so fast and so far towards a genuine national life, in spite of the Reformer's influence, had not the Turkish forces on the east and the armies of Francis I on the west diverted the Emperor's attention from his Saxon subjects, leaving them measurably free to develop from within. It is plain enough to every student that there were princes, statesmen, scholars, and reformers, scattered over western Europe, all consciously

or unconsciously co-operating to bring about national consolidation, quite apart from the monk of Wittenberg.

All this, however, detracts in no degree from Luther's fame. He will always occupy a unique position in the history of his time, and every comparison between him and other leaders serves, in the end, only to establish his superiority. In effective moral leadership none of his contemporaries, not even Zwingli, can for a moment be compared with him. He led men back from their self-made pomps and vanities to the Gospel as the foundation of their faith,—back to the forgiving love of God in Christ. Extraordinarily full of interest is this German peasant! Of humble birth, and yet the friend of princes; a monk, and yet a man; a revolutionist, and yet a conserver of the past. Through his lecture-room in the university he multiplied himself a hundred-fold. From his pulpit in the castle church he preached the Gospel to Wittenberg. Through his translation of the Bible and his hymns he preached it to all Germany. And through the printing-press he taught the world. Martyrdom for the cause he long expected, and indeed desired, but he was spared for the more arduous witness-bearing of a long and laborious life. Unmatched in the art of polemics, dauntless in combat, a master of invective, a magnificent fighter, he could yet be as playful as a child, as gentle and tender as a woman. Imperfect no doubt he was,—hasty, hot-tempered, at times mistaken,—but a most rare spirit, a nobleman, a Christian.

To those who sympathize with the principles of the Protestant Reformation, the most attractive and at the same time the most impressive period of Luther's career falls within the first five years. Then, in the prime of his powers, exultant in his newly found spiritual freedom, increasingly confident of success, notwithstanding what princes, priests, or popes might do against him, he sprang into the lists and fought the good fight of faith. Carlyle called the Theses "the first stroke of honest demolition to an ancient thing grown false and idolatrous." In explanation of his boldness, Luther afterwards declared that he had received from heaven the gift of depending upon himself instead of others. From being an object of contempt and derision to the powerful hierarchy, he soon became the object of their dread and hatred.

The time came when a single burning message from his pen struck something very like terror to the heart of the proud bishop and elector, Albert of Mayence, and again to that of Duke George of Saxony. The duke's son complained of Luther's prayers against his father, so potent were they believed to be at the heavenly throne. There is a fine scorn in the scene enacted outside the Elster gate of Wittenberg, where, in the presence of pupils and colleagues, Luther committed to the flames the papal bull of excommunication together with the canon law. In dramatic intensity, however, this scene must yield to the more famous one at the Diet of Worms, where Luther stood calmly defiant in the presence of the assembled powers of the Empire, and made his great refusal.

In open rebellion against the Pope, Luther clung tenaciously to his belief in the duty of passive obedience to the civil power in civil affairs. He insisted that his followers should not attempt to establish their cause by force of arms, even though many of them were clamoring for armed resistance. When at last the Schmalkaldic League was formed, its advocates won Luther's reluctant assent to their plans only by bringing forward an ancient law which seemed to allow subjects in certain contingencies to resist the emperor. Luther's own account of the matter betrays a feeling of disgust, thinly masked by a scholastic justification of their contention. He writes to Spengler:

The affair then reduces itself to this syllogism: whatever Caesar, or the law of Caesar, decrees, must be obeyed; but the law decrees that he must be resisted in such a case; therefore he must be resisted. Now we have always taught the major premise, that the authorities must be obeyed in civil affairs; but we do not assert the minor premise, nor do we know anything about it. Wherefore we drew no conclusion, but referred the whole matter to the jurists,

of whom, it should be added, Luther cherished no high opinion.

About the year 1525 the student of the Reformation movement finds that the course of events becomes more troubled. With the enlargement of the Protestant constituency and the inevitable complication of issues Luther's problems multiplied, and the strain upon him became correspondingly more wearing. He found himself occupying the position of a little pope for his Germans, and

to him all manner of causes, great and small, were constantly referred. Very naturally men looked to him for guidance in all departments of the new church life which he had called into being. However willingly he might respond,—and he was never sparing of himself,—this constant drain upon his almost inexhaustible energies and sympathies was bound in the end to make itself felt. His marriage, while it brought into the Black Cloister the comfort and joy of home life and the companionship of a devoted helper, raised a hue and cry against him. The painful scenes of the Peasants' revolt caused a bitterness which was wide-spread and lasting.

Moreover Luther encountered increasing difficulty in maintaining purity of faith and life among his followers, whereas, by his principles and according to his expectation, this should have been ever easier. Theological divisions emerged to vex his soul. With Zwingli he could reach no agreement, and the forces of Protestantism seemed to be hopelessly divided. Luther's own health became impaired, and his indomitable spirit threatened at times to weaken. Not a serene old age, which his devoted followers would have wished for him, but anxious years, full of unremitting toil and marked at times by censoriousness and impatience, due in large part to the prolonged physical suffering which he was compelled to undergo,—this is the less inspiring picture which meets our eyes during his later years. "Instead of finding the world transformed into a paradise by his Gospel, he saw things continuing much as before, and his heart grew sick with disappointment," writes one of his most recent biographers. Yet it is Luther's glory that he never actually despaired. He died true to his faith, loyal to the cause to which he had given his life. "Do you stand firm by Christ and the doctrines you have preached?" asked Justus Jonas shortly before the end. "Yes," was Luther's simple answer. It was his last word on earth.

Two valuable studies of Luther's life have lately appeared on this side of the water, one by Dr. Arthur C. McGiffert, the well known professor of church history at Union Theological Seminary, the other by a younger scholar, Dr. Preserved Smith, fellow and lecturer in history at Amherst College. Apparently the approach of the four-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation,

which will be celebrated in 1917, had no especial influence on the production of either of these volumes, although they serve as timely reminders of it. Dr. Smith was moved to rewrite the life of Luther by the rapid advance in Reformation studies during the past ten or fifteen years, in which he himself has had a part through his publication of articles in the *English Historical Review* and elsewhere. Dr. McGiffert, who has long been an enthusiastic student of Luther, was moved to write by the request of the *Century Magazine*, whose editor conceived the happy idea of publishing a popular biography of the Reformer in serial form. As a book, this biography retains the special features which distinguished it in the magazine. It has many well-chosen illustrations; the text is free from notes of any kind; and, while an index is provided, there are no other technical paraphernalia, such as scholars are accustomed to expect in every modern work of history. The author has even dispensed with the conventional preface and introduction. The casual reader might not suspect that this life-story was written at first hand from the sources, and that, in the author's original manuscript, it was completely documented, but to the competent critic the quality of the work is sufficiently apparent. Yet it must be confessed that Dr. McGiffert is not at his best in "popular" writing. Excellent as this book is, and it deserves high praise, one feels that it would have been still better if the author had been addressing his usual public, and had not felt himself under the constraint of adapting his style to a more general audience.

Dr. Smith's volume tells the story of Luther's life at greater length than Dr. McGiffert's, and with more detail. It is furnished with notes, but by no means burdened with them, and it contains an extensive, although not exhaustive bibliography. In an appendix the author prints a few little-known letters, not found in the latest German edition of Luther's correspondence by Enders and Kawerau. The book bears evidence of diligent preparation for the author's task. It is written simply, in a direct, straightforward fashion, which is without rhetorical art but never dull, and the product is sure to be useful not only to students but also to general readers. A number of good illustrations add interest to the narrative. The plan of presentation is such as to necessi-

tate some repetition, and there are a few unnecessary digressions, —for instance, on the subject of indulgences and on the history of the sacramental system, but no doubt there may be readers who will be grateful for both. In literary style Dr. Smith's work suffers a little by comparison with Dr. McGiffert's, but hardly more than might be expected in view of the difference in method. In several respects the books admirably supplement each other. If one should say that he rises from their perusal with the conviction that Martin Luther was something more and greater than either of these two biographers has succeeded in depicting, that after all would be in a sense a compliment to both authors, for what better result of his labor could the biographer of a great man desire?

The reader who wishes to obtain a general view of Luther's life and personality will choose McGiffert; he who seeks to know his life in detail will read Smith. The reader who would carry away a unified impression of Luther's historical significance will turn to McGiffert; he who wishes to acquaint himself with each of the principal events of his career will find more to his purpose in Smith. McGiffert pays considerable attention to Luther's thought; Smith very little, believing, as he himself says, that a man's theology does not constitute an essential part of the biographer's task,—a judgment in which most persons will hardly agree with him. McGiffert pays his readers the compliment of taking much for granted; Smith pursues the safer, but less flattering, plan of explaining many things as he goes along. Where an historical judgment is required, it is reassuring to find the two authors generally in agreement. For example, both of them justify Luther's attitude towards the Peasants, although at the same time they condemn his intemperate and cruel tract.

The lack of any adequate treatment of Luther's thought by Dr. Smith is regrettable, especially in view of his frankly expressed opinion that Luther's "dogmatic system has lost part of its hold upon mankind, and seems likely to lose still more." The phrase, "dogmatic system," is not happily chosen. Luther was the founder of a theological method, not the framer of a system, and while it is no doubt true that he was led to take positions some of which are no longer tenable, yet the underlying principles on

which his method was based, and the method itself, are very much alive in modern Protestantism. His method and type of thinking are very clearly indicated by Dr. McGiffert, although naturally treated in a less systematic manner than in that author's recent essay on *Protestant Thought before Kant*. Not only the progress of his thought, but also the logical implications of it are pointed out, even where Luther himself failed to move on to them. One may see how far he went, and also how far short he stopped of the attainable position. One may see the reformer and the conserver united in the same person, and the apparent cross-currents of his thinking finally combined in what the Hegelians would call the "higher unity," which, however, Dr. McGiffert would never think of calling by that name. A single paragraph may suffice for purposes of illustration.

In his attack on indulgences he had appealed from the indulgence-vendors to the pope; at Augsburg, from the pope-ill-informed to the pope-to-be-better-informed; and soon afterward from the pope to a council. Now, when the decision of a council was cited against him, he declined to be bound by it, and took his stand upon the sole authority of the Scriptures. But even this was not final. The Bible itself, he maintained, has to be used with discrimination, for parts of it do not teach Christian truth. He really substituted for all external authorities the enlightened conscience of the individual Christian. The Bible he read for himself and admitted the right of no council or body of men to read it for him. This, in principle, though he never fully realized it, and seldom acted upon it, meant the right of private judgment in religious things, and in it lay the promise of a new age. [Page 144.]

It would be difficult to state the fundamental position of Martin Luther more accurately or more compactly than Dr. McGiffert has stated it in these few short sentences. With equal clearness does the Union professor point out that Luther was at times far more powerfully influenced by conditions than he was by theories. What principles of reasoning could ever have impelled him or his followers to pass from their belief "that salvation is possible apart from the pope" to the "still more radical belief that it was impossible with the pope"? Verily there is an "iron logic of events" more cogent than the logic of the schools.

Neither of our two biographers is blind to Luther's faults. His intolerance, his coarseness, his wholesale employment of abusive language, his occasional seeming irreverence, are all noted by them both. The one conspicuous blunder of his career, namely his hesitating sanction of Philip of Hesse's bigamous marriage with Margaret von der Saal, is frankly condemned, although both authors do Luther the justice of recognizing that he acted conscientiously in this extremely awkward and difficult affair. Dr. Smith calls attention to the fact that the very qualities which have aroused the severest criticism of a later age were elements of strength to Luther in his own. The common people, naturally timid before rulers, took heart when they heard him address a king as "Henry, by God's disgust king of England," and then go on to call him a "damnable and rotten worm." It was not nice language, but honors were evenly divided between the two disputants, for Henry had called Luther "a wolf of hell." It was not the same thing however for a monk to launch invective against royalty as for a king to denounce a monk. Again, to hear the pope called "most hellish father" was a novelty,—rather a blasphemous one, many thought, but effective as a means of encouraging religious independence. Luther's bold speech seemed to strip the mighty of their tinsel, and to invite a judgment based not on crowns and mitres but on character, manhood's universal test.

Luther's intolerance of certain other Protestant leaders, especially Zwingli and Schwenkfeld, while historically intelligible, is harder for the modern mind to condone. One rises from each fresh perusal of the proceedings at the Marburg conference with the deepened conviction that if ever two men ought to have put aside their differences and worked shoulder to shoulder in the same cause, Luther and Zwingli were the men. Luther himself was convinced that if the forces of Protestantism were only united, "all the gates of hell and all the papacy and all the Turks and all the world" could not harm them. Yet to the Swiss reformer he seemed unalterably opposed. Only one short month before his death he wrote this paraphrase of the first Psalm: "Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the sacramentarians, nor standeth in the way of the Zwinglians, nor sitteth in the seat

of the men of Zürich." Towards Schwenkfeld he was, if possible, even more bitter: "The Lord rebuke thee, Satan, and may the spirit which called you, and the race you run, and all your fellow sacramentarians and Eutychians, go with you and your blasphemies to perdition." Religious toleration was evidently not within the circle of Luther's interests. Yet it was in principle involved in his position, and its coming throughout all Protestant lands was only a question of time. In fact it was largely due to him that it came at all.

The two biographies which have here concerned us are welcome additions to our Luther literature. It is much to be desired that they should be widely read. Fresh interest in the German leader and a more adequate popular conception of his extraordinary service to the world will be certain to follow their perusal. If they fail to arouse enthusiasm, they will at any rate serve the cause of sound knowledge. Our torches can still be kindled at the altars whereon Carlyle and Freytag lighted their sacrificial fires. For the worthy interpretation of a great life is something other than the narrative of its outward happenings, however faithfully recorded,—something other than the transcription of its words and thoughts. In order to catch the full significance of a man like Martin Luther, one must needs feel a spiritual kinship with him, such as was felt by the Scottish hero-worshipper. And to portray him to the world, one must possess something of the patriotic sympathy, the artistic insight, and the dramatic power of the author of *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*. It is no easy task to cross an interval of four hundred years, and make the dim and shadowy figures of a far-off age take on the aspect of reality. Few are the prophetic writers upon whom such gifts of re-creative vision are bestowed. Most of us, authors and readers alike, must be content with writing or reading simple annals of the past, wherein we are constantly aware that the figures which pass across the stage are the figures of the dead, and all our chronicling is but an inscription on their tomb. They lived once; they live no more. But one day there comes the literary artist,—and then they live again before our eyes.

LUTHER AND OTHERS

FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

The recent books on the life of Luther by Dr. Preserved Smith and Dr. A. C. McGiffert may well rouse new consideration of Luther's religious experience. America was dominated by Calvinism, but there is small reward today in going back to Calvin, who applied the logic of a legal mind to a subject beyond the sphere of jurisprudence. Luther, on the other hand, was trying to utter the apprehensions of a great heart. Calvin's thought is dead. Luther's heart still throbs. We shall perhaps understand our own hearts more clearly if we apply religious psychology to his.

Religious psychology is not all pathological. True, some of its devotees write of ecstasies and trances and convulsive conversions and talking in tongues and the loss of the sense of personality. They tell of subliminal selves and intellectual visions and visual or auditory hallucinations. They describe primitive or still surviving methods of inducing these states by wine or dancing or howling, or by starvation and repression of sleep, by terrifying images or by hypnotic suggestion. If a man demurs that he is seeking for something still rational, he is answered that religion is not rational, and then, if honest, he may confess that he has no religion, since he has none of these pathological experiences, and in fact does not desire them. Such a man may take great comfort in Luther. That "Philistine of genius" understood religious experience as the activity of normal and healthy consciousness, and he understood that this normal and healthy consciousness was evoked by truth. He meant that people could have a complete and perfect religious experience without tampering with the balance of a clear and self-possessed mind and without getting under or over the threshold of natural consciousness.

It is true that Luther was not a rationalist, and he would, if on the scene today, heartily indorse our "anti-intellectualists." He certainly did not identify religion with the acceptance of an opinion on logical grounds. He would agree that faith is not logical

knowing, not the ethical response of the sense of obligation, not the same thing as the perception of beauty. He would say that it is a form of consciousness specifically different from all these,—namely, faith or the religious consciousness. But in his inelegant way he would declare that faith is always an activity of a wide-awake, unbefuddled consciousness. He would also declare that this activity has its stimulus in the old familiar truth of the Fatherhood of God, and that the truth is given in a concrete human image of God, namely, in the Jesus of whom we read in the Bible and who is preached in church. He would insist that religion is psychologically intelligible and healthy, and that to be religious does not require any injections of new forces from without or any impartation of new capacities or new organs. Religious experience comes when the truth essential to that sphere is presented to a man just as he is, without supernatural additions, and when the man's self responds in the psychological manner proper for such a truth. Luther called the truth in question the Word of God. The psychological response he called faith.

It will be objected to this that something has been omitted, namely, the action of God, since Luther spoke of faith as divinely caused. We are, however, omitting what for Luther was a constant factor in all experience. Luther did not mean, in speaking of the *gift* of faith, that an individual miracle broke through the natural nexus of experience so that the divine causation of faith is a supernatural interruption. He meant that the whole natural nexus, whether we mean things physical or things psychical, is grounded in the eternal divine will.¹ I am descended from parents who owed their being to parents before them and so on back to Adam, but the whole human line of descent in time has its cause in the timeless action of God. I am therefore in proper sense a creation of God without a supernatural intervention in my case. So God works timelessly through a truth transmitted historically from generation to generation and communicated by one mind to another. Faith comes by hearing and hearing by the word of God. The operation of the truth in time is psychologically intelligible, not a miraculous intrusion, and yet the gift of God. This was Luther's answer to the Zwickau prophets.

¹ Cf. Otto, *Darwinismus und Religion*, p. 26.

Again it will be said that it cannot be so simple a story of a truth and its natural effect on consciousness, since in view of the fact that the truth did not evoke the religious psychological response in all, Luther held firmly to the doctrine of election and meant that God did not will the salvation of all. The answer is that Luther did indeed indulge in contradictory ideas, but that the main fact remains as stated. He did not hold the idea of election on general philosophical grounds, but as interpretation of the obvious fact that some men respond to a truth and others do not. The idea of election as a permanent reprobation of some is a too quick despair about this melancholy fact, and a little argument on our part might induce Luther to modify it with advantage to his general view. Our response to this truth or that has its own natural time, and the time is not the same for every man. For the youth in Wordsworth's "Excursion" the sunrise over the ocean's liquid mass was a "high hour of visitation from the living God," but some youths remain insensitive. Music may be mere sound to me, while it brings all heaven before your eyes. These cases of dulness and insensitiveness are no warrant for a doctrine of limited election. They do not prove a hopeless incapacity. They mean only that for some the day of visitation has not yet come, that the soul is not yet ready to make the proper human response. We may have no off-hand explanation of the inertia, of the fact of the *not yet*, but so long as it is a case of a given truth securing a normal human response we do not need to interpret the human delay as an inconsistency in the divine causality. The associated doctrine of man's total corruption of will and affection before the experience of faith simply cannot be reconciled with Luther's real and fundamental truth, which is that the religious truth wakens a normal religious response without any reconstitution of human faculties.

We are therefore ready to consider what the religious truth is and what the response of faith is, and this we shall do in complete independence of Lutheran theology, though with fidelity to the actual experience of Luther and to his account of that experience.

What, then, is the religious truth or Word of God, and what is the response of faith? Luther was reared in a circle sensitive to

fear and terror. Satan visited men with calamities, and the wrath of God menaced the sinner with eternal torment. God was the terrifying avenger of sin. Piety meant the practices and use of agencies by which one cancelled offences and merited mercy. The sincere and sensitive conscience that could not claim moral perfection must live in anxiety, and the anxiety was engrossing, paralyzing the free play of life and checking the spontaneity of active moral work with other men in the world's common interests. The malady here was that for its engrossing object consciousness had God as the wrathful avenger of sin. Luther won redemption, renewal, justification, salvation, eternal life—all these being the same thing—when his consciousness found another object than the wrathful, avenging power. The new object that he found was the infinitely gracious and forgiving and loving being whom the Christian calls *Abba, Father*. In his wretchedness and anxiety there was brought home to him the conviction that the power claiming from him a perfect life was all friendship and graciousness to him in spite of all his defects and sinfulness. This was not an opinion entertained on any logical ground. It was brought home to him. It established itself as truth to his soul, and thereby inevitably, spontaneously, irresistibly, arose the emotion blended of humility and trust and gratitude and joy which he called *Glaube*, or faith, the sense of complete liberation from fear, freedom from constraint of external mandate, freedom to do all the good which a spirit thus humble and trusting and sure of friendship in the Holy Authority would fain and naturally do. The vital point is that Luther discovered a new object, namely, God as Jesus presented God, and that it was discovery, not wish or surmise.

To apprehend this vital point adequately we need to observe the present situation. The starting-point for vast numbers of men today is not anxiety and fear before the avenger of human imperfection. The object that confronts them is not a God of wrath, but a world indifferent to the human soul and its ideals, its self-condemnation, its yearnings, its homesickness for the perfect.

“Nature whose free, light, cheerful air
Oft made thee in thy gloom despair.”

The consequence for such men is not the paralysis of fear, but the paralysis of moral indifference, moral scepticism, the chill of spiritual loneliness in an unspiritual world. The salvation of such men comes when they discover through the veil of the phenomenal world a Being of holy perfection towards whom the high human ideals go out in embrace and who embraces man's soul through the very constraint of those ideals. When a man in this modern situation discovers that object, then he cries out that underneath are the everlasting arms, then he too is rejoicing and free, then for him too begins the spontaneous activity of all his higher nature. He too has awe and humility, love and peace and trust and liberation and enthusiasm. He too has all the rich emotional content that Luther called faith, and he finds in it a sense of linkage and affinity with the eternal, the timelessly worthwhile being. He too has salvation and knows eternal life.

It is obvious that the keenest interest attaches to the discovery of the object. What is that discovery? How is it that the verity becomes truth for a man's consciousness? In considering Luther in his relation to these questions, we need to discriminate between his retention of the definitions of the ecumenical creeds and the value they had for religious experience itself. We need to be free also to judge his experience by the aid of a modern understanding of religious cognition.

Luther was bound not to be a heretic, and we need not try to prove him one, but when Luther discovered the God who is compassionate love, it was not a discovery of the Trinity. As a conservative child of Christianity he held the doctrine, and in theological utterances seemed to place a high value on it. Even so he spoke of it as incomprehensible mystery which thought could not appropriate. It must be "*ungemeistert geglaubt*." Yet he omitted it from his popular catechism and does not use it in his expositions of faith. The propositions of the Athanasian creed were not a part of the "Word of God," of the 'Gospel,' of the truth productive of religious experience. Luther does speak of the action of the Holy Spirit in this experience, but when examined the utterances are inapplicable to a third person in trinity. They are but variant expressions for the action of the Gospel, the Word, when he wishes to say that God acts by means of the

Word.² What Luther discovered was not God as trinity, but God as a gracious will, bestowing compassion and help, a will that is illustrated by the father of the prodigal son.

Luther discovered this divine Father in a man. Undoubtedly he kept the historic idea of the two natures in one person, and how valiantly he could use the *communicatio idiomatum* to meet all the difficulties can be seen in the disputation of February 28, 1540.³ On the other hand it is equally certain that he consciously and clearly distinguished between such theological reflection and the meaning of the deity of Christ for religious experience. In that relation, he said, the union of two natures in one person is a belief that helps no man in the least.⁴ Early, in the cloister of Erfurt, he concluded that to confess Christ as God meant to acknowledge spiritual good as received from him,—and Melancthon formulated this: to know Christ was not to contemplate his two natures and the modes of incarnation, but to know the beneficent action of Christ on the soul. To the apprehension of religious experience the deity of Christ was not then a metaphysical truth. The meaning for experience is that Christ performs a divine office for men, namely, in revealing the gracious character of divine Fatherhood. There are passages in which Luther dwells on the thought that all believers may serve as Christ to others. The grace that comes to them through faith makes them, too, more than man; it deifies them.⁵ Luther discovered the heavenly Father through the medium of a man. A man was the Word of God. Whatever divine majesty of being in an ontological sense belonged to this man was not recognizable in the religious experience. The object contemplated is "*lauterer Mensch*," Jesus as he was between the cradle and the cross. When theologians "bore through the sky with their heads and look around in heaven, they find no one, for Christ lives in the manger and in the woman's bosom." "The sophists have depicted him to show how he is at once both God and man—but this is only a sophistic knowledge of the Lord Christ. For Christ is not called

² Otto, *Die Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther*, 1899.

³ Drews, *Disputationen*, p. 585.

⁴ Erlangen Edition, vol. xii, p. 163.

⁵ Weimar Edition, vol. ii, p. 248.

Christ for the reason that he has two natures. How does that concern me? Rather does he bear this glorious and comforting name from the office and work which he took on himself." In preaching, said Luther, act as if you had a Jew to convert. At the outset be silent about Jesus as the Son of God. "I should say he was a man like any other, sent from God, and tell what benefit God has done to man through him. If now I had brought that home to his heart, so that his heart should burn within him and have love and pleasure in Christ, then I would carry him further to believe that Christ was God." Yet Luther would certainly not guarantee certainty of metaphysical comprehension. "He who will brood and reckon how to make it rhyme that God and man are one person, let him brood on forever and see what he gets out of it. Many have lost their wits over that reckoning and rhyming."

Luther spoke of Jesus as a born Jew, a child that ate milk and honey at his mother's breast, a boy that was stupid and ignorant like other small children. There is no room for doubt that Luther, like Augustine, meant *mediator tanquam homo*. As a man Jesus revealed to other men the gracious character of God. For the most part, when Luther spoke of the presence of Jesus to men in the sixteenth century, he meant his presence as the word in memory, the truth preached as it had been preached through the ages. The exception to this is his incongruous insistence about the omnipresence of Jesus in the sacramental bread and wine, and for this insistence there is a special motive.⁶

If we ask, then, what does it mean to discover the heavenly Father in this Jewish man subject to human limitations, the answer is plain. This Jewish man had a measureless love for undeserving sinners, living and dying for their spiritual good and their eternal blessedness, and this man was always and continually responsive to the divine wish and will. His sheer beneficence and graciousness, his human character and disposition, was a revelation of the heart and disposition of God towards men. Did Luther apprehend this in mere reflection? Did Luther believe that the man imaged God's disposition because he was told so in the gospels and epistles? Other men were told and

⁶ Von Kügelgen, *Luthers Auffassung der Gottheit Christi*, pp. 55 ff.

remained cold. What was told became for Luther personal revelation,—the experience of faith; and the description of faith as we have heard it shows that it was no mere reflective assent to a justified conclusion. It was not assent but consent. After his Christian instruction from the Bible, from Augustine, from Bernard, from Staupitz, he had before him the picture of the great historic fact of Jesus. When he in his wretchedness of self-condemnation, in his need of complete love and favor from the Holy One who claimed holiness of him, saw the man of Galilee, himself the oracle of righteous demands and at the same time of measureless and self-sacrificing love to the meritless, he found in that character the same power of necessitation over his inner being as belonged to the power of right. It was supremely valid to him. Immediately, without a conscious process of reflective thought, there was a rejoicing consent of heart and conscience. It was an immediate apprehension and valuation by feeling—a non-logical affirmation of an eternal and unconditioned worth. That character, that personal being, had supreme constraining necessitation for him, and his own heart and will gave unreasoning direct consent. To say this same thing in other terms, the eternal divine Power had revealed to Martin Luther His gracious fatherhood through a man whose character and deeds imaged that fatherhood. The assertion that such religious faith is not a rational act means only that it was not a process of reflective reasoning. The object contemplated was not consciously referred to an inclusive concept. It was nevertheless an act of reason in a sense of reason higher than the logical understanding. Feeling is the act of reason when it is response to that which is valid object for the Ideas of the reason. Many of us under scientific education were taught that feeling was not an organ of discovery, but moral and aesthetic and religious experiences have shown us the contrary. In these highest activities of our nature, which are feeling activities, there is a glimpsing of an eternal and absolute worth, the worth that belongs to eternal and absolute being shimmering through the particular object of our experience. It is recognition—even though it is not the kind of recognition that the logical understanding makes. It is direct recognition without a clear consciousness of the standard by which we measure

the worth and identify the object as supremely worthful. But the standard is in our possession. It is a latent and obscure possession in the depth of our spirit, and it is the difficult work of critical philosophy to bring our possession to light as the Ideas of the Reason. The direct non-logical recognitions of the religious consciousness are possible by virtue of these deeply hidden Ideas.

It is profitable for us of American inheritance to turn from Luther to Edwards. At first we have a sense of complete contrast. The figure of the historical Jesus does not belong to the preaching of Edwards. When he had brought his hearers to the intense religious experience by which they could claim salvation, he observed that Christ was absent from their thought, and needed to remind them that Christ had purchased their salvation. Christ belonged to their theological reflection, not to their religious experience, just as Trinity and Two Natures were institutional truth for Luther. Edwards, however, is not a complete contrast to Luther. His "word of God" was called Divine Sovereignty. Every parishioner knew that word and believed it, but few had experienced it. The homiletic method of Edwards was to inculcate a sense of complete human degradation and moral inability, to intensify the sense of need by vivid pictures of the eternal torment for sin, to win acquiescence to the claim that God was absolutely just in so avenging sin. Then he presented to his shuddering hearers the ineffable clemency of God, who out of sheer sovereignty of good pleasure gave infinite bliss to some of the completely depraved and undeserving mass of men. Thereupon some from the depths of their own self-condemnation praised such sheer absolute mercifulness with disinterested approbation, aware now of the glory of such a graciousness, tasting the sweetness and the beauty of such a will, consenting to it with all the ardor of their being. Such a will as God's free sovereign will in the bestowal of mercy was recognized as absolutely worthful. The conception had always been in their minds. Now they had appropriated its truth with the humble, disinterested, rejoicing consent of a judgment of feeling. It was this direct aesthetic appropriation of feeling that Edwards regarded as experience of God,—and no one need gainsay him, even if he deems

that there was a perturbing error in this presentation of the Word of God. Men were indeed brought to a sense of present eternal being, the latent *a priori* capacities of their spirit being brought to play even by an imperfect presentation of the heavenly fatherhood. Edwards's preaching method was an effort to psychologically expel from consciousness those objections to the Calvinist conception of God which he himself had had to overcome. He quelled the sense of the injustice and cruelty belonging to the Calvinist God and he intensified the residue of conception which imperfectly stood for the Fatherhood of God. In comparison with Luther's experience there is an evident artificiality. In the Northampton parish God was recognized through an idea. In Erfurt God was seen through the person of a man. Edwards could have achieved his end with Mohammedan ideas. Luther's experience was Christian—and due to the historical Jesus.

The American who thinks of Edwards will think also of Channing. The youthful Channing had a religious experience which he always remembered with awe. He read in Hutcheson of man's capacity for "disinterested affection"—a cold and inexpressive term for an intense meaning—and then the full glory of such a dignity or divinity of human nature burst upon him. The infinitely worthful personal character was revealed to him, and, as the description given of the experience shows, it was a recognition of God through the human nature that imaged God. Here was the same kind of feeling recognition that belonged to Luther's experience, although the antecedent psychological steps are different. At that time Channing saw God through man, the analogue of God. His Christ was the Arian Christ, not a man. Later the Arian conception faded away, and Jesus became for him the supreme illustration of the divinity of human nature, the image of divine character. And the divine character so imaged was just the heavenly fatherhood of infinite love that Luther preached. The leading difference is that to the Boston preacher Jesus, being a measure of the human highest, is more than a comforter of conscience, is more distinctly the inspiration of an historic social work whereby the divine humanity seen in Jesus may find complete expression in the life of the community.

Dr. Martineau, again, springs to mind. Influenced by Priestley,

he held to a religion of divine causation. That thought was at first his word of God. Under Channing's influence he added the "religion of conscience." Now man was seen as the true image of God in proportion as man wins disinterested love. Finally Martineau arrived at what he called the religion of the spirit, by which he meant an ascent beyond reflection to personal communion, an exchange of love between the human spirit and the divine. He was passing from the apprehension of religion as devout thought to the apprehension of it as spiritual emotional experience, and this emotional recognition of God found increasing stimulus and provocation in the contemplation of the man Jesus, who was "the supreme witness to the spiritual union of man and God; a union which, were it constant as in him, might be deemed an Incarnation."

Luther experienced God through a man presented to his consciousness. So did Channing. So did Martineau. All alike meant the historical Jesus. In the case of Channing and Martineau, Jesus is seen in relation to the spiritual personality of man in the fulness of its meaning, and less exclusively in relation to the distresses of conscience. For all alike Jesus was, in the profound sense in which De Wette used the term, a spiritual symbol. He was a person who stirs the slumbering powers of our spirit to the recognition of the Eternal and Unconditioned Holy Father of Love. This is not Sabellianism. It does not identify the man and God. It means that through the man we glimpse the spiritual being in whom our being has its coessential ground and whose friendship revealed is our peace and the release of all our higher energy.

THE MYSTICISM OF MAETERLINCK

PAUL REVERE FROTHINGHAM

BOSTON

The publication of *The Blue Bird* a year or two ago, and later its successful presentation on the stage, has awakened new interest in an author whose fame and influence seemed somewhat on the wane. It is now some twenty years since a little volume of essays by Maurice Maeterlinck caused the author to be proclaimed with a flourish of French trumpets as the "Belgian Shakespeare," the "European Emerson," and the "greatest mystic of the age." And these epithets and designations were not without some reason. *The Treasure of the Humble*, which helped to call them out, became of genuine soul-value to many people who could lay no claim to that particular virtue. The author's later essays, too, were conceived in a somewhat similar vein. *The Buried Temple* and *The Double Garden* contain hidden teachings of a deep and subtle character, which, being born of spiritual insight, shed light upon the path of destiny and duty.

As I say, however, the fame of Maeterlinck from a purely popular point of view has hardly been increased for some years past until his entrancing little play of *The Blue Bird* was put upon the stage. It was the first of the author's many dramas to prove popular,—the first perhaps that was clear as to its meaning; one might almost say, the first in which it was possible to know what the author really meant. He came out at last from the shadows into the sunlight; he forsook the depths of gloomy woods, where the scenes of so many of his previous plays were laid, and gave himself up to interpret the hearts and minds of little children. For this reason, as for many others, it seems worth while to study with some care the teachings of a man whose message might appear to be falling on a deaf, or somewhat heedless, world. In an age of socialism here is a prophet of individual salvation, and at a time when material welfare is the thing considered most, it is refreshing to find some one talking of the soul. And yet, in another way, it may be said that Maeterlinck is one of the most typical teachers that our age contains. He is a startling epitome

of the state of modern thought. In him and his teachings we may see what the world apparently is coming to, if not indeed where it actually has arrived.

We can hardly speak of Maeterlinck, however, as a distinctly modern prophet. There is a curious atmosphere of mediaevalism about all he writes; a mingling of the old and new, of the ancient East and the modern West. Although he lives in the twentieth century, and finds twentieth-century readers in abundance, there seem to cling about him the garments of the century that nurtured Francis of Assisi, or of that later age which gave birth to a Saint Theresa, or a Madame Guyon. To explain this we must look for a moment at the conditions out of which he came, and consider the environment that helped to shape him with delicate and gentle hands.

Professor Royce has said that William James was distinctly American in his philosophy. In his interesting address before the Harvard Phi Beta Kappa he called attention to the fact that James's pragmatism was an outgrowth of a civilization whose watchword is "efficiency," and that America, and no other country in the world, could have brought to birth and nourished to perfection that free and daring style, with its forceful images drawn from local life and speech. In James, he declared, "certain characteristics of our national life have found their birth. . . . His robust faith is the spirit of the frontiersman, of the gold-seeker, of the home-builder, transferred to the metaphysical and religious realm." And so it is, in a precisely opposite direction, with Maeterlinck. In his books, and the style they are written in, we seem to see a clear and true reflection of the quiet courtyards, the shaded convent gardens, and the bent and gray old gateways leaning up for support against some thick-set, moss-grown wall, that are so distinctive of his native land. There are few parts of Europe where the veil of mediaevalism lies so closely drawn across the face of things as it does in certain corners of Flanders. It is all the more apparent, moreover, for being violently rent and torn in places by the insistent and intruding hands of modern industry and enterprise. This is true, for instance, of such towns as Bruges and Ghent. Bruges is one of the sleepest old cities on the continent of Europe. Its dull and stagnant but

winding, picturesque canals appear to find a counterpart in the slow-moving and deliberate currents of traffic and of trade. Nor is Ghent much different from it except in having felt more heavily the great black hand of modern factory life, which is a hand of death indeed to the beautiful, the artistic, and the picturesque. In Ghent, therefore, to a singular extent the new and old stand forth as deadly rivals, while the mediaeval and the modern jostle one another openly upon the streets. Many a gray old gabled house has been converted into a workshop, and a beautiful gothic guild-hall half turns its back upon a giant factory.

It was in this half-modern, half-ancient town of Ghent that Maurice Maeterlinck was born in 1862; and to those who are familiar with his writings it is evident that his early surroundings laid firm hold upon his thoughts. The son of Roman Catholic parents, he was sent for his education to the local Jesuit college, where, no doubt, it was hoped that his steps would be guided toward the priesthood. And, indeed, of the eighteen boys in his special class eleven followed this traditional course. But Maeterlinck revolted. Although, like his transatlantic master and acknowledged guide, he

Liked a church and liked a cowl,
And loved a prophet of the soul;
Yet not for all his faith could see
Would he a cowlèd churchman be.

To please his father he agreed to study law, although his thoughts were evidently far afield throughout the process. One case he argued and no more, and that he lost; after which he gave himself to the pursuit of letters. A vague, wild, fearful bit—"The Slaughter of the Innocents"—ushered him upon the field of literary strife, where now we are free to think how great a slaughter of innocent hope and promise it would have been, had parental influence sufficed to enclose and cramp him either in the church or court-house.

But when we have chronicled these outward facts of age, inheritance, and education, setting him down as a Belgian by birth, and a man of letters by brave resistance to familiar household foes, we are beset by difficulties. Further classification is not easy. Where does Maeterlinck belong among the authors of

the world, and how shall we describe him? He has written plays and he has written poetry; he is the author of essays and of biographical sketches. His writings include things spiritual as well as things scientific. He has dealt, in the most convincing way, with spiritual beauty; but perhaps the best of all his books is a scientific study of the humble and familiar bee. It may be because of this wide variety in his writings that he has been claimed by many schools and classified under many heads. He is called a symbolist, a moralist, a mystic, a clever dramatist, a spiritual essayist, a poet writing in the medium of prose, a naturalist and man of science who carelessly assumes the clothes of a philosopher. He has been likened to Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, Madame Guyon, Walt Whitman, Edgar Allan Poe, Emerson, and others; and the caustic Bernard Shaw has accused people of endeavoring to confer upon him the "Order of the Swan." Latterly he has been described as "the greatest living poet of love, if not the greatest poet of love that ever lived." And none of these appellations is without some reason to support it. In his love of the weird and gruesome he has some kinship with Poe. In his meditative vein he shows descent from the great Aurelius. I am not familiar enough with Walt Whitman to be able to pass upon his affinity there, but any one can recognize in his writings the influence of Tauler, Ruysbroeck, and their school.

One reason for these similarities is found, perhaps, in the fact, which may here be noted, that Maeterlinck is a persistent but discriminating borrower. He knows a good thing when he sees it, and he is not above being helped and taught by others. What he receives, however, it is hardly necessary to add, he thoroughly transforms and makes his own. Taking the crude, unminted metal, he passes it through the furnace of his glowing fancy and stamps it with a glory that it did not have before. Thus in his latest play of *Mary Magdalene* he frankly confesses himself indebted for two central features of the drama to Heyse's *Maria von Magdala*, and he frankly tells us in the preface that, when he wrote to Heyse and asked permission to use and develop the situations, his request was curtly and even threateningly refused. *Monna Vanna*, it has been pointed out, "owes its milieu, and one of its structural features, to Browning's *Luria*, while *Pelleas and*

Mélisande finds its roots in Dante's story of 'the two who go forever on the accursed air.'" Moreover, there can be no question of the kinship of *The Blue Bird* with *Peter Pan*; and the Belgian playwright, I believe, has bestowed on Mr. Barrie the title of godfather to the play. The greatest similarity, however, is undoubtedly with Emerson, who was himself so broad and free a borrower. Indeed, it is not without good reason that Maeterlinck has been hailed as the "European Emerson." Oftentimes, when you compare selected passages from the essays or writings of the two men, it is difficult to guess offhand which one of them is speaking. Which of them said this, for instance:

Man is always throwing his praise or blame on events, and does not see that he only is real, and the world his mirror and echo. He imputes the stroke to fortune, which in reality himself strikes.

Those of us who have explored the treasure-chambers of *The Buried Temple* would perhaps select this as one of the gems to be discovered there. As a matter of fact, it occurs in Emerson's "Sovereignty of Ethics." Again we read:

There are certain fastnesses within our soul that lie buried so deep that love alone can venture down, and it returns laden with undreamed jewels whose lustre can only be seen as they pass from our open hand to the hand of one we love.

That, we think, sounds familiar, and we search the essays on the "Over-Soul" and "Love"; but we must turn to the pages of *Wisdom and Destiny* to find it. Maeterlinck declares:

What I *say* often counts for little; but my presence, the attitude of my soul, my future and my past, that which takes birth in me and that which is dead. . . . All this it is that speaks to you at that tragic moment.

And who, as he reads, can help thinking of Emerson's declaration:

What you *do* speaks so loud that I cannot hear what you say. Character speaks over our head. The infallible index of true character is found in the tone man takes.

Again, there is Maeterlinck's description of the "inevitable self" that waits to meet us at the end of all our journeys:

Whether you climb up the mountain or go down the hill to the valley, whether you journey to the end of the world or merely

walk around your house, none but yourself shall you meet on the highway of fate. If Judas goes forth to-night, it is towards Judas that his steps will tend.

And Emerson, we know, agreed with him :

Travelling [he says, in speaking of self-reliance] is a fool's paradise. I pack my trunk, embrace my friends, embark on the sea, and at last wake up in Naples, and there beside me is the stern fact, the sad self, unrelenting, identical, that I fled from. I seek the Vatican and the palaces. I affect to be intoxicated with sights and suggestions, but I am not intoxicated. My giant goes with me wherever I go.

So there are other similarities which are too numerous to name. We remember Emerson's verses :

Yon ridge of purple landscape,
Yon sky between the walls,
Hold all the hidden wonders
In scanty intervals.

And we wonder if Maeterlinck did not have them somewhere in the back of his mind when he wrote :

There are eternal crevices even in the humble walls of a hovel, and the smallest windows cannot take away a line or a star from the immensity of heavenly space.

But enough! As these quotations indicate, there can be no doubt of how Maeterlinck would classify himself if he were granted that extraordinary privilege. He is a Mystic, pure and simple. As a mystic he began to write, and as a mystic he reveals himself in all his more important works and studies. But before I go on to estimate him in this light, and to make a more careful analysis of his teaching, let me justify myself by his own deliberate words and judgment, and then let me hurriedly remind you of the essential teaching and the historical method of the mystics of all ages.

First of all let it be said that whether he makes good the title or not, Maeterlinck considers himself a genuine mystic. He is confident of his inheritance, and claims descent from Ruysbroeck and Tauler, from Philo and Swedenborg and Fox,—believing himself no foundling nor a son by mere adoption, but a spiritual heir. In his early writings he speaks enthusiastically of

the great Plotinus, who, he declares, "of all the intellects known to me draws nearest to the divine." He quotes from Porphyry and the gnostics as though he had fed his soul upon their writings and had not simply dipped into their mystic shadows, as so many are content to do. Moreover, in his writings he has carefully justified and eloquently defended the mystic philosophy and teaching. "Many people," he says, "take it for a wild, dark dream, crossed with vivid flashes of lightning, whereas, I believe that the writings of the mystics are the purest diamonds in the vast treasures of humanity; their truths have a strange privilege over ordinary truths, for they neither grow old nor die; and whether they come from India or Greece, they have neither country nor date, and wherever we meet them they are calm and real as God himself." "We are dealing here," he adds, "with the most *exact* of *sciences*, and not with a dream, for dreams have no roots, while the glowing flower of divine metaphysics has its mysterious roots in Persia and in India, in Greece as well as Egypt." These, it is clear enough, are the words of a man who believes that he has found the philosophy of life, containing definite truths of the deepest spiritual nature.

Of mysticism in general I need to speak in none but the briefest possible way, and that for the simple sake of clearness. We shall agree, I suppose, that mysticism is one of the many paths in life which lead to God. More than this, it is not merely one of the paths, it is the straightest path, and, according to those in every age who have found it out and gone that way, it leads directly into the presence of the Holy and Divine. The mystic is one who looks within, lives within, and loves to interpret all things from the standpoint of the soul. He believes in the supreme guidance of the "inner light," and holds to the necessity of trusting instinct, and honoring emotion. While the naturalist looks without, the mystic peers within; while the man of science studies the phenomena of outward nature, the mystic is absorbed with the phenomena of human nature. The one inquires, the other dreams; the first compares and classifies occurrences in the natural world, the second composes himself and contemplates things in the spiritual world which is centred in himself. Always, however, the true mystic pursues this inward path with one great

end in view; and because of the gaining of that end he has secured the attention of the world. That end is the consciousness of the divine, and a conviction that God is the great Reality. "The mystics," says Professor Rufus Jones, in his recent and most rewarding volume entitled *Studies of Mystical Religion*, "in all ages and in all lands—*semper et ubique*—have been intent on finding a direct way to God"; and he adds, in the introduction to his book, "I shall use the word mystic to express the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relations with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage." "Moreover," he says, "it has been the contention of mystics in all ages that God Himself is the ground of the soul, and that in the depths of their being all men partake of one central life. The genuine mystic, therefore, no more wants arguments to prove God's existence than the artist wants arguments to prove the reality of beauty, or the lover to prove the worth of love."

From all of this, and a great deal more that might be said or quoted, it appears that mysticism is a path of life, or avenue of thought, which, when properly pursued, conducts to a definite goal. It is a process, but it is likewise an end; it is a way of approach to truth along which, or more particularly at the end of which, one central and commanding truth has always been discovered. The way is the way of the individual soul,—along the shadowy road of quiet introspection,—but it ever has been held to lead to the consciousness of the Over-soul.

Accepting, then, as accurate these modern definitions of mysticism and its method, we go on to inquire in what sense Maeterlinck may properly be classed as a member of this historic and highly honored school. To what extent and how accurately may he be looked upon as a follower of Plotinus and Swedenborg and a true disciple of Emerson?

Now that Maeterlinck believes in the path that has been trodden in all ages by the mystics of the world there cannot be the slightest doubt. In all his leanings toward the shadowland of Self, in all his love for things unseen, in all his praise of silence, too, and his perception of the treasures that the humble hold,

our author is undoubtedly a mystic. He follows in the footsteps of those seers and solemn prophets of the soul who have declared, since the earliest time of human thought, that "within is the fountain of life,"—that within is to be found the secret of contentment and the soul of truth. A Latin motto which is said to be written over his study door fitly gives expression to his faith. The motto may be translated:

Whoever turns his outer sense
To see his soul aright,
He hears when no one speaks to him,
Walks seeing through the night.

Yes, in the methods he pursues, as in the cravings of his nature, this Belgian thinker is distinctly mystical. Leave him alone for a moment, and he loses himself amid the heavy shadows that are cast by the pointed arches of some buried temple in the depths of human life; let his footsteps take their natural course, and they lead him along the winding pathways of that "double-garden," one-half of which extends across the sloping hillside of the human soul. "*La vie intérieure*" is his first and last, and it sometimes seems, his only real concern. The supreme aim of life, he tells us, is to "keep open the great road that leads from the seen to the unseen." As some one has written of him, he "comes with gentle words of wise and aspiring sincerity to impress upon the world the belief that the development and disclosure of the human soul is the ultimate aim and goal of existence." Here, in a nutshell and phrased in his own enticing way, is his teaching in this regard. "I have grown to believe," he writes, "that an old man, seated in his arm-chair, waiting patiently with his lamp beside him, giving unconscious ear to all the eternal laws that reign about his house, interpreting without comprehending the silence of doors and windows and the quivering voice of the light, submitting with bent head to the presence of his soul and of his destiny,—I have grown to believe that he, motionless as he is, does yet live in reality a deeper, more human, and more universal life, than the lover who strangles his mistress, the captain who conquers in battle, or the husband who avenges his honor."

Again, to give another illustration of his thought, it is natural that such a man, when writing of so universal yet so personal

a thing as justice, should seek and find it in the secret place that is dearest and most familiar to him. "Justice," he says, "had been imagined everywhere except in man. It had dwelt in the sky. It had lurked behind rocks, it had governed the air and the sea, it had peopled an inaccessible universe. Then at last we peered into its imaginary retreats, we pressed close and examined; its throne of clouds tottered, it faded away; but at the very moment we believed it had ceased to be, behold, it reappeared and raised its head once more in the very depths of our heart."

Moreover, Maeterlinck is a mystic in this respect, that his books have hardly an impress of an epoch. Although his latest volume bears the title of *The Measures of Time*, his thoughts, his words, his innermost teachings, are practically timeless. It has been truly said of his books that most of them might have been "conceived and written a thousand years ago, and might equally, no doubt, be produced in any one of the thousands of years to come." So, too, he is a mystic in his occasional lapses into the exaggerated, the foolish, and grotesque,—a respect in which the mystics have always sinned most gravely. Thus Angelus Silesius, a daring mystic of the seventeenth century, declared: "I know that God cannot live a moment without me. If I perish he must for want of me give up the ghost. I am as important to Him as He to me. I help maintain His being, as well as He mine." Emerson approached him when he declared, "The simplest person who in his integrity worships God becomes God," and added, "I become a transparent eye-ball. I am nothing. I see all."

Maeterlinck's exaggerations run along a different line, and he leans over the edge of sanity particularly when he deals with death. "Our death," he says, "is the mould in which our life flows; it is death that has shaped our features. Of the dead alone should portraits be painted, for it is only they who are truly themselves." And again he says, "Whoever meets me knows all that I have done and shall do;—nay, he knows the very day on which I shall die." Of wisdom such as this we may well cry despairingly with the Psalmist, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it."

But if Maeterlinck is a genuine mystic in such respects as these,

and in others that we shall take account of later, let us pause here and make it evident that in the supremest sense of all—so far as arriving at the goal which the mystics of all ages have felt convinced that they reached—he distinctly and definitely fails. The old story tells us that the Magdalene went down to the dew-swept garden in the early morning light and found one waiting for her at the gate whom she took at first to be the gardener, but who turned out to be the very Saviour of her soul. And so it has been throughout the centuries, as we have seen, with the men and women whom we speak about as mystics. Their distinction has been always this,—that the way they went has brought them to the very presence of the Highest. With Maeterlinck, however, although his “thoughts all gravitate in a visionary way to the Eternal, to the Absolute,” he yet never finds, nor feels, himself face to face with a Supreme and Eternal Being who is both creator and inspirer of life. He goes down ever and again into the spacious garden of the soul, and he loves to walk and watch there. He caresses the shadows, and converses with the flowers. The bees are humming in the heavy afternoon of speculative thought, and he sees them store away the honey in the cells of quiet contemplation. But in all his musing, and his sense of mystery, he meets no shadowy form who asks for recognition, and to whom he cries out in an ecstasy of joy, “Rabboni.”

Maeterlinck, in other words, is a mystic, but a mystic who does not arrive. He sets forth on the historic road, but fails to turn up at the historic goal. He takes the well-worn path on which other pilgrims have journeyed with joy because of what it led to; but with him not joy, but fear, is met along the way which leads him nowhere in particular. Never, for example, in the writings of this so-called mystic do you find an exultant cry like that of Emerson: “O my brothers, God exists! There is a soul at the centre of Nature and over the will of every man, so that none of us can wrong the universe. The whole course of things goes to teach us faith. We need only obey.” Nowhere does he proclaim the assurance that man can acquaint himself at first-hand with deity. Instead, what do we find? Only a heavy silence as to the mystery of mysteries,—the Power supreme above

us all. When we come to the end of what he has to say, we see before us a question mark. Here, for example, is a case in point. In *The Buried Temple* he declares: "It was well that the Poet who found in his God an unquestionable ideal should incessantly hold before us this definitive ideal. But today, if we look away from the truth, from the ordinary experiences of life, on what shall our eager gaze rest?" Again, we come upon some cryptic utterance like this: "It is not the incomprehensible in Nature that masters and crushes us; but the thought that Nature may possibly be governed by a conscious, superior, reasoning Will,—one that, although superhuman, has yet some kinship to the will of man."

Moreover, and what is worse, there are other connections in which he seems distinctly unreligious. Instead of finding God as the result of his quest, what he reveals is nothing but a sub-conscious, or a higher, self. "Within us," he says, "is a being that is our veritable ego;—our first-born; immemorial, illimitable, universal, and probably immortal. Our intellect, which is merely a kind of phosphorescence that plays on this inner sea, has as yet faint knowledge."

Yes, it is self, mysterious, hooded, veiled, incomprehensible self that he finds at the end of all his inner searchings; and in this self his teachings find a centre. There is neither good nor evil, neither pain nor pleasure, neither ease nor hardship, neither calamity nor happiness,—except as thinking, and our inmost feelings, make them so.

Maeterlinck, I repeat, therefore, is mystical, but not a mystic; or, let us say again, he is a mystic who does not arrive. He believes, so he tells us, in a faculty in man higher than intelligence, a faculty which he calls "mystic reason"; but that faculty, wonderful as it is, cannot penetrate the veil, nor conduct us through the realm of shadows into light. Though it discloses wonders, it knows nothing about One who is the source of wonder; and though it recognizes beauty, it knows nothing of One who is the architect of beauty.

In the ancient temple of Edfu, the most symmetrical and best preserved of all the old Egyptian temples, one is led along through gateway after gateway, from outer sunlight, fierce and glaring,

into shadow and then into deeper shadow, until one moves in almost utter darkness. Chamber opens into chamber, each one at a slightly higher level than the one preceding. Outside, behind the towering pylons, where the people gathered, is the spacious open court, roofed in by the azure sky. Within, at the opposite and furthest extremity, is the Holy of Holies, open to the priests alone, where the statue of the god was niched. It is a fascinating temple to explore, and at last, when the heavy gloom has silently embraced one, when chamber after chamber has been reached, and hall after hall been left behind, one comes to that holiest of holy chambers, with its solemn little niche,—a niche of dark and solid granite in a dark and silent room. It is a dramatic moment, and one which comes to be the more dramatic when one discovers that the niche is—*empty!* The statue of the god is no longer there. His worship ceased long since, and the image was thrown down, broken, and destroyed.

Thus it is in the temple of thought that Maeterlinck has built. It is a perfect structure in its way, and enriched by the highest art. It is dim and suggestive, too, with shadowy corridors that open toward the sacred shrine of life. But the niche in the Holy of Holies is an empty niche; there is nothing there. If we worship, we must worship an abstraction; if we kneel, it must be before a reach of dark and impenetrable wall.

Moreover, the analogy of the Egyptian temple, with its passages that lead one into solemn darkness, suggests another truth which is characteristic of Maeterlinck. The ordinary mystic pursues his way along the hidden avenues of life, but comes out at the last upon a bright and broadening plain. He plunges into secret darkness, but rejoices to have found thereby a glorious light. With our Belgian philosopher, however, the gloom is never lightened, the shadow never left behind. The darkness is what he revels in; and, with the darkness, all forms and fears and strange forebodings that cannot bear the light. Whether or not he is fond of shuddering himself and finds in it a species of religious awe, he is fond of making others shudder and grow cold. He is master of the art of stimulating the creepy feelings of life. In some of his plays he seems anxious to set forth mystery as something that is altogether terrifying. We see people huddled to-

gether at a window out of which they fear to look, or pressing against a door which they dread to open.¹ The scene is generally laid on the edge of a dark and pathless wood. In the play which he called *The Blind* the people are lost in a forest, and in *Pelléas and Mélisande* the lovers first encounter one another in a lonely and distant glade. The shadows are heavy. The dusk is everywhere. The sun is setting,—in fact, it has never fully risen. But if the gloom of the silent forest is on one side of his plays, the gloom of the stormy ocean, with tumbling waves that roll in from a boundless deep, is on the other. The ocean is always lashed into fury by a storm, while the sky is dark and full of thunder. Situated thus, between the two great natural symbols of impenetrable mystery, the poet pictures for us a dark and gloomy castle which is half in ruins. In the courtyard of the castle, or perhaps by the edge of the forest, there is a deep, black well, and beneath the crumbling castle walls we are led along dismal passageways and creaking corridors into silent crypts and gloomy dungeons. All the time the wind is howling, and the waves of the troubled sea are beating at the gates, and threatening to burst through the habitation man has built.

I remember that as a child I used to be strangely fascinated by the title of a book which stood upon the library shelves at home. I cannot recall that I ever opened it, and to this day I do not know exactly what it dealt with; but it was called *The Night Side of Nature*. That is the side of nature which appeals to Maeterlinck; and it is the side of human nature, too. His very characters are shadows, and when we strive to grasp their meaning they fade away into nothingness. Now all of this is mystical in the popular and superficial sense of being hazy and indistinct; but philosophically mystical it is not. The genuine mystic always deals with life;—with soul-life and with life in heaven, if you will, but still with life. Maeterlinck, however, is forever exploring the spaces of the soul, where death and gloom, not life and light, are what prevail. Some one has called him a “meteorologist of the soul”; and so he is. But like many another of the ordinary craft it is storms and tempests that he usually reports.

It is interesting to notice, however, that within recent years

¹ A. Symons, *The Symbolic Movement in Literature*, p. 158.

he has left definitely behind him this morbid attitude of youth. In place of a dread of the unknown has come trust, and an almost superstitious awe has yielded to complacent confidence. In other words, he has gradually shaken off the shadow of the Jesuit college where he studied and has come out into the noon-day of the twentieth century. So much is this the case that critics, who are always bound to find some fault, are now complaining of his easy optimism, and are tearing rents in what they think the flimsy garments of his latter-day philosophy. But the change has really been a growth, and a natural and wholesome one at that. What is more, it has made him in some respects a truer mystic than he was at first. He himself has given expression to this change, and says:

It is consoling to observe that you follow the same route as the soul of this great world: that we have the same intentions, the same hopes, the same tests, and almost,—except for our dreams of justice and pity, which is our own specific work,—the same feelings. . . . That is why our attitude in the face of the mystery of these forces is changed. It is no longer that of fear, but of courage. It is no longer the kneeling of a slave before his master, but it permits the look of equal to equal; for we carry within ourselves the equal of the most profound and the greatest mysteries.

And yet I do not say all this in the spirit of foolish criticism. I am not of those who are disposed to quarrel with talent, and least of all with genius; especially when the genius is one that seeks the mystery of the soul for inspiration, and proclaims the saving grace of individual character. Moreover, Maeterlinck being a mystic who does not arrive, he seems to me particularly typical of the age in which we live. Like all great writers he voices the unspoken feelings of his time; and among the interesting phenomena of the particular period in which we live is the somewhat depressing fact that while the thirst for the divine remains unchanged, the means for the slaking of that thirst appear to be taken from us. People wish to believe, but often cannot. They have religion, or something which passes for it; but oftentimes are not religious. How many are the people who might fitly be described as agnostic mystics! They have the instincts and desires which fired and inspired saints and seers of old; but far

too often they find themselves compelled to go without the glorious vision and the all-sustaining faith.

In this respect our Belgian prophet is among the most modern of all writers, reflecting the doubts and wonderings of his day. But while perhaps the most significant thing about him as a mystic is the one that I have pointed out, it would be a mistake and, worse than a mistake, it would be a grave injustice to ourselves and him to pass over without emphasis many other features in his teachings which are hardly less distinctive, and of very positive worth. Although he may not reach the mystic goal and achieve direct vision of the Highest, yet on the way he has seen and taught us things of great importance. His very "glorification," as Chesterton calls it, "of the inside of things at the expense of the outside," is not only a corollary of his mystical bent of mind, but a corollary which calls for every emphasis that can possibly be given. Welcome, indeed, in these days of superficial, and often silly, materialism, is the prophet of a scientific mysticism; and thrice welcome at a time when most of us are intent on improving the mere conditions of life is a well-accepted teacher who enforces the supremacy of life itself. The value of Maeterlinck's teaching, therefore, has the general value of all teaching which calls attention to self-reliance, self-development, and the need of spiritual culture. And it has much more than this. Under the spell of his genius the importance of the life within is given fresh interpretation and has taken on a dignity and glory which hardly had been given it before.

Most important, perhaps, but at any rate of genuine value and significance, is the teaching of this man in regard to the soul's relationship, or attitude, to trouble and disaster. He gives new emphasis and meaning to the old assertion that "the soul is its own refuge, and its own defence." Nowhere does he rise so close to ecstasy, or glow with such a fervor of conviction, as when he pictures a human soul facing some terrible and inevitable calamity and calmly defying it, saying in substance to the shadowy form, as it approaches, "You can have no power over me except as I supply the weapons." That is dramatic and sublime. For how often do people exaggerate and arm their troubles, making them terrible, indeed, and capable of inflicting mortal wounds!

"Physical suffering apart," he says in *Wisdom and Destiny*, "not a single sorrow exists that can touch us except through our thought; and whence do our thoughts derive the weapons wherewith they attack or defend us? We suffer very little from suffering itself; but from the manner wherein we accept it, overwhelming sorrow may spring."

Less unique, and much more commonplace, is his constant reiteration of the fact that the soul is the source and seat of all true content and happiness. This trite and familiar truth is lifted out of the dust of what is familiar and out-worn, being presented to us at the hand of genius in new and shining garments. "All men can learn to be happy," he assures us, "and the teaching of it is easy. . . . Smiles are as catching as tears, and periods men have termed happy were periods when there were some who knew of their happiness. . . . There is more joy in the smallest joy whereof we are conscious than in the approach of the mightiest happiness that enters not into our soul."

Again, Maeterlinck stands for what we may call the democracy of the moral life. He believes in the Republic of the Soul. The world within, as he sees it, pays little attention to the ethical gradations and classifications which are so distinctive of our class-morality. "Not to all men," he reminds us, "is it given to be hero or genius, victorious, admirable always, or even to be simply happy in exterior things; but it lies in the power of the least-favored among us to be loyal, and gentle, and just; to be generous and brotherly;—he that has least gifts of all can learn to look on his fellows without envy or hatred, without malice or futile regret; the outcast can take his strange, silent part (which is not always that of least service) in the gladness of those who are near him; and he that has barely a talent can still learn to forgive an offence with an ever nobler forgiveness."

He applies the same deep principle to degrees of insight, or revelation, believing with Emerson,

There is no great, and no small,
To the Soul that maketh all.

"Not an evening passes," he is convinced, "but the smallest thing suffices to ennoble the soul"; and he is very sure, as he says

in *The Treasure of the Humble*, "that the day you lingered to follow a ray of light through a crevice in the door of life, you did something as great as though you had bandaged the wounds of your enemy, for at that moment you no longer had any enemies."

Maeterlinck has stood very attentively and reverently close up to the narrow wall that separates the finite from the infinite, the human from the divine. If he has not heard certain voices that have always seemed of chief significance, let us at least be thankful that he has told us honestly what he does hear, and in language of transcendent beauty. The world is full enough of echoes, and it is hardly worth our while to pay attention to them. But when a living voice is raised that tells of personal revelation, and expresses some of our unuttered longings, we may wisely stop and pay attention. And in the meantime we may well believe that not yet has this thinker given us his full or final word. It is much to be hoped that it is with him, as with the fine patrician house in Bruges which bears, he has told us, on beams and pediment the suggestive device,—“Within me there is more.”

BOOKS RECEIVED

- PERIODICAL ARTICLES ON RELIGION 1890-1899 (AUTHOR INDEX).**
Compiled and edited by Ernest Cushing Richardson. pp. 8+876. New York: Published for the Hartford Seminary Press by Charles Scribner's Sons. [1911.]
- BIBLE STUDIES ON THE SABBATH QUESTION. FOR USE BY PASTORS, SABBATH SCHOOLS, YOUNG PEOPLE'S CLASSES, IN HOME STUDY, ETC.** *By Arthur Elwin Main.* 2d ed. pp. 20+107. Plainfield, N.J.: The American Sabbath Tract Society. 1911. 50 cents.
- THE TORONTO GOSPELS.** *By Edgar J. Goodspeed.* (Historical and Linguistic Studies, Series I., Vol. 2, part 2.) pp. 21. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. [1911.] 25 cents net.
- SAINTS AND HEROES TO THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES.** *By George Hodges.* pp. 6+268. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1911. \$1.35 net.
- LIFE'S CHRIST PLACES.** *By Joseph Agnew.* pp. 10+206. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911.
- A HISTORY OF CREEDS AND CONFESSIONS OF FAITH IN CHRISTENDOM AND BEYOND, WITH HISTORICAL TABLES.** *By William A. Curtis.* pp. 20+502. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911.
- PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.** *By George Malcolm Stratton.* (Library of Philosophy.) pp. 12+376. London: George Allen and Company. 1911. \$2.75 net.
- THE RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT CELTS.** *By J. A. MacCulloch.* pp. 16+399. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911.
- A DISCIPLE'S RELIGION. SERMONS.** *By William Holden Hutton.* ("The Scholar as Preacher." Second Series.) pp. 10+236. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911. 4 shillings, 6 pence net.
- AT THE TEMPLE CHURCH. SERMONS.** *By H. G. Woods.* ("The Scholar as Preacher." Second Series.) pp. 12+239. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911. 4 shillings, 6 pence net.
- RUDIMENTA LINGUAE HEBRAICAE SCHOLIS PUBLICIS ET DOMESTICAE DISCIPLINAE BREVISSIME ACCOMMODATA.** *Scriptserunt Chr. Herm. Vosen et Fr. Kaulen. Nona Editio quam Recognovit et Auxit Jacobus Schumacher.* pp. 12+171. Friburgi Brisgoviae: B. Herder. 1911. 70 cents net.
- RECHERCHES SUR LES CARACTÈRES DU GREC DANS LE NOUVEAU TESTAMENT D'APRÈS LES INSCRIPTIONS DE PRIÈNE.** *Par*

Jean Rouffiac. (Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses.) pp. 106. Paris: Ernest Leroux. 1911.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF ST. PAUL. *By Percy Gardner.* (Crown Theological Library.) pp. 16+263. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1911. \$1.50.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS. *Edited by James Hastings.* Vol. IV. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. \$7.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE BUDDHA'S ATHEISM AND NON-ATMANISM. *By Sakyo Kanda.* pp. 40. (Reprinted from the *Buddhist Review*, Vol. III., Nos. 3, 4, London, 1911.)

QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DES PAPSTTUMS UND DES RÖMISCHEN KATHOLIZISMUS. *Von Carl Mirbt.* 3e auflage. pp. 24+514. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1911. Unbound, 8 marks, bound, 9 marks 20.

THE EGYPTIAN CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY. *By George Andrew Reisner.* (The Ingersoll Lecture, 1911.) pp. 10+85. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1912. 85 cents.

GREECE AND BABYLON. A COMPARATIVE SKETCH OF MESOPOTAMIAN, ANATOLIAN AND HELLENIC RELIGIONS. *By Lewis R. Farnell.* pp. 12+311. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911.

THE ADVENTURE OF LIFE. BEING THE WILLIAM BELDEN NOBLE LECTURES FOR 1911. *By Wilfred Thomason Grenfell.* pp. 12+157. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1912. \$1.25 net.

THE CAMBRIDGE MANUALS OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.) 1911. 40 cents net per volume.

THE MORAL LIFE AND MORAL WORTH. *By W. R. Sorley.* pp. 8+147.

EARLY RELIGIOUS POETRY OF PERSIA. *By James Hope Moulton.* pp. 12+170.

ENCHIRIDION PATRISTICUM LOCOS SS. PATRUM, DOCTORUM SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIASTICORUM. *In Usam Scholarum Collegit M. J. Rouët de Journal.* pp. 24+887. Friburgi Brisgoviae: B. Herder. 1911. \$3.15 net.

SOCIALISM AND CHARACTER. *By Vida D. Scudder.* pp. 18+431. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1912. \$1.50 net.

THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS. *By Shirley Jackson Case.* pp. 8+352. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1912. \$1.50 net.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE CHURCHES. *By Shailer Mathews.*
pp. 6+66. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [1912.]
50 cents net.

TABULAE FONTIUM TRADITIONIS CHRISTIANAE (AD ANNUM 1563).
Quas in Usum Scholarum Collegit J. Creusen. Friburgi
Brisgoviae: B. Herder. 1911. 40 cents net.

L'EXCUSE DE NOBLE SEIGNEUR JAQUES DE BOURGOGNE, SEIGNEUR
DE FALAIS ET DE BREDAM. *Par Jean Calvin. Réimprimée*
sur l'Unique Exemplaire de l'Édition de Genève 1548 avec une
Introduction par Alfred Cartier. 2e éd. pp. 78+49. Genève:
A. Jullien. 1911. 7 francs 50.

MARTIN LUTHER, THE MAN AND HIS WORK. *By Arthur Cush-*
man McGiffert. pp. 11+397. New York: The Century
Company. 1911. \$3.00 net.

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF MARTIN LUTHER. *By Preserved*
Smith. pp. 16+490. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
1911. \$3.50 net.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V.

JULY, 1912

NUMBER 3

WHAT IS DRIVING MEN TODAY BACK TO RELIGION?

RUDOLF EUCKEN

UNIVERSITY OF JENA

He is but a superficial observer of the times who can think that the movement of life today is altogether against religion, and that only the denial of religion has the spirit of the age with it.

For, certain as it is that blatant denial still holds the public ear and is more and more permeating the masses, yet in the work of the intellect, and likewise in the depths of men's souls, the case is different. Here, with ever greater vigor, is springing up the feeling that religion is indispensable, the yearning for religion. What is understood by religion is often anything but clear, and often very different from the traditional forms of religion; but the demand is unmistakable for more depth of life and for the establishment of profounder inner connections than our visible existence affords. In the spiritual life of the present day, molecular transformations are taking place, inconspicuous at first but constantly increasing, which will eventually burst upon our view, and which will necessarily provoke essential changes in the entire condition of life. Today this movement is still an undercurrent, and on the surface the tide flows in the opposite direction. But more and more the undercurrent is rising to the surface, and unless every indication fails, it will soon come into control.

The most fundamental reason for this tendency may be indicated by a single sentence. It is caused by the increasing dissatisfaction with modern civilization, or at least with those aspects of civilization which now occupy the surface of life. All

the splendor of the external successes of civilization cannot hide the fact that it does not satisfy the whole man with his inner needs, and that the amelioration of the world around us which it has accomplished does not compensate for the inner emptiness of its excessive concentration of effort on the visible world, its secularization of life.

We moderns have set ourselves at work with all our might, have acquired technical perfection, have combined isolated achievements into great systems. By the increased efficiency of our labor we have increasingly subdued the world, and at the same time have imposed upon human society a far more rational form. But, while we have given every care and effort to the means and conditions of life, we have exposed ourselves to the risk of losing life itself, and while performing astounding external feats, inwardly we have become smaller and smaller. Our work has separated itself from our souls, and it now reacts overmasteringly upon them, threatening to absorb them utterly. Our own creations have become our masters and oppressors. Moreover, as the division of labor increases, work constantly becomes more specialized and engages an ever smaller part of each individual soul; the whole man comes less and less to activity, and we lose any superior unity of our nature. Thus more and more we become mere parts of a civilization-machine.

The dangers thus arising were not felt to be so serious a menace, so long as religion and a culture controlled by ideals kept before men's minds another conception of life. But now that these are weakened and repressed, this trend toward the visible world meets less and less resistance. Yet it is true that as a result of the same process the accompanying loss is at least clearly seen and keenly felt. The victory itself is thus calling forth a counter-movement, and the outer triumph, by letting us plainly discern the limits of human power, is being transformed into an inner defeat. An independence once gained for the spiritual life can be temporarily obscured, but not permanently destroyed. At one and the same moment the craving that life should have more soul and depth is expressing itself with elemental power, and, on the other hand, it is becoming clear that, if the All is without soul and no new spiritual world stands open

before us, we humans, too, can have no souls. The result is that we are again driven into the path of religion, since without religion life cannot find the longed-for depth.

This craving for soul is accompanied by a craving for continuance and eternity.

Modernity has abandoned religion's mode of conceiving life and the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, has left eternity colorless and empty, in its uncurbed desire to plunge full into the current of the time, to uplift conditions here, and from this world to derive all its forces. In all this a special importance has attached to the idea of development. Instead of thinking their position to be fixed and unshakable by the appointment of a higher power, be it God or fate, men have come to think of our life as still in flux, and its condition as susceptible of measureless improvement; above all the immaturity and all the losses of the present has arisen the confident hope of a better and ever better future. Such a conviction has led men to devote endeavor entirely to the living present and carefully to adjust effort to the existing stage of evolution. That contributes great freshness and mobility to life; all rigidity is dispelled, all magnitudes become fluid, infinite increase multiplies the abundant forms.

Without in any wise attacking or disparaging all this, one's own experience of life yet makes it more and more clear that this trend has its dangers and limitations. To yield to the tendency of the times seemed at first to bring clear gain, for a group of persistent convictions still maintained themselves and supplied to the movement a counterbalancing repose. More and more, however, the movement drew into itself these survivals; more and more exclusively it mastered all life. It constantly became more swift, more hurried, more agitated; the changes followed faster and faster, one moment crowded on another, and the present was reduced to a passing instant. But in this process it has become apparent that this passionate forward striving leaves no room for true life. And, further, all courage must needs perish, so soon as we are forced to the conviction that everything which we today revere as true, good, beautiful, is subject to change and may tomorrow become unstable, that what is today acclaimed "modern" may tomorrow be cast aside as obsolete. He who un-

reflectingly lives merely for the moment may in all seriousness look upon that moment as the acme of the whole; but he who looks a little farther cannot doubt that it will be no better with us than with those who went before us, and that the saying still holds which according to Indian doctrines the spirits of the dead cry to the living: "We were what you are; you shall be what we are." In fine, if life is all strung on the thin thread of successive moments, each crowding back its predecessor, so that when the moment vanishes all action at once sinks again into the abyss of nothingness, then, in spite of all the exciting activity of the moment, life becomes a mere shadow.

If only we were quite sure that all our pains and care and haste were bringing about progress for the whole of human life! But that, again, we are not. True, we are constantly advancing in exact science, as we are in the technical mastery of our environment; we are compelling the elements into our service; we are freeing our existence from pain and enriching it with pleasure. But are we by all that winning a closer connection with the depths of reality? Are we growing in spiritual power as in ethical sentiment? Are we becoming greater and nobler men? As life gains in pleasure, do our inner contentment and true happiness increase in due proportion? In truth, we are growing only in our relations to the world outside, not in the essence of our being; and hence the question is not to be evaded, whether the unspeakable toil of modern civilization is worth while. We work and work, and know not to what end; for in giving up eternity we have also lost every inner bond of the ages and all power of comprehensive view. Without a guiding star we drift on the waves of the time.

As soon as this becomes a fact of clear consciousness and individual experience, either all courage to live must collapse or we must again discover within our domain, and resuscitate, something durable, something eternal, to give us support against the flight of the moments and to permit us to work for durable aims. Otherwise, our life has no sense and no value. That a longing for such an eternity, for a superiority to mere movement, pervades our time, is revealed by many signs. But such a craving leads, if not directly to religion, yet near to religion, as the chief representative of eternal truth.

Again, men crave more love and more solidarity in the human race than modern civilization affords, and that, too, is driving men to religion. Christianity not only had made love the kernel of religion, but also, starting from a Kingdom of God, it had established an inner human solidarity and created an organization on a spiritual foundation. For the modern age, however, so far as it went its own way, other aims came to the front. The chief thing came to be the individual, his emancipation from all hindrances, the development of all his powers, their unlimited enhancement. In all departments of life the independent development of the individual is a chief trait of the modern world; each of the great civilized nations in its own way has contributed to it, according as each has found its high level in art and literature, in religion, or in political and social life. Now for a time this individualism did not come into collision with the old ideals, for the individual found the totality of a spiritual world present within him, so that each one in his proper station could make it his chief task to stamp his own peculiar form on this inner world and to render it his peculiar service. But the situation altered as soon as that world of the spirit faded and disappeared. With it vanished everything that inwardly united individuals and bound their souls together. One individual became inwardly indifferent to another, and the way was opened for a man to make his highest aim his own personal advancement and utmost selfish gain, in total unconcern for any one else.

The same principles which govern individual conduct are extended to social groups and entire nations; self-interest is the single rule of action, the moral solidarity of mankind is relaxed and dissolved. The danger is imminent that the end may be a war of all against all (*bellum omnium contra omnes*). Undoubtedly the resulting rivalry and strife has effected much that is great; it has given life a thorough shaking up, and banished all idle repose. And on this new foundation cohesive forces are by no means lacking. Such a force in particular is Work, which with its growth to great combinations perfects organization, assigns to each single element a definite part, and binds them all firmly together. But such gearing together of performances by no means amounts to harmony of sentiment; if it did, the antinomies of the social

question and our economic conflicts would be impossible. In truth, combination in work does not prevent wide divergence of conviction and opinion, or even mutual hatred and strife. Sects and parties are increasing; common estimates and ideals keep slipping away from us; we understand one another less and less, and are falling deeper and deeper into a confused Babel of tongues. Even voluntary association, that form of human unity peculiar to modern times, the free union of many individuals, unites more in accomplishment than in disposition, brings men together outwardly rather than inwardly. Thus, among the monstrous confusions of the present time the demand for stable connections grows insistent, connections which shall take concern both for the common weal and for the individual. If, however, this demand plants itself wholly on the basis of the visible world and denies everything invisible, it must inevitably assume the form of a harsh oppression and compulsion, for it can produce its effect not through conviction but solely through force. In the social-democratic movement of the present such a danger already shows itself in full distinctness. But while the modern man struggles with all his soul against such a compulsion, a solution of the entanglement is to be sought in no other direction than that of a recovery of inner human bonds and of recourse to an inner world, common to all, of convictions, faith, ideals. We need to up-build humanity from within, and this cannot be done without a profound deepening of life, and this in turn is not possible without religion.

The fact that today, with the greatest abundance of external points of contact, we are internally getting farther and farther apart, necessarily leads to inner isolation. Amid the stupendous driving-gear the individual sees himself left to his own resources and completely indifferent to everyone else. Such isolation is painful, yes, unbearable, especially for finer natures. All the fulness of human activity, highly as it is to be prized, cannot make good the lack of inner union and essential love. It affords no sufficient counterweight for the self-seclusion of man in his special circle of interests, for the preponderance of selfishness. Yet this selfishness, which separates all from all, turns out to be too narrow for the man himself; irresistibly

a longing arises for a greater harmony of our spirits and for a value for each individual that shall transcend himself. But how could such a longing push its way to victory against the indifference of nature and the corrupt doings of men, unless a kingdom of love, a world of love, come to man and lend him a value? But that is exactly what religion represented, and what it brought to mankind.

Soul, eternity, love,—these are not brought to us quickly and painlessly by the world about us; they require an inner elevation, they demand a new world. And beyond these individual aspects doubts are also awakened and transformations made necessary by the totality of human nature. It was a main point of religion, especially of the Christian religion, not to accept and recognize man as experience presents him, but to require of him a complete transformation, an inner re-birth. The modern age has more confidence in man, it awakens in him the consciousness of strength more than of weakness, it summons him to the full development of all his slumbering powers. And in fact it has been shown that man is capable of far more than he used to be given credit for, that he can actively put his hand to the world, and successfully strive to realize the rational and rationalize the real. While, however, man in the past thought highly of himself and bravely undertook high things, he formerly felt himself to be still living in the spiritual associations which he had inherited, as member of a Kingdom of God or as sharer in a world of reason; and this consciousness disciplined and enlarged his power. But these associations have gradually vanished; the tendency toward man has gradually passed into a rude opposition to any super-human world, and constantly takes a more hostile attitude toward religion and toward any invisible order. Characteristic of this is the well-known saying of Ludwig Feuerbach: "God was my first, reason my second, man my third and last thought." In contrast to such a conception of man, which limits him to himself alone, the saying of Hegel in his *Philosophy of History* has its truth: "The consequence of putting man into the highest place is that he holds himself in no esteem. For only with the consciousness that a higher being exists does man attain a standpoint which allows him true esteem."

It cannot be denied that by giving up all connection with an invisible world and by complete limitation to visible existence man has been growing smaller. First of all, his place in the sum of reality has been reduced. He is now a mere bit of nature, and cannot claim a superior position and a peculiar work. In contrast to the enormously expanded space and time which nature has opened to modern research, the whole human circle is shrinking into tiny littleness. Rightly did William James emphasize the fact that for one hundred and fifty years progress seems to have meant nothing but a continual magnifying of the material world and a steady diminution of the importance of man.

And not only has the external position of man grown worse, he has also retrograded internally. When man is limited to sensuous existence, he loses all motive and all capacity to raise substantially his spiritual level and to counteract with any vigor the petty, low, self-centred part of his own being. He has to accept what he finds in himself, and exclusively follow the impulses awakened in him by nature; all resistance to them necessarily seems folly. That was endurable while an optimistic point of view glorified man, and lent him greatness and dignity in his own eyes; it becomes intolerable as soon as a more candid consideration causes us to discern and recognize the limitations and defects of man, understood as a mere natural being. And it cannot be denied that the experiences of modern life have given decisive preponderance to this unfavorable estimate. Whereas the eighteenth century could not exert itself enough to exalt the dignity and greatness of man (*la grandeur de l'homme*), we of today, when we picture man to ourselves, are far more inclined to think of what is petty, low, self-centred, the "all-too-human" (Nietzsche). And since we do not intend to yield without a struggle to this humiliation, we are developing a zealous endeavor to elevate man of himself, in his own sphere. Some hope to attain this by uniting individuals into great masses and considering those masses as the bearers of reason, in agreement with the doctrine set up by Aristotle of the accumulation of reason in the mass; such have a firm belief in the reason of the multitude. In exactly the opposite direction, others wish to exalt single eminent individuals as high as possible above the masses and to

make them the centre of gravity of intellectual creation. Thus the former through aggregation, the latter through isolation, hope to be able to make more out of man. But, whatever relative justification these two tendencies may have, they do not reach the main goal. For by no readjustment within the human circle can greatness be given to man, if human nature is not capable of elevation from within, if man is a mere natural being. So we continue to press on to a mere human culture and civilization; we see through its inadequacy, and yet cannot emancipate ourselves from it or lift ourselves above it; we can neither discover new aims nor develop new powers other than those which it supplies. The fact, however, that, despite the vast amount of earnest work and the restless movement of today, we yet lack a satisfying aim for this work, an aim that ennobles and inspires the work itself,—that fact makes the present state of civilization absolutely intolerable. Man can bear much hindrance and hurt and not lose his courage; but he cannot endure to have his whole life aimless and meaningless. Just because our life is ever growing more intense and more laborious, we must unconditionally demand that it be given an aim and a meaning.

Therefore in all deeper souls today is stirring a demand for an inner uplift of human nature, for a new idealism. And this demand will necessarily have to seek an alliance with religion. No matter how many opponents religion may still encounter, nevertheless, stronger than all opponents, stronger even than all intellectual difficulties, is the necessity of the spiritual self-preservation of humanity and of man. Out of the very resistance to the menace of annihilation will proceed elemental forces,—which are the strongest thing in the world.

Thus, though it be through a course of hard fights and radical upheavals (as history indirectly tends to prove), religion will surely come to new ascendancy. But the return to religion by no means signifies a return to the old forms of religion. Through modern culture too much in the condition of life has been changed for us to resume these forms unchanged. Religion will win back men's souls so much the sooner, the more energetically it harks back to its original sources, the more sharply it separates the tem-

poral and the eternal in their own spheres, and so brings the eternal to new effectiveness and sets it in close and fruitful relation to the real needs of the present. The superiority of the eternal consists not in that it persists unchanged within time, but in that it can enter all times without losing itself in them, and from them all can elicit that particular portion of truth which their endeavor holds. "The old that ages, he must let go, who would hold fast the old that ages not" (Runeberg).

The fundamental mood of mankind today is essentially the reverse of what it was at the beginning of the modern period. At that time the freshness of new vital power lent a rose-colored hue to all reality, and it was possible to hope that an immanent culture would bring about the complete satisfaction of all man's spiritual needs. The experiences of the period have shown man his limitations; great complications have arisen, much unreason has become apparent in our circumstances, our ambition has encountered greater and greater obstacles. But the recognition of so much unreason in our world forces us to the following alternative: either we declare ourselves powerless against unreason,—then all the courage and strength of life must collapse and we succumb to pessimism; or, on the other hand, wrestling manfully, we gain a connection with an invisible world and the depths of reality, draw thence new power of life, and take up with new courage the fight against all unreason. That course will result in a well-founded and serious optimism, radically different from the superficial optimism of the market-place. The false optimism ignores complication and unreason, and hence inevitably loses all depth of life; the true optimism knows and appreciates these, but is not warped and deterred by them. It possesses a resource superior to every hindrance, and from opposition only gains new might and courage. I should like to think that such a genuine and well-founded optimism corresponds to the intrinsic nature of the American people. But without Religion genuine optimism is impossible.

IS FAITH IN GOD DECADENT?

GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD

YALE UNIVERSITY

Much the most important change in theological opinion which has taken place during the last half-century has reference to an altered conception of God, and, as an inevitable consequence, of his relations to the world of things and of men. This change was originally neither initiated nor approved by theologians themselves. It was rather commended to them, or even forced upon them, by modern science and modern philosophy. The attitude, however, of these two sources, or prime causes, of change toward the questions involved and toward the then reigning theological position on these questions was in certain important respects markedly different. Physical and natural science, proceeding painstakingly but rapidly by means of experimental methods, and making use of the facts discovered by these methods as a basis for induction, arrived at a quite new conception of Nature. This conception was either frankly or tacitly, but always quite decidedly, opposed to the idea of a Divine Being as a supernatural person and worker of miracles, interposing within, or acting contrary to, the working of a mechanical system under the control of natural laws. Thus during the greater part of the nineteenth century these sciences were regarded by the most tenacious adherents of the dogmas of orthodoxy as distinctly anti-theological, if not also anti-religious.

Meanwhile philosophy, so far as it was faithful to its central aim of finding some Idea which should appear to harmonize all spheres of human experience and to satisfy the demands made by all sides of human nature, undertook to reconcile the new views of natural forces and natural laws and of the history of natural evolution with the essential faith and practices of religion. In other words, it undertook so to conceive of the being of the world as to adapt the conception of the physical and natural sciences to the demands of religion for a superhuman and morally worthy, if not in the strictest sense of the word *supernatural*, object of faith and worship.

At first, and for a considerable time, this attempt of philosophy was regarded in theological circles as little, or not at all, less dangerous and irreligious than the tenets of modern science. Indeed, there were certain obvious reasons why philosophy should be met with a more hostile attitude than it seemed convenient or necessary to oppose to the new scientific conception of nature. For the latter might be considered as simply "science," and so as moving in a plane different enough from that of theology to make it impossible that the two should come into a square conflict. This was, indeed, only a "might-be," a mere seeming. The actual fact was that the new conception of the world and its possible relation to any personal God was essentially incompatible with the older forms of theological dogma. In a word, modern science was slowly but convincingly proving either that the world is a godless world or that the conception of God and of God's relations to the world, as held by the then dominant theology, must be essentially changed.

But if much of science was deemed to be atheism by the orthodoxy of this period, the attempts of philosophy at reconciliation were almost universally deemed to be a more or less skilfully disguised pantheism. In some sort "pantheistical" they certainly were. But so far as they were not systems of pantheism, like the naturalism of Strauss or the materialism of Haeckel (to take examples standing in time at the extremes of the period we are considering), they were not more pantheistical than is Biblical religion; they were less so than are all other Oriental religions, if we include the mystical sects of Mohammadanism and exclude its more rigidly orthodox forms of monotheism.

Already theology has gradually yielded to the influences which it so hotly and fearfully contested, has gone a notable way toward absorbing the positions of both science and philosophy, and has somewhat radically changed its conception of God and of his relations to the world both of things and also of souls. We say "also of souls"; for although the abolishing of the sharp distinction between the natural and the supernatural in the sphere of physical things and events was the first to yield to the efforts at harmony of reflective thinking, the inevitable result of extending the same point of view into the realm of mental and

spiritual affairs was soon reached. Thus the changed conception of the God of nature was followed by a change in the conceptions of revelation, inspiration, sacred Scripture, and of the conduct, ideals, and growth of the religious life.

In some such way it was that the older forms of deism and theism, with their common belief in a quasi-personal Divine Being as the creator of a Nature capable of running itself, and their bitter controversy over the question whether this Being ever intervened by way of enacting a miracle or other supernatural event, have been alike discredited. Quite commonly now, by theologians, philosophers, and men of science alike, God as the object of religious belief and worship is thought of as immanent in nature and in humanity, the Life, present everywhere and ever, of the world of things and of spirits. As supernatural,—being from the ideal point of view over and above, but not outside of or unconcerned with, nature, the world, the universe (choose what word you will for the sum-total of all phenomena, whether regarded as causes or as effects),—he is not parted from the natural. Natural and supernatural must never be looked upon as mutually exclusive spheres. It is not true of some things and of some souls, or at certain times only, but of all nature and of all humanity, and at all times, that in Him is life, motion, and being.

It is interesting and suggestive in this connection briefly to notice the more recent tendencies of opinion in science, philosophy, and theology,—the three ways of looking at one and the same problem. It is not too much to say that there is notably less crude and open antagonism between theology and the physical and natural sciences than there was during the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century. Nor is this fact wholly due to changes in the positions of theology. In most questions of the details of the constitution and history of nature, science has, as was right and inevitably to be expected, triumphed over theology. But science itself is more cognizant than it formerly was of its own barrenness and insufficiency in attempting to give a final account of nature. It is more ready to admit the claim, confirmed both by psychology and metaphysics, that the notion of a unity of forces operative in the universe, really argues for

the dependence of all individual beings on One Will. It is disposed to confess that the term "law" (even when spelled with a capital), if it means anything more than the expression of an unexplained fact, namely, that there is generally a partial and approximate uniformity in the sequence of similar phenomena, implies the control of active ideas as innate to the deeds of that One Will. And in general, its entire theory of the universe as a closed and impenetrable mechanism has of late shown the plainest signs of breaking down utterly.

On the other hand, theology, when once the outer barriers to a new conception as proposed by a reconciling philosophy had given way, has hastened—sometimes in quite unnecessary and even unseemly fashion—to defer, even though that might compel the relinquishment or important modification of some of its most cherished doctrines, to the newest, as yet unverified tenets of evolution, or to the unrecognized "authority" of the private caprices of some novice in natural science. Thus it has happened that not a few theologians have become quite superfluously heretical as judged by the ancient standards, while of the body of clergymen in general it is not too much to say that no other class of persons are more easily gullible by "oppositions of science falsely so called."

Meanwhile philosophy has in several quarters been outstripping science, and urging on theology to make friends with those whom only a few years ago it had considered as belonging to the mammon of (intellectual) unrighteousness. Hence there has arisen a large crop of new and bizarre forms of the "theory of reality."

On the whole, however, it does not admit of doubt that the conception of God and the divine relations to the world which characterizes the reflective thinking of the age is, from the purely intellectual point of view, a vast improvement over the conception which it has superseded. Its establishment, its convincing influence over theology, in spite of the opposition which it has somewhat persistently encountered from theology, is the most important contribution to a new and improved system of theological thinking which the last century has to show.

If now we seek for some expression which shall picture, if it does not accurately define, the important change which we are

considering, it would be a true though somewhat startling description of it to say: It is little less, essentially considered, than the *rehabilitation of the ideal of a Living God*. The Divine Being, as conceived of by the French and English deism, was a barren abstraction, invented chiefly to supplement the theoretical explanation of the beginnings of things in terms of the crude physics, chemistry, and biology of the time. As has been truly said, it had not the life in it, nor the power over human life, of the conception of God held by the North American Indian. But the Divine Being as conceived of by the theism which, in the interests of piety, opposed this deistical belief was, in his immediate relations to nature, too spasmodic and incalculable to satisfy the demands of the natural sciences or the conclusions of reflective thinking. God as immanent in the world, God as the abiding "Ground" of the evolution of physical life and of the development of the life of reason, God as the personal and ethically perfect Will, realizing his ideals in the universe of things and of spirits,—this is a conception which has been welcomed by thousands of the most profoundly thoughtful and deeply religious souls as one on which science, philosophy, and theology might cordially unite.

The most unreserved claims of superiority for the modern—which is at the same time the more ancient—conception of God do not, however, afford an off-hand answer to the question we are now to consider. For there is a very great difference between holding a conception and having a faith; and this difference is apt to be greatest in matters of religious concernment. The question, "Is faith in God, as a matter of fact, decadent?" can be convincingly answered only by an appeal to the facts of the moral and religious life,—the sphere in which the faith corresponding to the conception ought properly to be apparent and to be dominant. But these facts are vastly more complicated and difficult of access than are those facts on which we may rely for establishing changes in philosophical and theological opinions.

How, then, shall we discover whether this improved way of *thinking about* God has become an active principle in the *soul's attitude* and in the *conduct of life*, as from moment to moment in the immediate presence of God? To take a census of all who make profession of such a faith is plainly impossible. To rely on

vague general impressions for the answer to such a question is easy, but it can scarcely be called satisfactory as the basis of a conclusion. But the question is a pressing one, and its true answer would determine much as to the direction of our hopes and our fears, as well as our practical activities, respecting the future of religion in this country; and likewise of all the other interests which depend so largely upon religion as a form of faith controlling life.

It is with no pretence of affording a convincing argument, but in the modest hope of stimulating inquiry, that the following suggestions are offered as bearing on an affirmative answer to this grave practical problem.

If we read the religious books current among the men and women of two generations or of one generation ago, we can scarcely fail to notice how much they dwelt upon the unquestioned right of the divine commands to control the conduct of life, and upon the divine all-seeing eye as taking unceasing cognizance of the way in which these commands were recognized and obeyed. That this is not true in the same way and to the same degree on the part either of the writers or the readers of the religious books of today, it seems to me impossible to deny. But here let not the point of the consideration be misunderstood or wholly missed. It is not that our way of trying to find out what are the divine commands has so largely changed; that pious people no longer open the Bible at random and find therein God's word everywhere alike, without raising the questions, by whom, to whom, when and where and for what purpose, this alleged word of God was spoken to men. To make these inquiries is an obligation which follows as a corollary from the improved conception of God. The discouraging token of this literature is, rather, that it is neither written nor read as though all of man's life must be lived, in order to be lived aright, as in the sight of an ever-present and living God. The same characteristic regard for the divine command is to be noted in the letters and diaries of pious folk of fifty and seventy-five years ago. I have been reading of late much of this form of testimony. These old letters and diaries seem to be pervaded with the comforting conviction that life's duties and trials are to be accepted—those discharged, these borne—as in the presence

and with the help of a living God. I know that not a few—perhaps the majority—of those who could be dismissed from one church to another with a certificate of “good and regular standing” would look upon the language of such antiquated type as suggestive, if not plainly expressive, of cant. But here is not the temptation of the Christian Endeavor Society, of the teacher or practitioner of Christian Science or other form of so-called faith-cure, or even of the class-meeting in some Methodist church. Here is the soft breathing, in private, of one soul’s experience with God into the sympathetic ear of another soul; or—what is still more significant—of one lone soul into the ear of God. No; for my part I do not believe that this form of testimony to faith in God is to be suspected of any considerable measure of cant. And if the present lack of such expression be accounted for as due to the increased modesty or secretiveness of the modern man and woman, the reply at once suggests itself: In what other notable respects are the professedly pious people of today more modest and secretive than were their forbears?

But it may be said that deeds speak louder than words, and that this is especially true of the religious life under modern social and economical conditions. No really pious person can be otherwise than sincerely and heartily glad at the present increased interest in the social and economic welfare of the great body of the people; and no student of history can fail to recognize that much of this interest has been, and still is, the direct or indirect result of religious principles and of the religious motive. On the other hand, we are led to raise the inquiry whether most of the awful pressure for the radical reform of existing moral, as well as economic and social, evils, is not due to the lack of a practically operative faith in God as the guardian of the poor and the oppressed, and as the avenger of the unrighteousness and crime which inevitably grow out of greed, cowardice, and selfish political and social ambition. In a word, the very evils which demand an increased faith in an ethically perfect Divine Being, and an intimate experience of him in the effort to realize the ideal of Jesus, “Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect,” seem to indicate a widely prevalent decadent condition of this kind of faith.

There are three dependent forms of faith in a living God, the

existence and efficacy of which in practical ways might afford a measure for testing the answer to our main inquiry, as to whether faith in God is decadent. These are the faith in God as Providence, the faith in God as the Giver of eternal life, and the faith in God as the indwelling Redeemer of humanity.

That the conception of God and of his relations to the world which, under the influence of modern science and modern philosophy, has of late more and more prevailed, is opposed to a certain form of the theological doctrine of providence, admits of little doubt. This doctrine selected a certain set of persons, and certain relations and occasions, within which somewhat too exclusively it stood ready to admit a divine control over human affairs. In this selection it was tempted to give the preference to such events in the life of the individual as seemed most favorable to the success of the individual's own plans. Thus not infrequently it became the gratification of human wills which was thought to give token of some special action of the Universal Will. But the conception of an immanent personal Life in and through all nature and in every event of human history logically requires a much more closely fitting and truly universal doctrine of providence; and it is eminently adapted to foster a much more devout, as well as reasonable, faith in God as providence. It permits and it demands that each individual shall lay the foundations of his creed and of the conduct of his life in what Luther declared to be the hardest thing of all to believe: "*I am Jehovah thy God.*" It lifts above the mirage of mere sentiment and the uncertain clouded regions of emotion into the heights of rational faith, the exhortations and the experience of Jesus. It regards the lilies of the field, the birds of the heaven, even the sparrows that are sold at two for a penny, as wholly within the sphere of the divine providential care. How much more, everything that concerns the discipline of a soul which aspires to realize the calling of a son of God! Such a soul will make no meaningless babble or formal recital of an address to "Our Father in heaven." And when its prayer is for the gift of daily bread, or for deliverance from that which is evil, there will accompany these petitions a steadfast and embracing trust that these, and all other requests, will be answered wisely and faithfully, in and through each experi-

ence in our human lives of the indwelling divine Life. It is this kind of faith in God as providence which animates the question of the Rig Veda, "Whom shall we worship but Him who is the sole King of the seeing and living creation?"; which inspires the resolve of Augustine, "I will pass beyond this power of my nature also, rising by degrees unto Him who made me. . . . Yea, I will pass beyond it, that I may approach unto Thee, O sweet Light"; and which above all others furnished the *motif* and the explanation for the words and life of Jesus: "Yea, Father, for so it was well pleasing in thy sight."

By common consent of those competent to pass judgment, the present is an age of dissatisfaction and unrest, world-wide and profound, beyond anything belonging to the past history of the race. Instead of this condition abating, as the opportunities for comfortable living are more widely distributed and the amenities and moralities of civilization are rising (for so the case stands, according to general but not universal agreement), it is becoming more prevalent and more intense with every year. As the price which providence exacts for these advances in material welfare and social privilege rises in correspondence with their increase, the revolt against the exaction becomes more open and more pronounced. In some it takes the form of avowed and determined, or hesitating and spasmodic, attempt to escape the evils of living in a world that gives no proof of being governed in the spirit of tender pity by a so-called heavenly Father; in others it stiffens into defiance or relapses into sullen despair; in still others it takes the form of callous indifference. In how few does the experience of these evils, when they invade one's own life-circle, awaken a still more reposeful and comforting faith in God as providence!

Is then the faith in God as providence decadent in the present age? Are men, whatever their theory of the divine immanence may be, really living, more than a half-century ago, as though in a godless world? It is indeed again impossible on this precise point to take a census of individual experience. No one would venture to say how many, what percentage of the entire population or of the Christian churches, there be, who do their daily work, accept their share of ordinary vicissitudes of evil and good, and of extraordinary trials of grief, disappointment, and loss,

with an abiding and reposeful faith in providence. Certainly, the more obvious phenomena of business, of menial labor, and of domestic administration, of politics and of social intercourse, do not on the surface indicate that the number of those who *realize* the doctrine of a providential control of the universe, as a compelling and comforting principle for the conduct of a truly pious life, is very large.

The attitude of faith in God as providence is a matter of the most intimate personal experience. Its essence is founded largely in a deed of the will. It involves a choice between being in rebellion against the universe because it does not treat us as we think it ought, and placing ourselves on terms of confidence and affection with this universe as knowing better than we what is best for us and for all mankind. It represents the practical side of an ideal conception of nature and of human history, that sees behind the more obvious appearance of the facts a meaning which they do not readily, or of necessity, disclose to each observer. It requires prophetic vision and apostolic self-renunciation to believe reposefully in God as providence, and to shape all one's life in the confidence of this belief. The sort of "practicalism" demanded by much of the current philosophy, by most of the customs regulating social life, and by all the usages of politics, diplomacy, and business, is opposed to this faith. One must be something of a mystic to have faith in God as providence. And although it follows logically from that conception of the Divine Being which affirms that all life, motion, and being are in Him, it can not easily overcome the obstacles which it encounters from the characteristics of this so-called practical age.

The case is not the same with the second form of that faith to which we addressed our appeal in the effort to find some answer to the main inquiry we are discussing. How, now, in the popular favor stands the faith in God as the giver of eternal life? From time immemorial the immortality of the human soul has been regarded as the doctrine standing nearest to the belief in a personal God, and almost equally essential for maintaining the foundations of the Christian religion. God and immortality were two of the three beliefs which Kant undertook to establish on foundations of moral intuition, after he had removed by criticism

the pretence of theology to establish them on grounds of scientific demonstration. The attempt of Kant in its negative result was seemingly successful. Less and less, since the Kantian criticism prevailed, have the arguments, as such, for the soul's immortality seemed conclusive to the reflective thinking of modern men. Even the reasoned conviction of a *posse non mori*, established on moral grounds, with which this criticism displaced the *non posse mori* of the older theology, has been assailed with experimental proofs by science in the form of biology and physiological psychology. This assault has not only modified, but has almost destroyed, the confidence with which theologians were wont to announce the doctrine of immortality as a matter of almost indisputable proof. It has weakened or dissipated the faith of thousands in their own conscious existence after death, and for these same thousands the hope of meeting the loved ones who have preceded or shall follow them into that which lies beyond death. Nor has that effect upon the conduct of this life which depends upon the faith in God as the giver of eternal life been of small account.

As the guardian and inspirer of true religion, the fear of future punishment and the hope of future reward, when impressed by external influences upon the individual, have never been of real and enduring value. It is not to be regretted, therefore, that the motives they once furnished to lead the life of religion have been greatly diminished in these latter days. On the other hand, the essential nature of true religion is such as to make it a matter of grave doubt whether it could continue in existence for long, if the support of a belief in the immortality of the individual were wholly withdrawn. For it is the continuity of life, and of the issues of life, and of the character formed by the discipline of life, that renders the practical faith in immortality of so essential value to religion.

If now we consider that attitude of science toward the theological doctrine of immortality which has shaped itself to accord with recent biological, physiological, and psychological investigations, it would seem more favorable, or at least less hostile, than it was twenty-five and even fewer years ago. In the judgment of the writer, the latest results of cerebral physiology and

of physiological psychology are distinctly more concessive, if not conducive, to the view which advocates a reality and possible separate existence for the soul in independence of the present physical organism. But even this improved attitude of science is of scarcely more than negative value in the argument which aims to establish the theological doctrine of immortality. Still further is it from producing the practical faith in God as the giver of eternal life. It does, indeed, remove some of the obstacles to continuing in this faith under the temptation to abandon it for intellectual reasons; in certain cases it may suggest this faith to those who, for reasons chiefly emotional and sentimental, are already well disposed toward its espousal. But to science it is as yet in vain that we appeal for proof.

In his "Aphorisms on That which is indeed Spiritual Religion" Coleridge speaks of "certain convictions" under which one "can tranquilly leave it to be disputed in some new Dialogues in the shades, between the fathers of the Unitarian Church, on the one side, and Maimonides, Moses Mendelssohn, and Lessing, on the other, whether the famous passage in Paley does or does not contain the three dialectic flaws, *petitio principii*, *argumentum in circulo*, and *argumentum contra rem a premissis rem ipsam includente*." As a matter of fact, in all the more thoughtful and spiritual religions it has been a conscious attitude of loving and trustful communion with Him who is the Life of the world of souls and of things that has engendered and supported the belief of the individual person in his own immortality. The basis in reality for this conscious communion is to be found in the essential unity of ethical spirit, which is perfect in the Divine Being, and which is struggling toward perfection in all the sons begotten of this Divine Being. Therefore it is no unmeaning paradox to say that the faith in God as the source and giver of eternal life is its own best argument. It can not, indeed, be communicated to others in the form of arguments. It can be obtained only in the form of an experience; but it may be made reasonable by a knowledge of the collateral evidences which are afforded in the conception of God as the immanent Life of the World and so in a very real and special way the source of eternal life to all his sons.

It was a measure of this faith which prompted the Stoic slave

Epictetus to exhort us: "Dare to look up to God and say, 'Make use of me for the future as thou wilt. I am of the same mind. I am one with Thee.'" It is this same faith which inspires the declaration of the Bagavadgītā: "He who has known me as the Lord of sacrifice and of penance, the mighty Ruler of the worlds, and the Lover of all beings, goeth to peace." But pre-eminently is this true of all Jesus' teachings and of all his deeds, where, to employ the words of a German theologian, "the approach of eternity awakened in Jesus the recognition of all that is essential, of all that endures in the sight of God." Indeed, it is the characteristic and dominant thing about the Christian faith that with all God's dear children eternity should ever be near at hand, in the mind's eye and in the affections of the heart. The veil between the two worlds is thin; indeed, there are no two separate worlds, but only one—the realm of the Father—in which the life of the men of filial spirit is spent. This is the attitude of mind and will toward both lives, the present and the future, the earthly and the super-earthly, which essentially accords with the religion of Christ.

But is this, in fact, "the attitude toward both lives" which prevails in the Christian world at the present time? It is indeed true as the writer just quoted also says: "Even though later on the eschatological drama receded ever farther into the background, and this earth and the present raised their claims on man ever louder, yet eternity surrounds us ever in the garb of time, and its demands are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. . . . Jesus' words condemn his own church down to the present day."

Whatever we may think as to the relative morality of the Christian world in comparison with previous ages, and whatever one may decide as to the question whether it is worse or better; whatever we may claim as to improvement in creeds and increased interest and activities touching social welfare; and highly as one may appreciate and praise the advances made in these and other respects, one can scarcely avoid the confession that the claims of "this earth and the present" were never more loud and insistent than at this very present time. Never before were they more inclined to confuse and overwhelm the faith and the practice dependent upon the conscious nearness of the world unseen and eternal.

That the theological doctrine of the immortality of the individual is not accepted with anything approaching the unanimity of a generation ago, there can be, I think, no reasonable doubt. Even those who adopt a certain conception of God, as at least a sort of Unity of intelligent force in nature, and as a power making for righteousness in human history, find themselves unconvinced as to the belief in the continuance of the conscious life of the individual after the dissolution of the physical organism. The demonstrative arguments employed by the pre-kantian philosophy and theology for a natural indestructibility of the soul seem as inconclusive to most psychologists as does the argument of Plato from his theory of reminiscence and prenatal ideas. Even as a belief relying on the teachings of Scripture and the promises of Jesus, this doctrine has not, apparently, anything like its old-fashioned power to comfort the mourning, assure the dying, and bring peace to those who are in hopeless conflict with what are for them the present and prospective conditions of temporal and earthly welfare. There are few to whom the future joys of heaven seem to afford any measure of compensation for the unseized or unattainable benefits and pleasures of the present life.

For such a change of mental and practical attitude toward the doctrine of immortality I can find no adequate account in the increased strength of the objections derived from modern science and modern philosophy. These objections are not essentially different from those which have been urged against the belief from the time men began seriously to question its grounds. In modern times the most acute form of the physiological contest has never been a clear victory for either side. To the unprejudiced expert the battle, as waged on this level, has always seemed to result in a draw. And, as I have already said, the vitality and cogency of the scientific objections have of late been diminishing in force. There seems, therefore, no other so obvious explanation for a decline in belief in the doctrine of immortality as a positive decadence in the faith in God as the giver of eternal life,—and, indeed, a lack of interest and appreciation for those eternal and unseen things in the right attitude toward the values of which the essence of the Christian religion consists.

From this new and improved conception of the Divine Being should follow, logically, a more reasonable and firm faith of a practical sort, in God as the redeemer of humanity. And, surely, never before were the demands upon such a faith more strenuous and insistent than at the present time. If we look the civilized world over, we may note everywhere a more or less clearly conscious apprehension of important and somewhat awful political and social changes, impending and not for long to be delayed. The faces of an incalculable host of human beings, some wan with hunger and disease, some pale with anger or despair, some flushed with envy and hatred, some lighted with the dawns of a new intellectual and moral experience or with expectations of a coming victory, are seen gathering for a determined assault upon the political, economic, and social, and even upon the legal and religious forces that for nearly two thousand years have held the world of civilized men under their control. With enormously increased vigor and portent the lower and the lowest ranks of the democracy are coming to the front in human affairs. Observers are dividing themselves in opinion as to the result into schools of optimism and pessimism, and, as to the methods of dealing with the problems which this rise of the democracy creates, into schools of co-operation, of conciliation, or of armed resistance to the very end. Some anticipate the vast improvement, and some the utter destruction, of existing institutions, when Socialism succeeds—as it now seems destined to succeed—in carrying through its avowed plans. Some rely on education, some on the laws of that vague and uncertain thing called “social science,” and some on the police and the army. Religion relies on God,—but not as an abstraction, or as a blind mechanism, or as an absentee spiritual force, but on a Living God, immanent in and operating through all the economic, political, and social forces for the redemption of mankind.

Those whose memories reach back toward the middle of the last century remember with what hope the new age was anticipated; it was to be renovated by modern science; its wants were to be supplied by modern industry; its wisdom and obedience to natural and social law were guaranteed by modern education. That the hope has not been realized in all its fulness is a mild

statement of the truth. So far as statistics can establish anything, they confirm the prevailing dissatisfaction with the reigning systems of politics, of education, of church administration; and with the prevalent tone of the moral and religious life.

It is notable that in all the great and successful reforms of the past, those who have worked and suffered in them have done all with the persuasion that God is in the world, and that the strength of all workers for the uplift of humanity has its source in his omnipotent and benevolent will. Thus in its broadest and profoundest meaning the religious motive has been the most powerful of all in effecting reforms. The work of destroying evil may well enough be done in the spirit of the evil one; the healing of the evil and the substitution of the good in its stead is best done—if indeed it can otherwise be done at all—in the spirit of God, the redeemer of mankind.

And that God is indeed in and through it all, as the ethically uplifting, convicting, and illumining Spirit of humanity, is an indisputable corollary from the thesis proposed by the conception of Divine Being which modern science, philosophy, and theology encourage us to construct and to hold. This conception is that of a Living God, immanent in nature, in history, and in the soul of man, for the redemption of the world. It is the practical faith in this truth which summons all the true sons of God to work in the spirit of sympathy and obedience with the Father for the realization of that far-off divine event.

Has this form of religious faith become of late less confident and effective? That the social obligation was never before so keenly felt and the value of social co-operation never before so highly estimated, we may gladly admit. But has it not lacked that fine touch of religious enthusiasm, confidence, and patience in hope, which comes from the faith that God is in the world bringing the world back to himself? It is this that makes one man who has it worth a thousand who have it not. For in spiritual conflicts that is true which Napoleon declared to be true of battles fought with carnal weapons, "*À la guerre les hommes ne sont rien; c'est un homme qui est tout.*"

*THE DIVINE REVELATION AND THE CHRISTIAN
RELIGION*¹

DANIEL EVANS

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

With the dawn of the modern era there came a new interest in nature and the human mind. There was a withdrawal of attention from the supernatural to the natural, from the eternal to the temporal, from the divine to the human. This world with its interests came to its own. The secrets of nature were studied; its facts gathered; its laws formulated; its powers utilized; and its beauties appreciated. And the greater secrets of the human mind, too, were eagerly studied. The ideas of the mind were examined to discover whether they were innate or acquired; the relation of the data of the senses to the structure and the function of the mind was noted that the rise of knowledge might be learned; the legitimacy of the use of the categories of thought to interpret nature and the validity of our knowledge was called in question; and aspects of experience and powers of mind other than the distinctively rational came in for new appraisal.

The effects of this new study of nature and mind are seen in the practical concerns of daily life, in the world's commercial interests, in the political formulations of new states, and in the greater cultural values, like art, philosophy, religion, and theology. Many theologians began to find new arguments for the existence of God in the structure and the processes of nature, and to turn this new knowledge to religious and theological uses. They subsumed this new natural religion under revealed religion and, indeed, practically identified the two. Other thinkers, however,

¹ The Dudleian Lecture, delivered at Harvard University, May 2, 1912, on the following subject, prescribed by the founder, Paul Dudley, in 1750:

"The confirmation, illustration, and improvement of the great articles of the Christian Religion properly so called, or the revelation which Jesus Christ the son of God was pleased to make, first by himself, and afterwards by his holy Apostles, to his church and the world for their salvation."

reversed this order of natural and revealed religion. The one group levelled up natural religion, the other levelled down revealed religion. In the one as in the other the identification was practically complete; the only difference was the plane on which it was made.

Soon, however, came a separation of the two and their opposition. Some found in nature and in the human mind and the ordinary experiences of life the adequate sources and content of religion. They felt no necessity for recourse to a supernatural revelation. On the other hand, the apologists of revealed religion began to discredit the power of reason and to cast doubt upon the truth of its deliverances, to point out its failures and to explain them by its corruption through sin. Revelation, it was held, was thus seen to be necessary, and it was conceived as supernatural in its source and miraculous in its method. It required, and received, external attestation through miracle and prophecy. The apologists thus entered into the two spheres in which scientific thought and philosophic interest were most keen. They contended for the intervention of God in the natural order by miraculous events and in the psychological realm by miraculous predictions. Not the intrinsic character of revelation, but its external and miraculous evidences, engaged their attention.

Then came Hume upon the scene and did his destructive work. He undermined the presuppositions of those who based all upon natural theology by calling into question the legitimacy of the use of the causal principle and the validity of our knowledge, and left men only with *beliefs*. And, on the other hand, he undermined the position of the apologists by opposing to their claim of miracle the experience of the orderliness of the world. The sceptic had done his work; he had served his day and generation. After the destroyer came Kant, the reconstructor, whose aim was to reinstate the mind and the world in a vital relation, by way of knowledge on the level of sense, and of faith on the plane of moral experience. The task of building the world anew in our bosoms was thus given.

As one looks over this phase of thought, which we have rapidly sketched, and tries to estimate its value, he notes that beneath all the superficial reasonings and inconclusive arguments there

was a deep undercurrent of experience. In the Reformation there was a return from the church to something more fundamental in life,—to the religious experience of the soul which men found in the Bible; and in the Renaissance there was a movement of the mind from things established and written to life in its contact with the world and experience in society. The desire was for fresh experience and first-hand contact with the world and the sense of living.

In this inner sphere of experience there are many elements, or aspects. The religious element is there as well as those elements which come from contact with the world and general human life. What estimate is to be placed upon these several aspects of experience? How shall this total experience be systematized? This is the problem which confronted both the rationalists and the apologists, and it remains with us still. Their efforts at the solution of the problem no longer satisfy us. The apologists in their efforts at solution depreciated too much the value of the experience derived from contact with the natural order, degraded the reason of man as the organ of knowledge, sought external supports for revelation in miracle and prediction, and identified revelation with the total contents of the Bible; and they also failed to make the revelation of God in the orderly processes of nature and the moral experiences of the soul and the historic career of the race, the fundamental basis of religion. The mistakes of the apologists are now perfectly plain to us.

Now on the other hand there is a growing sense of our debt to the rationalists, for never more than at present has there been such an appreciation of the experience that underlies the conception of natural religion. It is the finding of something worth worshipping in and through the natural order and the ordinary experiences of our common life. This discovery is revelation, and it makes for religion. This is the truth in their contention, and it has rendered us much service in our thought of the meaning of revelation. It has tended to make the idea of revelation natural, normal, and native, whereas apart from this influence the tendency was, and still is, to regard revelation as miraculous, abnormal, and alien, or at best as something given *ab extra* of which there is no reasonable explanation or justification.

This grounding of revelation in the natural order and in the nature of the soul is a contribution of permanent value.

Nevertheless the inadequacy of the rationalistic interpretation of religion is now deeply felt. It conceives the object of religion (that is, God) in far too static a fashion to give us a true understanding of the divine nature or to satisfy the demands of religion. God stands in the shadow and waits there to be discovered. Religion is primarily man's search for God and discovery of him rather than God's seeking and finding man. Still further, rationalism is too intellectualistic, for it regards the intellect as the supreme or the sole organ of knowledge. Then, too, it gives us an insufficient content. It takes the common elements of all religions rather than the distinctive elements of the highest religion. It takes what men in any age or place are supposed to have discovered and constitutes these the essential elements in religion. The richest and most significant content of life which the race possesses is not used for its interpretation of God or of man's life in the world. This procedure is at once unhistoric and unphilosophic. No one would think of giving an adequate interpretation of art in the terms of the common art-products and ignoring the great masterpieces of such artists as Phidias and Praxiteles, Raphael and Michel Angelo, Beethoven and Wagner, Dante and Shakespeare. To give us a natural religion without taking into consideration the profound experiences of the prophets, the psalmists, and Jesus is to cut one's self off from history, to refuse one's rich racial heritage, and instead of becoming original to become commonplace.

Moreover, these very values, inadequate as they are, are not sufficiently grounded in the nature of the ultimate reality to provide the essential elements of religion. They are primarily human values, produced and passed on by the race. In shifting the emphasis in revelation from the supernatural to the natural, and its method from the miraculous to the normal, and its basis from the ultimate reality to the native capacities of the soul, there has arisen the question whether these values are anything more than human? Do they have any other than a subjective basis? Are they grounded in the nature of ultimate reality?

Thus for many this diminishing of the content of revelation

has made religion impotent, and this positivizing of revelation has made religion impossible. If the content of revelation is not as rich as the deepest experience of the race and of the best soul in the race, then it is too poor for the soul's high demands today. And if the content of revelation does not express the nature of the ultimate reality and is not grounded therein, the soul remains in the phenomenal, bereft of its divine companion, and, however nobly it may strive to live its life, it falls short of the distinctively religious experience. Religion can live and be potent only when men have the deep experience and the firm conviction that they are in touch with ultimate reality. The deeps in man call to the deeps in the universe, and only as there is response, and this believed to be from God, is the soul satisfied.

We are still left with the problem of the right estimate and relation of the various aspects of experience. There can be no question now as to the necessity that the religious experience should fall in with the other experiences, that it must come to the mind in accordance with the normal functionings of its powers, and that its events in the world happen in accord with the ordered working of natural forces. If religion cannot come today in this way, if revelation is not by natural and normal methods, then there is little hope either for religious experience or for its claim on attention of serious-minded men.

On the other hand, religious experience means little or nothing if it is not a revelation of the ultimate reality. Through the other aspects of experience we are consciously related to the phenomenal order; through the religious experience we are consciously related to the noumenal order. Here is the fundamental truth for which the apologists were contending in their defence of the idea of revealed religion. Their interpretation of the truth, and their method of its establishment, and much else besides, we must abandon, and indeed have abandoned; not so, however, the truth for which they contended. This is still the basic truth in all deep thinking on ultimate things; it gives meaning, worth, and power to religion; and it needs accentuation today for the deepening life of the race. Much effort for a long time has been given to make our beliefs rational, and all this has been necessary

and salutary. The time has come, however, to give more time and thought to making our religion deep and spiritual, and this we can do through a higher appreciation of the reality of the revelation which created, and culminated in, the Christian religion.

Natural religion views man as searching for God, seeking where he might find him, reaching lame hands of faith and stumbling up the world's great altar-stairs. This is a noble conception. It does justice to one aspect of human experience. It is characteristic of much in our modern religious life and thought. There is, however, another view which grows out of a richer experience and gives a deeper insight into the meaning of religion. It is that of revelation. It is the experience of the disclosure of the divine reality in the human soul and the race. It is the experience of God seeking and finding man. It is the sense of the reality of the divine which becomes the most certain fact in life. The bearer of divine revelation is not, as Schultz has well said, in the first instance a philosopher who concludes from the data of experience and the wonder of the world that God is a reality; but rather he is a prophet who is conscious of the divine reality that has come into his life, stirred his soul, quickened his conscience, gripped his will; and this experience compels its proclamation. The philosopher moves toward God through the world and man; the prophet comes from God to the world and man. The one is in search for God; the other is found of God; the one longs for certitude, the other has it. It is from God that every prophet and founder of religion comes with his revelation.

This is the experience that gave rise to religion in the first place and has continued it until this day, and which has purified and deepened it in proportion to the growing insight into the meaning and power of the divine revelation. Some revelation there was of the divine from the very beginning. Something other than nature and deeper than the human disclosed itself. Crude indeed were the interpretations of these disclosures of the gods, bizarre the methods devised for the discovery of their wills, and low the level on which all these occurrences took place. Yet the experience of the revelation of the divine, the sense of its reality, the consciousness of its power, the realization of some-

thing mysterious seizing the soul and wrestling with it, lies back of all these ideas and makes the disclosure of the divine real and potent. And the religious progress of the race means an ever-deepening experience of the incoming of this divine reality into its life, an increasingly higher level of interests on which the divine and human meet, a constantly growing spiritualization of the media through which the divine comes, and a progressively larger interpretation of the meaning of this experience.

For the true interpretation of an experience we must have recourse to its best instance. This shows more clearly its real nature. This brings us to the place in the progress of revelation of the Christian religion. The divine revelation in the Christian religion is taken as the fullest disclosure of the nature of God on the ground that it is the converging-point in which the religions meet and find the fulfilment of their meaning, that in it the experience of the soul in fellowship with God satisfies all human needs and cravings, that its interpretation of God in the terms of divine fatherhood, and man in the terms of sonship, and the final end of life as a kingdom in which all men realize their nature, is alone adequate, and that the outlook it cherishes of the external world at once inspires and purifies. This does not mean that there is no revelation of God elsewhere; on the contrary, it presupposes that there is, and that this universal revelation becomes the more certain and significant through the divine revelation which culminates in the Christian religion. It is therefore with this religion that we are now concerned and from it we get our idea of the meaning of revelation. Only as we remain on this high level we shall rightly interpret the significance of the divine disclosure.

What then, we ask, is the nature of the divine revelation?

The answers given to this question on the lower levels of religious experience are manifestly inadequate. The interpretation of revelation in the terms of information by means of divination, soothsaying, prediction, or oracle-giving concerning the will of the god in petty matters, or his dangerous power, or ritual requirement, no longer avails us. Though on a somewhat higher moral level, yet not much more adequate is the interpretation of revelation in the terms of guidance in special situations or for the

establishing of an ecclesiastical institution. These interpretations have this in common: they refer both the content and the purpose of revelation to something which in the first instance concerns man rather than God; the revelation is conceived primarily for man rather than of God. Another idea of revelation is that it is information communicated by God about himself. This is the common view. It has been held by the church from the time of the Greek fathers. It has various forms. Some think revelation to be the attestation of the truth which men have thought out for themselves, in their philosophic endeavor to interpret the meaning of the world, man, and God. Others think it gives men knowledge of the truth about the world, man, and God which they cannot acquire by their own powers. It either restores the knowledge they once had but lost, or gives it for the first time. Still others think that it is the imparting of those distinctive truths of the Christian religion which concern our salvation. Theological doctrines are the content of revelation which we must think if we would know the truth, and must believe if we would be saved. This interpretation, in so far as it makes revelation refer primarily to the disclosure of God, is nearer the truth than the other. Its defect, however, lies in its notion of the content revealed. It is information about God rather than the manifestation of God himself. It gives knowledge about God rather than experience of God. The idea is too intellectualistic. It is conceived in the terms of knowledge,—either attested or restored or imparted; and the sole organ of revelation is the intellect. We are still kept at a distance from God; there is as yet no real divine self-revelation.

The only adequate idea of revelation is that which conceives it in the terms of self-manifestation.² This is the conception for which we are largely indebted to a succession of German thinkers: to Schleiermacher, who saw that religion was something deeper and more vital than the orthodox thinkers on the one side and the rationalists on the other had realized, and that at the very basis of religion was the fundamental fact of revelation; to Rothe, who turned the thought of his day from questions

²Ihmel, *Centralfragen der Dogmatik*, pp. 56 ff.

of inspiration of the Scriptures to the inspiration of men as the condition for the manifestation of God; to the Erlangen school, and to Frank in particular, who in the God revealed saw the redeemer of men, whose revelation therefore has redemption for its purpose and history for its great sphere; to Ritschl and his followers, for whom revelation culminates in the disclosure of God in Jesus, and has for its purpose the establishment of the Kingdom. For one and all of these theologians revelation is no longer the communication of knowledge but the manifestation of God and the impartation of his life. God himself is the content of the revelation.

These theologians have sent us back to the Scriptures, the great record and source-book of the experiences of men to whom this revelation of God came, and we find that the Biblical historian thinks first, last, and always of God in the events of the world; the prophet feels the presence and sees the power of God in social affairs and proclaims his message; the psalmist finds God in the depths of the inner life. In like manner, the New Testament shows us men to whom God is revealed; and the revelation is deeper and truer, for the God disclosed is greater and more loving. Thus in the divine revelation in Christian experience it is God himself who is unveiled. His life in the soul produces the experience that makes for the conviction of his reality and the knowledge of his character.

And this manifestation takes place in the soul. The ultimate reality registers itself in the human consciousness. Revelation is not in the outer realm, but in the inner through the outer. The mystic is right in his insistence that the soul is the dwelling place of God; that the mind of man is the candle of the Lord; that revelation is of spirit to spirit. There is no real revelation where the human spirit does not realize the presence, experience the power, and rejoice in the life of God within. It is when there is a reaction to the influence of God in the soul that revelation takes place. This is the reason why no ready-made knowledge of God can be imparted. The experience of the soul in touch with God in its contact with the world and in its participation in historic movements is the stuff out of which it elaborates its knowledge of spiritual realities and makes its interpretations. As sense-

experience has its knowledge-value when elaborated and transmuted, so has religious experience its knowledge-value when it is pondered on and interpreted. Revelation provides the experience and the soul makes the transmutation. The reality, however, in and through all these experiences and interpretations is God.

Now the experience of this revelation of God within the soul makes possible and more easy the discovery of God elsewhere. The light of God in the soul shines out also upon the world, and in his light we see light. This revelation of God is mediated in several ways. It comes through one or another aspect of the total reality. There is nothing in the vast universe which may not come trailing clouds of glory from God who is its home. There is nothing created by God which does not serve as his organ of expression and the means of his coming into contact with the soul of man.

Thus nature is a medium for the revelation of God. It is true that some go through nature to God, but it is more true that God comes through nature into the life of man. This is the point of view of religion. It is the experience and the conviction of religious persons that God comes in and through this wonderful world into the secret places of the soul. He reveals himself through those objects and forces which condition man's earthly life, and which manifest his beneficence and create in man the grateful heart; in the stars, which, as they go singing on their way, declare the glory of God and produce awe in the soul; in the vastness of the world, which discloses the infinite reach of his power and gives man the consciousness of the ever-present divine help; in its order, which proves his faithfulness and invites man to take the attitude of trust; in its purposiveness, which manifests his providence and assures man that his life is safe in the divine care and keeping.

In the great pages of the Bible, in the prophecies, the psalms, the apostolic letters, and above all in the teaching of Jesus there is the manifold expression of the experience that God thus comes into the life of man through nature. And the best literature of last century is replete with the same thought. As one sings,

"Earth's crammed with heaven,
And every common bush afire with God."

And yet this revelation in nature is inadequate. It raises problems which trouble us keenly today. There are many things in nature which we cannot understand, occurrences we cannot explain, methods used which we cannot justify, results produced which we cannot approve. And there are times when the world is to us only a vast machine. We do not see the Spirit in the wheels discerned by the prophet with which our spirits can meet, consequently for many a man today there is no converse with the divine, and religion has ceased to be, and the soul finds itself solitary, sad, and hopeless.

"Brief and powerless is man's life; on him and all his race the slow sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the resistless forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power."³

Nature considered apart from man is an inadequate organ for the expression of the divine thought and an imperfect medium for the impartation of God's life to the soul. Things are never the adequate means for the revelation of one mind to another; even at their best, when they are raised to a high level through artistic modification by man, they are still inadequate to the expression of his deepest life. Far more with the expression of the divine life and thought. It is only through something greater than things, however vast, complex, and ordered, that God can express his deeper thought and realize his greater purpose. If we remain

³B. Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, p. 70.

on the level of nature, we shall not receive the greater divine disclosures, and we shall always be exposed to those dark-shadowed experiences of doubt and despair. At its best, nature is but the flowing garment of God; we long, however, for the vision of the divine face, and this comes through other media.

It is in human life that we find the fuller expression of God's life. Through the person rather than the thing, however great, comes the deeper revelation of the nature of reality. In the coming of man there arrives a better medium for the divine disclosure. Here is a mind that can think and interpret the meaning of its life and penetrate into the secret recesses of the world, delight in its beauty and grandeur, enter into intimate relation of love and friendship with human beings, and know the joy of life in fellowship and service; find his vocation in subjugating the passions of the flesh in the interests of the higher nature, in developing the distinctively human powers, and building here on the earth the kingdom of heaven; and in and through all his moral tasks live in communion with the eternal Spirit.

It is just through such a personal medium as this that God enters more directly and completely into this human world. It is this personality with all its human experiences, with its love and moral passion, its high tasks and noble endeavors, its joys and sorrows, its suffering and sacrifice, its distress and peace, its sins and their forgiveness, its tragic defeats and great victories, which provides for God the greater medium through which he can reveal, far better than through nature, his moral character, and more fully impart his life. It is in these deeper experiences that God comes to the soul, makes his presence realized, his power felt, and his grace experienced. It is through these experiences that we come to realize the revelation of something greater than the world and deeper than human life.

And, on a greater scale, through the action and interaction of men and the world, in the sphere of history, God comes into human life. Revelation is not a matter of the individual life alone, in its depths and solitariness; it is also, and indeed far more, a great historic movement. It is in the sphere of history that the thoughts of men are tested and tried out; here love builds homes and links the successive generations; here men pro-

duce their great cultural values; here the consciences and wills of men clash in tragic conflict in decisive battles; here the soul's longing for the infinite and the eternal builds temples and cathedrals. In and through this great historic life there comes the larger and more certain revelation of God. The men of deeper insight in all ages have found the disclosure of the divine, not only in and through their inner lives, but also in and through social interests, noble institutions, great national events, and the historic process of the race in its upward movement to the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves. This religious experience is long prior to the philosophic interpretation of history in the terms of teleology.

Now in our social world and in the movements of history there are certain persons through whom God comes into the life of the race in greater measure and with greater clearness than through others. He is best revealed through those persons who tower far above us in their moral majesty, whose hearts are full of devotion to the race, whose minds see deep into the spiritual realities of the universe, and whose souls dwell on the mount of vision in fellowship with the Eternal. Even the dull Israelites could not fail to see the divine glory on the face of Moses, and the prejudiced Saul could not be blind to the radiance of the angelic countenance of Stephen. The greater the soul and the richer its experiences, the clearer and the deeper is the manifestation of the ultimate moral reality and the more real has God become through them to others. Through the long line of the prophets, psalmists, apostles, saints, and founders of religions the great disclosure of the divine has most fully come. It has become more significant in meaning, richer in content, higher in worth, and more potent in influence, in proportion to the development of personality and the achievement of character. The greater the soul, the deeper disclosure of the divine. The difference in the meaning and worth of revelation is thus due to the difference in the persons through whom it came.

Since the deepest revelation always waits on the greater personality, the coming of Jesus provided God with the adequate medium for the consummate manifestation of his moral character and spiritual nature. The human race knows nothing, as

Ranke said, that can be brought into comparison with the moral greatness of Jesus. In the long line of great souls through whom the divine revelation has come, he stands alone on the highest pinnacle. He is the soul through which there has come to the human race the deepest revelation of the divine and the clearest vision of God. Without depreciating other personalities or minimizing the reality and the worth of the revelation through them, the Christian finds in Jesus the unique medium for the manifestation of God. For the Christian church there is no question concerning his moral greatness and the reality of the divine revelation through him. What differences there are in the interpretation of his significance for religion arise from the different understanding of what constitutes his uniqueness.

Some think this uniqueness consists in the miraculous manner in which he came into this world and the miraculous way in which by resurrection and ascension he returned to the eternal world. Since no one else ever had such an experience, this constitutes his uniqueness, and provides the major part of the content of his revelation, and establishes his truth and certainty. His revelation is a reporting of what he knew and remembered far more than of what he learned on the earth. Others find his uniqueness in his twofold nature, from the divine part of which came the divine revelation. Since it was like revealing like, there could be no question of its reality and worth. This interpretation moves in the right direction, since it seeks in experience the fact and the meaning of revelation.

Still others see his uniqueness in some philosophical idea which can be deduced from his character and then detached from the historic reality of his personality.⁴ They find the significance of Jesus in his having been the occasion for the rise in the consciousness of humanity of the idea of the God-man and in his serving the purpose of the identification of the idea and the person by the religious imagination, which always seeks such symbolic representation. Or they see his significance in serving as the "Christ-principle," a principle which is true not simply in Jesus but in reality only as the idea of Christianity itself, which maintains the essential unity of the infinite and the finite

⁴See Faut, *Die Christologie seit Schleiermacher*.

spirit. Jesus is the bearer of the principle and the guarantor of its realization in others.

In kinship of thought, though not in ecclesiastical affiliation, we find another group who trace their origin through the mystical succession back to the Pauline christology, and find the real significance of Jesus as the bearer of revelation not in his historical career and his achievement of character and his production of moral values on the earth, but rather in his exalted state and mystical relation with men today. What meaning, however, can be given to the mystical Christ apart from his historical reality, it is difficult to see. The tendency of all these interpretations is to lose sure footing on the earth and to get out of close touch with historic reality. To avoid this, we are forced back from the skies to the earth, from the mystical to the historical, that we may get our conception of the significance of his life as the revelation of God. It may be that here, too, as in the ancient legend contact with the earth will give strength, touch with historical fact bring greater meaning and power.

It is therefore in the historical Jesus that we find the supreme revelation of God. He stood rooted in his nation. He was conditioned by his people. He was nourished by its great literature. He felt its deeper currents pass through his own life; he knew himself as in the mighty succession of the prophets; he saw the great movement converging upon him; he penetrated into the inner reality of its hopes and expectations, and felt that they were realized in him. Much that he thought and lived, in its essential greatness and also in its transient form, he derived from the history of his race and from his own day and generation. Deeper, however, than both these sources was his own inner experience in contact with God, living his own life, thinking his own thoughts, feeling deeply the great movement of his own heart, taking his own direct attitude towards moral reality and living his own inner life of fellowship with God. The deepest thing in his life was his consciousness of God. His vision was clear; his insight penetrating; his spiritual certitude immovable; his communion unbroken. This religious experience was the controlling factor in his life. It made him what he was; it gave him his message; it made his moral consciousness function with sympathetic ap-

preciation and with inevitable unerringness. It kept him in touch with all sorts of men; it gave him his consuming passion for men; it sent him on his redemptive mission; it kept him true to his vocation; it led him to the cross.

It is in and through these great experiences of Jesus that there was given to the world the deepest revelation of God. It was through this spirit that the eternal Spirit disclosed its deepest depths; through this mind, the everlasting truths of life; through this moral consciousness, the nature of the ultimate reality; through this moral passion for man's redemption, the revelation of his supreme interest and his forgiving love for the race. The life of Jesus spells for us the character of God.

The purpose of this divine revelation is the creation of the Christian religion. It is to bring the divine and the human spirit into fellowship. The manifestation of the one spirit to the other is that they may both live together. The great purpose of God, as far as we can read it in revelation, is the establishment of right relations between him and the soul, and of all that this involves in the other relations of life. It means the fellowship of thought between the two minds in their common interest in truth; the fellowship of love between the two hearts for all holy things; and the fellowship of work between the two wills in the realization of divine ends.

The divine spirit is not, however, to be conceived as an isolated reality. The God with whom we have to do, and with whom we are to be in right relations, is not the God of the soul alone but also the God of the world and humanity, of time and eternity. To be in fellowship with God means to find him in his world, with all its forces and in all its laws; and to live in harmony with them and in obedience to them. It means, also, that we must find God in all souls, and serve him in and through them, and serve them by working for the realization of God's purposes for their lives. It follows then that we are to have fellowship with the God of contemporaneity; to find him in our day and generation, in this flux of things, in this seething stream of the world. But while "modernity is good, eternity is better," and the God of eternity, mirrored in the glassy sea of heaven, must be the supreme concern of life and thought. Revelation

is thus for fellowship, and in this fellowship religion is perfected.

But the realization of this sublime purpose of the divine revelation involves redemption. If religion is the end of revelation, redemption is man's great need and God's sure means for its realization. Through his spiritual ignorance man is blind to his true life. He does not know wherein he is to find the satisfaction of his soul; he thinks that things are the great values; he grasps at the tangible; he seeks for the material; he lives and moves in the phenomenal; he experiences an arrest of his soul's ascent; he does not go beyond the world or man in his search for the ultimate, wherein alone he can find his true and enduring satisfactions. The world, and certain aspects of human life which should be transparent media through which he could see the ultimate realities of life, are opaque and he remains with them. And while afflicted with spiritual blindness he is also in moral bondage. His passions bind him; his appetites drive him; his ambitions make him cruel; his selfishness makes him indifferent; and his egotism makes him godless. The person he was meant to be and can be, he is not, because of the stunting effects of his sin. There are powers in him which do not have the opportunity for development, since the life he lives is not in accord with his true nature.

The purpose of revelation, interpreted in the terms of the Christian religion, is realized in the redemption effected by Jesus through his moral greatness and spiritual power. Men and women came to a new sense of God through him. When they were in his presence and had insight into his moral greatness, they became conscious that they were also in the presence of God. Contact with this greatest moral reality of their human world made them realize the ultimate moral reality. Their own consciousness of God became clear, keen, certain, and controlling; and two different kinds of experience resulted. On the one hand they had a profound sense of the moral character of God and a deep conviction of their sin. No one was ever as sympathetic with sinners as Jesus, but no sinner ever confused the moral issues of life in his presence and in his relation to the God of whom he made men conscious. Moral confusion, no less

than intellectual perplexity, has often resulted from theological doctrines of the atonement; but neither the one nor the other befell the men who realized the august moral realities of life through Christ. They experienced a new conviction of sin, a new consciousness of guilt, and the absolute need for a moral change of life. The moral despair, however, which often results from this new experience was not theirs. They had the assurance of forgiveness. Terrible as was the righteousness of God seen and felt through the life of Jesus in its judgment on sin, yet these men felt that, in and through Jesus, God was seeking them and finding them. It was not so much his teaching that assured them, nor the promises he made them, rather it was his life of redeeming, forgiving love that convinced them, and in this they found absolution for their sin. Their consciences might condemn them, but Christ was greater than their consciences, and his attitude towards them made them realize the forgiveness of God.

This forgiveness, however, is for fellowship. It culminates in communion. Forgiveness of the past which does not restore personal relations is of no avail. The returning prodigal is received into filial fellowship. The father and the son are once more in loving relation. It is in this fellowship, intimate, deep, and comprehensive, that the divine revelation finds its purpose realized, and the Christian religion is established in power and permanence. It is in this fellowship that the redeemed soul finds the growth of its nature, and the release of its powers which make its life a larger reality, its experience more significant and worthwhile, and the dynamic for the undaunted and victorious struggle with the world, its suffering, sorrow, and death.

These great redemptive experiences which culminate in communion with God and the moral life triumphant over the world have been reproduced in the lives of men in all the centuries since Jesus' time. Through the record of his life and insight into its meaning they have come into a relation with God like his. As one is brought face to face with the beautiful in the contemplation of some great painting, with truth through the thought of some great thinker, so also, though in a deeper way,

are we brought face to face with God through this great soul. In and through this life the consciousness is produced that we are in right relation with the ultimate moral reality. Through this historical Jesus we find the eternal God, and are at home in worlds hitherto unrealized. While the revelation is thoroughly historical, it is more. It is personal; it is continuous; it is contemporaneous. The distance between our country and Palestine is overcome; the centuries are annulled; the God and Father of our Lord Jesus is disclosed to us here and now; and we interpret the God whom we find today in our souls and in the world and in advancing humanity, in the terms of the truth of the mind of Jesus, the love of his heart, and the purpose of his life.

This divine revelation which created the Christian religion and culminated in it is the only adequate disclosure of God which we possess. The Christian religion cherishes the conviction that there is no different or greater revelation to come than that which has been made in and through Jesus. Theologians have given expression to this conviction in their interpretation of this religion in the terms of its truth, or finality, or absoluteness. By these terms they have meant that in the truth of the Christian religion we have the real expression of the mind of God; in its finality we have the goal of the religious movement of humanity; in its absoluteness we have the realization of the deepest nature of man and the disclosure of the ultimate depths of the life of God.

This religious conviction, on the one hand, and its theological interpretation, on the other, are confronted today by objections which arise from other ideas and reveal other attitudes of mind. To speak of any finality today is to be met at once with the reply that nothing has reached its end, that every thing is evolving, that the universe itself is still in the process of creative evolution. And to speak of any thing absolute is to be met with the assertion of the relativity of all life and ideas, and even of the forms of thought and moral principles. Our life is so deeply involved in the phenomenal, the historical, the relative, that we find it hard to transfer our minds to the point of view of the superhistorical, the absolute, the ultimate. And yet it is just in

this region that religion lives and moves and has the secret of its being.

There can, however, be no question about the claim of finality on the part of the Christian religion. The evidence of this claim is clear enough. The movement of the historic process through which God reveals himself has as its objective the coming of Christ, and finds in him its culmination, since he was the realization of its mighty hopes and the fulfilment of its sublime aspirations for uninterrupted fellowship with God and for the establishing of his reign in the hearts of men and in the affairs of the world. Far more significant, however, is Christ's own consciousness and conviction on this matter. He interprets his life as the fulfilment of prophecy, regards himself as the Messiah than whom none other is to be expected, declares that he alone knows the Father intimately, adequately, and truly; and that his great mission to the world is to be the bearer of this revelation.

And the experience and conviction of the first Christians have borne witness to the same claim. They saw in Jesus the Christ of God, they found in him the revealer, they experienced through him their redemption and their personal fellowship with God. From this experience they conceived Christ as the one in whose name all nations were to be baptized; the cosmic process itself had come to its culmination, and they expected all the future progress of the race to be the deeper realization in life and thought of this revelation of God in him.

It is well for us to mark the limitation of the idea of the finality of revelation. It is not meant to cover the field of science, nor the sphere of philosophy, nor in large measure the region of history. The man of science has not yet come to his final conclusions concerning the nature of the forces he studies and the formulæ of their action. Nor has the philosopher given us the final interpretation of the meaning of the world, man, and the ultimate reality in their relation one with another. And certainly the historian must wait on events yet to occur before he can give us the meaning of the historic process even of our own day. Non-finality in all these aspects of reality characterizes our effort. It is this fact which keeps open for these students the great realms of the world for their study and makes us eager for their

discoveries and interpretations. In all these extensive regions of knowledge we are far from any finality or absoluteness in our knowledge. Consequently, any claim made by the theologian in the name of the Christian religion to the final interpretation of things in these spheres is not justified by the facts, or by the nature of the divine revelation. To make this claim for things which belong to the discredited and discarded world-view of the Bible is to endanger the spiritual reality which must be central in our thought. The idea of finality is something which concerns not the framework of things but the nature and character and purpose of God. Revelation is the disclosure of God. It is the manifestation of his deepest nature, his absolute moral character, his final purpose in the establishment of his kingdom in the world. In the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ we have the self-disclosure of the Spirit of which all truth is the expression, all beauty is the manifestation, and all love the embodiment. A higher term for our thought of God than christlike we do not possess. Not only do we baptize nature in the name of Christ but we baptize our idea of God in the same name. For us the ultimate reality is christlike. At the heart of all things there beats the loving heart of God. And in our fellowship with God we have the experience which for the soul is final. Not that the soul has entered into it completely, nor that it understands it adequately, but that in this experience the ultimate is reached, and nothing in God, or in the soul itself, is to make it a passing phenomenon. The right way is taken for the complete communion of perfect fellowship. Growth into Christ's experience takes us ever deeper into our fellowship with God on all the great moral and spiritual interests of life. Religious experience apart from Christ impoverishes our lives and leaves us uncertain of the nature and purpose of the ultimate spiritual reality. And we find in the spirit of Jesus in every critical situation and in all human relations the perfection of the will in its moral attitudes. To have the mind of Jesus is therefore to see into the moral depths of life, to be in right relations with all persons, and to make the affairs and interests of the world subserve social welfare. Personal moral progress is made in and through the realization of Christ's type of life, and the welfare of society

is secured through fidelity to his moral principles and social attitude.

This suggests our final consideration. In the divine revelation and the Christian religion Jesus has a permanent place. By some it is held that the divine revelation may indeed have been given through Jesus as through no one else, but that now that others know it, he is no longer essential to it. Once the great truths of life are made known and are capable of being thought by others, the person who first thought and expressed them may be wholly set aside or forgotten. No one need think of Euclid in working out present problems in geometry, or of Archimedes in dealing with problems in mechanics. How little did Buddha care for his fate at the hands of the universe or even in the memory of his disciples! Mahomet thought little of his person in view of the greatness of his bequest of the law to the people.

All this is perfectly true, and if the Christian religion were only a set of truths or a group of laws the same would be true of it. But since it is primarily a life in fellowship with God, the case is different, for it is in and through the life of Jesus that we know God best and are brought into fellowship with him. If revelation were not primarily of God but were only *for* man, we could dispense with Jesus, but since it is of God, and this in and through the life of Jesus, we are compelled to recognize his personal place in the Christian religion and his abiding significance for the soul of man. As Troeltsch says in his address before the Liberal Congress of Religion in Berlin:

There is . . . also the fact that there is no other means of holding the Christian community together than that of acknowledging Jesus; that it is impossible to keep alive the peculiarly Christian idea of God without seeing in Jesus the life-giving embodiment of him; that all the more important and characteristic ideas of Christianity, grace which enters into and possesses us, that sense of security which is offered us, that strength which elevates and subdues us, depend on a religious estimation and interpretation of Jesus as the revelation of God. To sever the Christian belief in God in every sense from the person of Jesus would mean cutting away this belief from its roots in the past, from methods which have been employed to represent and contemplate it, from all the greatness which so immeasurably surpasses that of the average of man,—ultimately in fact destroying the belief itself. . . . Jesus is the embodiment

of the transcendent power, ever illuminated afresh through the centuries, whose pulse beats through the whole of Christendom, just as the vibrations of a ship's engines are felt in every part and corner of the vessel. For this reason he will always remain a living force wherever the Christian prophetic faith in God abides; and the belief in him will, only by looking upwards to such a personality, raise itself to full power and security over the common weakness and poverty of mankind. If this is the case, then the image of Jesus will remain inseparable from all efficacious Christian belief in God.

The passing centuries, instead of removing us further from Christ and making him less significant, serve more and more to show his real greatness and his permanent worth for the race. It has been said that it is the fate of great thinkers to be obliged to make and wait for the coming of men who can understand them. This is still more true in the region of the moral and spiritual life. Christ must produce Christians in order to be fully understood; and the more Christian the race becomes, the more deeply will it penetrate into the meaning of his life, and the more truly appreciate the grandeur of his soul, and in and through it find God and have fellowship with him. The traveller in the valley of Chamounix is deeply impressed with the towering greatness of Mt. Blanc; but it is only when he climbs Mt. Brevent, which lies opposite, that he truly sees how far Mt. Blanc towers above the surrounding peaks and how majestic is its snow-capped dome. The race, through the passing centuries, will climb to ever-greater heights, but these heights will only serve as a vantage-ground to show how divine is the soul of the Master in and through whom God comes to men; in him they will see the Father and it will suffice them.

THE LUKAN TRADITION OF THE LORD'S SUPPER

BENJAMIN WISNER BACON

YALE UNIVERSITY

In its effort to determine the historic sense of the New Testament records, and thus to understand them genetically, modern criticism has developed no instrument more effective than the method of comparison. In former days the aim was harmonization, because the interpreter started with the assumption of a mechanical agreement among the witnesses. Today the aim is distinction, because mechanical coincidence is neither assumed nor desired. On the contrary the broader the contrast in point of view, the surer the ultimate inference. Stars so remote that they give no parallax, their rays seeming to come at precisely the same angle no matter from what point of the earth's orbit the observer takes his measurements, afford small hope of determining their real position. There must be difference of angle when the earth has swung round half its orbit, or there is no basis for measurement. Fortunately for the problem of the historical Jesus, the rays which come to us from him do not travel along precisely parallel lines. On the other hand the problem is enormously complicated by the process of mixture; for the testimony of one witness has visibly affected that of another, detracting from its independent value. Paul's conception is indeed distinctive in itself, strongly marked and characteristic. Little as he tells us of the common tradition, his own point of view is definable, and moreover he both expressly differentiates it from certain views which he opposes as reactionary, and also asserts its essential agreement with certain doctrines and traditions which he declares to be preached by all, "whether it were I, or they." The "apostolic" conception, on the other hand (if we may use the word "apostolic," in a Lukan rather than a Pauline sense, to include only the personal associates of Jesus) is hard to differentiate in its purity. The material embodied by Luke, espe-

cially in the early chapters of Acts reporting the speeches of Peter, admittedly shows the widest divergence from Paul's conceptions of the person of Christ and the work and message of redemption. Late as the work of the third evangelist may be,—its date in our judgment is not far from 100, and it is certainly later than Mark's gospel, which it incorporates as its very framework,—its author claims to have proceeded after the manner of a conscientious historian in examining and utilizing the work of his "many" predecessors, and we must to the following extent at least give credence to his claim. He has certainly embodied other sources along with Mark, and that not merely as did Matthew,—an evangelist whose historical interest is quite subordinate to that of teaching men to "observe all things whatsoever [Jesus] had commanded." Luke has not contented himself with Matthew's almost slavish dependence on the narrative of Mark as a framework for the body of precepts. Taking up most of this "logian" material in common with Matthew, though not in great agglutinated blocks of discourse, but with a sincere attempt to rearrange it "in order" as consecutive history, Luke also adds a goodly amount of material, both narrative and "logian," found in neither Matthew nor Mark, yet so clearly interconnected and so distinctive in type as to have won from modern analytical and literary critics the designation the "special source" of Luke. And this "special source" is strong precisely where the collection of precepts so dear to Matthew is weak, namely, in the story of the passion and resurrection. Here more than anywhere else Luke drops even his Ariadne's thread of Mark, and boldly strikes out an independent course. Often, indeed, this departure is in the interest of rhetorical beauty, sentiment, and edification, rather than of history; but instances of real gain in historical verisimilitude are not wanting, as in the account of Jesus' detention and abuse by "the men who held him captive" in the courtyard of "the house of the high-priest" until his taking away by "the whole crowd of them" to the trial before Pilate in the morning. Here the probability is very greatly on the side of the special source, as against Mark's impossible story of a trial before the entire Sanhedrin at midnight of passover night (!) For in Mark the Jewish senate is successively con-

vened and dismissed and reconvened at the high priest's house between cock-crowing and dawn (Mk. 15 1), with no advantage gained by the process, save a publicity and responsibility they are really anxious above all things to avoid, together with an opportunity to indulge (the Sanhedrin!) in personal abuse of the helpless victim. Here the simplified Lukan version extorts at least the verdict, *Si non è vero, è ben trovato*.

The weakness of the method of literary or source analysis in the gospels is the lack of external criteria by which to check and verify its results. Besides the far more complete digestion and assimilation of source-material in an author such as Luke, as compared with one of the compilers of Hebrew history such as JE^r or JEP^r, there is the lack of a well-defined relation between historical praxis and literary presupposition. The deuteronomic and priestly codes introduce revolutionary changes in the national cultus, so that we can say with confidence, The period before Josiah cannot possibly have known Deuteronomy; or, The period before the exile is unaffected by religion as understood in P. But it is exceedingly difficult to trace variations of observance in various branches of the apostolic and post-apostolic church. We know something of its two great rites, baptism and the breaking of bread, though little as to their origin and the differences of meaning attached to them at various stages of their development in different quarters. We know something of the later disputes over the observance of days and seasons; but what would we not give to be able to trace to its real beginning the observance of "the Lord's day," or the annual fast and feast of the quartodeciman "true passover of the Lord"!

Of the relation of the widely variant accounts of the resurrection in Paul on the one side and gospel tradition on the other to "primitive observance" we have spoken elsewhere.¹ It remains to be seen whether it may not be possible similarly to correlate research into the origin and significance of the Lord's supper with literary analysis of the gospels, in such wise as to

¹ See *The Resurrection in Primitive Tradition and Observance*, Yale University Press, 1911 (reprinted from *American Journal of Theology* for July, 1911), and *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, Yale University Press, 1909, pp. 190-232.

reflect light in both directions. A large amount of able and scholarly criticism has lately been expended upon the historical problem of the origin and significance of the sacraments, the point of departure being practically dictated by the historical references of Paul in 1 Cor. 10 1-11 34, with the Synoptic Gospels as check, and the aim a differentiation of the Pauline surcharge of new and mystical significance leading over to the sacramentarian conceptions of the Fourth Gospel, Ignatius, and the church fathers. We can scarcely hope to define this process of development more clearly than has been done, for example, by Heitmüller in his admirable discussions of the subject²—if indeed we guard ourselves from too much emphasis upon the new elements contributed by Paul. The factors of Paul's personal contribution were twofold: (1) his own religious experience, (2) the influence exerted upon him by Greek ideas indirectly through hellenistic Judaism and directly through his adaptation of his message to the capacity of Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking communities. But we must beware of overestimating the new constituents. A. Schweitzer's³ keen and insistent criticism will serve here as a mentor of sleepless persistence and alacrity.

Heitmüller's classification of the sources for our knowledge of the institution of the Lord's Supper may be adopted as commanding general assent. We have really but three forms of the tradition in the New Testament; for Mt. 26 26-29 is an almost identical transcript of Mk. 14 22-25, and in the Fourth Gospel the sacrament is not instituted at all. There Jesus gives only a symbol and interpretation of it in the miracle of the loaves and the discourse in Capernaum on the bread from heaven,⁴ as the Baptist in the opening chapter gives a prophecy and symbol

² *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*, 1903, and "Abendmahl" in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, i, pp. 19-51.

³ *Das Abendmahlsproblem auf Grund der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des 19. Jahrhunderts und der historischen Berichte*, 1901; and *Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung*, 1911, pp. 141-180.

⁴ Jn. 6; cf. Jn. 13. The discourse of Jn. 15 f. develops eucharistic themes, and thus throws an indirect light on the problem.

of baptism (conceived as exclusively a Christian ordinance) which Jesus in the two succeeding chapters interprets.⁵ This leaves as actual reports of the institution only (1) Paul's references in 1 Cor. 10-11; (2) Mark-Matthew; (3) Lk. 22 15 ff. Moreover, to get at strictly independent testimony we have still to subtract from the evangelic records of 70-100 A.D. the element absorbed from the Pauline, which dates in this form from 53-54 A.D., but gives evidence of transition from an earlier to a later mode of observance and interpretation of the rite.

In the case of Lk. 22 15-20 the process of removal of the Pauline element is simplified by the testimony of the textual authorities. So decisive is the evidence of "Western" texts and versions to the absence from the original of verses 19b-20, and so obviously is the latter passage constructed on the basis of 1 Cor. 11 24 f. and interpolated in the context, that Westcott and Hort are driven to the following verdict:

These difficulties, added to the suspicious coincidence with 1 Cor. 11 24 f. . . . leave no moral doubt that the words in question were absent from the original text of Luke.

Our Revised Version accordingly inserts the marginal note: "Some ancient authorities omit *which is given for you . . . which is poured out for you.*" The subtraction leaves for the Lukan tradition a strangely different representation of the institution of the "covenant" meal and of the significance of the cup and the broken bread. To this we must return hereafter.

But the higher criticism has also evidence to adduce for Pauline influence upon the tradition represented by Mark-Matthew. The general phenomena of our second gospel not only confirm the tradition of its origin in the great Pauline church at Rome, but show clearly the evangelist's dependence upon distinctive Pauline ideas. This is less apparent in mere matters of language than in the evangelist's general attitude of mind, as when he takes up (especially in 4 11) the doctrine of the hardening of Israel, or when he makes the believer's attainment of eternal life depend on faith in Jesus as the Son of God and loyal self-surrender to him, rather than on obedience to precepts or forms of righteous-

⁵ Jn. 1 19-34; cf. 2 1-11 and 3 1-30.

ness (chap. 10). We should anticipate in a gospel of this type decided evidences of Pauline modification of the proto-apostolic tradition; and such, we believe, can be shown to be the case with Mark's dating and interpretation of the supper. The Markan dating not only conflicts with the Johannine, but is inconsistent with the narrative taken up by himself. According to Mk. 14 1 f. the authorities are urgent to apprehend Jesus *before* the great feast day (Nisan 14) in order to avoid "a tumult of the people." As the chapter continues, the supper is identified with that of the Jewish passover on the night of Nisan 13-14. The motive is transparent. The evangelist wishes to represent the Jewish (annual) feast as having been superseded and abolished by the institution of the Christian (weekly) sacrament. But the result to the narrative is to make it self-contradictory. The description of the meal of leavened bread (*ἄζυρος*) and wine, without the distinctive passover elements and ritual, together with the ensuing disregard of the legal requirements⁶ is perhaps of less moment. But what shall we say of the arrest, trial, and crucifixion, which are now made by Mark to take place on passover night (Nisan 14), the crisis occurring at the very hour which the conspirators are most anxious to avoid! Nothing but the occidental evangelist's antipathy to the oriental practice (reflected in the Fourth Gospel) of an annual commemoration of the crucifixion and resurrection on Nisan 14, the "passover of the Lord," can fully account for the discrepancy. Mark desires to justify the conception of the supper and the mode of its observance current in his own section of Christendom, that is at Rome. Fortunately we have reliable witness of a collision on this point between East and West no later than 154 A.D. We must anticipate, therefore, in the Markan form of the tradition greater or less conformation to the mode of celebration and interpretation prevalent in the church at Rome not long after the time of Paul's letters and residence. For our gospels were not composed to please the critical historian, but to edify and confirm the believer in "the things wherein he had been instructed."

We need pause but a moment for the minute additions of Matthew. The later transcript has "Take, eat," instead of the

⁶ Cf. for instance 14 26 with Ex. 12 22.

mere "Take" of Mark, and changes "And they all drank of it" to "Drink ye all of it." It also further defines the symbolism of the "shed blood" by adding "for the remission of sins." This clause is removed from Mark's characterization of the baptism of John and appended here, much as Jn. 1 29 removes from this pre-christian rite all significance with relation to sin and forgiveness, and makes the Baptist merely point to "the Lamb of God," with his baptism of the Holy Ghost, as real remover of "the sin of the world." Manifestly no basis of independent tradition can be claimed for Matthew's changes. They merely fortify the Markan rubric.

If we would subtract from Mk. 14 22-30 the element due to Pauline influence, and thus come back to the basis of pre-pauline (or at least non-pauline) tradition on which Mark is framed, we must first of all try to discover from Paul's own suggestions what was distinctive in his teaching regarding the supper, as compared with the commonly received doctrinal tradition. Fortunately, Paul himself has defined for us the distinctive element in his message, for instance in his report of his vindication of his doctrine of the abolition of the law against Peter in Antioch (Gal. 2 15-21). It was the assertion that the death of Christ has annulled the legal economy; and this doctrine is very closely related to that of mystic union with Christ "in the Spirit." Both factors are typified according to Paul in the sacraments. Knowing what we do from Paul himself (Rom. 7 7-25, Phil. 3 4-11) of the personal religious experience which made him conscious of a message beyond and above all he might gain by intercourse with "those who were apostles before him," we ought to be able to differentiate his distinctive and individual doctrine in 1 Cor. 11 17-34, where he prescribes the mode of observance of "the Lord's supper" and interprets its significance, from the current and general conception taken for granted in the allusions of 1 Cor. 10 1-11 1.

Israel, says Paul in 1 Cor. 10, were baptized in water and the Spirit when they passed through the Red Sea, and were covered by the cloud. So, too, they ate and drank of spiritual food and drink, which is Christ, when they received the manna and the

water from the rock.⁷ Their idolatry and fornication at Beth-peor, that brought on them the wrath of God, offer an example of what it should mean for a Christian to go from "the table of the Lord" to "the table of demons" as guest at an idolatrous feast. To become in this way "partners with demons" will "provoke the Lord to jealousy," because, while the idol is nothing, the demonic being represented by it is real, and a repast partaken of in honor of a demon produces fellowship with demons. The admitted proposition that "the cup of blessing which we bless is a fellowship of the blood of Christ," and "the loaf which we break is a fellowship of the body of Christ," carries with it the necessary inference, "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. Ye cannot partake of the table of the Lord and of the table of demons."

Here is the basic starting-point. The sacrament is a fellowship (*κοινωνία*) which unites the believer to Christ; making him a member of Christ's body. It is a "table-covenant," separating the Christian from all alien relationships. It is apparent that the rite of the "communion" (*κοινωνία*) is practised and understood universally in this sense. Hence the interrogative form, "Is it not?"

The noteworthy thing is that in all the allusions of this chapter to the symbolism of the rite as commonly understood there is no single clear reference to the death of Jesus. It is a "communion" of his "body" and "blood"; but one can be united in "blood-covenant" with a living man, so as to be "of his body and blood" or "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh" without any thoughts of his death. In fact the act of "guest-fellowship" or "table-fellowship" is commonly held to effect a union of life rightly thus expressed. An equally important difference between 1 Cor. 10 and 1 Cor. 11 might be that of *order*, if we could be sure that the change from 11 *3 f.* ("eat . . . drink") to the reverse order in verses 16 and 21 ("cup . . . bread," "cup . . . table") was a conformation to the customary praxis, wherein the ritual of the cup preceded. But no certain conclusion of the kind can be drawn.

⁷ Ex. 16 and 17. The order of events in the narrative makes here the order "ate . . . drank" inevitable.

A paragraph answering the Corinthians' question regarding the costume of women in the assembly (11 2-16) intervenes before Paul continues the subject of the "communion" service. Then in 11 17-22 he rebukes the local disorders, and in 11 23-24 gives specific regulations for the future. These are partly based upon his own interpretation of the significance of the rite, partly are aimed to remove the too convivial and festive character (to give it no worse name) which the Corinthians had been giving to the "Lord's supper," and invest it with the solemnity of a sacrament commemorating "the Lord's death." The emphasis is placed throughout on this relation to "the Lord's death," as the thing needing to be apprehended. With this object the explanation is added, "For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye are proclaiming the Lord's death."⁸ If, as many hold, the opening statement, "I have received of (παρέλαβον ἀπὸ) the Lord," is to be understood not of tradition (παράδοσις) but of mystical revelation (ἀποκάλυψις), it can of course refer only to this special aspect of the rite as a commemoration of Jesus' death, perhaps to the words twice uttered (vss. 24, 25), "This do in remembrance of me," words central for Paul's thought, but singularly (if not inexplicably) wanting from the Synoptic record. If Paul is here communicating "revelation," we must understand it of this feature only; for the Apostle can hardly have spoken of the generally current tradition of the rite as a special revelation to himself. If he is speaking of a form of the tradition reaching back to Jesus, we must account for the absence of the command, "This do," from Synoptic story as the rules of criticism require; and it is far less likely to have been dropped by transcribers, who sought in every way to enhance the solemnity of the ritual, than added in process of its transmission.

We are justified, then, in tracing (provisionally at least) a distinction between the general significance and mode of observance

⁸ The expression τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου καταγγέλλετε, as Rev. G. H. Box points out in his admirable article, "Jewish Antecedents of the Eucharist" (Journal of Theological Studies, April, 1902, p. 364), corresponds to the *haggada* (from *higgid*, "to tell a tale"), the *ιερός λόγος*, of the passover, "which consists mainly of the telling of the story of the Exodus." Cf. Deut. 26 1-11.

of the communion of the Lord's supper, as presupposed in 1 Cor. 10, and the special connection with the doctrine of the cross (Paul's own distinctive doctrine) which he is laboring to give it in 1 Cor. 11. The former interprets the "cup of blessing" as a covenant-cup, not necessarily referring in any way to the Lord's death, but simply cementing, by a rite of almost world-wide observance and of immemorial antiquity, an eternal and indissoluble bond of brotherhood. The latter interprets it as "the new covenant in my blood." Chapter 10 interprets the broken bread simply of "table-fellowship" with the Lord, a "fellowship of the body of Christ, seeing that we who are many are one loaf, one body, for we all partake of the one loaf." It might go back to the "breaking of bread" in Galilee, when Jesus acted as house-father to the little company for whose sake he had sundered the ties of earthly home and kin, as well as to "the night in which he was betrayed." Chapter 11 interprets it as the body "given [some texts read "broken"] for your advantage," introducing a reference to the cross as a vicarious sacrifice.

But let us limit ourselves to the first of these differences, expressed in the words "the new covenant in my blood." The reference is unmistakable to Paul's individually distinctive doctrine of the "new covenant," "not of the letter but of the spirit," developed at length in contradistinction to "the old covenant" in 2 Cor. 3 6-4 6. Jesus is depicted as comparing the blood of his cross to the blood sprinkled by Moses on the altar when he pledged Israel at Sinai to obedience to "all the words of this covenant" (Ex. 24 8). Paul's disciple, the author of Hebrews, takes up the antithesis of 2 Cor. 3 3 and 11, between the tables of stone and of the heart, between "that which passeth away" and "that which remaineth." He further develops it on the basis of Jeremiah's great chapter on the "new covenant" written on the heart. Here, then, in Heb. 8 1-10 25 comes the full elaboration of Paul's conception of "the blood of the new covenant," reaching its loftiest expression in the closing benediction: "The God of peace, who brought again from the dead the great Shepherd of the sheep with *the blood of the eternal covenant*, make you perfect."

Are we to see in this reference to the superseding of the Mosaic dispensation by a new one the real, historic sense of the rite? Did Jesus intend to institute a commemoration of his death as an atoning sacrifice, abolishing the legal and instituting the filial relationship of men to God? Or is this a part of the special revelation of Paul? We must apply such standards as we now possess to Synoptic tradition before we can properly answer this question, endeavoring here also to differentiate Pauline from pre-pauline, or at least non-pauline, conceptions.

Mark 14 22-25 undoubtedly corresponds to the conception and mode of observance of the Lord's supper prevalent in Rome in 70-80 A.D., and forms part of a narrative clearly derived from pre-pauline sources. Yet if we place the story of 1 Cor. 11 24 f. side by side with it, we shall inevitably be struck with the close similarity, and this impression will surely be heightened if subsequently we observe the contrast of this Pauline-Markan-Matthaeian account with the Lukan (in the true text) and its kindred. To bring out more distinctly the real nature of such differences as exist we print in *Italics* the additions in Paul which seem to be of an explanatory character, and in black type those of Mark which imply an independent source.

ΜΚ. 14 22-25.

²² And as they were eating he took a loaf and blessed (*εὐλογήσας*) and gave to them and said: Take, this is my body.

²³ And he took a cup and gave thanks (*εὐχαριστήσας*) and gave to them, and they all drank from it,²⁴ and he said unto them, This is my blood of the [new] covenant which is shed on behalf of many.

²⁵ Verily I say unto you, henceforth I shall no more drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.

1 COR. 11 24 f.

^{23b} In the night in which he was betrayed Jesus took a loaf ²⁴ and gave thanks (*εὐχαριστήσας*) and brake it and said: This is my body, *which is (given) on your behalf. Do this in remembrance of me.*

²⁵ Likewise also the cup after supper, saying: This cup is the *new* covenant in my blood. *This do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me.*

²⁶ *For as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye are proclaiming the Lord's death until he come.*

We note, first of all, a coincidence of order which may prove highly significant. In agreement with the apparent meaning of Paul in the phrase, "the cup after supper" (1 Cor. 11 25), and at all events in accordance with the Corinthian practice of first satisfying hunger in the common repast, Mark (followed by Matthew) states that Jesus took one of the loaves "as they were eating," and instituted *first* the ordinance of bread, *afterwards* that of the cup. Since the record of Luke and primitive Syrian practice as recorded in the liturgy of the Didache ⁹ reverses this order, the point is worth noting.

Secondly, we note that while Mark neglects Paul's repeated commandment of the Lord, "This do in remembrance of me," as well as the addition of Paul, "given on your behalf" after the bread, he shows decided sympathy with the symbolism Paul is developing. For he inserts after the cup the words "shed for many," and so amplifies from the same Isaian passage which had previously affected his phraseology in 10 45 ("to give his life a ransom for many, cf. Isa. 53 11). As we have seen, Matthew carries the process further by adding "for remission of sins." Thus far there is, on the surface, nothing to indicate Mark's dependence on a source other than Paul's, unless we count as such the omission of the command, "Do this in remembrance of me." The word "Take" in vs. 22 and the clause, "and they all drank from it," in vs. 23 are so easily accounted for as mere editorial enlargement that only independent evidence would lead us to regard them as supplied by a source. This evidence, however, is in fact available, and will appear when Mk. 14 22-25 is placed alongside of Lk. 22 16-18.¹⁰ But this does not affect the general impression of the record. The interpretation put upon the rite as a covenant of *atonement blood* is distinctly and unmistakably Pauline. Only the awkwardness of the double genitive ("my blood of the covenant") suggests amplification of an original shorter form, to make it correspond with 1 Cor. 11 25 ("the new covenant in my blood"). This impression would be

⁹ See the passage quoted below, p. 024.

¹⁰ See below, p. 014. Mark borrows Lk. 22 18 in 14 25; the preceding clause (17b) is the source for his additions, "take" and "and they all drank of it," in 14 23 f.

irresistible if we could admit the very early interpolation "new" in the reading "blood of the *new* covenant," but this we unhesitatingly reject. If we proceed further to reject the second genitive ("of the covenant") as well, the formula of Mk. 14 24 will correspond exactly with its predecessor: "This is my body . . . this is my blood," and we shall obtain a formula free from Pauline admixture. But we have no manuscript authority for omitting "of the covenant." The addition (if such it be) must be attributed to the evangelist himself.

Thirdly, we meet an element in Mk. 14 25 which is certainly not of Pauline derivation, though a faint echo of the sentiment is perhaps to be found in the closing words of Paul's final comment (1 Cor. 11 26). With vs. 25 a wholly new aspect of the symbolism is all at once opened up; and the phraseology ("fruit of the vine") is as new as the thought. It is not Paul who has suggested this interpretation of the supper as a symbol of the messianic feast in the kingdom of God. To Paul "the kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." There is no occurrence in his epistles of the figure so common in the Synoptic Gospels and the Revelation of the marriage supper of the Lamb, the redemption banquet, in which the elect from east and west and north and south enter into the joy of their Lord and feast with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. At all events, in this closing verse of Mark's record of the supper we are compelled to look to other sources than Paul's for the distinctive thought and phraseology.

And we have not far to look. Turning, lastly, to that element of Luke's record which remains after subtraction of the interpolation from 1 Cor. 11 24 f., we may first of all put in one column the Lukan source, subtracting only the few verses (22-28) demonstrably drawn from Mark, and side by side with it Paul's references to "the Lord's supper" in all the naïveté of its unreformed observance in 1 Cor. 10 1-11 1, together with the passage just noted in Mark.

LK. 22 15-30 (authentic text).

¹⁵ And he said unto them: With desire have I desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer.

¹⁶ For I say unto you that henceforth I shall by no means eat it until it be fulfilled in the (redemption feast of the) kingdom of God.

¹⁷ And he took a cup and spoke the blessing (εὐχαριστήσας) and said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves; ¹⁸ for I say unto you that henceforth (ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν) I shall by no means drink of the fruit of the vine (ἀπὸ τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου) until the kingdom of God come.

¹⁹ And he took a loaf (of leavened bread) and spoke the blessing (εὐχαριστήσας) and gave it to them and said: This is my body. . . .

²⁸ Ye are they that have continued (διαμεμενηκότες) with me in my trials.

²⁹ And I for my part make covenant appointment (διατίθεμαι) to you, even as my father hath covenanted (διέθετο) to me a kingdom, ³⁰ that ye shall eat (ἐσθῆτε) and drink at my table in my kingdom (cf. 2 Sam. 9 7), and shall sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel (cf. Ps. 122 5).

(The Covenant of David—as the promise Mt. 19 28=Lk. 22 30 might be called—is employed by Matthew to supplement what he regards as an inadequate statement of the reward promised to Peter and the rest who had “left all and followed” in Mk. 10 28-30.

PARALLELS IN PAUL AND MARK.

(1 Cor. 5 7. “Ye are unleavened. For Christ our passover hath been sacrificed for us.” Mk. takes “this passover,” i.e. the annual festival “sanctified” in this rite, to mean the repast actually on the table. The declaration, “I shall no more eat of it,” implies to his mind abolition of the Jewish institution.) (Mk. 14 25: “new in the kingdom of God.”)

(Mk. 14 23, εὐχαριστήσας).

(Mk. 14 22 ff.: “Take” . . . “And they all drank of it. . . .” ²⁵ Verily I say unto you that henceforth (ὀκνέρι) I shall by no means drink of the fruit of the vine (ἐκ τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου) until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.”)

(1 Cor. 11 20, εὐχαριστήσας).

(1 Cor. 10 16: “The bread which we break, is it not a communion (κοινωνία) of the body of Christ?”)

(Lk. 22 28 is a transition verse in which the evangelist returns to this source from the material in vv. 24-27 drawn from Mk. 10 42-44. The language has perhaps received some editorial modification.)

(Mk. 10 39, 40: Ye shall indeed drink the cup that I drink . . . but to sit on my right hand or on my left is not mine to give.)

Literary relationship between the (fragmentary) material of Mark which we have already found to be independent of his

Pauline tradition, and that which now appears to form the *complete* Lukan tradition of the covenant-meal, is here undeniable. So close approximation in language as that between Mk. 14 25 and Lk. 22 18 is inexplicable on any other theory than that of direct literary dependence. If appeal is made to the unknown possibilities of oral tradition, the answer is that oral tradition carried to this degree of stereotyped uniformity is equivalent to a document. The issue is then reduced to a mere quibble over the word "literary."

At first thought it is natural, in view of the known employment of our second gospel by the writer of our third, to think of this literary dependence as on the side of Luke. But to this there are at least three insuperable objections: (1) The unity of the Lukan record, inseparably connected as it is with a saying of Jesus not found in Mark, but independently attested by Matthew (Q); (2) the pre-pauline form and interpretation of the rite as compared with Mark's adaptation to his own context and connected argument; (3) peculiarities of style and language. Let us take these considerations in order.

(1) It is important to observe that the Lukan tradition of the covenant-supper is not a mere agglutination of unrelated fragments, but a closely connected whole, having its own very marked and distinctive character, and not even mutilated by serious gaps when subtraction has been made both of the textually unauthentic material from 1 Cor. 11 24 f. and of the Markan material inserted by the compiler of the gospel. The general theme is stated at the beginning in vss. 15 f. The approaching feast of passover—commemorative of Israel's redemption from Egypt—had long been the goal of Jesus' hope. He had wished to celebrate it with the twelve; but his wish is not to be granted. The plots against his life will frustrate the outward observance. Therefore, let the mind be set on the greater redemption feast of which it is the type. "It shall be fulfilled in the kingdom of God."

The ritual observance to which Jesus now proceeds is not that of the passover, but the far simpler one of the *kiddush*, a ritual common to every pious Jewish household, prescribed for the *eve* of every Sabbath and of every feast-day, and deriving its name

(*kiddush*, "sanctification") from the fact that the day (which began at sunset according to Jewish usage) was thus made "holy."¹¹ The elements employed in this "sanctification" are simply a cup of wine and a loaf of *leavened* bread. The ministrant is the head of the household. The ritual is (1) a blessing of the cup, in the form, "Blessed art thou, O Lord, our God, king of the universe, creator of the *fruit of the vine*. . . . Blessed art thou, O Lord, who sanctifiest the Sabbath." After participation in the cup there follows (2) washing of hands (for which, as Edersheim points out,¹² Jn. 13 1-11 substitutes foot-washing to emphasize Lk. 22 27). This is followed (not preceded) by (3) a similar blessing, breaking, and distribution of the loaf. After this the evening meal proceeds.

Jesus, according to the Lukan record, employs this ritual of "sanctification." But since the ensuing day was not the Sabbath but Friday, we can only understand it as "sanctification of pass-over," making Luke's chronology coincide with that of the Fourth Gospel, in spite of the fact that the first of the four cups of the passover ritual is reckoned (according to G. H. Box¹³) as the cup of "sanctification of passover."

In the Lukan ritual, at all events, the main point is the institution by Jesus with the twelve of an eternal covenant looking forward to the great messianic redemption feast in the kingdom of God" (cf. Lk. 14 15). It is a blood-covenant like that between David and Jonathan (1 Sam. 20 13-17, 28) wherein David pledged himself, when he should have attained the kingdom, to remember for good the house of Jonathan. As David fulfils this "covenant" in 2 Sam. 9 7, by "appointing" that Mephibosheth, the crippled survivor of the house of Jonathan, "shall eat bread at my table continually," so Jesus makes "covenant appointment" (*διατίθεμαι*) with those that have endured (*διαμεμνηκότες*) with him that they shall "eat at his table in his kingdom." He adds a further promise as distinctly Davidic as the blood-covenant with Jonathan. It is based on one of the "songs of ascents; of David," Ps. 122 2-5.

¹¹ The rabbis interpret the command: "Remember the Sabbath day to hallow it" as inculcating the use of the *kiddush*.

¹² Life of Christ, vol. ii, p. 497.

¹³ Op. cit.

Our feet shall stand within thy gates, O Jerusalem;
 Jerusalem that art builded as a city compact together:
 Whither the tribes go up, even the tribes of the Lord,
 An ordinance for Israel to give thanks unto the name of the Lord.
*For there are set thrones of judgment,
 The thrones of the house of David.*

Modern commentators, so far as known to the present writer, have as completely failed to recognize this transparent Old Testament basis for the promise of Lk. 22 30b (=) Mt. 19 28, as they have to recognize the relation of vs. 30a to the blood-covenant of David with Jonathan. Only Andreas of Caesarea in Cappadocia, principally known to us as having employed Papias's "Exposition of the Sayings of the Lord" for his own commentary on Revelation, points out in commenting on Rev. 20 4¹⁴ that such is the unmistakable basis of the promise.

We think it more probable that this development of Ps. 122 25, the song of "thanksgiving" for the "thrones of judgment for the house of David" in the new Jerusalem, should have been added to Jesus' original "blood-covenant" with those who had "endured in his trials" with him, than that Jesus himself should have uttered a promise so at variance with the declaration of Mk. 10 35-40, where he explicitly disclaims authority to appoint to thrones in his kingdom, even for those who have endured his martyrdom with him. But as to the antiquity of the tradition there can be no question. It not only forms part of the Q-element derived by Matthew and Luke from a common source independent of Mark, but is attested over and over again in the earliest documents back to the great epistles of Paul themselves. We have found Andreas of Caesarea justly connecting Rev. 20 4 with the basis of it, perhaps in dependence on Papias. At about the same period (c. 93) 2 Tim. 2 12 quotes it as a "faithful saying":

If we died with him, we shall also live with him;
 If we endure (*ὑπομεινόμεν*), we shall also reign with him;
 If we shall deny him, he also will deny us;
 If we are faithless, he abideth faithful;
 For he cannot deny himself.

¹⁴ "And I saw thrones and they [those who had endured the great trial] sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them, . . . and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years."

Here the liturgical form and the reference to Christ's faithfulness in martyrdom alike suggest derivation from the covenant-ritual. Even the greater Pauline epistles already exhibit allusions to the pledge of "thrones of judgment." In 1 Cor. 4 8 Paul reproaches his converts with proceeding already to the enjoyment of their "reign," while their apostles are still "enduring." In 6 2 they are reminded that "the saints shall judge the world," whereas they have lowered themselves appearing as litigants before heathen judges. In Acts 14 22 the apostles "confirm the souls of the disciples" with the promise, given in direct discourse as a quotation, "Through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God." In Jas. 1 12 the man who "endureth trial" is assured of "the crown of life" which the Lord "promised to those that were lovers of him," and the reference is repeated in 2 5, where those who had been chosen by God as "poor in this world" (cf. Lk. 6 20) are declared to have been "promised a kingdom," as "those who loved him." It is apparent that we are dealing here with elements that go back to the very foundations. From a time indefinitely antecedent even to 1 Corinthians the covenant-meal was celebrated as a pledge that those who endured with Christ should also reign with him. The cup of blessing is a token of living and reigning in union with Christ in the new Jerusalem. The thought is expressed in the ancient Syrian ritual: "We give thee thanks, O our Father, for the holy vine of thy servant David [Ps. 80], which thou madest known unto us through thy servant Jesus." John 14 1 ff. expresses it in the parable spoken at the supper: "I am the true vine. . . . Except ye abide in me, ye cannot bear fruit. . . . If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you. . . . A little while and your sorrow shall be turned to joy."

The Lukan form of the tradition of the supper is therefore a unit. Reference to the covenant-blood sprinkled by Moses on the altar is as completely absent as reference to the blood of the passover lamb. True, the passover is referred to as pointing to something higher, and regret is expressed that its celebration is prevented. But the *kiddush* is not meant to supersede it. It is expected to continue in annual observance as the *kiddush* continues as a weekly rite (so Acts 20 7 ?). There is no reason why

the *kiddush* might not be employed daily (so Acts 2 46, 6 1). There is no connecting of the ceremony with Jesus' death. The whole tone of the ordinance is joyous, the burden is: The feast we now "sanctify" is to be soon "fulfilled in the kingdom of God." Can it be supposed that the compiler of our Luke derived all this from the isolated verse Mk. 14 25, remaining all the time quite unaffected by the predominant Pauline animus of his source? For surely the main significance Mark attaches to the rite is quite other than this, and much more in line with 1 Cor. 11 24 f. Can it be maintained that the relevance of the Q-saying, "I on my part make covenant appointment to you, even as my Father hath appointed to me a kingdom," to the "eating and drinking" of the bread and wine, is a mere happy co-ordination by Luke of logion with Markan material? Or must we not rather admit that the whole Lukan context belongs together; that it is the logion concerning the glories of the kingdom which draws into this singularly inappropriate situation the Markan anecdote of the quarrel as to who should be greatest (Mk. 10 42-44=Lk. 22 24-27); and, finally, that Mark has taken over in the single verse 14 25 the (unexplained) phraseology and (unconnected) idea reiterated throughout the Lukan source (vs. 16, vs. 18, vs. 29), and not that Luke has effected so extraordinary a development of Mk. 14 25?

(2) We have already indicated by a group of references that the promise of the covenant in Lk. 22 29 f. = Mt. 19 28 belongs to the most primitive factors of Synoptic tradition, and is presupposed in the most varied elements of New Testament literature, including documents as early as the greater Pauline epistles themselves. It remains to show that the entire conception and mode of observance of the covenant-rite as represented in Luke's record, inclusive of the promise, agrees with what we know of pre-pauline conception and practice; whereas the peculiarities of Mark tend in the direction of the changes introduced by Paul, or indicate still later developments. It will be convenient for this purpose to place again before our eyes the real contrast between Luke and Mark, continuing the account of the institution of the covenant a little further for the sake of clearer definition of Mark's point of view.

INSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNION.

Lk. 22 15 ff.

¹⁵ And he said unto them: With desire have I desired to eat this passover with you [before I suffer]. ¹⁶ For I say unto you that henceforth I shall by no means eat it until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.

¹⁷ And he took a cup and spoke the blessing and said: Take this, and divide it among yourselves; ¹⁸ for I say unto you that henceforth I shall by no means drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God come.

¹⁹ And he took a loaf, and spoke the blessing and gave it to them and said, This is my body.

(Prediction of betrayal, and quarrel as to "Who is greater?" from Mk. 14 18-21 and 10 42-44 Vss. 21-27.)

²⁸ [But] ye are they that have endured with me in my trials; ²⁹ and I on my part make covenant appointment unto you, even as my Father hath appointed unto me a kingdom, ³⁰ that ye shall eat and drink at my table in my kingdom; and ye shall sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

Mk. 14 22-29 (order transposed).

(Prediction of betrayal "as they reclined and were eating," vss. 17-21.)

²² And he took a cup and spoke the blessing and gave to them, and they all drank of it. ²⁴ And he said unto them: *This is my blood of the [new] covenant which is shed for many.* ²⁵ Verily I say unto you I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.

(Singing of the Hymn—the *Hallel?*—vs. 26.)

²⁸ And as they were eating he took a loaf and spoke the blessing, and gave it to them and said, Take ye, this is my body.

(Quarrel as to "Who is greater?" Mk. 10 42-44 ensuing on the request of James and John to sit with Jesus "in his glory." Jesus answers:

³⁹ Ye shall drink the cup that I drink [The clause "and be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized" is wanting in Mt.]; ⁴⁰ but to sit upon my right hand or my left is not mine to grant, but belongeth to those for whom it hath been prepared.)

PREDICTION OF STUMBLING.

³¹ Simon, Simon, Behold, Satan hath obtained leave to sift you as wheat. ³² But I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not; and thou, when thou art turned again, establish (σθαισις) thy brethren. ³³ But he said to him, Lord, with thee I am ready to go both to prison and death.

²⁷ And Jesus saith unto them, All ye shall be stumbled, for it is written, I will smite the Shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered abroad [²⁸ Howbeit, after I am raised up I will go before you into Galilee]. ²⁹ But Peter said unto him, Although all shall be stumbled, yet will not I.

The principal variations in Mark are as follows: (a) The change of order (note the place of vs. 22) in the institution, involving the representation that the passover feast is in progress (note the "hymn" in vs. 26), the bread broken "while they were eating," and the cup consecrated "after supper." (b) Additions in vs. 24 to relate the observance to the covenant of Sinai and to bring out the correspondence between the atoning blood of Jesus and the vicarious sufferings of the "Lamb" of Isa. 53.¹⁵ (c) Removal of the Davidic covenant (διαθήκη) of Lk. 22 28-30 to another context wherein sitting with Jesus in his glory is sought from Jesus by two of the twelve as a reward for endurance with him of his trials, but denied on the ground that he has no authority to grant such rewards, even to those who have "drunk his cup" of suffering. (d) Addition to the prediction of stumbling of a prediction of betrayal (vss. 18-21). Evidence that these verses constitute a later addition appears in the resumption of their opening clause ("as they were eating") in vs. 22, "as they were eating." That is, the announcement has no psychological effect. The twelve continue the meal as unconcerned as though the overwhelming announcement had not been made. Our Luke has inserted this Markan addition along with the other (strife as to who is greater) in the single paragraph, vs. 21-27, but this only injures the sequence of the story. (e) Addition of vs. 28 to prepare for the (missing) account of resurrection appearances in Galilee.¹⁶ With Lk. 22 23 = Mk. 14 29 the two records begin again to flow in a common channel.

If now we turn from the Markan form with its transpositions of order, additions, and changes (for it is possible in each case to account for the difference as an adaptation by Mark to later and occidental ideas, but not conversely), to the consistent record of Luke, we shall find it to differ to an extraordinary degree from

¹⁵ Italics have been used in vss. 22 and 24 to indicate the changes which bring the record into conformity with 1 Cor. 11 17 ff. and the Pauline point of view. The clauses, "And they all drank of it," in vs. 23, and "Take ye" in vs. 22, which at first might seem to be mere editorial additions, are found on comparison with Lk. 22 17 to have warrant in the older source.

¹⁶ On the significance of this editorial insertion, breaking the connection of vss. 27-29, and its relation to the missing conclusion of Mark, see my *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, *ad loc.*

the Pauline interpretation of the supper and directions as to its observance; but to correspond in no less striking degree with pre-pauline, or at least non-pauline, interpretation and observance. The latter are known to us partly from Paul's own references, but mainly from ancient sources not affected by Pauline influence.

It is apparent from Paul's rebuke of the Corinthian abuses that "the Lord's supper," as it had been practised, had a character quite too convivial to meet Paul's sense of propriety. The prevailing note was one of festivity and joyousness. The name given it, from which we may safely infer what it chiefly betokened, was "communion" (*κοινωνία*). Participants entered into "fellowship" with the Lord. Paul would have them remember that it was a fellowship of the Lord's *death*, and lays stress upon this as the real meaning of the symbolism. Clearly this has not previously been prominent in the minds of observers of the rite.

Whether Paul's directions as to the order, involving a postponement of the ritual act until hunger had been satisfied in the common repast, and his declaration that the cup of the covenant was taken by Jesus *after* the supper, which would naturally lead to placing the ceremony of the bread before it, constitute an intentional change from the mode of observance which had prevailed at Corinth or elsewhere, we cannot say with certainty. It is certain, however, that in Syria, even down to a much later period, the ritual of the cup preceded that of the bread, and that the *agape*, or fellowship-repast, followed both, a concluding prayer of thanksgiving being prescribed for its close, "after ye are satisfied." ¹⁷

We encounter a ritual and an interpretation of the observance quite independent of Paul, and much more like that of the Didache, when we interpret the Lukan record for itself, with minds uncoloured by the ideas of Paul and Mark. We have indeed a covenant meal, but the institution itself is completely devoid of any reference to Jesus' death,¹⁸ and the covenant in question is not

¹⁷ Didache 9, 10.

¹⁸ The preamble (vs. 15 f.) contains a clause ("before I suffer") which we have enclosed in brackets as perhaps an addition of the evangelist; for the references of Jesus to his "suffering" are so distinctively characteristic of Luke (cf. 24 26, 46; Acts 1 3; 3 18; 17 3; 26 23) that this partial exception must be reckoned of the kind which "proves the rule."

related to that of Moses at Sinai, but to that of David with Jonathan. It is a "blood-covenant"; and Jesus employs the bread as a token of his body, but not as symbolizing its fate. The breaking and distribution of the bread are simply preliminary to sharing in the common loaf, whereby, according to the immemorial laws of guest-friendship, the participant comes to share in the life of his host. The guest becomes for the period of time during which the food is supposed to remain in his body a blood-brother of the host, and is entitled to his protection, as being, in a manner, "bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh," a true member of his body. The cup has no other meaning apart from the fellowship thus established and has nothing to do with Jesus' sacrificial death.

The words which introduce the ritual, on the other hand, do refer to the passover and to Jesus' fate as liable to frustrate his wish to celebrate the feast with the twelve. But, so far from indicating that the table before them is that of passover, it goes to show on the contrary that it is the *kiddush* or "sanctification" (of passover?), the ceremony for the eve of the feast.

As regards the correspondence of this Lukan tradition of the institution of the covenant-meal with ancient observances, as it can be made out from the earliest Syrian and Palestinian sources, we cannot do better than to transcribe from Heitmüller. The following six considerations are to him convincing evidence that

this [Lukan] form of the Lord's supper, which is moreover traceable to Jewish-Christian, Palestinian soil, comes nearer to the original celebration instituted by Jesus himself, and reflects it more clearly than that known from Paul and from Mark-Matthew,—in short that at the original Lord's supper, as here, the cup and the words of institution of the cup were wanting.

For it is one of the striking features of the Lukan form that the cup not only precedes, but is separate from, the covenant of fellowship in the Lord's body. The cup is simply the "cup of blessing" for the "sanctification" of the coming holy-day. After it, in breaking and distributing the (leavened) bread, Jesus bids the twelve make this a covenant-meal by using the shared loaf as a token of union in his body. It should hardly require to be pointed out that the symbol of a draught of human blood, which the later tradition makes to follow upon that of the loaf and to

repeat its meaning, would be, if possible, still more abhorrent to Jews than to ourselves. The covenant of brotherhood by eating from the same loaf, on the other hand, was sanctioned by immemorial usage, and accounts for the dominance in all ancient tradition of the thought of union, unification, concentration, as the central meaning of the rite.

But to return to Heitmüller. The following are the six considerations which lead him to assign priority to the Lukan form, as against that represented by 1 Cor. 11 17-34 and Mark-Matthew:

- (1) We unfortunately possess no direct reports of the communion observances of the earliest Palestinian communities. In Acts 2 46, however, we have the note: "And breaking bread from house to house they did take their food with gladness and singleness of heart." If this remark affords a true picture, the Lord's supper of the most primitive community of believers did not bear the character of a commemoration of the death of Jesus (Paul and Mk.-Mt.); on the contrary, the key-note was one of gladness and rejoicing,—just as in the Lukan form of observance the reference to death was wanting, and the mood of joyous hope (Lk. 22 18) predominated.
- (2) The Lord's supper in Acts is systematically designated the breaking of bread—Acts 2 41, 46; 20 7, 11,—*presumably* an indication that there was no more than the partaking of bread, or that the wine, at all events, was by no means essential.
- (3) We have an indirect testimony to the Lord's supper of the primitive church in a narrative from the life of Jesus. The feeding of the five thousand (or four thousand) is indubitably intended as a type, a representation of the Communion. (Note in the narratives the same description of Jesus' procedure as at the supper. He took bread, blessed, and brake it, and gave to the disciples, Mk. 6 41, 8 6 and parallels.) In this representation of the Lord's supper there is no mention whatever of the cup.
- (4) Later (Jewish-Christian) sects inhabiting the region of the Jordan celebrated the Lord's supper without use of wine till long after this period.
- (5) The peculiar, otherwise unexplained,¹⁹ remark, Mk. 14 23: "They all drank of it," is best explained as a polemic observation aimed at a supposable depreciation of the cup in other circles (cf. 1 Jn. 5 6, Ign. *ad Smyrn.* 6).
- (6) Finally, it is a suspicious circumstance that the formula of the cup, whether in the rubric of Paul or that of Mark and Matthew, bears a distinctly theological stamp. It interprets the death of Jesus as a covenant-sacrifice, and betrays itself thus as a product of primitive Christian, perhaps of Pauline, dogma.

¹⁹ See, however, above, note 15.

It is certainly inadmissible in view of these considerations—omitting others—to regard that form of interpretation and observance of the supper which we find inculcated by Paul, and which in Mark-Matthew is superimposed upon an underlying narrative of different type—the form which contrasts the “new covenant” in the blood of Christ with the “old covenant” of Moses at Sinai, as the earlier; and to consider that which uses the symbolism of the covenant of David (2 Sam. 9 7; Ps. 122 5), corresponding as it does in order, in phraseology, and in significance with the liturgy of the Didache²⁰, to be later and derived. The Lukan form and the Didache are alike in containing no reference in the symbolism to the death of Jesus, and this peculiarity is absolutely unaccountable unless referred to sources as yet unaffected by Paul’s interpretation and prescription.

In one respect, however, we must withhold complete assent from Heitmüller’s observations. It may be admitted that early references and practice show that to the primitive church the essential feature of the observance was the “breaking of the bread” together, and that the cup was not considered an inseparable factor, if we limit the inference to a disproof of the originality of the reference developed by Paul, Mark-Matthew to Jesus’ shed blood. The ritual of Luke and the Didache stand in very close interrelation, mutually interpreting one another, and here it is undeniable that the cup plays an important, and even leading, part, though its symbolism is preliminary to, and independent of, that of the covenant-meal, and has, of course, no relation to the shed blood of Jesus. The unity of Lk. 22 15–19a, 28–32, becomes doubly apparent when we observe how the interpretation of the symbolism of the cup (vs. 18) merely repeats the refrain

²⁰ Didache, 9, “As touching the eucharistic thanksgiving give ye thanks thus. First as regards the cup: We give thee thanks, Our Father, for the holy vine of thy servant David, which thou madest known unto us through thy servant Jesus. (*Response*:) Thine is the glory for ever and ever.

“Then as regards the broken bread: We give thee thanks, Our Father, for the life and knowledge which thou didst make known unto us through thy servant Jesus. (*Response*:) Thine is the glory forever and ever. As this broken bread was scattered upon the mountains and being gathered together became one, so may thy church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into thy kingdom. (*Response*:) For thine is the glory and the power through Jesus Christ forever and ever.”

of the preamble (vs. 16), and that of the loaf (vs. 30a) is closely parallel. Comparison of the ritual of the *Didache* reveals at once the twofold unifying thought: an antithesis of trial and triumph symbolized in the cup, an antithesis of "scattering" and "gathering" symbolized in the loaf.

For in Luke the attachment here of the prediction of stumbling (scattering) which runs on into the offer of Peter to go with Jesus "unto prison and death" is not without relation on the one side to the ground of the Davidic covenant, "Ye are they that have endured with me in my trials" (vs. 28), nor can we fail to see on the other its connection with Mk. 10 42-44 as well as Mk. 14 27-29. These are all variations on the theme, "the gathering together of the elect," as symbolized in the loaf eaten as the body of Christ. As the "cup of blessing" represents the antithesis of present trial ("Are ye able to drink my cup?") and future triumph (the redemption feast "in the kingdom of God"), so the bread, "once scattered on the mountains, but now gathered together into one loaf," represents in general the "gathering together of the elect," but more especially the sifting as wheat which the twelve are about to undergo, and the rallying again under the leadership of Simon. So Luke; but the Roman gospel has a far different attitude toward the apostolic leaders. Just as the right to sit upon the thrones in Christ's glory is denied to James and John in spite of their having "drunk the cup" of suffering with the Lord, so it is not by "Simon" that the "scattered" flock are to be "gathered" in Galilee. The Shepherd himself—at least in our form of Mark—will intervene to rally them. But here we are entering another and a difficult field, the problem of the ending of Mark. Let us be content with having shown that the earlier and consistent form of the tradition is that of Luke, as interpreted by *Didache*.

(3) It remains to point to a single peculiarity of style, which may serve to connect the Q-logion in which our Lukan record of the institution of the covenant-repast culminates, with certain other Q-material in regard to which the present writer has pointed out heretofore that we are dealing not with *precepts*, where the interest is ethical, but with *narrative*, where the interest centres in the person of Jesus and the significance of his message and min-

istry. The form of the verb in the passage: "Ye shall eat . . . in my kingdom" is not the usual *ἐσθίω* employed elsewhere in the New Testament, but a form which occurs but in four other passages, and is classified in the lexicons as "rare," "poetic," "obsolete," or the like, the form *ἐσθω*. Three of the other occurrences are in Q-sections of Luke, two of them in the discourse wherein Jesus vindicates his joyous ministry of forgiveness and healing against those who "were stumbled in him" after the departure of the messengers of John: "For John the Baptist is come *eating* no bread. . . . The Son of man is come *eating* and drinking" (Lk. 7 33 f. = Mt. 11 18 f.). The other Lukan occurrence is in Lk. 10 7, another Q-passage. Elsewhere in the New Testament the form occurs nowhere but in Mk. 1 6, in a passage (vss. 2-6) which shows unmistakable literary dependence on the Q-passage regarding John the Baptist.²¹

Limitations of space will not permit us to dwell upon the relations of Luke's source for his tradition of the supper to other elements of Q. That which has already been adduced should suffice to indicate that here, as in other parts of the Lukan passion story, we are dealing with a source which is at least pre-markan, and in its point of view reflects conceptions and data wholly independent of Pauline influence. To trace this source in the single narrative of the institution of the (Davidic) covenant-meal is a matter of no small importance in determining Jesus' own conception of his mission. To find him here, for example, pointing his disciples forward, not as in Matthew to a "throne of glory" whereon he sits as "Son of man" to judge all nations, but to a new Jerusalem, where he will sit rather as Son of David, surrounded by those who "endured" with him, and who now "eat and drink with him at his table in his kingdom," brings us face to face with a christology which may not be the earliest or most authentic, but whose value to the historical student can only be measured by the breadth of its divergence from long-current and accepted forms. And this is only a beginning. The question of the part played by this source in the development of gospel composition is a problem for treatment on some future occasion.

²¹ For a discussion of the relation, with demonstration of Mark's dependence on this element of Q (Q^{lk}), see my *Beginnings of Gospel Story*.

JOHN ELIOT, THE APOSTLE TO THE INDIANS

JAMES DE NORMANDIE

ROXBURY, MASSACHUSETTS

In the old and worn parchment leaves of the baptismal register of Widford Parish in "pleasant Hertfordshire" we find this record:

Anno dm. 1604. John Elliott the sonne of Bennett Elliott was baptized the fite daye of August in the yeere of our Lord God 1604.

There is also this record:

An^o Dm. 1598. Bennett Eliot and Letteye Aggar were married the xxxth of October an^o Sup Dicto.

Bennett Eliot had property in several of the neighboring parishes, and about 1608 removed to Nazing, where he died. In his will he directs his executor to pay out of the rents and profits of his lands and tenements, for the space of eight years from 1621, quarterly to his son John Eliot "the sum of eight pounds a yeare of lawful money of England, for and towards his maintenance in the University of Cambridge where he is a scholar."

The home of Eliot was marked by the best religious influences stirring England in these early days of the Reformation and the dawning of the Puritan controversy, for he speaks of his first years as "seasoned with the fear of God, the word, and prayer." He became a pensioner of Jesus College in 1619, took his first degree in 1623, and was early distinguished for his talent and proficiency in the study of languages. Upon leaving Cambridge he was a tutor for a time in a school kept by Rev. Thomas Hooker,—afterwards the founder of the state of Connecticut. Here the influences of his own home were deepened, for he wrote: "Here the Lord said unto my dead soul, live! live! and through the grace of God I do live forever! When I came to this blessed family I then saw as never before the power of godliness in its lovely vigour and efficacy."

Eliot was prepared for the ministry but the bitter enemies

of the Puritans and the advocates of imposing strict conformity on the observance of the ritual of the Church of England were making life intolerable for the nonconformists. A number of the inhabitants of Nazing and the neighboring villages were preparing to go to the new world, some on account of the religious disturbances, some out of that spirit of colonization so active at that period, and Eliot told them that if they wished he would be their minister when they were settled at Rocksborough.

In Winthrop's History of New England it is stated that "on November Twelfth 1631 the ship Lyon arrived at Nantasket. There came in her, the Governor's wife, and Mr. Eliot, a minister, and others, being in all about sixty persons, who all arrived in good health, having been ten weeks at sea." Mr. Savage in a note says, "This was the celebrated apostle of the Massachusetts Indians."

Immediately upon his arrival in Boston Eliot "adjoyned" the church at Boston and, as the pastor of that church was absent, Eliot "exercised" as its minister. The church became at once much interested in him, desired to call him as its teacher, and pleaded their great need of him; but Eliot replied that he was "preingaged" at his English home to his friends there about to settle at Rocksborough, that he would be their minister if they still so desired. As Winthrop says, "Though Boston labored all they could both with the congregation at Roxbury, and with Mr. Eliot himself, yet he could not be diverted from accepting the call at Roxbury; so he was dismissed." At the end of the summer he came to Roxbury, where a church had been gathered with Weld for its pastor and there he was ordained as teacher in November, 1632. His intended wife, Miss Ann Mumford, a name still lingering in the neighborhood of Wiford, came over with the same company, and soon after Eliot's settlement over the church they were married. Then began a ministry which lasted over fifty-eight years.

Eliot was twenty-seven years old, vigorous and earnest for work. One account a little later says of him: "The first Teaching Elder is Mr. Eliot, a young man at his coming thither of a cheerful spirit, walking unblameable, of a godly conversation, apt to teach, as by his indefatigable paines both with his flock and

the poore Indians doth appeare, whose language he learned purposely to help them to the knowledge of God in Christ, frequently preaching in their wigwams and catechising their children." Another account says: "He that God hath raised up and enabled to preach unto them, is a man of most sweet, humble, loving, gracious, and enlarged spirit, whom God hath blest, and surely will still delight in, and do good by."

There is a little volume on the early life in New England, printed in 1639, which says that "Boston is a town of very pleasant situation two miles north east from Roxborough," and of Rocksborough it says: "It is a fair and handsome country town, the inhabitants of it all being very rich; it is well wooded and watered, having a clear and fresh brook running through the town. The inhabitants have fair houses, store of cattle, impaled cornfields, and fruitful gardens." The earliest residences were along the street which now bears the name of the old town, and around the hill on which the meeting-house was built, the same site occupied by all its successors, and now one of the best specimens of the old Puritan meeting-house standing in New England. There was a regulation (for safety from the Indians) that everyone must build within half a mile of the meeting-house—and "meeting-house" every one called it, for the word church was an offence to the Puritan. (Cotton Mather said that he found no just ground in Scripture to apply such a trope as church to a house for public assembly.) Simple and rude it was, about twenty by thirty feet in plan and twelve feet high, built of logs, the interstices filled up with clay, with a thatched roof and an earthen floor. Here was the scene of the faithful ministrations of Eliot as for nearly sixty years to all meetings on Sunday or during the week he came from his humble home not far removed.

In all that ministry, with its restless missionary zeal, its busy labor of the scholar, and its deep interest in every social matter touching the welfare of a new community, there is never any hint of a neglect of his parish duties. He watched his flock, small at first but very rapidly growing, like a faithful shepherd. Every new settler was carefully looked after, and if his morals were questionable, there was no peace for him but through repentance

and reformation or banishment from the plantation. No search was ever keener than the Puritan's watch for heresy and for sin. Close by the meeting-house stood the stocks and the pillory, that any neglect of the gospel should soon be followed by the terror of the law.

About all that we can learn of the early ministry of Eliot must be from his records in the parish book. There was a special reason for the minister's making such records, in the Puritan's idea of the church. The church was a company of "visible saints," and its aim was to maintain a high standard of godliness among its members. Each church was a unit to determine its own rules of faith and life,—and as no church had any right or power to interfere with the faith or creed or discipline of any other church, so it had to be a jealous custodian of its own members. There was no disposition to gloss over the faults of any one who, having once taken hold of the covenant, had fallen from grace. So the minister was quite ready to record his spiritual judgment of his flock. These records of the Apostle Eliot are interesting beyond those of almost any of our New England churches because the man is the most interesting figure in our early history. There is a flavor of humanity and godliness still shedding from these pages because the man was so humane and godly. If you read between these lines, you see what a yearning and tender love, what a broad and deep sympathy are beneath even the sentence of excommunication. Here was a man to whom the unseen things were more real than anything seen or handled. Mather says he once heard him utter these words upon the phrase, "Our conversation is in heaven":—"In the morning if we ask, 'where have I been to-day?' our souls must answer, 'in heaven.' In the evening if we ask, 'where have I been to-day?' our souls may answer, 'in heaven.' If thou art a believer, thou art no stranger to heaven while thou livest, and when thou diest, heaven will be no stranger to thee; no, thou hast been there a thousand times before."

Here is his watchfulness over trade. "The wife of William Webb. She followed baking, and through her covetuous mind she made light waight after many admonitions, and also for a grossely in publik, flatly denying y^t after she had weighed her dough,

she never nimed off bitts from each loaf, w^h yet was four witnesses testified to be a cōmon if not a constant practis, for all w^h grosse sins she was excommunicated, her ways having bene long a greif of heart to her Godly neighbors. But afterwards she was reconciled to y^e Church, and lived christianly and dyed comfortably."

Calling one day on a merchant in his parish, he noticed in his counting-room some books of business on the table, and some books of devotion laid away on a shelf, and said: "Here, sir, is earth on the table and heaven on the shelf; pray do not sit so much at the table, as altogether to forget this shelf; let not earth thrust heaven out of your mind."

"The Church takes notice of six, who humbled themselves by public confession in the Church, and we have cause to hope y^t the full proceeding of discipline will doe more good than their sin hath done hurt."

"These young persons, males, all did publickly, by their own consent and desire, take hold on the covenant, waiting for more grace."

"Robert Lyman was an ancient christian but weak."

"Valentine Prentise, lived a godly life, and went through much affliction by bodily infirmity, and died leaving a good savor of Godlyness behind him."

"William Hills, he removed to Hartford on Connecticott where he lived several yeares, without giving such good satisfaction to the consciences of the saints."

"John Moody had two men servants y^t were ungodly, especially one of them. They went to the oyster bank in a boate against the counsel of their governor; they did unskillfully leave their boate afloat, and quickly the tide caryed it away, and they were drowned, a *dreadful* example of God's displeasure against obstinate servants."

"Mary Chase, had a paralitik humor which fell into her backbone, so that she could not stir her body, but as she was lifted, and filled her with great torture, and caused her backbone to goe out of joynt, and bunch out from the beginning to the end, of which infirmity she lay 4 years and a half, a sad spectacle of misery; but it pleased God to raise her againe."

One of our antiquarians searching among the old church records, and finding this account of Mary Chase's trouble wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes, asking him to give a diagnosis of the case in the light of modern medical science. Dr. Holmes sent the following characteristic letter:

A consultation without seeing the patient is like a murder-trial without the *corpus delicti* being in evidence. You remember the story of Jeremiah Mason and the witness who had had a vision in which the Angel Gabriel informed him of some important facts. "Subpoena the Angel Gabriel." So I should say, carry us to the bedside of Mary Chase, but she has been under green bedclothes so long, that I am afraid that she would be hard to wake up. We must guess as well as we can under the circumstances. The question is whether she had angular curvature, lateral curvature, or no curvature at all. If the first, angular curvature, you must consult such authorities as Bryant, DeWitt, and the rest. If you are not satisfied with these modern writers, all I have to say is, as I have said before when asked whom to consult in such cases, go to Pott, to Percival Pott, the famous surgeon of the last century, from whom this affection has received the name by which it is still well-known of "Pott's Disease," for if a doctor has the luck to find out a new malady, it is tied to his name like a tin kettle to a dog's tail, and he goes clattering down the highway of fame to posterity with his aeolian attachment following at his heels. As for the lateral curvature, if that had existed it seems as if the Apostle Eliot would have said she bulged sideways, or something like that, instead of saying the backbone bunched out from beginning to end. Besides I doubt if lateral curvature is apt to cause paralysis. Crooked backs are everywhere, as tailors and dressmakers know, and nobody expects to be paralyzed because one shoulder is higher than the other, as Alexander the Great's was, and Alexander Pope's also.

I doubt whether Mary Chase had any real curvature at all. Her case looks to me like one of those *Mimoses* as Marshall Hall calls certain forms of hysteria which imitate different diseases and among the rest paralysis. The body of a hysteric patient will take on the look of all sorts of more serious affections. As for mental and moral manifestations a hysteric girl will lie so that Sapphira would blush for her, and she could give lessons to a professional pickpocket in the art of stealing. Hysteria might well be described as possession, possession by seven devils, except that this number is quite insufficient to account for all the pranks played by the subjects of this extraordinary malady.

I do not want to say anything against Mary Chase, but I suspect

that, getting nervous, and tired, and hysteric, she got into bed, which she found rather agreeable after too much housework, and perhaps too much going to meeting, liked it better and better, curled herself up into a bunch which made her look as if her back was really disturbed, found she was cosseted, and posseted, and prayed over, and made much of, and so lay quiet until a false paralysis caught hold of her legs and kept her there. If some one had hollered "fire," it is not unlikely that she would have jumped out of bed, as many other such paralytics have done under such circumstances. She could have moved probably enough, if any one could have made her believe that she had the power of doing it. *Possumus quia posse videmur*. She had played *possum* so long that at last it became *non possum*.

Yours very truly,

O. W. HOLMES, M.D.

In addition to such records as these there is little to be noticed about Eliot's early ministry; but these make interesting reading for our day, and let us into the secret of his life. Here is no formality of piety, only the deep, vigorous, serious, constant, bubbling-over life of the spirit. While much gentler and more amiable than his colleague Weld, he was still strenuous and unyielding for the faith he held, and a strong antagonist of the heresies he thought were creeping into the colony, as one may notice in his occasional notes about the Quakers, the Anabaptists, the Familists, and the part he took in the Anne Hutchinson controversy. One of the matters which now seem to us very trivial was his indignation over the sin of men wearing long hair. The discussion waxed so hot that Eliot with others sent a lengthy petition to the magistrates rather discouraging a contribution to the college until this sin was removed from the students, saying: "They are brought up in such pride as doth no wayes become such as are brought up for the holy service of the Lorde, either in the magistracy, or ministry especially, and in particular in their long haire, which last, first took hand and broke out at Colledg, so far as we understand and remember, and now it is got into the pulpit to the great greife and offense of many godly hearts in the country." Eliot's prejudice against long hair or the wearing of wigs seems an unaccountable weakness. He preached against it, he prayed against it; he thought all the calamities which came upon the

country, even Indian wars, might be laid to this fashion which was gaining such strong hold upon the people and especially on the young.

A scholar himself of no mean attainment, and with the best education England could give, he took early and throughout his life a great interest in the education of the young. He established the first Sunday school of which we have any account in this new land. "First our male youth in fitting season stay every Sabbath after the evening [that is, afternoon] service in the public meeting house; where [after they had already attended the two services of two or three hours each] the elders will examine their remembrance [of the services] that day and any fit poynt of catechize. Secondly, that our female youth should meet [on Monday] in one place where the elders may examine them of their remembrance yesterday, and about catechize, or what else may be convenient."

He was restless to offer to all young persons the best opportunities for learning, lest in the activities and demands of a new settlement they should be turned away from literary pursuits. Wherever he went he made a plan or a prayer for good schools. In a synod of the churches he exclaimed: "Lord for schools everywhere among us! That our schools may flourish! That every member of this assembly may go home and procure a good school to be encouraged in the town in which he lives. That before we die we may be so happy as to see a good school encouraged in every plantation of the country." Mather writes: "God so blessed his endeavors that Roxbury could not live quietly without a free school in the town, and the issue of it has been one thing which has almost made me put the title of *schola illustris* upon that little nursery; that is, that Roxbury has afforded more scholars, first for the college, and then for the public, than any town of its bigness, or if I mistake not, of twice its bigness in all New England. From the spring of the school at Roxbury there have run a large number of the streams, which have made glad this whole city of God."

The Trustees of the Roxbury Latin School have in their possession the agreement to establish the school, on a beautifully written parchment in ancient characters dated the last of August,

1645,—as follows: "Whereas the inhabitants of Roxburie, in consideration of their religious care of posteritie, have taken into consideration how necessarie the education of their children in Literature, will be to fitt them for public service, both in Church and Commonwealthe, in succeeding ages—they therefore unanimously have consented and agreed to erect a free schoole in the said Towne"; and a little later the teacher promises to use his best skill and endeavor both by precept and example to instruct in "all scholasticall, morall, and theological discipline."

Another effort which Eliot very early made, together with his colleague Weld and with Mather of Dorchester, was the preparation of the "Bay Psalm-Book," the first book printed in this country. The intention was good, to turn the Psalms of David into verses to be sung—but the result was awful! How congregations could venture to sing such verses, or to think there was anything musical in them, can be explained only by granting that somewhat of the beauty and harmony of the Psalms had already stolen into their hearts. These men were scholars, they were faithful ministers, but such a work was beyond their gifts. They must themselves have felt the inadequacy of their work, and something of the ridicule with which it might be received by the churches, for they have their apology in the preface: "If the verses are not alwayes so smooth and elegant as some may desire or expect, let them consider that God's altar needs not our pollishings; for wee have expected rather a plaine translation, than to smooth our verses with the sweetness of any paraphrase, and we have attended conscience rather than elegance, fidelity rather than poetry in translating the Hebrew words into English Language, and David's poetry into English Metre." It was reserved for some of Eliot's descendants, Fitz-Greene Halleck with his ringing strains of "Marco Bozzaris," and Ethelinda Eliot Beers, who wrote "All Quiet along the Potomac," to compensate for the signal poetical failure of their ancestor.

Eliot's efforts for a good school did not cease with the founding of the Roxbury Latin School. A short time before his death he gave an estate of about seventy-five acres of land to certain persons and their heirs for the support of a school and schoolmaster in that part of Roxbury then called the Pond Plains, or Jamaica

Plain; to provide teaching for the children of that end of the town, "together with such Indians and negroes as shall or may come to the school, and to no other use, intent, or purpose whatever." That school had been established some years before, but by reason of the generous gift of the Apostle Eliot his name was given to it and it continues to the present time. Today it is an industrial school, designed, in the words of Eliot, "to remove the inconvenience of ignorance."

It is impossible to learn when Eliot first turned his attention towards the native Americans, and felt that his life-work was to be for them. Several of the ministers hereabout were interested in them, and joined in visiting and preaching and in endeavors to convert them to Christianity, but no one else who, in the large spirit of humanity which marked Eliot's whole life, regarded them as the children of God, and believed that if the gospel was for God's children it was for the red man as much as for the white, and that if civilization was a benefit, they should share in that benefit. Many of the early charters expressed an interest in the Indians, as also did some of the early settlers, but generally they were looked upon as savages to be exterminated, or as children of Satan deserving little sympathy; and the curiosity or welcome or friendly offices which were so often manifested upon the first arrival of the whites soon turned into bitter hostility as the natives found their possessions taken from them and themselves driven further and further away to seek new hunting-grounds.

Eliot had been in the ministry here about ten years, mingling with the Indians, whom he saw daily in the village or hiding between the trees watching with piercing eyes these strange white creatures and their strange ways, when it came to him that his chief mission was to learn the Indian language, and preach the gospel to them in their own tongue. He believed, and it was not an uncommon opinion in his day, that the Indians belonged to the lost tribes of Israel; and after the Captivity had made their way into America from the extreme parts of Asia. He also believed that in their language he would find some traces of the Hebrew, which he firmly believed was the language of heaven, in which by God's own voice the Old Testament had been given to men, and

which would be forever the only language of the redeemed. Eliot was a remarkable Hebrew scholar, and had such a love for this language that he thought it better fitted than any other to become the universal language of mankind. "It had need be so," he writes, "for being the language which shall be spoken in heaven, where knowledge will be so enlarged, there will need a spacious language, and what language fitter than this of God's own making and composure? And why may we not make ready for heaven in this point, by making and fitting that language, according to the rules of the divine artifice of it, to express all imaginable conceptions and notions of the mind of man in all arts and sciences?" However, as he went on in his studies he found the Hebrew did not help him to understand the Indian language.

In 1643 he began the study of their tongue. He found a bright young Indian who had been a servant in an English home, and "him," he says, "I made my interpreter and thus I came at it, we must not sit still and look for miracles. Up and be doing, and the Lord will be with thee. Prayer and pains through faith in Jesus Christ will do anything." He made such progress that in three years he attempted to preach to the Indians. It was on the 28th of October, 1646, at a place called Nonantum, a part of Newton. As Eliot with three friends accompanying him drew near to the wigwam of Waban the chief, he met them with expressions of welcome, and led them to his wigwam, where quite a large company were gathered. Eliot began the service with a prayer in English, "being," he said, "not so farre acquainted with the Indian language as to express our hearts herein before God to them." There was the feeling, probably, of looking upon prayer as a more serious and sacred matter than preaching, so that any errors of speech might make it ludicrous. Perhaps, too, there was something of the feeling which many have that it might be rather difficult for the Almighty to understand any other tongue as well as their own. The story is told of an Indian squaw, who might have been an unusually neat one, and kept her wigwam cleanly swept, who had learned only the word "broom." She became deeply concerned about her salvation. Her Christian friends begged her to pray. She supposed she must pray in English, but she had only that one word. Her anxiety grew intense,

and at last, throwing herself upon her knees, and lifting up her eyes in the attitude of prayer she kept repeating, "Broom! broom! broom! broom! broom!" Was it not as acceptable, and as well understood, as the most ornate and finished prayer?

Prayer is the burden of a sigh,
The falling of a tear,
The upward glancing of an eye,
When none but God is near.

After the prayer, Eliot preached a long sermon from a passage in Ezekiel, "Prophecy unto the wind." The name of Waban signified wind, so that the Indians thought it was the same as if he had said "prophecy unto Waban," and as if it were a call from the Scriptures to him to be converted and join the Christians, but Eliot told them he had no thought of such an application when he selected his text.

At this first meeting Eliot began a custom, continued through his preaching, of having the hearers ask whatever questions they chose, either for a clearer understanding of what had been spoken to them, or for light upon any point which had exercised their minds. "We asked them," said Eliot, "if they understood all that which was already spoken, and whether all of them did understand all that which was then spoken to them, or only some few. And they answered with multitude of voyces, that they all of them did understand all that which was spoken." It is somewhat doubtful if any congregation today could understand all that the Apostle preached to them that day. "It was," says Eliot, "a glorious affecting spectacle to see a company of perishing, forlorne outcasts, diligently attending to the blessed word of salvation then delivered; it much affected us that they should smell some things of the Alabaster box broken up in that dark and gloomy habitation of filthiness and uncleane spirits."

The questions of the Indians at some of these meetings make an interesting study of their minds when presented with the statement of a religion and a theology of which nothing had been heard; for Eliot not only spoke of the pure living it required of them, but with that he entered into some of the abstrusest dogmas of the faith which the greatest of Christian theologians have

never been able to state with clearness. Eliot never reproached them for the insufficiency or falsity of their own religion, he only presented with earnestness what he thought was the heaven-descended and glorious faith; and if they were not won from their own, they received it in a respectful silence out of their love for him. And never through his long missionary work among them do we find a trace of the experiences the Jesuit fathers relate as frequently theirs. The Indians would give to them, in their slight knowledge of the language, the most vulgar and obscene words, and the priests would use them with the most sacred offices of their religion and notice the Indians convulsed with laughter over the mistakes that were made.

There is a story of a later date which ought to be a wise lesson to all missionaries. One of them was instructing a group of Indians in the truths of his holy religion. He told them of the creation of the earth in six days, and of the fall of our first parents by eating an apple. The courteous savages listened attentively, and, after thanking him, one related in his turn a very ancient tradition concerning the origin of the maize. But the missionary plainly showed his disgust and disbelief, indignantly saying, "What I delivered to you were sacred truths, but this that you tell me is mere fable and falsehood!" "My brother," gravely replied the offender Indian, "it seems that you have not been well grounded in the rules of civility. You saw that we, who practise these rules, believed your stories; why, then, do you refuse to credit ours?" There are many of the Indian myths and legends about creation quite as helpful and spiritual as the story of the fall of man by eating the apple. Any genuine appreciation of Christianity ought to dispose us to be kindly and courteous and receptive of the best in any other religion; ought to urge us to a careful study of what that best is, and not to despise it, or call it all false because its traditions or its forms or its views may be so contrary to our own—and all this without yielding the least of any principle of faith or life which we regard as essential.

Some of the answers the Apostle gave to the questions of the Indians have, also, a far-off interest. Let us look at a few of both. "Do not English spoil their souls when they say that a thing

costs them more than it did cost, and is not that all one as to steal?"

"If a man talk of another's faults and tell others of them when he is not present to answer, is not that a sin?"

"Why did not God give all men good hearts that they might be good?"

"Why did not God kill the devil that made all men so bad?"

"If a man should be enclosed in iron a foot thick, and thrown into the fire, what would become of his soul? Could the soul come forth thence or not?"

"Were the Englishmen ever at any time so ignorant of God and Jesus Christ as themselves?" Answer: "There are two sorts of English men. Some are bad and live wickedly, and these are as ignorant in a way as the Indians now are. Another sort are good men and love Christ and honor him. Once they were all as ignorant of God and Christ, as the Indians are, but the Indians shall know him if also they seek him."

"What do you get by praying to God and believing in Jesus Christ? You are as poor as we, and we take more pleasure than you do. If we could see that you gain anything by being Christians we would be so too." Answer: "There are two sorts of mercies. The little ones [which he illustrated by holding up his little finger], and the great ones [which he signified by extending his thumb]. The little ones are riches, good clothes, houses, pleasant food; the great ones are wisdom, the knowledge of God and Christ, of truth and eternal life. Though God may not give you any large measure of the little mercies, he gives you what is much better, the greater blessings."

Eliot's first missions among the Indians were so encouraging that every day his enthusiasm and hope increased. The work became a fervent zeal which went out only with his death. In the summer of 1650 Natick, or "the place of hills," was chosen as a fit spot for a town where the converted or praying Indians could be gathered into a community of their own, renounce their roving habits, and follow the arts of civilization. The town was laid out in three streets, two on one side and one on the other of the river Charles, with a foot-bridge the Indians themselves built. Each family had a lot, and they built a large house, the lower part to

be used for their worship on Sunday, and a room in the upper part set apart for the Apostle whenever he should visit them. A form of government was arranged for them, entirely from the Scriptures, and since they had no previous conception of laws, Eliot thought it would be easy for them to adopt that form to which he was sure all the world must finally come, with the Lord for their judge, the Lord for their lawgiver, the Lord for their king.

These praying Indians took the gospel as it has been said the Hebrews took their religion, with a gush, with a joy. They received its precepts and its ceremonies with great seriousness, and made them a large part of daily life. A great reason for their lapsing into indifference was that they soon found the English were so loud in their professions and so lax in their lives. One of them, lodging at the home of an Englishman one night, asked the next day why the man at whose home he stayed did not pray in his family as Eliot had taught the Indians to do every day. Then he concluded there were *matchet* Englishmen as well as *matchet* Indians, men who did not practise what they professed, —*matchet* meaning wicked.

Eliot's heart was full of joy. He had found the better side of the Indian character. They trusted and venerated him. He never deceived them; he treated them with absolute sincerity; he believed they were quite as worthy in the sight of God as himself; they never faltered in their allegiance to him as a benefactor and friend. In vision, he saw the whole race coming into the Christian fold. His labors knew no end: on week-days, reaching them wherever he could by walking or on horseback; on Sunday, when he could leave his own flock; and on longer journeys, when he could spare the time; down as far as Cape Cod, up through Concord and Lowell as far as the forests of New Hampshire, back into the state as far as Lancaster, and on west as far as Brookfield; with no roads, no bridges, no inns for lodging or refreshments; fording swollen rivers, riding in drenching rains; in midsummer heat or winter storms; following lonely paths through dense forests with only blazed trees to mark the way—wherever he could find a little gathering of the red men, in their wigwams, or under some broad-branching tree, there the Apostle was to be

found. He gave his strength and his money, and faced danger and perils and death, with the quiet, undaunted spirit of the early martyrs. Often with no shelter, wet to the skin all day long, halting to rest at night by the hospitality of some Indian or only the forest's shade; wringing the water from his stockings, cold and hungry, he speaks of it all with joy. "God stepped in and helped, for I considered that word of his, 'endure hardness as a good soldier of Christ.'"

Then, when the day's work was done, or the journey ended, in the evening in his study teaching his Indian classes, or long into the hours of the night, by the light of a tallow candle, with a physical endurance and a mental force and a spiritual zeal hardly ever equalled, translating the Scriptures and books of piety for his Indian converts. The story of those missionary labors has gone throughout Christendom. A few years ago I found a "Life of Eliot" in Greek, published at Malta.

Now, however, a far greater task confronted the Apostle. It was difficult enough to learn the Indian language, of which Mather says: "If their alphabet be short, I am sure the words composed of it, are long enough to tire the patience of any scholar in the world. One would think they had been growing ever since Babel, unto the dimensions to which they are now extended: if I must translate 'our loves,' it must be 'Noowomantainmoon-kamnownash.' I pray you count the letters."

After learning the language so as to converse with them, and preach to them, and pray with them, there was something more to be done. Eliot could not visit them as frequently as they were pressing him to come; and his voice would soon be silent. He was Christianity to them; they could listen to no other, and they must have the Bible and religious books in their own language to read when he could no longer counsel them. Then began that mighty task of translating the Bible into the Indian language; although in the beginning of his work of translation he had not the faintest idea that he could ever live to complete it all. "Since the death of the Apostle Paul," writes Edward Everett, "a nobler, truer, and warmer spirit than John Eliot never lived; and, taking the rudeness of the age into consideration, the state of the country, the narrowness of the means, the history of the Christian

church does not contain an example of resolute, untiring, successful labor, superior to that of translating the entire Scriptures into the language of the native inhabitants of Massachusetts, a dialect as imperfect, as unformed, as unmanageable as any spoken on earth; a labor performed not in the flush of youth, nor within the luxurious abodes of academic ease, but under the constant burden of his duties as a minister and a preacher, and at a time of life when the spirits begin to flag."

First came a little catechism in 1654, supposed to be the first book in the Indian language; the book of Genesis in 1655; a few of the Psalms in 1658; the whole of the New Testament in 1661, and the completed Bible in 1663.

If we had among us now some Indians who thoroughly understood the Algonquin language, which was the dialect most used hereabout in Eliot's time, and could tell us how his translation of the Bible was received, how some of the long chapters of genealogies or some of the rapt passages of the prophets, or the sublime pictures of nature in the Psalms, or the metaphysical arguments of Paul, or the profound and far-reaching moral requirement of the epistles, or the sublime, heaven-descending beatitudes and spiritual utterances of Jesus, fell upon the ears or entered the hearts of the red men of the woods,—what an interesting revelation it would be! All this has gone beyond recovery. Or, if we had some one who, better acquainted with the language, could show us the imperfections of the Apostle in trying to put the Scriptures into any meaning they could grasp! That too is impossible. With all the incredible toil and profound interest at heart, what an elementary work must have been the result! If only Eliot himself could have left on record some of the mistakes into which he was led for the lack of words, or his knowledge of them, to convey the meaning of the Scripture! We have but one instance, and this may be somewhat apocryphal. When he came to translate the verse in Judges, "The mother of Sisera looked out at the window, and cried through the lattice," he could find no word for lattice. He asked one after another, he described it as a framework with open spaces, as netting, as a kind of open basket-work or wicker. At last they gave him a long, unpronounceable word; and years after, when he understood the language better, he was

much amused to find that he had rendered it: "The mother of Sisera looked out at the window, and cried through an eel-pot." What of it all? They may have got the pith of the bloody story, and it might have soothed their consciences in some similar tragedy in their own wigwams, as in the tent of Jael.

One of the most pleasing incidents in Eliot's life must have been a visit paid to him by another who shared the same zeal for these tribes of the woods. Of the devoted Jesuit missionaries of the Northwest, few were more active than Father Gabriel Druillettes. On one of his expeditions he came from Quebec down the waters of the Kennebec, and at last embarked for "Rogs-bray," to visit a minister he had heard much of named "Heliot." He came to Eliot's and found him instructing some savages. "Eliot," he wrote, "received me with respect and affection, and prayed me to pass the winter with him." At a time when the religious antipathies of the Protestants and Romanists were most bitter, here we find two men in the vigor of life, yet to pass their fourscore years in their loved and poorly rewarded labors, met in simple, fraternal fellowship, comparing notes about their methods, successes, disappointments, hopes. The aims of each were the same, but their methods very unlike.

Of Eliot's personal appearance we know nothing. No portrait of him is in existence. He kept no diary full of self-depreciatory, self-conceited, self-lauding exclamations, like Cotton Mather's, now bearing witness to God's special providences to him, now confessing himself the vilest of worms, and now telling of his wonderfully persuasive eloquence and gifts, and wide influence. His ministry was one of utter unworldliness, of self-exacting toil, of entire surrender to the good of others, of a daily walk hid with Christ in God. He had no time to write daily notes of self-introspection. Every gift and every strength and every movement was devoted self-renunciation. "His apparel," says one of his biographers, "was without any ornament except that of humility. Had you seen him with his leathern girdle (for such a one he wore) about his loins, you would almost have thought what Herod feared,—that John Baptist was come to life again. He that will write of Eliot, must write of his charity, or say nothing. His charity was a star of the first magnitude in the

bright constellation of his virtues, and the rays of it were wonderfully various and extensive. His liberality to pious uses, whether public or private, went much beyond the proportions of his little estate in this world. Many hundred pounds did he freely bestow upon the poor; and he would, with very forcible importunities, press his neighbors to join with him in such beneficences. He did not put off his charity to be put in his last will, as many who therein show that their charity is against their will, but he was his own administrator and he made his own hands his executors, and his own eyes his overseers."

The story, familiar as it is, must always be added to any sketch of his life, of the treasurer of the parish who on paying him his quarterly salary, knowing well his lavish expenditure for the relief of others, put the money in a handkerchief and tied it in as many hard knots as possible to compel him to carry it home. On his way thither, he called to see a poor sick woman, and told her that God had sent some relief. Then he began to untie the knots, but there were Indians waiting in his study to be taught, and, growing impatient with the delay to get at his money, he threw it all into her lap, saying, "Here, my dear, take it, I believe the Lord desires it all for you." And charity in its deeper sense was shown, when to a minister, complaining of injurious treatment from some of his parishioners, Eliot said, "Brother, learn the meaning of these three little words, bear, forbear, and forgive." And when a friend asked him how he was in his last sickness, he replied: "Alas! I have lost everything. My understanding leaves me, my memory fails me, my utterance fails me; but I thank God my charity holds out still. I think that rather grows than fails."

Eliot's preaching must have been of a very high character for that day, to judge by occasional references which have been preserved. One may be sure it was long, and filled with Biblical quotations, without any regard to the context, or to their meaning at the time,—they were all God's words and it did not matter much how they were used. His sermons were prepared with all possible care and mental effort, as he said upon hearing a good preacher, "Brother, there is oil required for the service of the sanctuary; but it must be beaten; I praise God that your oil was

so well beaten today." His other labors were so distinguished that his preaching has been little noticed. The agents of the Labadist community, in the record of their visit in 1680, speak of Eliot as a very old man, and "the best of the ministers we have yet heard in Boston and its vicinity." And John Dunton, a bookseller from London, describes him in 1686 as "the glory of Roxbury, as well as of all New England." In his old age he said that he feared his friends Cotton of Boston and Mather of Dorchester, who had been in heaven a long time, would suspect that he had gone the wrong way because he stayed so long behind them, and added, "I wonder for what the Lord Jesus Christ lets me live. He knows that I can do nothing for him." He was compared to Moses because his face was continually shining as a result of his communion with God; and to Homer's Nestor from whose lips dropped words sweeter than honey. There was a tradition that the country could never perish as long as Eliot was alive.

In several letters we find him taking much interest in the progress of medical science, and he speaks in high praise of the studies and results of the College of Physicians in London. "By the blessing of God upon them, they seem to me to design such a regimen of health, and such an exact inspection into all diseases, and knowledge of all medicaments, and prudence of application of the same, that the book of divine Providence seemeth to provide for the lengthening of the life of man again in this latter end of the world, which would be of no small advantage unto all kinds of good learning and government." Then he adds his curious and ever-ready confirmation of his opinion from the Scriptures: "Doth not such a thing seem to be prophesied in Isaiah? If the child shall die one hundred years old, of what age shall the old man be? But I would not be too bold with the Holy Scriptures."

So wore this long and faithful ministry out, until with laboring steps he made his way up the meeting-house hill, and once, leaning upon his deacon's arm, he said, "This is very like the way to heaven, 'tis up hill; the Lord by His grace fetch us up." And spying a bush near by, he added, "And truly there are thorns and briars on the way."

What remains of all these labors? His Indian Bible not a per-

son in America can read. It is worthless except for the enormous price set upon it by the hunters of literary relics. The Indians have all vanished from the scenes of his teaching, loving sympathy, and guidance. Even before the Apostle died, he had to grieve that the evils of civilization were creeping upon them beyond the power of the gospel to stay. The settlers as a rule had always been suspicious of them, and their treatment of them, like that of the government with its broken treaties since, only strengthened and deepened whatever treacherous traits they had; and at last, after the war with Philip, the chief settlements at Natick were broken up, and by order of the State the families were all removed to Deer Island in Boston Harbor. There is hardly another scene so pathetic as when the Apostle, bending in old age, had to bid them submit to the decree of the Court, and with tearful eyes, bidding them farewell, said, "You will learn that through much tribulation you are to enter into the kingdom of heaven." Were these plodding toils of the scholar and the missionary all in vain? We may think he might have spent his gifts in a higher service. He did not think so. Was this life a waste or a failure? Is any life spent in such entire devotion to what it regards as a special mission in the uplift of any part of humanity as the service of God a failure? Think what a change two centuries have wrought! What prosperity, what power, what luxury! What results of agriculture, mining, manufactures, and commerce! What comfortable homes! What opportunities and obligations! Our problems may be far more intricate and perplexing and threatening; are we giving ourselves to them with the heroism, the consecration, the deep love of humanity, the undisturbed faith in the Eternal which marked the Apostle Eliot? Is it a time to forget those who, in the day of small things, laid the foundation of all we enjoy?

The tumult and the shouting dies,
The Captains and the kings depart:
Still stands their ancient sacrifice,—
An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget,—lest we forget!

In the church, on the site of the Apostle's ministry, a tablet has been placed which bears the following inscription:

JOHN ELIOT

APOSTLE TO THE INDIANS

BORN AT WIDFORD 1604 HIS FIRST YEARS
SEASONED WITH THE FEAR OF GOD THE WORD
AND PRAYER EDUCATED AT JESUS COLLEGE
CAMBRIDGE CAME TO THE NEW WORLD 1631
PREINGAGED TO THE CHURCH IN ROXBURY
ORDAINED AS PREACHER WITH WELD 1632
WHOM HE SUCCEEDED AS PASTOR 1641
1645 FOUNDED THE ROXBURY LATIN SCHOOL
1689 THE ELIOT SCHOOL IN JAMAICA PLAIN
ONE OF THE AUTHORS OF THE BAY PSALM BOOK
1646 BEGAN HIS MARVELLOUS WORK AMONG
THE NATIVE TRIBES OF NEW ENGLAND
1660 FOUNDED AT NATICK THE FIRST INDIAN
CHURCH IN THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY
1663 COMPLETED THE TRANSLATION OF THE BIBLE
IN ZEAL EQUAL TO SAINT PAUL IN CHARITY
EQUAL TO SAINT FRANCIS HE TRAVERSED THE
LAND FOR FORTY YEARS IN PERILS OF THE
WILDERNESS IN PERILS OF THE HEATHEN IN
HUNGER AND THIRST WITH GENTLENESS AND
FEARLESSNESS TO BEAR THE GOSPEL TO THE
CHILDREN OF THE WOODS WHO WERE TO HIM
THE CHILDREN OF GOD

DIED MAY 21 1690

FIRST AMONG PURITAN SAINTS

THE EVIL ONE: A DEVELOPMENT

JOHN EDWARDS LE BOSQUET

BOULDER, COLORADO

It is proposed in this paper to consider, largely from the standpoint of the philosophy of religion, one religious idea: the idea of a power or powers of evil, or, to grasp the whole in one symbol, the idea of the Evil One. Such a discussion should have its interest. The idea of the Evil One, or the Devil as we commonly call him, is perfectly familiar to the average person. There is no need therefore of any elaborate definings. One has only to note that by the Evil One is meant that force or power which is constitutionally—on principle, one might say, if that phrase did not seem a bit out of place—the champion and fosterer of chaos and discord and calamity, of evil and harm and wickedness in general. Or, to put it negatively,—as we perhaps more often think of it,—the Devil is the leader of the opposition as regards the hopeful, the progressive, the divine, with all the meaning which may be packed into that last word.

Look first, then, at the origin of this idea, so far as one may surmise it. On the stage of primitive religion, the savage sees every day happenings which he does not comprehend, which he therefore refers to powers beyond and above those of men. This notion of superhuman, "supernatural," actors in the world is natural enough. Early man with a rudimentary sense of orderly thought sets up by this idea of the supernatural a logical classification of that large number of events which for various reasons cannot be fitted into his ordinary relations with the men about him. That the category "supernatural" is always personal for primitive religion is due to the make-up of the savage mind, which is too far from abstruse to be able to grasp the thought of an abstract impersonal action or, as we should say, force. The reasons for assigning events to supernatural agency are chiefly that the happenings in question are odd or affrighting, or perhaps merely incomprehensible. Of course for the savage much comes under these descriptions. The matter may be illustrated from

what is often seen in the life of our domestic animals. When we see the cat start at an unexpected noise, or the horse prick up his ears at a motor-car or an odd-looking pile of wood, we are cognizant of a state of mind which explains much in the past of our race. We are looking on at almost precisely the mood of the savage over against many events in nature about him. The animal forgets, when the queer occurrence is past; but primitive man, already a reasoner, grasps all such events together as similarly based and caused. A surprising fall of a tree, a flood, an eclipse, a fortunate coincidence, such as the appearance of an animal just when one is in dire need of food, the phenomena of insanity or dreams, the stumbling over a stone of peculiar shape or color, the frequent encountering on some one day of one particular species of bird or beast, even the mere feeling that certain places or situations are uncanny,—heights, deep woods,—all these incidents, accidents we should call them, were for primitive man the plain and not unreasonable indications that there was here involved something beyond himself or any man like him. Chance was an explanation foreign and even impossible to him; in fact a high degree of sophistication is in any case demanded to grasp the idea of chance at all. Thus the savage speedily peopled his surroundings with supernatural powers. Where these found their mode of expression chiefly in animals, we have "totemism," in objects "fetichism," in certain men "shamanism." But even where the superhuman was thus localized, the thing was never exclusive. The savage is inevitably a polytheist. Powers of various energy and skill and danger are for him not in his totem or fetich or medicine-man only, they are all about him also.

At the earlier stages primitive men did not distinguish between benevolent and malevolent divinities. It was necessary to propitiate them all and carefully to avoid affronting any power whatever. There was in practice no need to draw a line between the good and the evil powers. It might perhaps be supposed that evil happenings would be ascribed to demons and beneficial ones to gods, but that was not the case. The category of good and evil, helpful and harmful, is very important and keenly remarked by the savage, but it does not give him the clew for making a distinction between good and evil powers. For an evil event may be

due to the displeasure of a being ordinarily well-disposed, while a good event might be the attempt of a really evil power to beguile.

As time goes on, however, this distinction arises; and it probably appears when the savage becomes "acquainted," so to speak, with certain divinities, marking them off and in a way recognizing them. That is to say, some happenings recur and become well-known so that the propitiating activity can be regular and the power in question can be assigned a name, a function, in brief a place in savage society. Now these familiar powers tend to be regarded as gods and friendly, while all others are looked upon as demons and unfriendly, on the general principle of the uncivilized that every stranger is an enemy. Of course under the savage conditions of life, the trustworthy, more or less manageable, powers are few in number, while the unfamiliar are encountered far more often. The savage lives in a world of terror such as we, after centuries of protecting civilization, can probably in no way imagine. He therefore believes, and it is scarcely surprising, in demons and devils more than in gods, just because he is so seldom surely and consciously safe. Savage religion has something of cultus, but much more of that exorcising or conjuring of demons which we call magic. By degrees, with the receding of ineptitude and fear and the advance of security and knowledge of the world and its ways, the gods relatively increase and the demons become less numerous and insistent, relegated to the background—though a very persistent background in all higher religions.

The next step is taken when these superhuman powers begin to take on a degree of order, no longer existing for thought as an unrelated, promiscuous welter of differing individual gods on the one hand and demons on the other. They all exist still but are arranged in a unity of some sort. With the gods this comes in differing ways. It may be that one of them becomes more and more powerful, while the rest come to be correspondingly subordinate and negligible—as in Greece and Rome. Or one deity may rise to an importance such that he is regarded as the only real divinity, of which accordingly all the others are expressions—as Brahma in India. This unifying process is not so common in the case of the evil powers. The tendency in the case of the elevation of the chief or only god is for the evil

ones to fade into mere memories, pale relics and survivals, lurking on as almost ineradicable superstitions among the more ignorant, and ready to revive to titanic energy at any weakness of the older established religions. This last has happened often in the history of religion, witness especially the recrudescence of exorcisms and conjurations and orgiastic rites at a time when the Greek and Roman religions were decrepit and Christianity had not as yet established itself. In the regular order of things, however, when religion is normally strong and commonly accepted, the evil powers become superstitions, as jinns, harpies, gorgons, evil geniuses, were-wolves, vampires, trolls, witches, and the rest.

If this were the only course of development in the ideas as to evil beings, then the discussion of the evil powers in religion would be a plain and simple one. There would be a steady evolution from the savage beliefs and magic in general, with less and less credence till the evil powers were on the point of vanishing altogether,—a result which would really come to pass when education with its salutary mental and spiritual sanitation had become universal. We are obviously far from it as yet, but that point would be a theoretical end of the evil one and all that is his. As matter of fact, however, this steady development toward monistic belief has not been the exclusive type of development, so that the prophecy of a disappearing evil one is not the only outlook. In certain quarters, alongside of the unifying of the gods, the evil powers, too, have coalesced to form an ordered whole over against the good. A classical illustration of the finished result of such a dualistic development is to be found in the later aspect of Persian religion, commonly called Zoroastrianism.

By Zoroastrianism¹ the world is conceived as a great battlefield for a life-and-death struggle between Ormuzd, the power of light, and Ahriman, the power of darkness, each having his numerous henchmen and followers. Ormuzd is the stronger, and is at length to conquer after various cycles of years—there is that degree of monism even here—but at this present the dualism is irreconcilable. The whole world is filled with supernatural

¹ For this sketch of Zoroastrianism I am largely indebted to E. Lehmann, in *Chantepie de la Saussaye, Religionsgeschichte*, 3d edition.

powers, evil as well as good. Of the evil ones, there are devas and drujš—demons all over the earth, all about and in us. In every corner they do their baleful work. No home and no individual is free or safe from them. Daily purifications, sacrifices, prayers, exorcisms, and the like are necessary to ward them off. Every sin and shameful act, every suffering and calamity, has its demon. Sickness and death, winter and famine, unchastity and drunkenness, envy and arrogance—these all and every other evil are due to the personal energy of Ahriman and his workers. The domain of the demons upon earth is constantly spreading in certain directions and narrowing in others, for all false thinking and unbelief is an addition to Ahriman's realm. All violent sinners are regarded as his recruits, and after death themselves become demons. In time the Persians came to classify all their political enemies as followers and helpers of Ahriman. So the Turanians, the Greeks and Romans, the Turks and Arabs, are to stand in the last battle between Ormuzd and Ahriman and fight on the side of the evil power. The task of the devas is therefore to wrest from Ormuzd the control of the world. Their method is partly by material calamities and devastations, partly by seducing men, corrupting in all possible ways their virtues. This war is going on in every nook and corner of earth. For every piece of ground which Ormuzd brought into existence at the creation, Ahriman at the same time made something evil which should spoil it,—bad soil or bad climate or poisonous insects or evil passions of men. Barrenness and sterility is always a sign of the evil one's presence. Desert, swamp, and moor, rock and dreary heath, are his favorite dwelling-places. Alike in winter-freezing and in summer-sicknesses the work of Ahriman is plainly apparent. Death is the peculiar element of the devas. When a good man passes away, a druj comes for him with glee, but when an evil person dies, they bear him off with sadness and lamentings in view of the loss thus sustained by the forces of evil upon the earth.

It ought to be noted that this religion is very practical in its moral emphases, all of which rest solidly upon its dualism. Every planting of waste ground, every curing of sickness, every overcoming of sin, is a definite driving out of Ahriman and an

extension of the domain of Ormuzd. Worship and purifications have their place, but they are not all-important. Morals and industry in all practical ways, in ploughing, sowing, digging, casting forth, educating—all that means the banishment of barrenness and waste and filth and ignorance—is a driving away of evil and as much the service of Ormuzd as is any formal worship. Is it not clear that in the Persian development of belief in the evil one there is not so much superstition as a positive and useful morality and religion? The belief in an evil one in the form which it here takes can hardly be put aside with contempt as a mere survival of primitive ideas.

Turn now to a brief consideration of the Hebrew religion in which the figure of an evil power is by some believed to be derived from the Persian ideas just portrayed. The religion of the Hebrews is the more significant in that all the notions of the devil which are found in our Western civilization go back, largely if not wholly, to the Old and New Testaments. Satan—to use his Old Testament title—is a late idea in the religion of the Hebrew scriptures, not making its appearance till such books as Zechariah and Chronicles and Job, while Azazel, undoubtedly resting upon a popular superstition regarding a demon of that name, is mentioned in one of the late portions of Leviticus, itself a late book. The idea of an evil one would thus not appear to be indigenous to the Hebrew religion, probably for the reason that the more religious of the Jews were stiffly monotheistic. There is, indeed, the story of the temptation in the Garden of Eden. The tempter, however, is not Satan but a serpent who speaks,—as do all Æsop's serpents, and on occasion the animals of folk-tales generally. The narrative in the first chapters of Genesis is in fact not a description of historical incidents but a tale, no doubt often retold before it was written down, and designed to account for various things, namely, the uncanny dislike felt by human beings for snakes, the crawling of that animal—plainly a most surprising and humiliating mode of progression, the origin of birth-pangs, the reason of the strange and harsh dispensation whereby men have to toil and to die.² It is not evil in general but certain particular evils upon which in naïve and beautiful folk-fashion this narrative reflects in its picture of the serpent-tempter.

² See Gunkel, *Genesis*, 2d edition, pp. 17-19.

Aside from this exception, which is thus only apparent, the figure of Satan does not appear until the latest books of the Old Testament. Even there, be it noted, Satan is not what he afterward becomes in the development of the Hebrew religion. At his first appearance he is no hostile power of evil over against God, but is a servant of God, returning to him and reporting among the others; so with especial clearness in the prologue to the book of Job. His peculiar task is the accusing of men by reminding God of their evil qualities, as a sort of heavenly "prosecuting attorney." As one scholar puts it, he may be said to personify the judicial severity of God, not opposing but serving and even, in so far, representing God. Even in Job, however, Satan takes a certain delight in his task, and this magnifying of his office helps to explain the full-fledged, God-defying Prince of Evil whom we know in the New Testament.

It should be remarked that the notion of Satan appears not only late but precisely after the exile gave association with Persian ideas, and that it is found during the time of the Persian influence. This suggests that Satan is derived from the Persian Ahriman, just as Persia is certainly responsible for the recrudescence of angels and demons in the later Old Testament period. But the figure of Satan as a servant of God is far removed from the Persian notion of him, and this consideration leads to doubt whether Persian influence be at all the source of the idea of the evil one in Palestine. If the development known to us began with the Apocrypha or the New Testament, Persian influence might be taken for granted, but in view of the characteristics of the evil one at an earlier period, it becomes improbable. It is, further, not impossible to explain the appearance of this figure in Hebrew literature on other grounds. In spite of the silence of the prophets as to Satan or demons, there may well have persisted among the great mass of the people survivals of primitive religious notions as to devils which would have sufficed to produce the Satan of later prophecy and of Job. This is the more likely in that Satan at first appears as one of the angels in Jahveh's service and yet as on the opposite side a paradox,—which looks like the resultant of two different religious ideas, namely, the popular belief in

demons, which has been said ³ to "stand at the beginning of all human religious development," and the stark, unbending monotheism which became for the Jewish nation more and more axiomatic. But at any rate Satan makes his entrance into Hebrew literature as a vassal of Jahveh and not until after the exile, and then presently appears as the traditional opponent of all that is right and good.

In the New Testament we read of demons innumerable, thought of as causing abnormalities and diseases of every kind, but most of all as bringing about mental derangements. The phrase "possessed of a devil" as a synonym for insanity is well known to every reader of the Bible. Another point of view is characteristic of the epistles, where the gods of the heathen are called demons,⁴ a suggestion of which Milton makes splendid use in his catalogue of the nobles of Satan's realm. Theodore Parker came very close to translating it into modern thought when he said to a narrow theologian who ascribed unworthy cruelty to the Divine Being, "Your God is my Devil!" But the New Testament knows not only devils of various sorts: it is certain also of a Devil, the leader and champion of evil, always opposed to God and the good—a single commanding figure gathering up into itself all the appeal and danger and wickedness of sin, called by various names and significations, such as Beelzebub, the prince of the power of the air, the prince of this world, the god of this world, as well as the more familiar devil or evil one. The New Testament is not entirely and consistently sure that all temptation is due to the evil one or his minions. It is sometimes implied that it comes from God, as for example in the Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation!" The Epistle of James ⁵ refers to God's responsibility for our temptation as a current idea which it emphatically denies, ascribing evil solicitations not to God, nor even to Satan, but to one's own evil desires. But, speaking by and large, temptation is in the New Testament ordinarily thought of as coming from the evil one. Sin and the solicitation to sin is his specialty, his department of the activity of the superhuman, spiritual world. More than this, this idea of the devil's

³ Bousset, *Die Religion des Judenthums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, p. 331.

⁴ 1 Corinthians 10 20, 21, cf. 1 Timothy 4 1.

⁵ 1 13, 14.

peculiar work is projected into the past, and, in particular, Satan is identified in the period of the New Testament with the serpent of the Garden of Eden in Genesis. So for the future the work of the evil one is to continue until there comes at length a final catastrophe comparable to a similar casting up of accounts in the Persian religion. In a word, evil and the devil are set over against God from all time and into the dim future, till at last according to the Book of Revelation the devil and his angels are cast into the lake of fire and brimstone.

Advancing with the development of Christianity, we may note that in the writings of the church fathers of the second and third century the devil plays an important rôle. All the Roman imperial system and all that opposed Christianity was regarded as a part of his kingdom. As the prince of this world, he is the rival and caricature of the divine, "God's ape" as Tertullian says. Cyprian calls him "the author of all delusions and heresies." He is the owner of men by reason of their sin, and a release can be obtained only by the death of Christ in which Satan overreached himself—since Christ never sinned, accordingly never deserved death—and was in fact intentionally and most cleverly outwitted. This idea of the atonement as made by a payment to the devil held sway in the church's thinking for over a thousand years, and the same aspect of Satan as one easily hoodwinked appears in many different quarters throughout the centuries. Ben Jonson wrote a play the title of which asserts that "The Devil is an Ass." Many folk-tales tell of peasants who get the better of him, such stories representing the naturalization, even with a play of humor, of the notion of an evil one. This very fact of humorous treatment indicates the great importance of the idea and the deep familiarity of the people with it. In fact, during the Middle Ages in general the belief in the devil was absorbing. Saints and others conceived themselves to be in constant conflict with him. It was a fixed idea with everybody, the climax being reached perhaps in the fifteenth century. Luther, for example, saw and fought the devil more than once. He threw an inkstand at him one day at the Wartburg—the ink-spot resulting is still one of the sights shown to tourists at that castle. In the miracle plays the devil is one of the leading char-

acters, and his figure found its way into greater literature. One need only mention Dante's devil at the centre of the earth, crunching in his three mouths the three arch-traitors, and by the motion of his wings sending a cold wind throughout all hell. Milton's Satan is a magnificent incarnation of indomitable pride and perseverance, who appeals to us by his sublimity and courage far more than he affrights or shocks us—for it is generally agreed that, although the writer meant otherwise, Satan is the hero of *Paradise Lost*. Indeed, the idea of the evil one, so clear-cut and so widely familiar as it had become, was sure to be largely utilized—whether one believed in him or not—as a convenient stock symbol for literature from the middle ages on. It was employed by Marlowe in his *Doctor Faustus*, by Goethe in his *Faust*, with its polished eighteenth-century Mephistopheles, not to pause upon such more recent treatments as Hauff's *Memoiren des Satans* or Molnar's *The Devil* or Andreev's quering, doubting, fearing *Anathema*. All these present and mould the idea in different fashions, recurring to it again and again, as well they may, for it is a deep-lying human notion, leaping out and flaming forth at the slightest opening. One may recall the witch-trials for a sad chapter in this folk-idea, or Mrs. Eddy's "malicious animal magnetism" for a comic one.

But what shall be said as to the religious meaning and validity of this idea of the Evil One? In the first place this at least, that superstition in the strict sense can never have any religious value. Detailed representation of the evil one and his doings may delight children and some few adults with the thrill of its pleasing horrors, but there is in it no more religious meaning than in the tales of the "Invisible Cloak" or "Fortunatus's Purse." The superstitious ideas of the devil which have continued alongside monotheistic religion are only to be reprobated—or laughed at. But, having said this, we must also say that the idea of an evil power over against good is not too hastily to be dubbed either irrelevant or a superstition. It may be an integral part of religion. From the point of view of belief in a power of evil in the world, there are today two types of religion. The one rejects the devil scornfully and contemptuously. The other believes in him; not because it prizes him, but because it regards that

belief as necessary to practical life and morality. To some this statement may sound incredible and even silly. It will lose somewhat of this oddness, however, when I hasten to add that the word "Devil" is meant and used as a convenient symbol for the abstract expression, "a positive and real force of evil."

There are religious men today who assert and believe in the reality of evil and there are those on the other hand who deny its essential existence. Of course we are all familiar with the view of those people—the "tender-minded" Professor James called them—who will never admit that there is any real danger anywhere. These blatant optimists are ever to be met with, they who are sure that, however things may seem, everything is bound to come out right. Another expression of this same state of opinion is yielded by the Christian Scientists with their never-ceasing assertion that all pain is an "error"; and there are also the violent partisans of the "larger hope" who, with Tennyson,

"Can but trust that good shall fall
At last—far off—at last to all,
And every winter change to spring."

All these more or less consciously deny that evil is a fact. Or, to use our symbol, they deny the existence of the Evil One. There is, they admit, sin in the world, but they deem it more accurately described as immaturity—a greenness of the fruit which will be outgrown with time and development. There is harm, calamity, anguish, but our idea that these are evil is due to our limited and distorted vision which is unable to see things whole. Only take the standpoint of an eternal All-knower, and evil is not, has not been, and never will be. It seems to be, it is true, and the saner idealists will even grant it to be a part of experience, but that seeming is not real. The chief exponents of this view of evil—Spinoza in the past, and at present the absolute idealists like Professor Royce—attempt to solve the problem of evil by denying its real existence, or rather—to put it positively—they cut this age-old Gordian knot by asserting roundly and dogmatically the power and ultimate triumph of goodness, breathing their souls full with the certainty that

"God's in his heaven,
All's right with the world."

Now this type of denial of the Evil One has its great value, and even its element of truth. It may be seriously questioned whether men could do their best without a deeply-felt belief, usually vague and inarticulate no doubt, that all, *all* is at bottom properly managed and good. Only so does the work that men do *hold*, so to speak, in place of falling back into the abyss. The positive faith-*motif* which underlies absolute idealism and much of the theoretical denial of evil is deeply practical and religiously helpful; the comfort and hope of it is undeniable. But in the details of its working out, and especially in what it denies, it betrays weakness and even a lack of moral earnestness.

For look at the other type of religious thought in this matter, the point of view which asserts that evil and the powers of evil are real and robustly alive in themselves, as well as in our thought of them. There are at least two considerations in favor of this assertion of the real existence of evil:

First, evil is not usually—so far as experience goes—a negative matter, a sign of immaturity alone or chiefly: it is positive, keenly hurting, affrighting. Look at sin. It is vital, emphatic, no mere lack of goodness. One may theorize in one's study, as though it were negative, but for those who have struggled with a habit that is ruinous, or have felt the grip of a hard temptation, sin is something with its own appealing individuality, with its own thews and muscles, and loves and hates. To put the same matter in another fashion, this is but to say that the evil-minded, the champions of evil, the selfish, are not pale negatives of the righteous; they are living, red-blooded human personalities. Go into politics, fight for a clean municipality, and one must soon realize that evil is, though not so strong in the long run, yet every whit as positive and real a fact as good. It is those who know evil and sin best from their own experience who most naturally accept and assert the reality of evil. We have in our vocabulary—that accumulated insight of many generations—the words “fiendish” and “devilish”; they are positive and for us all they are sometimes the only words that really fit a mood or an action or a person. One need only read of such a character as the sea-captain in Jack London's *Sea-Wolf* or Thénardier in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, to grasp what is meant by the positiveness of the evil in

humanity. So with calamity, sickness, microbes, they are not mere "growing pains"; they have a hateful, devouring, crushing aspect. They live for themselves and against what is for our weal. Physicians know well the uncanny entities, almost individualities, which lurk behind diphtheria or typhoid fever or tuberculosis. We often speak of the "meanness" of *la grippe* or the treachery of typhoid fever. The thing is largely true of all that pains us directly or remotely. In fact, it should be noted that pain, in particular, is for psychology at the present moment not the absence of pleasure, not even the subjectively disagreeable alone; it is regarded as a separate, vital sensation by itself and for itself, sometimes useful, sometimes agreeable even, but always positive. In fine, it is admitted that some evil is only apparent, but much, the great majority of it, is real and emphatic. This all is a fact of experience which can scarcely be gainsaid.

And, secondly, a belief in the reality of evil is necessary to a steady, strenuous, complete morality and so to a true religion. It is well to love goodness and purity and to live in their atmosphere, but there is need often, in this actual world, of fighting evil, too; of withstanding poverty and injustice and crime and self-seeking and other evils without us, and of opposing to the death evil tendencies, lusts, foul thinking, sloth, and all the rest within us. Now for this strenuous struggle with the powers of darkness it is a necessary preliminary that one believe that they are not apparent only, but real and dangerous, having an outcome, if not checked or scotched, which will be actual destruction and even damnation. The existence of the evil one must in so far be an article in our creed, if we are earnestly and with any success to overcome him and his works. A phantom foe will be half-heartedly opposed. A sham fight cannot have in it quite the stir, the verve, the agonizing thrust which a real battle with a real enemy will compel. It is all very well, as a moral holiday now and then, to forget the power and reality of evil in the world, but for that righteous indignation and downright eagerness for purity and justice which must have their places in every life, a belief in the Evil One and his potencies for harm is a mighty and indispensable stimulus.

A word in conclusion as to the modern representatives of what

may be called, not unfairly, a belief in the reality of evil. First and foremost, William James in the last chapter of his *Pragmatism* dwells on the value of appreciating the reality and danger of the struggle with evil, as over against the quietism of the easy "waiting game" of absolutism. Nor is this a matter of the pragmatists alone. It is not far from the truth to say that the reality of the power of evil is congenial to all the present-day opponents of absolute idealism—and these are many, as those acquainted with current philosophy know. These opponents include, besides the pragmatists, the pluralists (not always the same as the pragmatists) and the present-day realists,⁶ definitive opponents of pragmatism whose programme has recently appeared, and who bid fair to become a reigning school in philosophy. One may then be modern, and yet hold that there is a force for evil which exists and may long exist, which may even, as some assert, forever exist. The belief in an Evil One is not necessarily a superstition. To assert it is perhaps nearer the truth than to deny it, though it is granted that much can be said on both sides.

Whether or not one go on to believe that it is characteristic of the real evil in the world to be personal, will depend upon how fundamental to reality of existence the concept of personality is held to be. There are many, like myself, who cannot conceive an impersonal positive force for evil. The important truth, however, the precious result of the long-evolving, religious notion of the Evil One, is not that of the personality or impersonality of evil, still less of a literal traditional Devil in a flaming hell with horns and hoofs and tail and the rest; the vital and valuable residuum of it all is the sober assertion of the real existence in the universe of a positive tendency to harm and destruction and sin and death, which evil tendency it behooves men individually and society collectively to fight at every possible opportunity.

⁶ Because this type of philosophy is less known than it should be among theologians, let me quote here from Professor Perry, himself a realist, in his book, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 329. "Realism . . . rejects the doctrine that things must be good. . . . The universe, or collective totality of being, contains things good, bad, and indifferent. . . . It is the practical function of intelligence, not to read goodness into the facts, but to lay bare the facts in all their indifference and brutality."

*THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS:
ITS FIDELITY TO RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE*

WILLARD LEAROYD SPERRY

FALL RIVER, MASSACHUSETTS

After the critical proving as by fire to which the Bible has been subjected during recent years, Protestant apologists have succeeded in re-establishing its claim to a position of central importance in our religion. They have achieved this end by abandoning Calvin's vicious logical circle, which based the authority of Scripture upon the approving testimony of the Spirit and tested the Spirit by the standards of Scripture, and by adopting the more powerful lines of argument deduced from the accepted canons of general literary criticism. "I know that the Bible is true because it finds me," said Coleridge, and thus he achieved in a single sentence what the labored casuistry of centuries had failed to establish. The Bible is true, we say in this generation, because it presents persistent types of profound religious experience which may be verified, "always, everywhere, by all men."

In particular the critic asserts, and for Christianity at large this is the most reassuring dictum of contemporary scholarship, that the teaching of Jesus, as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, constitutes a body of truth quite untrammelled by the narrowing circumstances of time and place. In the Sermon on the Mount we stand in a "celestial everywhere and forever." Occasional dissenting voices have not destroyed the wide-spread conviction that modern scholarship in thus vindicating the universal validity of Jesus' words has achieved, if not its perfect work, at least a signal contribution to contemporary faith.

To the permanent validity of Jesus' teaching the present day has been compelled, however, to take one large exception. The eschatology of the Synoptic Gospels apparently controverts all reasonable standards of universality, and confines one to the "preposterous then and there." This age frankly acknowledges its inability to ascribe present spiritual significance to the

apocalyptic programme of religious progress, whether presented by uncanonical or by canonical writings. The problems raised by those portions of Jesus' teaching cast in this mould are confessedly serious. "We must all of us agree," says a recent essay,¹ "that unless some consensus of opinion among Biblical critics justifies us in denying the authenticity of certain of the sayings of Jesus . . . we shall find this attack upon our citadel the most dangerous in history. For even now things sidereal continue as they were since the beginning of creation."

Every student of the New Testament has felt the inadequacy of the familiar solutions of this problem. An earlier objective-minded orthodoxy found a justification for and a fulfilment of Jesus' words about the catastrophic consummation of the age in the happenings of Pentecost. This hypothesis does credit to our predecessors' ingenuity rather than to their candor. Later subjective-minded believers have spiritualized the whole subject, and thus avoided its obvious dilemmas. But in such exegesis the Ritschlians merely strike hands with the Alexandrians in their familiar preference for faith-values, and Luther is right when he says, "Allegories serve well for such preachers as have not studied much, who know not rightly how to expound the histories and texts, whose leather is too short and will not stretch; we should accustom ourselves to remain by the clear and pure text." Most persons, unsatisfied with both these arbitrary solutions, preserve their faith in the spiritual immediacy of Jesus' words by denying the authenticity of the apocalyptic matter accredited to him, and dismissing it as a later Jewish accretion upon the substratum of the original gospel. But this expedient is open to serious critical objections. For, whatever may be the relation of these passages to the current messianic categories, they form part of the groundwork of the oldest tradition, and from a literary standpoint must stand or fall with that record as a whole. Of the thirty "doubly attested sayings," cited by Burkitt, at least seven are distinctly apocalyptic in form and substance. The urgency of practical religion may warrant the believer in culling out an eclectic gospel for his private needs, but from the point of view of Synoptic procedure we have no more warrant for rejecting the twenty-fourth

¹ Ambrose W. Vernon in the *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1910.

chapter of Matthew, for example, than for rejecting the Sermon on the Mount.

Common recognition of the place of the eschatological matter in the primitive gospel has led to a re-examination of the whole field. Criticism now enables us to trace a slight development and expansion of the original idea during the period in which the gospels were taking form. Professor von Dobschütz has also recently argued that part of Jesus' teaching about the last things, when compared with contemporary apocalyptic literature, constitutes a "transmuted eschatology," that is, a dematerialized eschatology. Yet when these concessions have been made, there are still large blocks of discourse, neither accretions, nor yet a transmuted conception of the messianic consummation, which must be attributed to Jesus himself. It has, therefore, become necessary to review, as best we may, the development of Jesus' messianic self-consciousness. Few disciples of the present day are inclined to deny the validity of Jesus' belief in the perpetuity of his own person and the growth of the Kingdom. We are also coming to see that when Jesus sought to formulate and express these ideas he had only the messianic categories of his own day. We may regret that Jesus was compelled to have recourse to modes of thought which from the vantage-ground of later centuries seem scientifically inaccurate and baldly unspiritual; but what are the conceivable alternatives? Had he striven to express himself in any other terms, the dilemma would be infinitely more serious. That he prophesied his immediate return upon the clouds of glory may be a very real stumbling-block to his disciples of the twentieth century; but had he been a great anachronism and foretold his part in the realization of the increasing purpose, in terms of the "ascent of man," he would be a hopeless riddle. The present-day believer may very properly prefer some sober terminology to the catastrophic language of the Book of Enoch when he seeks to describe spiritual progress, but he does not make the person of Jesus more significant for faith by demanding in a man of the first century the terminology of the twentieth. Even the most jealous conservatism is now repudiating that conception of the incarnation which would make of Jesus a thesaurus of all wisdom, past, present, and

to come. Dr. Sanday expresses the conviction of many true Christians when he says, "The human thought and tongue of Jesus—and it was only through human thought and speech that even He could communicate with His disciples who were also His brethren—could only express themselves with that relativity which attaches to all that is human. The language of the Apocalypse, in one or another of its forms, was almost the only language available." Thus far has criticism brought us. Jesus expected the more or less immediate and catastrophic consummation of the kingdom, and his own return as the climax of that event. We are willing to acknowledge that, believing as he did in the ultimate realization of the messianic programme, his appropriation of this terminology was not only natural but inevitable. We accept the fact of the increasing realization of the Kingdom and the continued operation of the person of Christ in the sphere of faith as proved, while we recognize in the form of the apocalyptic matter of the gospels "that relativity which attaches to all that is human." And yet for most present-day disciples, when all these concessions have been made, the thirteenth chapter of Mark, the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew, the seventeenth and twenty-first chapters of Luke, still remain "dead hypotheses." In Coleridge's words they do not "find us." They have no direct contribution to make to our common religious life.

This general indifference and antipathy to the apocalyptic matter in the gospels seems to arise, not from a repudiation of that mental relativity which led to a use of the old imagery of Daniel, but rather from a profound distrust of the catastrophic mood which colors all Jewish eschatology. We can forgive the apocalyptist his symbolism, but we cannot accept as religiously valid for the present day his theory of chaotic and discontinuous progress. The sayings of Jesus about the end of the age are dominated by two ideas, suddenness and unforeseeability. These ideas constitute the continually recurring theme of all Jesus had to say about the future. "As the lightning cometh forth from the east and shineth even unto the west, so shall the coming of the Son of Man be." "Of that day and hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son." "Therefore be ye ready, for in an hour when ye think not." "In a day when

he expecteth not, and in hour when he knoweth not." "Ye know not when the master of the house cometh, at even, or at midnight, or at cockcrow, or in the morning, lest coming suddenly he find you sleeping." These words anticipate vague and nameless crises, lying outside the natural sequence of cause and effect, which are to burst upon the believer in the unexpected moment. The scientific and historical imagination find it all but impossible to translate this language about undefined, uncorrelated phenomena into the religious vernacular of the present day.

Over against this characteristic Jewish theory of change must be set the scientific conventionalism of our own day. "Nature," said Lamarck, "is never brusque," and when this dictum is applied to spiritual processes the believer finds that the Synoptic eschatology will not bear the test of such standardization. "The growth of historical study in the nineteenth century," says Professor Bury, "has been determined and characterised by the same general principle which has underlain the simultaneous development of the study of nature, namely the genetic idea. . . . Human history is a causal, genetic process." "The doctrine of the continuity of history," writes Professor Robinson in the same spirit, "is based upon the observed fact that every human institution, every generally accepted idea, every important invention, is but the summation of long lines of progress reaching back as far as we have the patience or means to follow them." Upon this point the difference between the modes of thought of the first and the twentieth centuries is absolute. The Jew knew nothing of a gradual evolution, while the modern believer knows of no progress without such evolution. From this difference the "problem" of the Synoptic eschatology arises.

The scientific presuppositions with which the Biblical critic approaches these apocalyptic utterances prove upon examination to be those of a quarter of a century ago. It is now just over twenty-five years since Henry Drummond wrote his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, and, though his contention that the laws governing the two realms are identical has been generally discounted, the presumption that they are analogous still prevails. When Harold Begbie tells us, therefore, that this genera-

tion "does not believe in a sudden heaven or a sudden hell," he merely re-echoes for the generation a conception of spiritual evolution which has very generally dominated religious thought since Drummond's day. A résumé of Drummond's introductory chapter will suggest the difficulties which this now familiar theory of progress places in the path of the apocalyptic programme. For Drummond does not hesitate to affirm at the outset that "catastrophism" has been "dismissed as a final form of science," since the lie of things in the spiritual world, as arranged by a catastrophic theology, is not in harmony with the world around. This proposition leads to an inevitable apotheosis of the "Principle of Continuity,"—the capitals are Drummond's,—which is said to be "growing in splendor with every discovery of science." This law of continuity is the acknowledged *a priori* basis for all the subsequent argument. It is said to be the ultimate ground upon which man as a moral and rational being may hope to stand. It is our final assurance that our intellect shall not be insulted nor our confidence in nature abused. "The Principle of Continuity may be said to be the definite expression in words of our trust that God will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion. . . . To premise a region where the principle of continuity fails would be to overthrow Nature, then science, and last the human mind." Obviously, within such a scheme there is no room for the apocalyptic order with its emphasis upon the sudden and the unforeseen. If this rejection of the catastrophic be the last word of science, then the eschatology of the Synoptic Gospels, not merely in form, but in essence, must be abandoned as archaic and untrue.

But such is the "relativity which attaches to all that is human" that science has faced about upon itself, and the whole theory of change is being carefully re-examined. "No one," writes Professor Bateson, "can survey the work of recent years without perceiving that evolutionary orthodoxy developed too fast, and that a great deal has got to come down." It now seems quite possible, if not probable, that our familiar conceptions of a continuous mechanical evolution must be radically modified, and modified, such is the irony of the situation, in the direction of the catastrophic programme, which the earlier evolutionists

boldly repudiated. When Darwin began to examine the subject of variation, he made a distinction between the slight differences which constitute ordinary variation and the rarer but more marked variations which seemed to arise spontaneously. This distinction has always been preserved and is now familiar to us as "continuous variation" and "discontinuous variation." The old Darwinian doctrine of evolution depends essentially upon the cumulative effect of those minute variations which constitute a continuous series. The examples of discontinuous variation were for the orthodox biologists the exceptional "sports" which proved their rule. Since Darwin's day a partially successful effort has been made to formulate the law of continuous variation, by which the fluctuations of a given individual from the norm may be anticipated. Now, however, that the law has been formulated, it appears to deal with phenomena too minute for natural selection to utilize. On the other hand a faithful empiricism does not hesitate to declare that life is more "brusque" than Darwin admitted. The school of biologists of which Bateson is the zoölogical and DeVries the botanical leader has, therefore, turned its attention to those individuals which illustrate the larger variations—the "mutations" as DeVries calls them—and which presumably constitute a "discontinuous series." Their contention that these considerable mutations make a perceptible difference in the individual's chance of life, and offer firmer holding-ground for natural selection than the insensible differences, is apparently incontrovertible. Whether or not one may be willing to agree with these scientific men that "Every new specific character may be assumed to have arisen by mutation," one must, at least, realize that the burden of proof has been shifted from the new to the old evolutionism, since "an evolution of species proceeding by definite steps is more, rather than less, easy to imagine than an evolution proceeding by the accumulation of indefinite and insensible steps." Of these mutations science can only say that they do not appear in accordance with any discernible law, but "suddenly, abruptly, . . . and unexpectedly, . . . perhaps once or twice in a century, perhaps even only once in a thousand years."

The significance for the question in hand of these changing con-

ceptions of physical evolution would not be so great were they not substantiated by the most significant movements in contemporary philosophy. Professor Höffding tells us that "the greater empirical discontinuity," which recent research has discovered, "has made us all open our eyes for new possibilities to arise through the *prima facie* inexplicable 'spontaneous' variations which are the condition of all evolution. This point is one of peculiar interest. Deeper than speculative philosophy and mechanical science saw in the days of their triumph, we catch sight of new streams, whose sources and laws we have still to discover."

Presumably the ablest and the most suggestive development of this line of thought is to be found in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*. Bergson has cast down the gauntlet before all the mechanical theories of psychical evolution, and is the acknowledged champion of the doctrine of "a new creation." Arguing against the traditional axioms of the past quarter of a century, but from the facts of life, he reiterates the statements of Bateson and DeVries that to foretell the form of a coming individual is beyond our powers, since each new stage of development involves original situations, never before realized. Since these conditions cannot be predicted until they appear, the mechanical theory of evolution has nothing to say of the future. Restating these hypotheses with immediate reference to the realm of personality, Bergson continues: "If our action be one that involves the whole of our person and is truly ours it could not have been foreseen. It is quite certain that if we could view the evolution of life in its entirety, the spontaneity of its movement and the unforeseeability of its procedures would thrust themselves upon our attention."

Bergson is quite conscious of his heresy, but like the true heretic he dare not recant. He reviews the law of continuity with candor, only to abandon it. Like a philosophical Childe Roland, he advances to the Dark Tower of logical infidelity, winds upon his horn and—*pace* Drummond—"overthrows Nature, then science, and last the human mind." "Against this idea of the absolute originality and unforeseeability of forms," he writes, "our whole intellect rises in revolt. The essential function of our intellect, as the evolution of life has fashioned it, is to

be a light for our conduct, to make ready for action on things, to foresee for a given situation, the events favorable or unfavorable, which may follow thereupon. Anything that is irreducible and irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes science. To get a notion of this irreducibility and irreversibility we must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, and go counter to the natural bent of the intellect."

What the influence of these conclusions may be upon the problem in question we can only vaguely anticipate, but that they will be great we may be certain. Our unutterable confusion regarding Jesus' words about the last things arises from our persistent determination to read them as a scientific description of the realization of the kingdom rather than as a presentation of actual life. Bergson continually reminds us that, as science has only to do with given facts, its eyes are forever turned toward the past. But eschatology is *ipso verbo* a theory of the future, and is not, therefore, a legitimate field for scientific investigation. Consequently, the thirteenth chapter of Mark, with its parallels and Q-supplements, cannot in the very nature of the case furnish any ground for theological speculation. Either they must be read as religious utterances only, or they must be ignored. For to read in retrospect chapters having to do with the religious experience of the future is to become a critical Mr. Facing-both-ways, and a criticism divided against itself cannot stand.

If we are to read these words about the last things in the only way they may be read, we must be willing to "do violence to the mind, and go counter to the natural bent of the intellect." In other words, we must be willing to ignore the conception of continuity which has hitherto seemed a necessity for science, and we must turn to experience itself, as it is given in life. The general recoil of religious thought in this day away from theory toward action should achieve our emancipation from doctrines which have unquestionably blinded us to the actual progress of experience. Whether or not one can see the catastrophic and apocalyptic depends upon one's whole attitude toward life. The theorist still asserts, with Miss Jane Harrison and those who worship the idols of the fathers: "Continuous evolution leaves no gap for revelation

sudden and complete." But the empiricists say with Father Waggett: "There is another view of life, equally valid and practically sometimes more important, which recognises the immediate and lasting effects of crises, difference, and revolution. Our ardor for the demonstration of uniformity of process and of minute continuous change needs to be balanced by a recognition of the catastrophic element in experience."

There is, perhaps, no religious phenomenon in which this contrast between the substance of experience and scientific description is more sharply drawn than in that of sudden conversion. Protestantism is apparently proceeding upon the assumption that Professor James's two classic chapters on Conversion in the *Varieties of Religious Experience* have destroyed that illusion for theology and banished the fact from religion. The experiences of S. H. Hadley and David Brainerd and Henry Alleine and the others of that notable communion to whom a sudden and a revolutionary manifestation of reality was granted, remain for the academic mind interesting psychological illustrations of the encroachment of the subconscious upon the conscious self. But this is the language of the laboratory and not of life. Religion cannot speak in these terms, just because the movements of the subconscious are never given in advance. The discovery of the subliminal self has unquestionably furnished psychologists with a clew to the immediate antecedent causes of sudden conversion, but this discovery has not altered the content of the experience for the convert or diminished its revolutionary values for consciousness.

This is unquestionably the implication of Mr. Begbie's telling "Footnotes" to the *Varieties*. He sees that religion is being taken from the learned, who are crippled by theories, and given to the simple, who accept facts. The facts which he presents lie, it is true, outside the beaten track of ecclesiastical conventions, but they bespeak a profound spiritual reality, which our stereotyped programmes of orderly but uninspired continuity lack. These are confessedly the men and the women whom the state and philanthropy and science had abandoned to the logically suicidal ravages of their own transgressions, but a religion which brought them the sudden and the unforeseen achieved their salvation. There is, to use Carlyle's phrase, "a felt indubitable certainty of Experi-

ence" in these records, which the decent mechanical theology of the times cannot boast.

The problem for the religious man is not whether he will be able to explain experience once it is given, but how he will meet it as it comes. If he worships the Principle of Continuity to the exclusion of all catastrophism, the unforeseen opportunities of the future and its as sudden trials must inevitably find him sleeping. If he insists upon denying the reality of these experiences, his life is by just so much impoverished. The real problem of the gospel eschatology for the present-day Christian is not whether the archaic imagery of the Book of Daniel may be ingeniously dovetailed into contemporary conditions, but whether the continually repeated warning, "Watch, for ye know not," has, in an age which craves the certainties of science, a divine immediacy. The latest utterances of biology and the ablest modern treatise in philosophy are at one with the testimony of profound religious experience in asserting that Jesus' conception of the future, as involving the sudden and the unforeseen, is still as faithful to life as the Sermon on the Mount and the parables of growth, those ancient premonitions of the theory of gradual evolution upon which we have built our modern faith.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- THE EARLY ENGLISH DISSENTERS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT RESEARCH (1550-1641). *By Champlin Burrage.* 2 vols. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.) 1912. \$6.50 net.
- L'ORIENTATION RELIGIEUSE DE LA FRANCE ACTUELLE. *By Paul Sabatier.* (Bibliothèque du Mouvement Social Contemporain.) pp. 320. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1911. 3 francs, 50.
- CHRISTIAN EPIGRAPHY. AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE WITH A COLLECTION OF ANCIENT CHRISTIAN INSCRIPTIONS MAINLY OF ROMAN ORIGIN. *By Orazio Marucchi. Translated by J. Armine Willis.* pp. 12+460. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.) 1912. \$3 net.
- CHRISTUS. MANUEL D'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS. *Par Joseph Huby.* pp. 20+1036. 4e éd. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie. 1912.
- A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF ISAIAH, I-XXXIX. *By George Buchanan Gray.* XL-LXVI. *By Arthur S. Peake.* (The International Critical Commentary.) In two volumes. Vol. 1. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. \$3 net.
- RELIGION AND LIFE. *By Rudolf Eucken.* pp. 8+46. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. 50 cents.
- THE CHRISTIAN HOPE. A STUDY IN THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. *By William Adams Brown.* (Studies in Theology.) pp. 12+216. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. 75 cents net.
- A STUDY OF AUGUSTINE'S VERSIONS OF GENESIS. A DISSERTATION. *By John S. McIntosh.* pp. 10+130. Chicago: The University [of Chicago] Press. [1912.] 75 cents.
- HOW THE CROSS SAVES. *By Robert F. Horton.* pp. 93. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1912.] 50 cents net.
- RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION. A HISTORY OF ITS ECONOMICS AND OF ITS RELATION TO THE STATE. *By Charles Lee Raper.* pp. 12+331. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. \$1.50.

- BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL STUDIES.** *By the Members of the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary.* Published in Commemoration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Founding of the Seminary. pp. 8+634. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. \$3 net.
- TURNING POINTS IN MY LIFE.** *By William Porcher DuBose.* pp. 6+143. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1912. \$1.10 net.
- AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS.** *By Arthur R. Gray, with a Concluding Chapter by W. Lloyd Bevan.* pp. 14+237. (Sewanee Theological Library.) Sewanee, Tenn.: The University Press. 1912. \$1.50.
- THE RULE OF ST. CLARE. ITS OBSERVANCE IN THE LIGHT OF EARLY DOCUMENTS. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEVENTH CENTENARY OF THE SAINT'S CALL.** *By Paschal Robinson.* pp. 32. Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press. 1912. 10 cents net.
- SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE BIBLE.** *By Louis Wallis.* pp. 36+308. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. [1912.] \$1.50 net.
- THE COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND THE EVOLUTION OF MIND. IMMORTALITY A SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY.** *By Duncan Taylor.* pp. 176. London: The Walter Scott Publishing Company, Ltd. 1912. 3 shillings, 6 pence.
- LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.** *By John Witherspoon.* (Early American Philosophers.) pp. 32+144. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1912.
- THE RELIGIONS OF MODERN SYRIA AND PALESTINE.** *By Frederick Jones Bliss.* (The Bross Lectures, 1908.) pp. 14+354. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. \$1.50 net.
- THE SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS INSIGHT.** *By Josiah Royce.* (The Bross Lectures, 1911.) pp. 16+297. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. \$1.25 net.
- THE CROSS, THE REPORT OF A MISGIVING.** *By G. A. Johnston Ross.* pp. 46. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1912.] 25 cents net.
- OSIRIS AND THE EGYPTIAN RESURRECTION.** *By E. A. Wallis Budge.* 2 vols. London: Philip Lee Warner; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1911.
- LA CRÉDIBILITÉ ET L'APOLOGÉTIQUE.** *Par A. Gardeil.* (Bibliothèque Théologique.) pp. 20+332. Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre. 1912. 3 francs, 50.

- TYPES OF ENGLISH PIETY.** *By R. H. Coats.* pp. 12+284. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.) 1912.
- CROYANCES, RITES, INSTITUTIONS.** *By Goblet d'Alviella.* 3 vols. Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner. 1911. 22 francs, 50.
- LIFE'S UNEXPECTED ISSUES AND OTHER PAPERS ON CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.** *By William L. Watkinson.* pp. 212. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1912.] \$1 net.
- THE RENASCENCE OF FAITH.** *By Richard Roberts, with an Introduction by G. A. Johnston Ross.* pp. 318. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1912.] \$1.50 net.
- "THE MESSIAH" OF THE TARGUMS, TALMUDS, AND RABBINICAL WRITERS.** *By Joseph M. Tydings.* Charts. Louisville, Ky.: Joseph M. Tydings. 1912.
- THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE.** *By S. S. Heberd.* pp. 6+251. New York: Maspeth Publishing House. 1911.
- DER WAHRHEITSGEHALT DER RELIGION.** *Von Rudolf Eucken.* 3e Aufl. pp. 14+422. Leipzig: Verlag von Veit & Comp. 1912. 10 marks.
- THE ORACLES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.** *By Edward Carus Selwyn.* pp. 24+452. London: Hodder & Stoughton. [1912.] 10 shillings, 6 pence.
- THE HISTORIC JESUS. A STUDY OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.** *By Charles Stanley Lester.* pp. 12+426. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. \$2.50.
- THE REALM OF ENDS OR PLURALISM AND THEISM.** *By James Ward.* (Gifford Lectures, 1907-10.) pp. 16+490. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1911. \$3.25 net.
- THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL UNDER THE KINGDOM.** *By Adam C. Welch.* (Kerr Lectures, 1911-12.) pp. 16+305. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1912.
- FAITH AND THE NEW TESTAMENT.** *By A. W. F. Blunt.* pp. 8+116. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1912.
- MISSION PROBLEMS IN JAPAN, THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL. LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, HOLLAND, MICH.** *By Albertus Pieters.* pp. 188. New York: The Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America. 1912. 75 cents.
- REVELATION AND ITS RECORD.** *By William W. Guth.* pp. 12+255. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1912. \$1.25 net.

THE RISE OF THE MODERN SPIRIT IN EUROPE. A STUDY OF THE PRE-REFORMATION AGE IN ITS SOCIAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND LITERARY ASPECTS. *By George S. Butz.* (Swander Memorial Lectures, 1910.) pp. 18+293. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1912. \$1.25 net.

ENDEAVORS AFTER THE SPIRIT OF RELIGION. *By Arthur G. Beach.* pp. 4+124. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1912. \$1 net.

AN ANGLO-SAXON ABBOT, ÆLFRIC OF EYNHAM. A STUDY. *By S. Harvey Gem.* pp. 16+200. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1912.

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V.

OCTOBER, 1912

NUMBER 4

EMPIRICISM AND PLATONISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

TO THE MEMORY OF WILLIAM JAMES

ERNST TROELTSCH

UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG

ERRATUM.

On page 413, line 6 from below, and page 419, line 4,
for "zoölogical" read "noölogical."

Europe, partly because of the wealth of his own new and valuable suggestions, which have been added to by a number of zealous followers. It may not be uninteresting, therefore, to the readers of this *Review*, if I try to characterize what is peculiar and new in this, the first thorough-going contribution from America to the philosophy of religion. In doing so, I shall discuss two points: *first*, the contrast between James's ideas and the European philosophy of religion; and, *second*, the positive value that the new ideas which thus emerge seem to me to have.

Before I undertake to define the difference, I must, however, point out what is common to the two systems. This common

element is, in fact, more extensive and significant than appears in James's own writings. The differences lie within the bounds of presuppositions common to both, and are not fundamental; the essential unity of the intellectual work of the modern civilized world is fully maintained. For James's philosophy of religion—and this is the common characteristic—is a true *philosophy* of religion, that is to say not a one sided sectarian or theological treatment of the subject. As with us the philosophy of religion is distinguished from the theology of the churches by setting out, not from a given theological norm of truth, but from the whole wide field of religious phenomena, so also with James. He, too, considers religion as a vast sphere of phenomena common to all mankind, within which no presumption lies in favor of minor individual circles. The goal, moreover, like the point of departure, is determined for him by no outside authority or dogma, but he compares and appraises the phenomena with entire freedom, according to a standard which the philosopher himself has first to discover and justify. The problem of this standard contains in itself, as we shall see, the difficulties which are most intrinsic to the philosophy of religion. In what has been said the third common trait has already been implied: his discrimination and his appraisal do not assume the supernaturalism of the church, nor set off a Jewish-Christian region of miracles over against a natural region devoid of the miraculous. It is the more important to emphasize this, because James himself repeatedly and positively professes adherence to supernaturalism and dualism, and by no means rejects miracles. Supernaturalism is for him, however, no exclusive attribute of Christianity, but pertains to every religion, and simply means the repudiation of rationalism and monism with their faith in law. The miraculous in James's sense has nothing to do with the miracles of Christian legend and theology. Faith in a divine government of the world, he says in one place, "of course means 'miraculous' interposition, but not necessarily of the gross sort our fathers took such delight in representing, and which has so lost its magic for us. . . . Signs and wonders and convulsions of the earth and sky are not the only neutralizers of obstruction to a god's plans of which it is possible to think." For the same reason natural religion means

for him the religious experiences received from the beauty and splendor of nature, in contrast to those which proceed from nature's hidden background and belong to Neoplatonism and Buddhism as much as to Christianity.

All this, however, imports the large conception of the philosophy of religion which has taken shape from the time of Herder and Schleiermacher, Spinoza and Hume. Setting aside every personal belief, the thinker addresses himself to the whole broad range of the actual psychological facts of religion, and, starting from the observation and analysis of these, tries to attain to normative forms of faith; leaving it the while an open question whether there are any such forms and what character they will turn out to have. Emancipation from the beliefs we happen to have inherited, comprehensive comparison of all the phenomena, determination of the meaning and content of religious phenomena by means of analysis, inquiry into the conditions under which a standard of judgment is to be framed—all this James also assumes as the only living presupposition, or "working hypothesis," in contrast to which ecclesiastical apologetics with its argument from miracles, whether it lays the greater stress on the external or the internal miracle, is a dead hypothesis.

The characteristic difference, then, must be sought within the sphere of the common presupposition; for, so far as the latter is concerned, James is distinguished from others solely by the fact that to him the presupposition presents itself as the only vital working hypothesis at present available, whereas we see in it the demand of reason, asserting itself as soon as the constraint of inherited prejudice is withdrawn. In this distinction, indeed, a hint is already given of the contrast between the two modes of thought. But it is only a hint, and, as for its effect on the thought as a whole, the difference is for the moment negligible; the result is the same in either case. The real difference can be made essentially clear only at the main point, namely, where the principle of psychological analysis and its consequences comes in. But that can be done only when we have first made clear the fundamental characteristic of the European philosophy of religion.

This fundamental characteristic may be described in a single

word as Platonic or Neoplatonic. The whole of European philosophy and science stands essentially under the influence of Platonic rationalism. This in turn presupposes, to be sure, the subjectivism and relativism of the Sophists, and in so far has its roots in empiricism; but at the same time its consistent aim is to transcend the merely actual through the demonstration that, seething and developing within it, is a rationally necessary conceptual element. Platonism proper understood these concepts only as thought-engendered intuitions and abstractions of the genuinely ideal; and it never seriously attempted to elucidate their essential reality, their relation to the experience that elaborates and contains them, their derivation from an ultimate rational basis, or rational law, of the universe. That advance was made in part by Aristotle, who taught that idea and law are immanent in experience, and derived them from the rational principle of the world by the use of the ideas of purpose and of organic development toward the cosmic principle. Neoplatonism then attached this development still more firmly to the cosmic principle by teaching that the descent from pure intangible superempiric ideality down to the world of experience is made on a kind of ladder of ideas, and that the reascent comes about through a growing knowledge of these ideas as realities. Stoicism, despite its original empiricism, eventually approximated in its theory of knowledge and its metaphysics to these same views, through its idea of a universal cosmic law governing nature and spirit, so that for European philosophy Stoicism was able to fuse with the two first-mentioned types.

This system of thought controlled all the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The relativism of the Sophists, the scepticism which appeals to the multiformity of the actual, the whole troop of radical subjectivism and empiricism, were completely routed by the Platonic school; only occasionally and uncertainly, in nominalism and in the scepticism of the Renaissance, did these features reappear. Raphael's "School of Athens" depicts European philosophy as it took shape in reaction against the Sophists and their relativism; a philosophy, that is, which points out in experience rational laws and ideas, and derives these laws from the divine cosmic reason. Here the modern

natural sciences, which in other respects pass clean beyond the horizon of antiquity, have changed nothing. With Kepler and Galileo, Descartes and Newton, the purport of science is the discovery of a rational necessity in the processes of nature. It is now rightly recognized that the conception of rationally necessary laws of nature is derived from Platonism. Even the Kantian philosophy follows the lead of Platonism when it attempts to construe these natural laws as a rational necessity of the mind, and thus to secure them against pure relativism, as well as against a materialism which annuls necessity and mind together. It is no wonder, therefore, that from the Kantian philosophy have issued once more the analogues of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. And Neokantianism, even in its most cautious, positivist-agnostic form, is prepared to assert the rationality and necessity of the laws, referring them to the *a priori* organizing activity of the thinking subject.

Under these circumstances, it is but natural that the philosophy of religion, too, should conform to the Platonic type. For the philosophy of religion is in truth nothing other than the application of universal philosophic theory to the understanding of religion and judgment upon it. Religion in itself is without ideas and without scientific method. Hence it can never give rise to a completely independent science determined only by the indications of religion itself. It will always be necessary to apply general principles, defined on the plane of science at large. Accordingly, the European philosophy of religion, so far as it has been able to develop at all in the presence of popular mythology and of the official theology (and to filter somewhat into the latter), is throughout Platonic and Neoplatonic in nature. Stoicism, whose contributions were considerable, and especially important for ethics, was hardly felt to be different from Platonism; it represented only the more simple and popular philosophical element. As soon, therefore, as the Christian community, emerging from the obscurity of the lower and middle strata of society, felt the need of the intellectual life and sought to offer a philosophical basis for the common faith, Platonism came to the fore.

The two greatest constructive theologians of the ancient church,

Origen and Augustine, required such a basis, and both found it in Platonism. The spiritual contemplation of the eternal and necessary ideas is for Origen the very substance of all religion; and if it be asked where in this is to be found the specifically religious element, Origen would answer that it lies in the assimilation, communion, and unification of being, between the divine and the finite spirit, realized in this contemplation. The fellowship of Christian worship and life adds to this only the concrete visibility of the divine reason in the incarnate Logos, the moral laws of the Logos, and the mysteries founded by him. Under such a view a distinction is of course made between an esoteric, philosophical type of Christianity and an exoteric, mythical, ecclesiastical one. For Augustine, the mind's logical certainty of itself, which overcomes scepticism, is the most elementary expression of religion. He goes on to seek support in the Neoplatonic conception of an immanence of the divine thought in human thought, so that, by the clarification of thought itself, the ascent to unity with the divine spirit which is operative in this process follows. Complete assurance, indeed, he obtains only through the authority of the church, with its dogma, its sacraments, and its rule of life.

From Augustine down, this fundamental philosophy of religion has persisted. It has been broadened by Aristotelianism, moralized by Stoicism; but it has remained the fundamental philosophy of religion, so far as one has been needed. This foundation appeared most clearly in so-called Mysticism, which satisfied its yearning for immediateness and intensity in the religious process by an unparalleled emphasis on these fundamentals, and made the Christian dogma a mere symbol of the cosmic process, in which the potential unity of divine and human reason—the universal cosmic law—is made actual in the Christian soul through contact with the truth taught by the church. We meet a like thought in the mystics of the Renaissance, but with the specifically Christian elements completely eliminated; while the mystics and spiritualists of Protestantism have naturally introduced the historical aspect of Christianity more strongly and in various ways. The religious part of Spinoza's teaching is to be understood no otherwise, and is closely connected with the mysticism

of his day. In recent times, under the influence of the modern conception of evolution in history, Christianity has been understood as a transitional stage, or as the culmination, of a process wherein the soul apprehends the unity with the divine reason which inheres in the nature of spirit. An unbroken line runs here from Leibnitz, Lessing, and Herder to Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, and thence to the religious philosophy of today. The doctrine of Kant, too, which pre-eminently maintains the fundamental thought of Platonism, does not depart from this type in its philosophy of religion. The apprehension of the immediate unity of the finite and the infinite reason does not, indeed, form the basis here, and religion is treated as the complement of ethics, to which it is annexed; but since the rationally necessary law of the practical reason connects the finite spirit with "reason in general," the Platonic type is maintained, at least indirectly, through the mediation of the moral. Kant's philosophy of religion is a sort of grafting of Stoicism upon the Platonic theory. So far, also, as the Neokantian theology (which in Herrmann is much nearer to Count Zinzendorf than it is to Kant) finds in the moral law a general philosophical support for the underpinning of Christianity, it, too, despite its contempt for the philosophy of religion, is connected, though by a rather slender thread, with Platonism and its conceptual necessities.

The leading ideas which appear in such a philosophy of religion are the following:

1. Consciousness, as a finite concretion of the universal cosmic consciousness, and taken together with the necessary presuppositions which are *a priori* and potentially contained in it, is the source of religion. Religion is a fact of consciousness; yet not mere fact, but the result of a necessity of consciousness, in the further interpretation of which the necessity of religious conceptions is made to approximate, now to the ultimate metaphysical, now to the ultimate ethical ideas, or again is characterized as something entirely unique, and with a content which is hard to define.

2. This necessity of consciousness, or *a priori* spiritual law, by virtue of which the individual relates himself to an absolute immanent in the soul, is the kernel of religious phenomena, which

are everywhere identical, in spite of all their external diversities, accidental variations, and obscurations. This is the "essence of religion," which in various manifestations becomes variously actual, but presses on toward the pure realization of itself—a genuinely Platonic thought.

3. This essence of religion actually appears as a constantly changing and mobile phenomenon, a fact which is explained partly by the notion of empirical distortion, partly by that of necessary individualization, partly by that of an historical, evolutionary movement directed toward the realization of itself. According to the sturdiness of our underlying rationalism, we either content ourselves here with empirical classifications, or else we seek to understand and rationalize this movement like everything else. In the latter case it will appear as an evolution necessarily resulting from the relation of the spirit to the world of experience, and one in which we can recognize the stages of development.

4. As the "essence of religion" never lies quite in broad daylight, while the historical movement aims at the pure realization of this essence, questions present themselves about a complete, final, and therefore rationally necessary, realization of this "essence"—whether such a realization is possible at all, whether it has already come into existence, when and how it may perhaps be brought about by the future. This is the problem of absolute religion, and is immediately encountered so soon as consciousness is recognized as expressing rational necessities and religion is accepted as one of these necessities. For Christian theologians the difficulty then arises of construing Christianity as the absolute religion.

5. All these investigations have set out from the fact of consciousness, which, however, as already said, is more than mere fact, being a compound of both the necessary and the contingent. Such a way of thinking gains its final security only when it firmly anchors the individual consciousness, of itself always contingent, in the holding-ground of "consciousness in general," and then, on that basis, makes the compound somehow comprehensible, so that in it the elements of necessity are plainly seen to derive their origin from the absolute consciousness, and the

direction of evolution is understood as a movement toward that goal. In the background here stands the problem of the connection of finite and infinite consciousness. This problem is often called insoluble, and in that case, as in Schleiermacher, the idea of God loses its metaphysical character. When a solution is attempted, as in the Hegelian school, universal rational necessity absorbs the empirical, contingent, and free elements, so that the result is a pantheistic monism; or, as in Schelling and Schopenhauer, it becomes apparent that the compound cannot be rationally analyzed, in which case an element of irrationalism enters into the idea of God that neutralizes the rational foundation thought.

When we set before us these fundamental ideas of the European, essentially Platonic, philosophy of religion, it is at once clear how exactly opposite is the position of James. James is more than the religious psychologist who has added a new field to the philosophy of religion. He is, by the very act of making the philosophy of religion into a psychology of religion, the representative of an altogether opposite type of thought in general, and ~~therefore of an opposite type of the philosophy of religion~~. James likes to call himself a radical empiricist. That means, first of all, that he describes himself as a radical antiplatonist; the implied contrast to the insufficiently radical empiricists, or agnostic positivists, is for the moment a secondary matter. The main point is opposition to all apriorism and to all belief in law in every field, to the rationalist theory of knowledge, and to any prepossession in favor of necessity and synthesis. He is a pure analyzer and empiricist, who takes the facts solely as facts, not seeking in them any rational necessity and validity in which alone the proper essence of the facts is manifested, not combining and linking them together according to rational principles and finding only in this combination the true object of knowledge. He sides with the type against which Plato contended, with the relativism of the Sophists, which naturally, with him also, turns into psychologism. He resembles the nominalistic and sceptical opposition which Platonism has always met. He has his proper, immediate root, however, in the British philosophy of strict empiricism, as Locke laid its foundations in opposition to

Descartes—who was the founder of the modern Platonism of natural science—as Hume developed it on a great scale, and as John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte brought it to wider dominion.

James does not, indeed, remain a relativist and sceptic in the sense of the Sophists. Rather, he, too, is seeking the way to normative and valid knowledge, although not by the aid of the rationalism of laws and necessities, but by means of biological evolutionism and an idealized utilitarianism. Hypotheses used in the process of knowing and verified by results, the economy achieved by logical generalizations saving the labor of thinking in particulars, principles which are helpful in the struggle for existence, and ennobling,—these give him everything that the Platonist and Kantian gets from *a priori* necessities. They give it, indeed, provisionally, and with the possibility of constant improvement, but they give it. Therein he approximates to such modern European antiplatonic thinkers as Mach and Avenarius—points of contact which have been instructively emphasized by Goldstein, in his book, *Die Wandlungen der Philosophie der Gegenwart* (1911). The aim of attaining to knowledge and to confidence in knowledge is not renounced by him, and he does not trifle as do the Sophists. But his knowledge is guaranteed solely by a practical faith, and determined only by the degree of its verification in practice. For him the individual is everything; and the individual is an element in a continuous stream which makes everything relative, and from which it can only artificially be isolated. We can merely analyze this stream, empirically classify its chief phenomena, and verify the scientific, social, ethical, religious, and metaphysical hypotheses emerging from it by assessing the amount of their practical efficiency in the furthering of life. There is no absolute unity and no absolute necessity whatsoever. Logic is only a labor-saving device, a kind of short-hand, indispensable, indeed, to knowledge, and resulting from the constitution of the mind, but indefinitely improvable. The ethical and other necessities, the values and ideals, are the more or less provisional condensation of experiences concerning what enhances, steadies, and harmonizes life. James himself calls this point of view “Pragmatism,” and has found a great number of

disciples, who hold it with intelligence and zeal. On the foundation of purely psychological analysis, which has no contemplative interest in knowing truth for truth's sake, but recognizes only a continual succession of stimuli and discharges in act, is built up a relativistic-utilitarian conception of the universe, which acknowledges that the brain intervenes in that stream with a free determination of relative values, and which includes among its values the spiritual, ethical, and religious, as expansions and enhancements of human nature. These are entirely subjective appraisals on one's own account and at one's own risk. But in their actual diffusion and in their function of expanding human nature they gain a certain measure of objective confirmation. From the purely metaphysical point of view, they remain a venture, which must be hazarded, and by which we perhaps help on the work of the cosmic Spirit.

A philosophy of religion conceived from this point of view can by its very nature be nothing else than a psychology of religion. It does not ignore the question as to the value, meaning, and future development of religion, but it proposes to answer this question with wholly antirationalistic means. Now this is the point where the "radical empiricism" of James turns not only against the more or less veiled rationalism of Plato, but also against the insufficiently radical empiricism of his own predecessors and contemporaries,—against the agnostic positivism which treats religion solely as a part of ethnology and the psychology of primitive men, that is to say, against Comte, and especially against Spencer's Darwinian evaporation of all present value in religion. While by their doctrine real experience is limited to the phenomena of the material world and of social relations, and all further belief in a transcendental world is declared illusory, James sees in such a conclusion the influence of that scientific Platonism which admits only the laws of combination of atoms, material and psychic, and which throws on the scrap-heap of romantic dreams everything that finds no room in these "necessary" combinations. If we free ourselves completely from this naturalism, with its doctrine of rational necessity inherited from a Platonism turned to natural science, then there is no reason why we should not see in religious and cognate phenomena real experiences—experi-

✓ ences as real as those which we have of a stone or from a beam of light. The experiences of the material world lose their tyrannical exclusiveness as soon as their coherence no longer signifies a closed causality of rational necessity; and there is no reason for not treating as genuine experiences the religious phenomena that still survive in full vitality. The naturalistic, antireligious prepossession of the positivists is the last evil remnant of a Platonism become natural science. If that collapses, as from this point of view it must collapse, nothing stands in the way of a completely unprejudiced analysis of religious phenomena. This analysis will have to be a psychological one, although here again not in the sense of a constructive psychology which from the smallest elements builds up complicated structures in accordance with ideas of causal necessity, but in the sense of an analytic psychology, such as James's radical empiricism has created. As constituent parts of a continuous stream of consciousness, ever acting and reacting, the phenomena are to be isolated, analyzed, classified, and their significance for life appraised. Their eventual metaphysical meaning then forms an ultimate and independent question by itself, which, again, is to be answered only through experience, and not through the phantom of rational necessity.

So arises a type of the philosophy of religion which, both in general and in particular, is at all points opposed to the Platonic. It will now be instructive, after this general characterization, to contrast it in detail with the main positions of the platonizing philosophy of religion, as they have already been stated. This will further make plain how each of the two types forms a self-consistent whole, and how in its own way each is a logically perfect theory. One can even say that these are the two logically possible leading types, each having a peculiar serviceableness to thought, and each corresponding to a distinct side of the phenomenon in question.

The contrast to the five points presents itself in the following fashion:

1. James, too, starts from the facts of consciousness. But for him, from the point of view of the psychology of religion as well as of general psychology, consciousness is a stream of psychophysical occurrences, not to be limited and not to be resolved,

a bundle of continuous experiences in constant motion, which, starting from some physical stimulus, pass on through mental activity, and are discharged in some action. Thus disappears all *a priori* unity of consciousness, all connection between contingent individual consciousness and consciousness in general, all derivation of validity from the central unity of consciousness, all contrast between pure necessities of mind and the concomitant or underlying organic processes. In brief, everything is lacking which, as he ironically says, is peculiar to the "Platonic psychologists of the Continent."

2. Accordingly, the characterization of those facts of consciousness, or experiences, which, using the common term, he calls religious, is something quite different from the search for the "essence" and typical valid contents of religion. James takes the religious experiences in a purely empirical way, and gives a purely empirical, approximate characterization, which accumulates its marks indefinitely, and leaves the question wholly open whether religious experiences are really unitary and specific experiences. For the estimate of the value of religion this indefiniteness of characterization is entirely unimportant, since this value obviously does not depend on any unitary and necessary function which religion may be supposed to have in the system of values of consciousness, but rather on its practical and biological service in the enlarging and strengthening of human life. Such a service can be rendered, of course, just as well by a highly complex group of experiences as by a simple one. Similarly, the connection which must be assumed between religious experiences and the processes of the nerves and brain, particularly the familiar relation between strongly religious temperament and nervous abnormalities, presents no difficulty. The worth of religion and the recognition of it depend upon its actual working, not upon the demonstration that it is derived from any "source," whether psychological or zoölogical or ontological. The result is that no *idea* of religion is in fact possible. All we can have is a highly indefinite, relative description, which piles up various characteristics, and, besides, confines itself to one selected part of what is in fact an illimitable phenomenon, namely, to the sphere of individual, personal, religious feeling, which represents

what is most primitive in religion. As a criterion for getting at these characteristics, in the absence of any self-contained and necessary "essence" of religion, James uses the empirically ascertainable eccentricities, the saints, ascetics, and mystics, in whom the phenomena appear in one-sided, and often morbid, phases. The reduction and adjustment which any respectable religion will require for purposes of practical use is accomplished by life itself.

3. So, while the European philosophy of religion, from its premise of a unitary essence, seeks to comprehend the historical stages of evolution as teleological, James knows the varieties only as psychological variations, in every case dependent on general psychical condition and on nervous constitution. The great historical complexes, taken by and large, are merely accidental differences in name and external historical location. In truth, he holds, analogies and psychically conditioned varieties run through all religious systems, and are to be understood by psychological and psychophysical interpretation, not by any dialectic of self-evolving thought. Hence James treats only of those religious systems from which definite subjective testimonies and confessions of religious persons are to be had. The religion of savages and of primitive men, which for ordinary positivism is all-important, he passes by as obscure and practically unimportant, as he does the several philosophical theories of an historical evolution of the religious consciousness. So he arranges the varieties solely according to the great psychological leading types of the general constitution of the soul, and divides religious experiences into such as correspond to the type of the "healthy mind," the "sick soul," and the "divided self." In accordance with the psychological nature of his thinking and the strongly neurological character of his psychology, James emphasizes the fact that these differences exist in all systems, and do not depend on thought and its movement, but on the nervous constitution. His principle, consequently, for the classification of varieties is derived neither from a necessary movement of ideas nor from the great historic complexes, but solely from the types of nervous systems by which the religious emotional attitude is colored and determined. In the great historic systems we can speak at most

of a preponderance of this or that type, according as the founder and leading personalities have made one or another type authoritative for the auto-suggestion of their followers. Nevertheless, all this does not signify a strict neurological fatalism, since James holds that it is in some measure possible for the free will to enter into the impressions which casually present themselves. His psychology is neurological, so far as this principle can be carried through, but not mechanistic and naturalistic.

4. As James's empirical conception of the nature of religion does not deny to religion practical or biological value, so in the presence of this manifoldness of experience he recognizes the necessity of a standard of discrimination and graduation. Of course, this cannot mean a measuring of the phenomena by the standard of an absolute and rationally necessary ideal of religion, nor even an approximation to such an ideal as something to be at least postulated and contemplated as ultimately achievable. As the absolute and the rationally necessary exist nowhere, they do not exist here. Rather does the standard emerge in the vital movements and adjustments which contribute to the self-preservation and self-expansion of the race. Here the one-sidednesses of exaggerated religion are happily removed through adaptation to the totality of the interests of life, and the medial type of a moderate religiousness results. Here also those experiences gain importance as the more valuable and the more conducive to welfare which embrace the whole complex life of the soul and overcome this complexity by the power of a unitary principle. These expand, enrich, and invigorate life as can no other function of the soul. Thus the relative maximum value belongs to the individualistic redemptive type of piety found in Protestantism, or the faith which emphasizes conversion with a strong ethical verification—which, of course, is not to deny that like precious experiences are found outside of Protestantism or of Christianity. The attainment of this maximum experience is dependent, however, upon the constitution of the individual, and it will never become a universal possession of mankind, nor will it be esteemed the highest except from a point of view which sets so high a value on the unification of the divided self. Every such judgment of value is purely subjective, a hazard, a venture.

5. In all this the only question is as to the biologically ascertainable value for life of religious experiences or of the contents of consciousness. The idea of value for life takes the place of truth or validity. But, obviously, that is not the whole story. Even James has eventually to raise the ontological question. He has all the more to raise it, because really the only specific feature of the religious state that he singles out is the coloring of universal mental processes by the subject's relation to a particular object, namely, the supposed divine Power. To be sure, it might be abstractly possible to give a neurological explanation for this conception of the object, and such an explanation would do no prejudice to his estimate of the value of religion. But such explanations, like those offered by the school of Freud, based upon sexual psychology, seem to him inadequate. Thus the question remains to be answered, as to the rise of this idea of the object and its possible relation to reality; and James, himself a man evidently of strong personal religious feeling, takes it up with special interest. But whereas Platonism is compelled to answer such ontological questions by referring the idea back to the self-revelation of the absolute, active and present in the idea itself, James can meet them only in a wholly empirical way, much as people generally refer the idea of an object to the reality behind the idea, assuming that the idea was somehow produced as an impression from the object, or as the popular faith believes in divine influences on the soul in individual cases.

At this point James comes to the most original and personal chapter of his philosophy of religion. Together with all his empiricist and positivist colleagues, he is unable to find in ordinary consciousness any place where such incursion of a religious power would be possible. Therefore, he turns to the modern discovery of the subconsciousness, as possibly offering the entrance at which the divine power generates the idea of the religious object. Of course, he can present such an explanation only as a wholly personal and merely probable "over-belief." Moreover, his use of the subconsciousness, which elsewhere in modern psychology is more like a sphere split off from the normal consciousness, serving to explain apparently sudden and, in particular, pathological incursions into the superconsciousness, is altogether origi-

nal. He here approaches Myers, and the "Society for Psychical Research," which studies mystical phenomena. But in this "over-belief" it is not merely methodically instructive to observe how the antiplatonic fundamental thought makes any other solution impossible, but James has equipped the solution with another much more important antiplatonic contrast. He insists that the Platonic solution must lead to the thought of an absolute being, a law of laws, a unified cosmic authority, and thereby necessarily beget pantheism or monism or the "block-universe," in which he holds there can be merely a religious light thrown upon the cosmic universe of law, but no vital intercourse with God; only mystic feelings of unity, no divine rescue and redemption; only general ideas, no vigor of life and no voluntary resolve of faith. His antimonism, which is a corollary of antirationalism and anti-platonism, does, he says, more justice to real religious experience, and at the same time emancipates religious life from doctrines that stifle it. Indeed, as the much-discussed "Postscript" shows, it also evacuates the thought of God of all inner unity and definiteness, and does not shrink from the further consequence of polytheism, which is, as he says, the strictly empiricist idea of God.

When we consider all this, the contradiction here presented to the European philosophy of religion seems complete, as James explicitly declared it to be. If that be so, the question as to the significance of James's philosophy of religion would become the simple alternative of a choice between it and the European type, a choice in which the only question to be raised would be the general one of their respective methods.

But before, in conclusion, I take up this question, one observation must be made which will again diminish the practical difference between the two types. On each theory the result for the conception of religion is very much the same. In both cases the result is a complete reaction from dogmatic theology, church, ecclesiastical worship, ritual, sacrament, and canonical law to the element of purely personal religious attitude. The marrow of religious phenomena is understood, on both sides, in a mystical and spiritual sense; only with the Platonists the contemplative mysticism of the vision of the Absolute and Eternal

preponderates, with the empiricists the practical mysticism of experience of the mystical state, saintliness, and love of humanity. In both cases the theory emphasizes the immediateness of the religious life, in contrast to historical authorities and traditions and to sociological constructions. The historical sinks to an inciting occasion, and redemption lies in the elevation of the subject into immediate unity with the divine power. In neither case does the philosophy of religion substitute a "pure religion" for the dominant religions; it simply furnishes a solid foundation and justification for the religious life in general, leaving free its living course, which it essays to regulate only for those to whom reflective thought is a necessity. This naturally brings about a difference between the esoteric religion of the thinker and the exoteric religion of the masses. On either hand, the freedom which is secured to the heart of religion to create its own form involves a complete mutual tolerance between the religious groups and between believers within each group. This means that in the end both views see on the whole the highest, or most valuable, evolutionary form in an individualized and spiritualized Protestantism, such as has resulted from a great part of Protestant history, and itself, indeed, stands under the influence of such theories.

There abides, however, the contrast between the inner majesty of the absolutely necessary and valid, on the one hand, and practical vitality and concreteness, unimpaired by scientific abstractions or by ideas of unity or law, on the other. The one view inclines to monism and pantheism, the other to untiring activity and to living interaction between God and the soul. The one finds its demonstration in its intuitive apprehension of the necessary and the universally valid, the other in the spiritual power and effect of the mystical state. It is, in mediaeval language, the difference between realism and nominalism. It is a difference like that between Saint Thomas and Saint Bonaventura. It suggests, too, the difference between Luther and Calvin. To go farther afield, one can think of the difference between Brahmanism and Buddhism. In modern German literature treating of the philosophy of religion, the difference might be illustrated by the contrast between Simmel, who has much in common with

James's psychological relativism but rejects his robust utilitarian standard of judgment and his theology of the subconsciousness, and Rudolf Eucken, who, in sharpest opposition to the psychological method, endeavors to establish a philosophical one, and understands by this the derivation of the entire world of ideas from an historically unfolding basis of universal realities. In Simmel we have a combination of nominalistic-psychological mysticism and sophistic relativism, in Eucken a combination of Plato, Fichte, and Hegel. The contrast is therefore plainly founded on the two great, diverging tendencies in human life and thought universally; and by reason of the very agreement of both tendencies in their apprehension of what is the central religious process, that process is subjected to contrary interpretations.

This contrast of interpretations and of the theories to which they give rise—one that of a psychological positivism, the other that of an absolutist theory of knowledge—is certainly great enough to bring again before us the old alternative.

A full discussion of this question is impossible in the present article. Such a discussion would touch upon the most general philosophical principles, and has been often undertaken, and by many hands. For myself I can only accept the *a priori*, transcendental philosophy. It seems to me closely bound up with the recognition of all logical validity. Moreover, a doctrine of values in the field of ethics and aesthetics is not to be constructed without the idea of an element unqualifiedly valid, issuing from the nature of consciousness. Finally, and above all, justice to the religious sentiment is done only by a theory which does not put usefulness in the place of truth, nor substitute a quasi-physical action in the subconsciousness for the presence of God in the human spirit. In religion a relation to a whole, to an absolute, to something possessing inner necessity, is always indispensable. James himself felt this when, among other characteristics of religion, he spoke of a "reaction upon the cosmos, upon the universe," of a relation of the individual to "the first and the last word of truth," to "primal truth," to "the most primal and enveloping and deeply true," when he recognized in religion a "root of happiness in the absolute and everlasting." Such words, taken seriously, shatter James's whole theory and recall

Plato and Schleiermacher. For my part, I hold substantially to Platonism, and to that extent would still stand by the criticism which I passed on James in an address before the Congress at St. Louis on "Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge in the Science of Religion."

On the other hand, the impression of James's presentation, living, unprejudiced, saturated with reality, grows on me. I perceive that the criticism of the idea of the absolute which, though without transgressing the limits of transcendentalism, I made in my essay on the "Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religion" (2d edition, 1911), comes unintentionally rather near to that of James, so far as it deals with a standard of judgment for the history of religion. So I find it much more difficult today than in the past to incorporate the element of relative correctness in James's philosophy of religion into the structure of the transcendental, *a priori* philosophy of Kant and Schleiermacher. We are dealing not merely with the psychology of religion, but with a philosophy of religion begotten of psychologism—a method of thought in which the two things are inseparably connected, and which stands sharply opposed at every point to transcendentalism.

Nevertheless, if the fundamental principle of the Platonic system of thought is accepted, nothing remains but to sever religious psychology from the pragmatist presuppositions as to the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and to adopt into Platonism the element of truth which pragmatism holds.

There is, it seems to me, one way in which this can be done, although I can but briefly indicate it here. The transcendental method starts from a purely psychological analysis, and from that works on to find the point where the *a priori* element of consciousness asserts itself. Such an analysis must be made without any presupposition from metaphysics or the theory of knowledge. It must proceed in purely positive and empirical fashion, and therefore can very well operate, provisionally, with the fundamental assumptions of empiricism and pragmatism. But all that is a purely provisional description and analysis of the phenomena. Now James, by retaining, as he does, in such an analysis the conception of the religious object as a residual

datum, indicates the point at which the transcendental analysis can start in and penetrate deeper. At every stage of such a procedure, James's chief virtues—his marvellous freshness, freedom from prejudice, and sharpness of observation—will be a model.

But there is one thing more which we can and must learn from James. With full justice he calls attention to the consequences of the absolute transcendental belief in law, which in its ultimate outcome transforms reality into a monistic formula expressing a universal law, and reduces religion to an abstract sense of unity, or confines its function to that of supplementing a closed mechanical universe by sundry ineffective postulates or judgments of value. In opposition to this, James rightly points out that every unsophisticated and unperverted religious sentiment presupposes a "piecemeal supernaturalism," that is, a power distinct from universal law and operating within it as a living force. Of course, this observation does not hold good for Christianity alone; and in making it he is undoubtedly right. But even here the relief cannot come through pragmatism, which with its "pluralistic universe," its "multiverse," and its polytheism, does violence to the equally naïve basic sentiment of religion. The only question can be how, within the universal connexion which issues from the Deity, to give due weight to multiplicity, irrationality, mere actuality, vital creative power. In my article on "Contingency," in Hastings's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, I have referred to this task, which, in spite of its difficulty and of the repudiation of it by the prejudices of the prevailing rationalism of law, has always formed, and still forms, the chief problem of speculation. If laws and the *a priori* can be elicited from the chaos of reality only by abstraction and analysis, then, when the return is made from them to reality, all the irrational and purely fact-contents of reality must remain or must be restored to their rights. So we shall always have the "mixed universe" of which James speaks. Indeed, only so can we arrive at such mixture; by James's way it is only possible to attain to a multiplicity of irrational facts, and never to such a mixture of the rational and irrational. This mixture constituted the problem of Plato and of Neoplatonism; it is the problem of Kant, and was again em-

phasized by the aged Schelling in the final stage of his evolutionistic pantheism. Only where, under the influence of classical natural science, the *a priori* philosophy has been transformed into the mechanical monism of a "Naturphilosophie" does the problem of mixture disappear—and with it religion as well. To this James has rightly called attention. But his own solution is so radical a cutting of the knot that in consistency he ought not to recognize any mixture, but only a pure irrationality and multiplicity, which likewise nullifies religion, and is more consistently represented by agnostic positivism than by James's doctrine. In so far as from his point of view he does justice to religious experience, he also is constrained to interfuse Platonic elements in his general view.

For all that, James has set before the philosophy of religion, as well as philosophy in general, the task of giving serious heed to realities, and has filled them with justifiable mistrust of abstract theories. But, nevertheless, the abstract is the sphere of philosophy; and our task is to make abstractions fit life, not to abolish them altogether and put the chaos of reality into their place. If the philosophy of religion is to exist at all—and it is impossible to see how, in view of our distrust of all merely ecclesiastical faith and of all merely enthusiastic affirmations, we are to get on without it—then the abstractions of the transcendental method will have to stay with us. We must simply try to put into them more of the living reality.

CHRISTLESS CHRISTIANITY

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

The Christ Myth by Arthur Drews was published early in 1909,¹ and before the year was out its author was being requisitioned by dissidents from Christianity of the most incongruous types as a promising instrument for the general anti-christian propaganda. Few more remarkable spectacles have ever been witnessed than the exploitation throughout Germany in the opening months of 1910 of this hyper-idealistic metaphysician, disciple of von Hartmann and convinced adherent of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," by an Alliance the declared basis of whose organization is a determinate materialism. As, under the auspices of the *Monistenbund*, he made his progress from city to city, lecturing and debating, he drew a tidal-wave of sensation along with him. A violent literary war was inaugurated. It seemed as if all theological Germany were aroused.

In one quarter there was an ominous silence. The "Conservative" theologians looked on at the whole performance with bitter contempt. When twitted² with leaving to the "Liberals" the whole task of defending the historicity of Jesus against Drews, they replied with much justice that it was none of their fight. The Liberals had for two generations been proclaiming the only Jesus that ever existed a myth: why should it cause surprise if some at length were taking the proclamation seriously and drawing the inference—if such a simple recasting of the identical proposition can be called an inference—that therefore no Jesus ever existed? If the Christianity which flowed out from Palestine and overspread the world was not the creation of Jesus, but the spontaneous precipitation of old-world myths from a solution just

¹ Arthur Drews, *Die Christusmythe*, Jena, 1909, and many subsequent editions. English translation: *The Christ Myth*, by Arthur Drews, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Techn. Hochschule, Karlsruhe. Translated from the third edition (revised and enlarged) by C. Delisle Burns, M.A. London, [1910].

² As by the *Christliche Freiheit*, February 13, 1910.

now, as it happened, evaporated past the saturation point, why postulate behind it a shadowy figure, standing in no causal relation to it, without any effective historical connection with it, for whose existence there is therefore neither historical nor logical need? We may not think the language elegant, but we can scarcely pronounce the jibe unprovoked, when Herr Superintendent Doctor Matthes of Kolberg bursts forth in Hengstenberg's old *Evangelical Church-Journal*:³ "That the wasted, colorless phantom which alone the Liberal theology leaves over of Jesus could not have transformed a world,—that is clear to all the world except the Liberal theologians themselves, who are still always hoping to see their homunculus come forth from the Gilgameshmishmash-mush-brine which alone is left in the pantry of the comparative-religionists and which Arthur Drews has served out afresh to the Berliners." That the Liberal theology has travailed and brought forth a monstrous birth is not surprising; nor is it surprising that the fruit of its womb should turn and rend it. Let them fight it out; that is their concern; and if the issue is, as seems likely, the end of both, the world will be well rid of them. Why should sane people take part in such a "theological mill" in which "as-yet Christians" and "no-longer Christians" struggle together in the arena with nothing at stake,—for certainly the difference between the reduced Jesus of the one and the no Jesus of the other is not worth contending about? To deny the existence of Jesus is, of course, as Ernst Troeltsch puts it, "silly";⁴ to be asked to defend the actual existence of Jesus is, as Adolf Harnack phrases it, "humiliating."⁵ But the artillery which the Liberal theologians have hurriedly trained upon the denial shows how little they can really let it go at that. It is only the Conservative, secure in the possession of the real Jesus, who can look serenely upon this shameful folly and with undisturbed detachment watch the wretched comedy play itself out.

Only the Conservative,—and, we may add, the extreme Radical. For there is a Radicalism, still calling itself Christian, so

³ Die evangelische Kirchenzeitung, March 6, 1910.

⁴ "Die törichte Frage" (Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben, 1911, p. 2).

⁵ "Beschämend" (Neue Freie Presse, May 15, 1910, reprinted in Aus Wissenschaft und Leben, 1911, vol. ii, p. 167).

thoroughgoing as to fall as much below concernment with the question whether Jesus ever lived as Conservatism rises above it. The Conservative looks with unconcern upon all the pother stirred up by the debate on the historicity of Jesus, because he clearly perceives that it is all (if we may combine Harnack's and Troeltsch's phraseology) scandalous nonsense, unworthy of the notice of anyone with an atom of historical understanding. The Radical looks upon it with unconcern because in his self-centred life Jesus has no essential place and no necessary part to play: the question whether Jesus ever lived is to him a merely academic one. An interesting episode in Drews's lecture-tour through the Germanic cities brings this point of view before us with strong emphasis. A discussion was contemplated at Bremen also, and the *Monistenbund* there extended an invitation to the local *Protestantenverein* to take part in it. This invitation was decisively declined, and the *Protestantenverein* took a good deal of pains to make it perfectly plain why it was declined. The *Protestantenverein* was not quite clear in its own mind that the whole business was not merely an advertising scheme for the benefit of the *Monistenbund*; though, to be sure, it could not see what Monists as Monists have to do with the question whether Jesus ever lived, more than "whether Socrates ever lived, or Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays." The *Protestantenverein*, moreover, for itself felt entirely assured on good historical grounds of the historicity of Jesus, and had no interest in threshing out old straw. But it was on neither of these grounds that it declined to take part in the debate, but precisely because it was a matter of no importance to it whether Jesus ever lived or not. "All the theologians of the Bremen *Protestantenverein*," they formally explain, "are agreed that the question whether Jesus lived is, as such, not a religious but a historico-scientific question. It would be sad for Christianity as a religion if its right of existence hung on the question whether anybody whatever ever lived, or anything whatever ever occurred, even though it be the greatest personalities and the most important events which are in question. Every true religion lives not because of 'accidental truths of history,' but because of 'eternal truths of reason.' It lives not because of its past, more or less verifiable and always subject to the critical

scrutiny of historical science; but because of the vital forces which it every day disengages afresh into the soul from the depths of the unconditioned." All the great religious forces of Christianity—trust in the Living God, elevated moral self-respect, sincere love of men—are quite independent today of all question of the historicity of Jesus, and therefore this question can without fear be left in the hands in which it belongs,—in the hands of untrammelled historical criticism. "Whether Jesus existed or not, is for our religious and Christian life, in the last analysis, a matter of indifference, if only this life be really religious and Christian, and preserve its vital power in our souls and in our conduct." ⁶

There is asserted here something more than that religion is independent of Jesus. That was being vigorously asserted by the adherents of the *Monistenbund*; and as for Drews, his *Christ Myth*—like the *Christianity of the New Testament* of his master, von Hartmann, before it—was written, he tells us, precisely in the interests of religion, and seeks to sweep Jesus out of the way that men may be truly religious. With the extremities of this view the members of the Bremen *Protestantenverein* express no sympathy: they are of the number of those who profess and call themselves Christians. What they assert, therefore, is not that religion merely, but distinctively that Christianity is independent of Jesus. They do not declare, indeed, that Christianity, as it has actually existed in the world, has had, in point of fact, nothing to do with Jesus; or that Christians of today—they themselves as Christians—have had or have no relations with Jesus. They are convinced on sound historical grounds of the historicity of Jesus; they recognize that he has played a part in setting the movement called Christianity going; they draw, no doubt, inspiration from his memory. What they cannot allow is that he is essential to Christianity. They are conscious of standing in some such relation to him as that in which an idealistic philosopher stands, say, to a Plato. In point of fact such a philosopher reverences Plato, and derives from him inspiration and impulse, perhaps even instruction. But had there been no Plato, he would be able to do very well without a Plato. So Christians may in

⁶ See the whole document in the *Christliche Welt*, April 28, 1910, pp. 402 ff.

point of fact owe not a little to Jesus, and they may be very willing to acknowledge their indebtedness. But Christianity cannot be dependent on Jesus. Though there had been no Jesus, Christianity would be; and were his figure eradicated from history—or even from the mind of man—tomorrow, Christianity would suffer no loss. The sources of its life, the springs of its vitality, lie in itself: it may owe much to a great personality, teaching it, embodying it; it cannot owe to him its being.

The *Protestantenverein* of the good city of Bremen is, of course, not the inventor of this christless Christianity. It is as old as Christianity itself; and has come to explicit assertion whenever and wherever men have thought of Christianity rather as universal human religion in more or less purity of expression—perhaps in the purest expression yet given to it, or even in its purest possible expression—than as a specific positive religion instituted among men in particular historical circumstances.⁷ The classical period of this point of view is, of course, the Enlightenment; and its classical expounder in that period, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing; and the classical treatise in which Lessing propounds it, the tract written in response to Johann Daniel Schumann under the title, *Concerning the Proof of Spirit and Power* (1777); in which occurs accordingly its classical crystallization in a crisp proposition, the famous declaration (very naturally quoted by the theologians of the Bremen *Protestantenverein*) that “accidental truths of history can never be the proof of necessary truths of reason.”

In Lessing's conception, as in that of some before him and of many after him,⁸ Christianity is in its essence simply what we have learned to know as altruism. He sums it up in what he calls “the Testament of John,”—“Little children, love one

⁷ Hermann Reuter, *Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, 1876, 1877, gives mediaeval instances.

⁸ Perhaps the most thoroughgoing expression of it is given by Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, Eng. trans., 1881, p. 209: “He therefore who loves man for the sake of man, who rises to the love of the species, to universal love, adequate to the nature of the species, he is a Christian, is Christ himself.” Auguste Sabatier, however, in his ultimate statement, scarcely falls short of this. Christianity, he tells us, is the religion “of universal redemption by love,” that is everybody's love for everybody. (*The Doctrine of the Atonement in its Historical Evolution*, Eng. trans., 1904, p. 134.)

another"; and he refuses to believe that "dogmas," whatever may be said of their probability, or even of their truth, can enter into its essence. The proximate purpose of the tract, *Concerning the Proof of Spirit and Power*,⁹ is to show that the "dogmas" of the "Christian religion" cannot be put forward as essential truths, and so far as they are not intrinsically self-evidencing rest on evidence which is at best but probable. But the argument itself takes rather the form of an assault on the trustworthiness of historical testimony in general. Lessing does not deny, in this tract, that truths might conceivably be commended by authority. If a man actually witnessed miracles or fulfilments of prophecy, he might no doubt be brought to subject his understanding to that of him in whom the prophecies were visibly fulfilled and by whom the miracles were wrought. But this is not our case. We have no miracles or fulfilments to rest on; we have only accounts of miracles and fulfilments. And "accounts of the fulfilment of prophecies are not fulfilments of prophecies; accounts of miracles are not miracles." "Prophecies fulfilled before my eyes, miracles worked before my eyes," he explains, "work immediately. Accounts of fulfilments of prophecies and of miracles have to work through a medium which deprives them of all force." "How," he exclaims, "can it be asked of me to believe with the same energy, on infinitely less inducement, the very same incomprehensible truths which people from sixteen to eighteen hundred years ago believed on the strongest possible inducement?" "Or," he demands, with a show of outrage, "is everything that I read in trustworthy history, without exception, just as certain for me as what I myself experience?"

The argumentative force of the representation resides, of course, largely in its exaggerations,—"*deprived of all force*," "*without exception*." But Lessing skilfully proceeds to cover these exaggerations up by assuming at once an air of the sweetest reasonableness. "I do not know," he remarks, "that anyone ever maintained just that; what is maintained is only that the accounts which we have of these prophecies and miracles are just as trustworthy as any historical truths can be. And then it is

⁹ Ueber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft, in Lachmann's edition of Lessing's *sämtliche Schriften*, vol. xiii, pp. 1-8.

added that no doubt historical truths cannot be demonstrated,—yet, nevertheless, we must believe them just as firmly as demonstrated truths.” Surely, however, exclaims Lessing, “if no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated *by means* of historical truths, that is, accidental truths of history can never be the proof of necessary truths of reason.” “I do not deny at all,” he protests, “that prophecies were fulfilled in Christ; I do not deny at all that Christ wrought miracles: but I do deny that these miracles, since their truth has altogether ceased to be evinced by miracles which are still accessible today, since there exist nothing but accounts of miracles (no matter how undenied, how undeniable, they may be supposed to be), can or ought to bind me to the least faith in any other teachings of Christ.”

The whole procedure involves at any rate a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. To know that Christ raised a man from the dead,—how does that prove that God has a Son? Suppose I could prove that Christ rose from the dead? How does that prove that he is God’s Son? “In what connection does my inability to advance anything decisive against the testimony to that fact stand with my duty to believe something which outrages my reason?” You tell me that the very Christ who rose from the dead declared that he was the Son of God, of the same nature with God. Of that declaration, too, we have nothing but historical evidence. If you say, No, we have inspired evidence, for the Bible is inspired,—of that, too, we have nothing but historical evidence! “This, this, is the nasty wide ditch, across which I cannot get, no matter how often and earnestly I have tried to leap it. If anybody can help me over it, let him do it, I beg him, I implore him. He will do me a great charity.” Thus Lessing ends his sinuous argument with a round denial that “historical evidence” can ever place a fact beyond question. It is a case of general historical skepticism. The only evidence which can really establish a truth is the truth’s own self-evidence. He breaks off suddenly, therefore, with a recommendation to his readers, divided by disputes over the Gospel of John, to come together on the Testament of John. “It is, no doubt, apocryphal, this Testament: but it is not the less divine for that.” Truth is truth

wherever we find it. And truth is truth to us for no other reason than that it finds us.¹⁰

It was not to be expected that a point of view so natural to the Age of Reason should continue in the same measure to hold the minds of men in the Age of History. But neither was it to be expected that a point of view so deeply rooted in the popular philosophy of the eighteenth century should fail to project itself into the nineteenth, and color the thought of all who in any large degree draw their mental inheritance from the Enlightenment. We are not surprised to find Kant standing in his judgment of history wholly on the ground of Rationalism, or the lately resurrected Fries following closely in Kant's steps. Nor are we really surprised to observe Fichte still determined by the old point of view, and not even Hegel yet emancipated from it.¹¹ What does surprise us is that at the end of the days a Rudolf Eucken, true child of the Age of History, and, if one could be permitted to judge only from his profound sense of sin and of the need of divine grace for its overcoming, almost persuaded to be a Christian, can still speak through much the same mask. There is

¹⁰ Otto Kirn, *Glaube und Geschichte*, 1900, pp. 9-10, remarks on Lessing's double point of view and the consequent confusion in his argument: "The position of the critic appears upon more exact consideration as little sure. He attacks his adversary at once from two standpoints which are not in harmony. He asserts with the Wolfian Dogmatism that reason can never receive its convictions through history. To this standpoint, however, self-experienced and past facts are alike unimportant and inconclusive, when the question concerns religious or ethical propositions. Then he comes forward in the armor of the historical critic, who is ready to let himself be convinced by facts if only they be certainly established, and authenticated by self-experienced analogies: the training of his critical judgment forbade him, however, to draw far-reaching conclusions from facts which 'act through a medium,' and remain controversial. As a Wolfian he could not openly concede what as historian of certainly authenticated facts he declared himself ready to grant. Lessing's vacillation between dogmatic rationalism and critical empiricism manifests itself in this double attitude towards history: with the one he belongs to the Enlightenment, with the other he is preparing the way for a time which would be able to see in history something better than a source of 'obscure and confused ideas' (cf. Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, § 33, 9)."

¹¹ A lucid sketch of the history of opinion on the relations of faith and history is given in pp. 1-27 of Otto Kirn's *Glaube und Geschichte*, 1900. See also Karl Dunkmann, *Das religiöse Apriori und die Geschichte*, 1910, pp. 11-51, and the admirable general account by C. W. Hodge, in the article, "Fact and Theory" in *Hastings's Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, vol. i, 1908, pp. 562-567, esp. 564-565.

a passage in the first edition of his book on *The Truth-contents of Religion*,¹² which, though historical in form, fairly expresses his own attitude towards the relation of religious truth to historical fact. Historical criticism, he thinks, has very seriously shattered the historical foundations of Christianity; indeed, the very subjection of these foundations to criticism, he argues, disqualifies them for serving as foundations of faith, however this criticism issues. Then he proceeds:

But the shaking of the historical foundations of the religious life goes still further: it is not merely that we are compelled to doubt particular items of their contents, it is that history itself no longer seems proper to serve as the foundation of religion. For the thought to which the modern world commits the guidance of life is not disposed to recognize history as a source of eternal truths. Such a truth must be capable of immediate realization; it must be verifiable by every one and at all times; that is possible, however, only where it is grounded in the timeless nature of reason, and is continually verifiable anew thence. An occurrence of the past, on the other hand, no matter how deeply it has been imbedded in the historical connection, and no matter how energetic it may still be in its effects, does not on that account at all become a portion of our life: we cannot experience it immediately, we cannot ourselves even test its validity, we cannot transform it into a personal possession. That, however, according to our conviction, is precisely what is required for fundamental truths of religion. Thus reason and history stand over against one another in sharp opposition, and the grounding, as of all spirituality, so also of religion, on history calls out the strongest opposition. "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason" (Lessing). If life, however, casts off this connection with history, it becomes nonsense and an unendurable burden to bind the health of man's soul to the voluntary acceptance of historical occurrences, or even of occurrences supported by history. "That historical belief is a duty and belongs to salvation is superstition" (Kant). Can such a dissolution of the old blending of reason and history affect and shake any other religion more deeply than Christianity, which is the most historical of all religions?

Some modifications have been introduced into this passage in the second edition of *The Truth-contents of Religion*,¹³ but these

¹² *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, 1901, pp. 34-35.

¹³ Published in 1905: Eng. trans., *The Truth of Religion*, 1911, pp. 33-34.

do not alter its general bearing. It is allowed that the Enlightenment "differentiated too sharply reason and history, the individual life and tradition, and overestimated the power of any present moment of consciousness." But the contention that history can provide no foundation for religious convictions is still pronounced true, and the quotations from Lessing and Kant are still approved, and this from Fichte is added: "Let no one assert that it does no harm to cling to such historical beliefs. It is injurious in that subsidiary facts are given equal validity with essential ones, or, indeed, are presented as the essential facts, and consequently the main facts are suppressed and the conscience tormented." With such a view of history in its relation to religion, of course Eucken cannot find the roots of his religion, which he would still call Christianity, in Christ. "We can honor him," he tells us, "as a leader, a hero, a martyr; but we cannot directly bind ourselves to him, or root ourselves in him: we cannot unconditionally submit to him. Still less can we make him the centre of a worship. To do so, from our point of view, would be nothing less than an intolerable deification of a human being."¹⁴ Eucken thus quite purely carries on the tradition of a non-historical, which is, of course, also in the nature of the case a christless Christianity.

There is much in the mental state of our times to add strength to this traditional distrust of history as a basis for religious convictions. Modern thought is not yet emancipated from that ingrained individualism which is impatient of all "external authority," and wishes each soul to be a law to itself. The very preoccupation of the age with history has moreover brought with it its nemesis. A wide-spread impression has grown up that in the crucible of historical criticism all historical magnitudes have melted; that the whole past has become uncertain and conjectural,

¹⁴ Können wir noch Christen sein? 1911, p. 37. Eucken, in this work, asks if we can still be Christians, and answers yes,—but only by remoulding Christianity to fit our new philosophy which will not hear of a divine Redeemer or an expiatory redemption. "We have asked," he says in his closing words (p. 236), "whether we of today can still be Christians. We reply that not only can we be, but we must be. We can be Christians, however, only if Christianity be recognized to be a world-historical movement still in flux, if it be shaken out of its ecclesiastical petrification and placed upon a broader basis. In this are found the task of our time and the hope of the future."

if not absolutely unknowable; and that nothing solid is left to offer a foundation for faith. Looking upon themselves and all that they have, instinctively, as the product of historical development, men's hold upon even their most precious spiritual possessions has relaxed; everything is in a flux, and all alike, as it is the product of change, so is held to be subject to change. Christianity itself in the universal flow comes to be thought of only as a passing phase of religious thought, as only one among many religions, rising above the rest, if at all, only in degree. Many have even become surfeited with history, and, suffocated by its load of facts, react from what Nietzsche girds at as "the hypertrophy of history"¹⁵ in the interests of "untrammelled thinking." Meanwhile the broadened historical horizon has dwarfed the significance of isolated historical events, which alone, it is said, are accessible to our observation. The imagination, fed on illimitable stretches of space and endless progressions of time, finds difficulty in attaching supreme importance to this or that historical incident, occurring at but a point of this boundless space and occupying but a moment of this measureless time. If men are disheartened by the uncertainties of history and irritated by its oppressive superfluity, they are even more dispirited by its littleness and insignificance as known to us. With what propriety, it is asked, "can a proposition about the happening of a particular incident at a certain time in a little corner of the earth" be represented as "one of the fundamental verities which every man ought to know and believe for his soul's health?"

This last sentence we have taken from an article by Arthur O. Lovejoy, which very fairly represents the manner in which this general point of view may still be advocated at the opening of the twentieth century. He calls his article, significantly, "The Entangling Alliance of Religion and History";¹⁶ and, in the course of it, he advances most of the considerations in aversion to this alliance which we have just rapidly summarized from a statement, already doubtless sufficiently summary, by Ernst Troeltsch.¹⁷

¹⁵ "Vom Nutzen und Schaden der Historie für das Leben," in *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, 1874, vol. ii, p. 210.

¹⁶ *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1907, pp. 258-276: cf. esp. p. 269.

¹⁷ Article, "Glaube und Geschichte" in Schiele and Zecharnack, *Die Religion*, vol. ii, coll. 1450-1452.

Since [he argues] religion constitutes a man's ultimate and definitive intellectual and moral reaction upon his experience, and since it presupposes the possession of truths valid and significant for all men, religious belief will naturally affirm only [why "only"?] truths of a universal and cosmic bearing. It will deal exclusively [why "exclusively"?] with the "eternal" verities and ignore contingent and temporal matters-of-fact. . . . Its content will consist of propositions equally pertinent to the interests, and equally accessible to the knowledge [is the equality absolute?] of all such beings, at any time, in any place. . . . It will not make the belief in the occurrence or non-occurrence of specific local and temporal events any part of its essence.

The very spirit of Lessing is here,—even to Lessing's characteristic assumptions of definitions and characteristic exaggerations of statement. It is treated as axiomatic on the one hand that the whole truth-content of religion must be self-evident, and on the other that history can afford us only probabilities. The Deists, it is suggested, were in the essence of the matter right, when they contended that historical propositions are unfitted to enter into the truth-content of religion because, on the one hand, they cannot be universally known, and, on the other, they "do not strictly constitute knowledge at all." No beliefs about happenings, assuredly, can stand the test of the *Quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*—if we take the terms strictly; nor can the actual occurrence of events be made more than probable, of remote and particularized events more than barely probable, of such events as are "contrary to the usual order" anything but improbable, so improbable that "it becomes at least debatable whether any amount of purely traditional or documentary evidence can offset" the presumption against them. It is recognized that Christianity is implicated, as is no other religion, with history; it is even allowed that its entanglement with historical facts was indispensable to its survival in the environment in which it first found itself struggling; but it is strenuously asserted that the historical elements which have thus become connected with it are not essential to it. The historical data with which it has been most intimately associated are gravely disputable; it is, indeed, "just those incidents to which theology has attached the greatest dogmatic weight" which have most

decisively "been removed from the sphere of the clearly ascertainable to that of the problematical." It is fortunate, therefore, that their reality is not of the highest importance from the religious point of view. Indeed, "religious history often becomes more available and more useful religiously when it is taken as poetry."

If we take even the life and character of Jesus, and consider them solely with respect to their inspirational and exemplary value, it is not a question of primary *religious* importance whether that life and character existed in bodily incarnation upon the solid earth of Galilee, or chiefly in the devout imagination of earlier believers. There happen, just now, to be signs of a revival of the theory of the non-historicity of Jesus of Nazareth. . . . Suppose the theory established. . . . There would be some real gain. The Gospels would become more wonderful and more encouraging than before; for the profound wisdom and lofty character found in them would prove to be the expression, not of a single and unique religious genius, but of the spiritual idealism of many humble and unknown men. That a group of men should be able to conceive the hero of the Synoptic Gospels is more inspiring than that one wholly exceptional man should have been that hero—but, for the same reason, doubtless more improbable. In so far, then, as religious history simply affords ideals for our reverence and imitation, the ideals are no worse for their lack of past reality; they were at least the products of some other men's minds, and foreshadowings of possible realities to come, in the human nature of the future. Our feeling with respect to Jesus would undoubtedly be in significant ways altered. . . . But nothing of the deepest religious concernment can be at issue here.

There is much in these remarks which invites criticism. What it concerns us especially to note, however, is that they go beyond the assertion that matters of fact do not enter into the essence of religion, and that Christianity, as it is religion, may be indifferent to them. They seem to suggest that religion may thrive better in an atmosphere of fancy than of reality. Christianity could not only do very well without Jesus; it would perhaps be better off without Jesus. Jesus as a myth might make a stronger religious appeal, might be of a higher religious value, than Jesus as a fact. It would almost seem a pity, religiously speaking, that Jesus ever lived.¹⁸

¹⁸ Lovejoy must not be thought singular in this suggestion: it is found also in the philosophers of whom he serves himself heir—for instance, in Kant and in Fichte; and it is intrinsic to the general point of view.

All cannot go quite so far as this. It does not appear that even the members of the Bremen *Protestantenverein* go so far. Most are satisfied with pronouncing Jesus unessential to Christianity, indifferent to Christianity, hardly noxious to it. The difference is rooted ultimately in a difference in point of departure. When the point of departure lies in a philosophical system, appeal to historical criticism is essentially in support of conclusions already attained. Most of those who nowadays pursue a line of reasoning substantially the same, begin nevertheless at the opposite pole. Their start is taken from historical criticism, and philosophical considerations are summoned only secondarily and subsidiarily, to give a basis to conclusions already adopted. Precisely the same philosophical assumptions are invoked, but they are not the primary presuppositions of the actual line of thought, and their logic is less prevalent. It is not so much in pride of pure reason and in contempt of history that these reasoners pronounce faith independent of Jesus, although they fall back on pure reason for a standing-ground, and express a hearty distrust in the trustworthiness of historical data. It is rather in timidity in the face of the processes of historical research, and in panic at the aspect of its results, that they seek and find a sheltered position in the independence of faith of historical entities. They are not so much tempted to despise Jesus because he is merely historical as they are tempted to despair of him for fear he is not historical enough. The christless Christianity which is springing more and more into view about us, is, in a word, the fruit less of a strong religious mysticism than of a weak historical scepticism, which has become anxious about the religious props on which it has hitherto depended.

It is the historical criticism of the Gospels "from Reimarus to Wrede" which has created the wide-reaching and deeply seated distrust in the historical tradition of Jesus that has of late become so evident. As Paul Wernle himself allows, in the very act of rebuking this distrust as excessive, "to us all it is more or less certain that the evangelists are not Jesus himself, that they are all already dependent on tradition, and that this tradition has already suffered all kinds of changes, by which the spirit of the disciples has in manifold ways been mingled with the

spirit of Jesus.”¹⁹ This being so, it is widely felt that no other attitude towards the person of Jesus remains possible except one at best of skepticism. There are in effect a whole series of Jesuses presented to our consideration. There is the dogmatic Christ which the great Christian community has worshipped through the ages with no other thought than that he was assuredly the Jesus Christ of the Biblical record. And there is this Jesus Christ of the Biblical record which the scientific study of the Bible has split up into several mutually inconsistent personalities. And there is the “historical Jesus” which Biblical criticism has hardly and with much variety of interpretation extracted from the pre-suppositions of the Biblical records. Where among these differing Jesuses can faith find a firm footing? The dogmatic Christ, we are told, has evaporated into a myth; the Biblical Jesus Christ has been disintegrated into the tesserae out of which its mosaic was formed; the “historical Jesus,” itself the product of doubt, remains a doubtful and fluctuating figure. If we are to continue Christians, must we not at least seek for our Christianity a less unstable basis?

The air in critical circles is fairly palpitating with questions like these. The resulting state of mind finds a clearly argued expression in such a treatise as F. Ziller’s *Modern Biblical Science and the Crisis of the Evangelical Church*.²⁰ The thesis maintained is that the progress of scientific study of the Bible has hopelessly shattered the entire basis on which the faith of the Christian church has hitherto rested. The results even of textual criticism already bring certain of the most cherished church-doctrines into peril. Literary criticism renders it very difficult to repose any real confidence in the Biblical writers. And material criticism has cast into the gravest doubt the facts related by these writers which are most indispensable to the established teaching. Finally, the science of comparative religion has reduced the foundations of the central doctrines and rites of the church to the level of heathen ideas and usages. The conceptions and ideas of the Bible have become only elements in the universal history

¹⁹ Christliche Welt, February 17, 1910, p. 147.

²⁰ Die moderne Bibelwissenschaft und die Krisis der evangelischen Kirche, Tübingen, 1910, see especially pp. 99-100.

of religions, and the Biblical writings themselves only a particular section of general religious literature. The figure of Jesus has been well-nigh wiped off the page of history: the dogmatic Christ, the product of reflection, of course; and the Biblical Jesus Christ, a composition of disparate materials, equally of course; but also in large measure the "historical Jesus" himself, which it has been the object of science to disinter. "The historical Jesus, as we have seen, has been set aside by the scientific study of the Bible down to meagre remnants, and the foundation of the dogmatic Christ has been obliterated." Is there then anything left to rest upon except an "ideal Christ," a creation of fancy? Ziller, who, despite the ruin of historical Christianity which he sees about him, would fain remain a Christian, insists that there is. There is not, indeed, the "historical Jesus," doubt-born and incapable of sustaining faith, but there is the "historical Christ," which is not an ideal, but a fact. On this fact faith can stay itself.

What the altruistic postulates of an inflated egoism, and what the postulates of pure reason cannot avail for, for that neither can those of the "ideal Christ" avail. That there is such a thing as practised self-renunciation, in contrast to nature; that on the basis of such a self-renunciation there can develop a high world-overcoming life,—this conviction cannot be derived either from the pure reason or from our practical ideals with the certainty that is required by faith, face to face with the known laws of nature. Only a fact can give the certainty for it, and this fact is "Christ."

But how is this fact of Christ to be reached? The reply takes the form of an apologue.

All the day long [Ziller writes], I have had before me a wide mountain-ridge. In the morning, it stood out, deep-blue, in almost menacing nearness; towards noon, in a like-shaped whitish-grey mist on the horizon; and now, in the evening, it throws over the whole landscape the splendor of a golden reflection. Is it really the same mountain through it all? I think so. What I see is merely the effects which it works on my eye by means of the light straining through the changing atmosphere. What, then, if the mountain were no mountain; if it were only the boundless plain which seems to rise in the distance; if it were only cloud-forms deceiving my eyes? My glance sweeps over the meadows, through which my path runs.

The brooks which water it come from yonder. The mountain itself I shall, indeed, not reach; its crags I shall not explore; but I believe in the existence of the mountain.²¹

So, he would say, he believes in the existence of the Christ from whom flow the streams of blessing which gladden the plain of human life. Thus, though the "historical Jesus" has been set aside "down to meagre remnants," the "historical Christ abides unshaken for faith." We seek, and we find, Him, however, not in a book, much less in a creed, but "in the entire, constantly developing Christianity in which we believe."

Out of faith in the Christ vitally active here today, there grows up for us faith in the Christ of the past. The predicates which the past ascribed to him, we can no longer ascribe to him in the same sense, but we know how to value them from the standpoint of our faith; and though we no longer connect the same meaning with them, or though we permit them to be supplanted by others which express *for us* what is highest—we do it in the consciousness that we are only carrying forward a process in which the oldest Christianity has preceded us, and which others in their own fashion will follow us.²²

Despairing of the "historical Jesus," Ziller, in other words, substitutes for him, as he says, a "Christ who varies with the changes of human thought." Christianity, transforming itself ceaselessly from age to age, finds for itself ever a transformed Christ, suited to its changed needs. Christ, in a word, grows with his church; and it would be as impossible for the church of today to believe in the Jesus of the first Christians as it would be for us to live today the life of two thousand years ago. It is out of the whole history of Christianity that God speaks to us of today, and Christ would be dead, did he not live on in the life of human development.²³

We are not concerned for the moment with the validity of this representation. Paul Wernle is unhesitant in declaring it nonsense. It is nonsense, he asserts, to speak of modern critical research as having sapped our confidence in the "historical Jesus."

²¹ *Christliche Welt*, May 5, 1910, p. 413.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Die moderne Bibelwissenschaft*, etc., p. 101. Cf. the very similar representation of Shirley Jackson Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*, 1912, pp. 306-307.

There continue to be, no doubt, as there always have been, skeptical writers; in late years, for example, there are Wellhausen, Wrede, Schweitzer; but they must not be taken too seriously. "I do not find that, in its essential traits, the person of Jesus has even in the least become uncertain or controversial through the investigations of recent years."²⁴ And how, indeed, could historical science, let us honor it ever so highly, "avail against the voice of a history of nearly two-thousand years' duration in which Jesus and faith in Jesus—I purposely bring them together—have been the greatest of impulsive and constructive forces?" It is greater nonsense still, Wernle declares, to pretend to retain Christ when the historical Jesus has been abandoned. Once convince him that the historical Jesus has been set aside by science, and faith in Christ has no further personal interest to him: faith in God without Christ would then be his only recourse. "This whole postulation of Jesus and Christ," he adds, "abandoning the one and retaining the other, is nothing but a miserable product of opportunism. It was the weakest point in the old Liberal Christianity, and it has not been bettered by any new grounding. What we retain in our hands when the historical Jesus falls away is just myths and phantasms, which can afford no support to our faith."²⁵

Meanwhile, however, we observe Ziller abandoning the "historical Jesus" and clinging to the "historical Christ," who "still lives in the church." In this, he but follows an example set by Schleiermacher,²⁶ and from his day on imitated by a long series of writers occupying essentially the same position, but differing immensely among themselves in the completeness or incompleteness

²⁴ *Christliche Welt*, February 17, 1910, p. 749.

²⁵ *Christliche Welt*, May 12, 1910, p. 441.

²⁶ Cf. Otto Kirn, *Glaube und Geschichte*, 1900, p. 22: "According to what has been said, we may trace back to Schleiermacher the idea which recurs through the nineteenth century in manifold modifications, that the figure of the Redeemer, ever only uncertainly or indistinctly established by historical research, is lifted, by the experience of his redemptive power continuing in the community, to a certainty and clearness sufficient for faith. The effect of Christ, capable of being experienced by every man seeking redemption, permits (so it is said) the inference to a personality standing at the head of the community, and in union with God, even if we cannot otherwise come to know anything whatever about him that is historically assured."

ness, on the one hand, of their abandonment of the historical Jesus, and, on the other, of their clinging to a living Christ. At the one extreme we may discover—shall we say even a Martin Kähler? or shall we content ourselves with saying a Wilhelm Herrmann?²⁷ At the other stand the theologians of the Bremen *Protestantenverein*. Those who gather around the former node, only sit loosely to the “historical Jesus” as he is presented to us in the Gospel narrative, and can in no way do without the “historical Christ,” on whom, indeed, their whole religious system hangs. Those who gather around the latter, though they may or may not, for themselves, feel any real doubt that Jesus really lived, yet are quite able to get along wholly without him in their religious system, whether we call him Jesus or Christ. It is these latter, accordingly, who are express “christless Christians.”

Perhaps it may be well to keep near home here and select as examples of this truest christless Christianity only certain prophets of our own.

A very good example is afforded by Douglas C. Macintosh.²⁸ With the historicity of Jesus, Macintosh has for himself no difficulty; but neither does he feel any imperative need of the living Christ. He finds the historical Jesus useful; the loss of him would be a great loss,—a sentimental loss, a pedagogical loss, above all

²⁷ Cf. what is said of Kähler and Herrmann as representatives of historical skepticism with respect to the “historical Jesus” by Otto Ritschl in an article entitled, “Der geschichtliche Christus, der christliche Glaube, und die theologische Wissenschaft” in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. iii, 1893, pp. 373 f. “There is accordingly at present no Rationalistic tendency, threatening to bring into question the value for theology of historical investigation. It is true, however, that the confidence which has been hitherto overwhelmingly felt in the result of theological historical research is made doubtful by a skeptical mood which seems to be gaining ground with many theologians. . . . To this skeptical mood . . . Kähler has hitherto given the strongest expression.” But Herrmann “shares Kähler’s historical skepticism, ascribing to historical research the ability to attain only probable judgments.” “In spite of these unfavorable judgments as to the capacity of historical science, Kähler and Herrmann are too deeply persuaded of the nature of Christianity as an historical religion not to lay stress on this—that the Christ which historical research cannot reach with its instruments, but is laid hold of now by faith, is the historical Christ. In contrast with him Kähler speaks of the ‘so-called historical Jesus’ as a creature of phantastic arbitrariness.” See also Karl Dunkmann, *Das religiöse Apriori und die Geschichte*, 1911, pp. 44–45.

²⁸ *American Journal of Theology*, July, 1911, pp. 362–372; January, 1912, pp. 106–110.

a loss to the easy attainment of Christian certitude. He would even, it appears, allow that the Christ-ideal is indispensable—that it is, indeed, precisely the differentia of Christianity; and he does not see his way to accounting for the clearness at least of this ideal without assuming the historical Jesus, and in this sense, therefore, he is prepared to admit that the historicity of Jesus is “historically indispensable.” Indispensable, that is, to the historian, not to the Christian. What the Christian must have is the Christ-ideal, not Christ. “Christian faith is trust in the Christ-like God; whether the Christ be regarded as historical fact or mere ideal, it is trust in the God of holy and unselfish love, whose purpose is the spiritual redemption of humanity and who is revealed in the Christ-like everywhere.” Was not Jesus himself—if he existed—a Christian, the first Christian? And was “the historical Jesus” needed for him as the presupposition of his faith? We cannot distinguish between the “religion of Jesus” and the “gospel of Christ”: the “gospel of Christ” is just the “religion of Jesus.” He is not the content of our faith, but only, historically, the first of the series of believers of that particular kind which we call Christian. Say that the series began in another, in a later, than he, and that he is a myth. What essential difference does that make to our faith? The “Christian God-idea” in any case remains; and the “Christian God-idea” is constitutive of Christianity.

So far as the content of Christianity is concerned, our religion would remain essentially the same, whatever judgment might be rendered upon questions of historical fact.

The disproof, or rendering seriously doubtful, of the historicity of Jesus would not mean the disappearance of any essential content from the Christian religion.

It is not incorrect to say that the essence of Christianity is Jesus Christ, if [Oh that “if”!] it be recognized that it is also possible to set forth the essence of Christianity without reference to the historic Jesus.

Granted the historicity of Jesus, was not *his* faith fully Christian? And yet *he* could not make that faith rest upon the historicity of a person of ideal character who had gone before him. If then we believe in the historicity of Jesus, we must admit that Christian faith has been possible in the case of one at least who did not believe in the historicity of any ideal Jesus before his day.

"Without the historical Jesus we may find ourselves with less verification of our faith than we thought." That is a loss; but it is not an irreparable loss, since we may find sufficient verification elsewhere. Meanwhile,

Christianity, while enjoying the advantages of historical verification, has this qualification for being the "absolute" and universal religion, that its fate is not bound up with the actuality of any one reputed fact of history, even when that "fact" is the one which surpasses every other fact in its value to humanity.

In a single word, Christ does not form any part of the content of Christianity, and therefore his historicity cannot be indispensable to Christianity. "Spiritual religion is self-dependent," and finds all its resources in itself; it cannot therefore be dependent "on the religious experience and inner assurance of another, even though that other be the Jesus of history."

An almost equally good example is supplied by Frank H. Foster,²⁹ the stress of whose argument is laid on the general consideration that our religious relation cannot rest on the uncertainties of history. His particular manner of phrasing his contention is that "in some important respects it makes no difference to the modern thinker whether Jesus was a historical person or not," because "no system of truth which shall dominate the mind and claim authority over the conduct of man can rest upon the reality of any historical person." "Salvation" is "an inner state of the soul," and therefore cannot be something "'objectively' secured by the work of a historical person." "Truth is truth" only as it "shines to the mind by its own light," and therefore "cannot be something which depends upon the existence of the person who first spoke it." If "salvation," "truth," were thus dependent on the historicity of a person, they "would be exposed to every breath of criticism." They must not be left in that perilous condition.

Though Jesus should be proved never to have existed, the truth which has come down to us, and which we have received because of its self-evidencing value, and which we have found to work out such great results in the liberation of our spirits from the thralldom

²⁹ American Journal of Theology, October, 1911, pp. 584-594.

of sin and the establishment of holy relations with our Heavenly Father, would still be true, and its effects would remain unaltered. In this sense, a historical Jesus is unnecessary.

For himself, Foster does not at all doubt that Jesus was an historical person. He confesses, indeed, that "of no single historical detail can we be absolutely sure, unless it be his death by crucifixion"; though, somewhat inconsistently, he at once draws up a tolerably detailed picture of the real Jesus and sets him before us as "a realized ideal,"—"a realized ideal," moreover, let us note, so lofty that none of his followers could have invented the portraiture. His historicity remains nevertheless unessential, since our real ground, for example, for acknowledging him sinless, is that this acknowledgment is useful to us—"our final reason for accepting it is its value"; and a "realized ideal" is after all fundamentally an ideal, and owes its existence as such and whatever power it may exert to its erection into an ideal, not to its historical embodiment, if it chances to be historically embodied, in a person. "No system of truth which shall dominate the mind and claim authority over the conduct of men," we will remember, "can rest upon the reality of any historical personality."

It is scarcely necessary to multiply examples further. We may pass from instance to instance; but do not escape from a common circle of ideas. R. Roberts assumes to speak for the class, and may be accepted as doing so, when he announces³⁰ that "the supreme need of the hour in these matters is the disengagement of religion from its dependence on historical personalities." "Truth is truth," he declares, "whether uttered by Sophocles or Plato in Athens, by Hillel or Jesus in Palestine, by Seneca or Aurelius at Rome." "Religion, too, rests not on inspired or divine personalities, but on the order of the world." "And if, in the inevitable evolution of the not-distant future, Jesus too should disappear from the assured certainties of the world, man would not cease to be religious." P. W. Schmiedel—if we may take advantage of the vogue of his writings in their English form to refer to him here—speaks, with the greater caution of his better scholarship, of the prospect of the elimination of the figure of Jesus from "the assured certainties of the world": "As a critical

³⁰ Hibbert Journal, October, 1909, pp. 100-101.

historian I can only say that I see no prospect of this." And it is a deeper note of personal appreciation of Jesus—and of indebtedness to him—which he sounds. But the purport of his declaration is the same.

My inmost religious convictions would suffer no harm, even if I now felt obliged to conclude that Jesus never lived. It would, of course, be a loss to me, if I could no longer look back and up to him as a historical person; but I should feel assured that the measure of piety which had long become a part of my nature could not be lost, because I could no longer derive it from him.²¹

Always there lie at the basis of the reasoning the twin assumptions of the old Rationalism: the assumption of the adequacy of pure reason to produce out of its own inalienable endowments the whole body of religious truth which it is necessary or possible for reasonable men to embrace, and the assumption of the inadequacy of history to lay a foundation of fact sufficiently assured to supply a firm basis on which the religious convictions and aspirations of reasonable men may rest. And always there is built upon these assumptions the denial that Christianity,—as it is a religion worthy of the acceptance of reasonable men, and actually exerting influence over reasonable men, and supplying the forms in which their religious life is expressed,—can possibly be dependent for its existence or power on any events or personalities in its past history, no matter how prominent a place these events or personalities may actually have occupied in its historical origination or its continued historical manifestation. The immediate motive which leads to this declaration of independence of historical events and personalities may differ from individual to individual: it is perhaps very commonly a feeling of uncertainty as to the actual historicity of the facts and personalities in question, and a desire to protect what is thought of as Christian faith from the danger incident to this uncertainty. The personal attitude of the reasoners towards Jesus may also differ greatly: most commonly, no doubt, a strong sense of indebtedness to Jesus and a deep feeling of reverence to him are preserved. But the general line of argument remains the same. History can give us only probabilities. Religion, therefore, which requires cer-

²¹ *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, Eng. trans., 1907, p. 85.

tainties, cannot be dependent on historical facts. Jesus is at best an historical fact. Christianity, therefore, as it is truly religion, cannot possibly be dependent on Jesus. So far accordingly as Christianity is truly religion, it must be independent of Jesus.²² What are we to say to these things?

It can scarcely be expected that at this time of day the ancient debate with Rationalism should be taken up afresh and threshed out over again. Butler's *Analogy* is still extant, with its initial insistence upon probability as the guide of life, and its solid proof of the reasonableness of an historical revelation. It might not even be amiss to invite those to whom matters of fact appear to be intrinsically doubtful, or at least to become at once on occurrence incapable of establishment beyond "reasonable doubt," to bring their philosophy down to earth by a course of reading in such primary text-books as Greenleaf *On Evidence* and Ram *On Facts*. Of course man is a religious being, and by the very necessity of his nature will have a religion. We have not needed to wait for W. Bousset to tell us ²³ that religion has its seat in the aboriginal disposition of the reason, and we have only to look within ourselves to find it as the central fundamental law of our life. To name none other, John Calvin has told us long ago that, entering into the very constitution of man, and, above all else, distinguishing him from the brute, there is an ineradicable *sensus deitatis*, which—so far from lying inert within him—is a fertile *semen religionis*; and that accordingly all men have, and must needs have, relig-

²² Compare the description of this type of thought by Shirley Jackson Case, *The Historicity of Jesus*, 1912, pp. 319 f.

²³ In his address at the Berlin Congress of Free Christianity, 1910, under the title, *Die Bedeutung der Person Jesu für den Glauben*. History according to Bousset gives us only symbols, which cannot demonstrate, but only illustrate, the eternal ideas that reside in our bosoms. Founders of religions, Jesus among them, as historical entities, have their place among these symbols. Neither the certainty nor the contents of our faith can find its grounding in symbols. On the one hand, as regards Jesus, "What do we know that is historically certain of this Jesus of Nazareth, his life, his teaching and his person" (p. 4). Yet, on the other, "the portrait of Jesus as it is depicted in the gospels by his immediate community, as romance and truth, remains and will remain more effective than all attempts at historical reconstruction, however exact they may be" (p. 17). Effective, that is, as a symbol; for as Wobbermin (*Geschichte und Historie in der Religionswissenschaft*, 1911, pp. 47 f.) points out, Bousset leaves to Jesus no significance as source of religion.

ion. It is another question, however, whether this constitutional religion, which man cannot choose but have, is adequate to his need in the situation in which he actually finds himself, a situation which Eucken tells us has been most truly appreciated not by the optimists but the pessimists.²⁴ It is not obvious, to say the least, that a provision of nature must be competent also for unnatural conditions; that a power of living implies also a *vis naturae medicatrix* which in the presence of disease renders the exhibition of remedies impertinent. Though "pure reason" be sufficient for the religion of pure nature, what warrants the assumption that its sufficiency is unimpaired when nature is no longer pure?

It was the fault of the eighteenth century, in its pride of intellect and virtue, to neglect in its religious theorizing the evil case of man, and to proclaim under the name of "natural religion" an abstract scheme of a few meagre truths of reason as the sum of all religion, and, as such, the whole religious content of Christianity, the presently dominant religion,—which was thus represented as, so far as it was truly religious, "as old as creation." We have passed beyond the possibility of such shallow intellectualism now; we all repeat with avidity Bernhard Pünjer's caustic jibe that the difficulty with this so-called "natural religion" was that it was neither natural nor a religion. But have we bettered things in the essence of the matter? The misery of humanity may be more poignantly present to our consciousness, and even, in a sense, its sin; religion may be more prevalently thought of as "faith," rather than as opinion; the goodness of God may fill the whole horizon of our thought of him, and loving trust in his love form the entire reaction of our souls in his presence. But are we doing justice to that inexpugnable sense of guilt which constitutes the most fundamental and persistent deliverance of our moral consciousness? Shall we hope to soothe it to sleep with platitudes about the goodness of God; assurances that God is love, and that love will not reckon with sin? That deep moral self-condemnation which is present as a primary factor in all

²⁴ See the striking passage on the radical evil which afflicts the human race in *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, 1st ed., 1901, pp. 72 f.; *The Truth of Religion*, 1911, pp. 96 f.

truly religious experience protests against all attempts merely to appease it. It cries out for satisfaction. No moral deduction can persuade it that forgiveness of sins is a necessary element in the moral order of the world. It knows on the contrary that indiscriminate forgiveness of sin would be precisely the subversion of the moral order of the world. The annulment of guilt is the annulment of the law of righteousness, out of the breach of which guilt arises; and the law of righteousness is only another name for the moral order of the world. There is a moral paradox in the forgiveness of sins which cannot be solved apart from the exhibition of an actual expiation. No appeal to general metaphysical or moral truths concerning God can serve here; or to the essential kinship of human nature to God; or, for the matter of that, to any example of an attitude of trust in the divine goodness upon the part of a religious genius, however great, or to promises of forgiveness made by such a one, or even—may we say it with reverence—made by God himself, unsupported by the exhibition of an actual expiation. The sinful soul, in throes of self-condemnation, is concerned with the law of righteousness ingrained in his very nature as a moral being, and cannot be satisfied with goodness, or love, or mercy, or pardon. He cries out for expiation. And expiation, in its very nature, is not a principle but a fact, an event which takes place, if at all, in the conditions of time and space. A valid religion for sinful man includes in it, accordingly, of necessity an historical element, an actually wrought expiation for its sin. It is the very nerve of Christianity and the essence of its appeal to men—by virtue of which it has won its way in the world—that it provides this historical element and proclaims an actual expiation of human sin. As it has been eloquently put:³⁵

Only the fact that Christ stands out in history as surety of the gracious will of God, that in God's name he punishes sin and calls the sinner to himself, that in holy suffering he endures the lot of sinners in order to convict them of their sin and free them from it, that as the Risen One he brings them the assurance of justification and of eternal life, is able to transform human seeking after salvation into finding. Severed from this fact which forms its very

³⁵ Otto Kirn, *Glaube und Geschichte*, 1900, pp. 47-48. Cf. the whole passage, pp. 47-50.

essence, faith is nothing, an empty desire, a question without an answer.

It would be sad for humanity, needing thus above all things an actual expiation that it may have warrant to trust in God's forgiving love, if no such warrant can be given it because of the inability of the human mind to attain certainty with reference to matters of fact. It is, indeed, difficult to see how man could sustain his being and prosecute his common tasks in the world, if matters of fact are intrinsically uncertain, or become immediately uncertain on their occurrence. Man is, after all said, a creature of time and space, and all that he does and all that he experiences takes place in the conditions of time and space, and becomes at once on taking place matter of history. He could acquire no knowledge whatever, the whole discipline of life would be lost to him, if uncertainty were really the mark of the historical. We deceive ourselves, for instance, if we fancy we may distinguish in principle between historical facts as uncertain and scientific facts as certain. As Lessing reminds us, we cannot base certainties on uncertainties; and the material of all the sciences is in point of fact historical. "Every science," observes Eberhard Vischer,* "builds its conclusions on the particular experiences which men have had. Every observation in the natural sciences, every experiment, gives us in the first instance not knowledge of what is, but of what at the moment of the observation, of the experiment, the observer experiences. . . . An experience had by the scientific observer, therefore an historical fact, is the foundation-stone on which is grounded, as in general the entire conduct of man, so also all scientific attainment." If, then, historical facts are by their very nature uncertain,—“if nothing that befalls man can be certainly known, then all scientific certainty whatever passes into the realm of the impossible.”

It may be suspected that the current assumption that historical facts cannot rise above probabilities, derives at least some of its force and persistency from a confusion of two senses of the word “probable.” As the opposite of “demonstrative,” “probable”

* *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1898, p. 200, article on “Die geschichtliche Gewissheit und der Glaube an Jesus Christus.” Compare also his lecture on *Jesus Christus in der Geschichte*, Tübingen, 1912, where the discussion is more popular in form.

refers to the nature of the ground on which the judgment of truth or reality rests; as the opposite of "certain" it refers to the measure of assurance which the grounds on which this judgment rests are adapted to produce. Historical facts may be "only probable" in the one usage and yet not less than "certain" in the other. This ambiguity of the term seems to be reflected in a certain embarrassment which is observable in its use in the present connection. Thus G. B. Foster talks of historical evidence as capable of producing only "probable certainty"; Otto Kirn of it as producing at best only "relative certainty"; while Heinrich von Sybel declares it able to produce "conclusive certainty,"—which he then explains by the further declaration that "historical science is capable of attaining to altogether exact knowledge."²⁷ "Conclusive certainty" is of course pleonastic, and "probable certainty," "relative certainty," are contradictions in terms, the employment of which only bears witness to the feeling of the writers using them that after all historical facts are, or may be, "certain." Let it go at that. In point of fact, there is nothing more certain than a matter of fact: what is, certainly is; and the certainty of demonstration cannot be more sure than the certainty of experience. It is no more sure that two and two make four, than that the two nuts which I have in each hand when brought together are four,—though I arrive at my certainty in the one case *a priori* by demonstrative reasoning, and in the other *a posteriori* by actual experience. The ground of certainty in both cases is my confidence in my faculties.

It may be urged, to be sure, that history, as commonly spoken of, deals only with past experiences, and it is only present experience which is "certain." But experience does not cease to be experience with the passage of time: and (as it has been well phrased) "reality that has been made" is no less reality than "reality in the making"; "reality once 'made,' is 'made' for ever."²⁸ If what is, certainly is, then what has been, just as certainly has been; and its actuality as matter of fact is not in

²⁷ Ueber die Gesetze des historischen Wissens, 2d ed., 1864, p. 17; or in Vorträge und Aufsätze, 1874, p. 11.

²⁸ F. R. Tennant, "Historical Fact in Relation to the Philosophy of Religion." Hibbert Journal, vol. viii, 1909-10, p. 173.

the least disturbed by the irrelevant circumstance that it has occurred at one point of time rather than at another. Indeed, as the writer just cited playfully points out, distance of time may be neutralized by distance in space. To an observer on the dog-star, earthly events which to an observer on earth occurred a generation ago are present-day facts; and by merely stationing ourselves at the proper distance we may recover any occurrence of the past to "immediate perception." We cannot, to be sure, take our post of observation at will in Orion or the Pleiades, but we need not on that account cast the actuality of the actual into doubt or declare ourselves incapable of assuring ourselves of it. If free transportation through the immeasurable reaches of space is denied us, there are other ways of getting at the actualities of the past which we need not on that account deny ourselves.

For one thing, we need not persist in looking at past occurrences as each an isolated event, standing absolutely out of relation with all other events, up to which therefore no lines of approach lead. Past events still live in other vibrations also, besides those which, trembling through the ether, carry notification of their occurrence to the depths of space. Everything that occurs affects everything else that occurs, and history must be conceived not merely as a series of linked chains passing side by side through time; but as one woven network covering the whole past, and running with unbroken web through the present into the illimitable future. Not by one line only but by manifold lines, therefore, we can travel from any point which for the moment may chance to be the present, over the woven pattern of the fabric to any other point, which holds changelessly its proper position in the whole, and its fixed relations to all the other parts of it. Of course, such creatures as we are cannot contemplate the whole pattern in all its details; we are like insects climbing slowly along a thread of some tapestry. There are myriads of occurrences of even the recent past which are gone beyond all hope of recovery. At best we can know a few of the events that have occurred, and them only in part. But the past is not singular in this. We do not know the present, even that present with which we are most intimately concerned, in all of its details, or in any of its details per-

fectly. We know nothing except in part. Every sparklet of human knowledge shines out from a limitless surrounding of obscurity. But we can yet know truly where we can know only in part. And because we cannot know all the past, we must not therefore fancy that we can know nothing that is past. There are occurrences which stand out so brightly against the enveloping darkness, which have wrought so powerfully on the course of events that have succeeded them, which are connected with us by so many and so deeply marked lines of effects, that we might as well pretend not to be able to see the sun in the heavens as not to be able to perceive them looming in the past, however distant. There are no doubt some who do not see the sun. They are blind.

Whether the origins of the Christian religion belong to this class of outstanding facts—the great peaks rising out of the plain with such prominence that no observer looking over the field of history can miss them—is merely a question of the evidence. This evidence is, however, of the most compelling and varied kind. It is not merely documentary, subject to those processes of testing which we lump together under the name of criticism. It is institutional as well; and it is more than institutional. The seed out of which Christianity has grown may be known, like other seed, by that which has grown out of it: “by their fruits ye shall know them.” Christianity itself is a witness to the nature of its origins; and to Christianity must be added the whole world in its development through two thousand years. It is futile to ask, as has been asked with the processes of historical criticism in mind: “Is any one entitled to believe, or to ask others to believe, in specific historical matters of fact except upon historical evidence?”³⁹ The question is already an-

³⁹ A. O. Lovejoy, *Hibbert Journal*, vol. v, January, 1907, p. 269. Cf. the much more cautious statement of O. Ritschl, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. iii, 1893, p. 376. Per contra, cf. Eberhard Vischer, *Jesus Christus in der Geschichte*, 1912, pp. 35 f.: had the historical records preserved for us no single intimation of the existence of a Dante, the existence of the *Divina Commedia* would compel his postulation, and had historical records preserved for us no single intimation of the existence of Jesus Christ,—or, what comes to the same thing, should historical criticism obliterate every existing intimation of his existence,—there are effects about us, quite as palpable as the *Divina Commedia*, which would compel his postulation.

swered by Lessing in that striking refutation of his own historical skepticism which he gives in his *Axiomata*:⁴⁰

There is still one question over which I cannot wonder enough, which the Herr Pastor puts with a confidence that seems to imply that only one answer is possible. "Had the New Testament books not been written, and had they not come down to us," he asks, "would there have remained in the world a trace of what Jesus did and taught?" God forbid that I should ever think so meanly of Christ's teaching as to dare to answer this question with a No. No, I would not repeat such a No, even had an angel from heaven dictated it to me, to say nothing of a case where it is only a Lutheran pastor who would put it into my mouth. All that occurs in the world leaves traces in the world behind it, even though men can not always point them out at once; and should Thy teaching only, divine Friend of man, which Thou didst command, not to be written but to be preached, have effected nothing, absolutely nothing, from which its origin might be recognized? Should Thy words have been words of life only when transformed into dead letters?

We are not fleeing from the results of historical criticism to take refuge in the argument from effects. We shall appeal, indeed, from a naturalistically biassed to an unbiassed historical criticism; but we shall have no difficulty in trusting the latter to give us not only an actual Jesus, but a supernatural Christ, and in Him a supernatural redemption. We are only concerned now to point out that even such a vindication of the fact-basis of Christianity on historico-critical grounds does not exhaust the evidence for it; that there is still further evidence of the richest and most varied kind for the origin of Christianity in a supernatural founder; that there is, for example, the evidence from effects, which, resting as it does on the causal judgment, has much of the quality of demonstration.⁴¹ "What then is it," asks a recent writer,⁴² "which gives us knowledge of what has been?" "Three things," he answers, "monuments, traditions,

⁴⁰ Lessing's sämtliche Schriften, Lachmann's ed., 1897, vol. xiii, p. 120.

⁴¹ The value of the argument from effects in establishing historical facts is expounded at length by Eberhard Vischer as cited above, and applied in detail to the facts of the Christian origins. Cf. the review of the lecture, *Jesus Christus in der Geschichte*, in the *Princeton Theological Review* for October, 1912.

⁴² *Christliche Welt*, February 17, 1910, pp. 162-163.

effects"; and then he adds another well-known saying of Lessing's: "When the paralytic *experiences* the healing shocks of the electric spark, what does he care whether Nollet or Franklin, or neither of them, is right?"⁴³—and concludes: "So may the pious man be of good courage, while the learned are disputing over particular problems of the gospel-history. But as to the presence and as to the nature of the power which then came into the world, he too has a little word to say." He has. And though this "little word" may not be quite the same word which either this writer or Lessing might suggest, it is a word which has supreme value, and which combines with the abundant evidence from other quarters and of other orders to render the facts which belong to the origins of Christianity the most certain of all the facts which have occurred in the world.⁴⁴

We are not absurdly undertaking to prove the historicity of Jesus in ten words. Happily, our present task does not require this proof of us; and happily also, as has already been intimated, the work has been perhaps sufficiently done for us—though in many more than ten words—by a multitude of recent writers who have sprung to the defence of the historicity of Jesus against its denial by the new radicalism most prominently represented at present by Arthur Drews. One of the results of the promulgation of this denial for which we may be thankful has been that some check has been put upon the less guarded expression of historical scepticism on the part of the Liberal theologians, and there has been called out some stronger assertion and fuller exposition of the more positive side of their conception of the historical origins of Christianity than it has been usual for them to give.⁴⁵ This has been a gain. Much has, no doubt, been left

⁴³ *Axiomata*, 1778; *Lessings sämtliche Schriften*, Lachmann's ed., 1897, vol. xiii, p. 134. Lessing is in this passage defending this proposition as previously made by him, and denying that he considers this experimental evidence the only convincing evidence of the truth of Christianity.

⁴⁴ "Jesus," says Erich Foerster (*Christliche Welt*, 1909, no. 52, p. 1249), "is a fact in the history of our race, and this fact cannot be eliminated by any dilettantism, however scientifically garnished. He who does not wish to turn his back on all reality must recognize it and adjust himself to it."

⁴⁵ Heinrich Weinel, *Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* 1910, has been particularly candid in chiding his colleagues for their excesses in the one direction and their shortcomings in the other.

to be desired, but it has been pleasant to see such writers as W. Bousset and Johannes Weiss take up even so far the rôle of "apologists." What we have been attempting to do is merely, by a brief statement of the actual state of the case with reference to the historicity of Jesus, to wash in a background against which the true character and significance of the christless Christianity which is being exploited about us may be thrown up into clear relief. There really is no occasion for a panic with reference to the historicity of Jesus; and there is no need of such drastic measures as those pursued by the promulgators of our christless Christianity to allay the rising panic with respect to it. It is only among the old Liberals and—on somewhat different grounds—the members of the school of Ritschl that panic here is natural. The mordant criticism of the evangelical history practised by the old Liberals has left them without defence when this criticism is pressed a step further and the historicity of Jesus is denied,—requiring, though they do, the historicity of Jesus not only to account for the origin of Christianity according to their view of its origin, but to give distinctiveness and distinction to their conception of what Christianity is. It has been the peculiarity of the school of Ritschl, in its effort to preserve Christianity from destruction by the assaults of historical criticism no less than by those of philosophy and science, to proclaim the independence of faith of all historical facts as well as of all metaphysical notions. What defence have they when the fact of Christ is included in the facts of which Christianity is independent? Yet "the fact of Christ" bears with them the whole weight of Christianity.* Our christless Christians have passed beyond all this. Indifference to Christ may have much the same practical effects as denial of the existence of Jesus; but it is a specifically different attitude and throws into the foreground specifically different questions. It has no interest in the historicity of Jesus. It has no interest in the living Christ. Its sole interest is in Christianity. It does not follow, however, that the historicity of Jesus

* On the Ritschlian attitude to historical facts and its sequences cf. E. Cremer, "Der Glaube und die Thatsachen," in *Greifswalder Studien: theologische Abhandlungen Hermann Cremer . . . dargebracht*, 1895, pp. 261–283; G. Vos, "Christian Faith and the Truthfulness of the Bible History," in *Princeton Theological Review*, vol. iv, 1906, pp. 289–305.

has no bearing on it; or the nature of the Jesus who is historical. Conceivably, a real Jesus may be more difficult to ignore than an imaginary one; especially if the Jesus that is real is a Jesus whom it is not easy to ignore, who has brought into the world influences and set at work forces which cannot be disregarded or escaped. In any event it is important to approach the consideration of christless Christianity with a clear understanding that the Christ it would ignore is not a doubtful Christ but a real Christ, is not an inert Christ but an active Christ.⁴⁷

The particular question raised meanwhile by christless Christianity is not that of the historicity of Jesus but that of the nature of Christianity, or, as it is fashionable nowadays to phrase it, "the essence of Christianity." It is only when "Christianity" has come to be looked upon as little more than a modern man's "religious reaction upon the whole realm of reality—past and present—available for him," "the total embodiment of the actual religious attainments of modern men in a modern environment"—whatever this "reaction," these "attainments," may chance to be—as it has been described by a not wholly unsympathetic historian,⁴⁸ that the question of the indifference of "Christianity" to Jesus can be seriously raised. Douglas C. Macintosh⁴⁹ very frankly allows that to all that has hitherto borne the name of Christianity the historicity of Jesus has been indispensable, or, to speak more adequately, the living Jesus has stood at the very centre of thought and faith. To the "early disciples of Jesus," whose faith hinged on the messiahship of Jesus; to "the Greek Christian development," whose entire teaching and trust turned on the reality of a divine incarnation in humanity; to "Christian faith in its mediaeval form, whether Romanist or Protestant," which grounded all its hope in the substitutive sacrifice of the God-man—to all these alike Jesus forms the very core of Christianity. It is only when historical—or if the word pleases better,

⁴⁷ Richard Rothe even a half-century ago sounded a warning against attempting to root faith in the *merely* historical Jesus, who lived and died two thousand years ago. "If," he declared, "this Christ is not to be altogether ignored and stricken out of history, if he is to be permitted to play any rôle and to be believed in at all, he must absolutely be conceived also as the *living* Christ."

⁴⁸ S. J. Case, as cited, p. 321.

⁴⁹ *American Journal of Theology*, vol. xv, July, 1911, pp. 304 f.

traditional—Christianity has suffered a sea-change and become “the Christianity of to-day,” that it can be contended that “the disproof or rendering seriously doubtful of the historicity of Jesus need not mean the disappearance of any essential content from the Christian religion.” The question thus concerns not Christianity in its historical sense, but “our religion,” “of to-day”; and it might perhaps be better phrased, not, Is Christ essential to the Christian faith? but, Is the so-called Christianity of today to which Christ is not essential still Christian?

Ernst Troeltsch has treated the matter more at large and with his wonted thoroughness and candor in a lecture which he has recently published under the title of *The Significance of the Historicity of Jesus for Faith*.⁶⁰ The question which he here raises is twofold: first, whether it is “still” possible to speak of an inner essential significance of Jesus for faith; and secondly, whether, that being answered in the negative, the historicity of Jesus is therefore indifferent to the “Christianity” which alone remains possible for modern culture. This latter question also Troeltsch answers with a negative, and thus comes forward as the advocate of the indispensableness of Jesus to even the most attenuated faith which still cares to call itself Christian. “So long as there exists a Christianity in any sense whatever it will be bound up with the central place of Christ in worship.”

The word “still” in the former member of Troeltsch’s question intimates that in his view a change has taken place in men’s conception of what Christianity is and imports, and that it is only because of this change that the question suggested can be raised. Troeltsch does not hesitate to speak of this change as a veritable “transformation”⁶¹ of Christianity.” Formerly Christians have believed in a divine Christ “propitiating God and thus freeing men from the consequences of their infection with original sin.” To raise the question of the historicity of Jesus from this standpoint would be simply to call in question the right of Christianity to exist. It is only when we have learned, like David Friedrich Strauss (in his Christian period), to distinguish between

⁶⁰ *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben*, Tübingen, 1911. Cf. the review of it in the *Princeton Theological Review* for October, 1912.

⁶¹ “Umwandelung,” p. 8.

the principle of Christianity and the person of Christ, and have come to see that what we call Christianity is just "a particular faith in God, a peculiar knowledge of God, with its corresponding mode of life, or, as it is called, a religious idea, a religious principle,"—so that there is no historical redemptive work postulated in the background,—that we may ask ourselves with any meaning whether there exists any necessity for the assumption of an historical Jesus. Even on this ground, however, a negative answer is not to be taken for granted. There even exist some who have come so far,—to whom therefore "redemption is not something once for all completed in the work of Christ, and thereafter only to be applied to individuals, but an occurrence continually completing itself afresh in the action of God on the soul by means of the knowledge of God" wrought by faith,—to whom a negative answer is still impossible. This is because they "connect this redeeming faith-knowledge with the knowledge and recollection of the historical personality of Jesus, although this comes into consideration with them, not in its miraculous element, nor in its particular teachings, but only in the total effect of the religious personality." It is "the later, ecclesiastical Schleiermacher" that Troeltsch has in view here, and especially Ritschl and Herrmann. With them "all notion of a historical redemptive miracle, occurring once for all," indeed, is lacking; but with them also the faith-knowledge that constitutes Christianity is "bound to the historical personality of Christ, by which alone power or certitude is lent it." In this, he contends, there is betrayed lurking at the back of the brain a remnant of the old doctrine of original sin; there persists a notion "of the essential incapacity of men who do not know Christ for hearty faith in God." To such a conception, questioning of the historicity of Jesus were as fatal as to the old orthodoxy itself. Only when we occupy ground which allows no inward necessity for the assumption of an historical Jesus, can we discuss with any meaning whether the historical Jesus is indispensable to Christianity.

Troeltsch himself occupies this ground, and therefore admits that the indispensableness of Jesus to Christianity is to him a legitimate matter of debate. He holds very decided views, how-

ever, in the matter. Even on this ground he argues—and it is the chief purpose of his lecture to argue this—that Christianity cannot get along without Jesus. His argument is based on considerations derived from the history of religions and religious psychology, and amounts in general to the contention that religion is, after all said, a social affair and cannot persist without cultus and communion; while these require a rallying-centre, which must be envisaged as real; and this rallying-centre in the present stage of culture cannot be anything but Jesus Christ. The persistence of even this type of religious belief hangs thus on the historicity of Jesus, and whenever, if ever (Troeltsch thinks they will never), the results of historical research shall prove unfavorable to the historicity of Jesus, then the death-knell of even this type of religious faith is sounded. This is, he assures us, the last word of social-psychological research in the realm of religion.⁴²

The question thus defined and debated is, however, little more than an academic one. Troeltsch does not pretend that the extremely attenuated "Christianity" to which alone the question of the indispensableness of the historical Jesus has meaning, possesses vitality as a religion. Individuals may profess it and do profess it; he professes it himself; but the churches in which religious life is rich and powerful, are, he tells us, of a very different faith. We may be interested to know that even in this, its most attenuated form, "Christianity" cannot, in the opinion of one of our chief masters in the psychology and phenomenology of religion, dispense with Jesus. But the real question which presses for an answer is whether this very attenuated "Christianity," in which alone the question of the indispensableness of Jesus to Christianity can with any meaning be raised, possesses any just claim upon the name of Christianity. Its adherents are no doubt prompt in asserting their right to the name. But the allowance of their claim depends upon the prior question of what precisely Christianity is, and what kinds of "transformation" it can suffer without ceasing to be Christianity. If Christi-

⁴² "In the central position of the personality of Jesus, Christianity does not possess a distinguishing peculiarity, separating it from all other religions, and for the first time making redemption possible, but only fulfils a general law of the spiritual life of man after a fashion peculiar to itself" (p. 42).

anity is only a particular way of conceiving God, with the emotional and volitional accompaniments and consequences of this way of conceiving God, then no doubt a particular way of conceiving God may claim to be Christianity,—that is, if it be the particular way of conceiving God which Christianity is. If Christianity, however, be anything more than just a way of conceiving God, it is hard to see what just claim a mere way of conceiving God can put in to the name.

We should not omit to note in passing that Troeltsch goes a step further than contending that Jesus is indispensable to Christianity even in that attenuated form of so-called Christianity to which he gives his adhesion. He contends that no other form of religion than this attenuated Christianity with Jesus enshrined at its centre can exist in the conditions of modern life. In a word, Jesus is to him indispensable to religion in the conditions of modern life. This is not, to be sure, quite the same as saying with Heinrich Weinel, that “after Jesus it is his religion or none.” Troeltsch is not prepared to declare Christianity “the eternal religion,” which can never be transcended. But he is prepared to insist that Christianity—of course, in the interpretation of Christianity which commends itself to him—is so bound up with, and gives such competent expression to, the religious side of the civilization of the Mediterranean basin, that so long as that civilization endures, so long must Christianity remain the only religion possible to civilized humanity. It is possible, of course, that the civilization of the Mediterranean basin may after a while be replaced by a still higher civilization; and then, no doubt, there will arise a new form of religious expression conformable to the new civilization. Christianity is thus not pronounced by Troeltsch the final, the absolute religion, but merely the only religion possible to the highest civilization as yet known to man. His defence of the indispensableness of Jesus means, then, only that we cannot in his opinion get along at present without Jesus.⁵³ After a

⁵³ Troeltsch's remarks in this connection provide a useful commentary upon the discussion in his *Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Geschichte*, 1902. The adherents of Christianity as of all other religions, he tells us there, live in a naïve belief in the absoluteness of their religion, due to failure to compare it with others and a natural estimate of their actual knowledge of the higher life as ultimate and unique. Christianity's claim to absoluteness is, no doubt, the most

while—who can tell?—as we advance beyond our present stage of culture, we may advance also beyond Christianity as a possible religion, and beyond the need of Jesus as the religious rallying-point of men.

The question of course springs at once into the mind whether, in thus representing Christianity as merely the natural and therefore necessary religion for the civilization of the Mediterranean basin, and Jesus as indispensable only for the religion belonging to that civilization,—which is not final but may pass away,—Troeltsch has not rendered this Christianity impossible as a religion for himself at least—if not for the Mediterranean basin—and thus emancipated himself from Jesus as the indispensable rallying-point of his religion. He himself certainly thus assumes a standpoint above the Christianity which he conceives as—at least possibly—only a stage in the journey of man towards the absolute religion, and he cannot possibly belong inwardly to its life-world. Can he, then, look to Jesus, the inspiring centre of this life-world, as really indispensable to his own faith? Must he not stand as much above the need of the inspiration of Jesus as he stands above the religious life which Jesus inspires, and so by his own definition exclude himself from the Christian name? ⁵⁴ In any event, by his refusal to recognize the Christianity to which, he argues, Jesus is indispensable, as “the eter-

inwardly free and universal of all; and when Christianity has attained its new form, in which alone it appeals to modern man, it comes near to justification. Troeltsch can even say: “The claim itself”—i.e. to absoluteness—“has nowhere as yet been refuted or surmounted, and no imagination is capable of excogitating such a surmounting; and so it remains that no other foundation is laid for the soul’s health of mankind except Jesus Christ” (p. 126). After a while, however, we here learn, it is possible that a new and better foundation may be laid. On the whole matter cf. C. W. Hodge, “The Finality of the Christian Religion,” in *Biblical and Theological Studies* by the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary, 1912, especially pp. 477 f.; also F. X. Kiefl, *Der geschichtliche Christus und die moderne Philosophie*, pp. 61–74.

⁵⁴ Otto Kirn, *Glaube und Geschichte*, 1900, pp. 31–32, speaking of the demand of faith for absoluteness, remarks: “A simply provisional revelation, a merely relative religious truth, an only probable reconciliation with God, and a purely conjectural assurance of salvation,—these are, not merely for a church, but for the religious nature, intolerable ideas. A religion which would see in Christ only a transition point of the religious development of mankind would have, even in an historical judgment, no right whatever to call itself Christian.”

nal religion," Troeltsch certainly takes his place among those who deny that Jesus is indispensable to the religion, if not of today, yet of tomorrow.

Meanwhile why should the definition of the essence of Christianity be so vexed? Why should there be so much controversy over the application of the name? There surely ought to be little difficulty in determining what Christianity is. We need not disturb ourselves greatly about the debate which has been somewhat vigorously prosecuted as to whether its definition should be derived from its New Testament presentation or from its whole historical manifestation.⁵⁵ Impure as the development of Christianity has been, imperfect as has always been its manifestation, corrupt as has often been its expression, it has always presented itself to the world, as a whole, substantially under one unvarying form. Unquestionably, Christianity is a redemptive religion, having as its fundamental presupposition the fact of sin, felt both as guilt and as pollution, and offering as its central good, from which all other goods proceed, salvation from sin through an historical expiation wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ. The essence of Christianity has always been to its adherents the sinner's experience of reconciliation with God through the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ. According to the Synoptic tradition Jesus himself represented himself as having come to seek and to save that which is lost, and described his salvation as a ransoming of many by the gift of his life, embodying this conception, moreover, in the ritual act which he commanded his disciples to perform in remembrance of him. Certainly his first followers with single-hearted unanimity proclaimed the great fact of redemption in the blood of Christ as the heart of their gospel: to them Jesus is the propitiation for sin, a sacrificial lamb without blemish, and all their message is summed up in the simple formula of "Jesus Christ and him as crucified." Nor has the church he founded ever drifted away from this fundamental point of view, as witness the central place of the mass in

⁵⁵ J. Weiss, *Jesus von Nazareth*, 1910, p. 7: "That the 'essence of Christianity' is to be found not merely in the New Testament, but in the entire fulness of its historical phenomena, there should today be no longer doubt." Cf. E. Vischer, *Ist die Wahrheit des Christentums zu beweisen?* 1902, p. 16.

the worship of its elder branches, and the formative place of justification by faith in Protestant life.⁶⁶ No doubt parties have from time to time arisen who have wished to construe Christianity otherwise. But they have always occupied a place on the periphery of the Christian movement, and have never constituted its main stream.

We can well understand that one swirling aside in an eddy and yet wishing to think of himself as travelling with the current—or even perhaps as breaking for it a new and better channel—should attempt to define Christianity so widely or so vaguely as to make it embrace him also. The attempt has never been and can never be successful. He is a Christian, in the sense of the founders of the Christian religion, and in the sense of its whole historical manifestation as a world-phenomenon, who, conscious of his sin, and smitten by a sense of the wrath of God impending over him, turns in faith to Jesus Christ as the propitiation for his sins, through whose blood and righteousness he may be made acceptable to God and be received into the number of those admitted to communion with him. If we demand the right to call ourselves Christians because it is by the teaching of Jesus that we have learned to know God as he really is, or because it is by his example that we have been led into a

⁶⁶ Emil Sulze may be adduced in passing as a witness to this fact. Writing on "Die notwendige Umgestaltung der evangelischen Glaubenslehre" (Protestantische Monatshefte, vol. xi, 1907, p. 250), he declares that "the greatest danger has been brought, as to the moral life so also to faith in God, by the circumstance that the old Protestantism held fast to the foundation-stone of Catholicism, to the doctrine of the substitutive satisfaction of Christ." He is deeply grieved, therefore, that the Protestant churches of Germany still sing:

Mein Gewissen beisst mich nicht,
Moses kann mich nicht verklagen.
Der mich frei und ledig spricht,
hat die Schulden abgetragen.

To make it truly "Christian," this verse, he declares, must be transformed into this:

Klagt mich mein Gewissen an,
lässt doch Gott mich nicht verzagen,
stärkt mich auf der Leidensbahn,
hilft mir Schuld und Strafe tragen.

The antipodal attitudes to redemption of the Old Protestantism and the "transformation" which would fain present itself as a New Protestantism could not be more vividly expressed.

life of faithful trust in God, or because it is by the inspiration of his "inner life," dimly discerned through the obscuring legends which have grown up about him, that we are quickened to a like religious hope and aspiration,—we are entering claims that have never been recognized and can never be recognized as valid by the main current of Christianity. Christianity as a world-movement is the body of those who have been redeemed from their sins by the blood of Jesus Christ, dying for them on the cross. The cross is its symbol; and in its heart sounds the great jubilation of the Apocalypse: "Unto Him that loveth us and loosed us from our sins by his blood; and he made us to be a kingdom, to be priests unto his God and Father; to Him be the glory and the dominion forever and ever. Amen."

A Christianity without redemption—redemption in the blood of Jesus Christ as a sacrifice for sin—is nothing less than a contradiction in terms.⁵⁷ Precisely what Christianity means is redemption in the blood of Jesus. No one need wonder therefore that, when redemption is no longer sought and found in Jesus, men should begin to ask whether there remains any real necessity for Jesus. We may fairly contend that the germ of christless Christianity is present wherever a proper doctrine of redemption has fallen away or even has only been permitted to pass out of sight. Of course in the meantime some other function than

⁵⁷It is of course generally recognized that Christianity is in its essence a religion of redemption. See for example its exposition as such by Eucken, *The Truth of Religion*, Eng. trans., 1911, pp. 10 f., where Christianity is described as specifically the religion of redemption from sin. But, as Troeltsch expresses it, the idea of redemption has been "transformed" to suit modern notions. It often happens, therefore, that definitions of Christianity recognize the specific peculiarity of Christianity in words while evaporating it in meaning. Thus Schleiermacher (*Glaubenslehre*, § 11), describes Christianity as "a monotheistic form of faith belonging to the teleological tendency of piety, distinguished from other similar forms of faith essentially by this—that in it everything is referred to redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth." Here the wide genus to which Christianity is assigned is monotheistic religion, and the proximate genus, teleological (that is, ethical monotheistic) religion, while its differentia within this proximate genus is found in the fact that "in it everything is referred to redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth." If they could be read without reference to the special use of terms by their framers, definitions such as this might be taken as loose descriptions of what Christianity really is. They bear witness to the difficulty experienced by writers of a different point of view in escaping from accustomed terminology.

proper redemption may be found for Jesus. We are not insensible, for example, of the importance of the function assigned to him in, say, the Ritschlian theology; and we quite agree when Troeltsch urges that to the proper Ritschlians, therefore, Jesus is indispensable. But we cannot close our eyes to the artificiality of the Ritschlian construction, and we cannot put away the impression that the indispensable rôle assigned to Jesus, as it rests rather on inherited reverence for his person than on the logic of the system, is, in a word, only an interim-measure. Why should an influence from Jesus be needed to awake man to faith-knowledge? And how could such a creative influence be exerted by a personality so slightly known, or an "inner life" so vaguely discerned through the mists of time? Herrmann, for example, expressly denies that there is any direct communion of the believer with the exalted Christ; everything is mediated through the "community." All this, therefore, will easily fall away and the actual influence which begets faith be assigned, as Otto Ritschl, for instance, does assign it, to the "community,"⁵⁸ while to Jesus there is left little more than the rôle of first Christian. And so soon as Jesus becomes merely the first Christian, he at once, as Macintosh justly urges,⁵⁹ ceases to be indispensable

⁵⁸ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. iii, 1893, p. 388. In the number of the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* for July, 1912 (pp. 244-268), which has come to hand since this article was sent to the printer, Wilhelm Fresenius subjects Troeltsch's Lecture to a detailed criticism from the Ritschlian standpoint and in the name of the Ritschlians repudiates the representation that the historicity of Jesus is indispensable to faith. Ritschlians mean only, it seems, that they themselves find in Jesus what they need for faith: they do not mean that others may not attain faith by some other way (p. 250). With them "faith rests not on 'historischen' but on 'geschichtlichen' facts," that is to say, on genuine "life-experiences"; and (p. 262) "accordingly faith can look quietly on while criticism does its work, and openly accept its results: it could even endure that the unhistoricity of Jesus should be proved—a thing which, to be sure, has not been done and which sober historical criticism, moreover, will scarcely maintain is likely to be done in the future,—but in principle this case would not turn the scale for faith, that is, so long as faith remains conscious that it is of historical (geschichtlichen) nature and the historical (geschichtliche) fact on which it bases itself ultimately, can be neither established nor refuted by historical (historischen) science. According to Fresenius, therefore, it is a matter of indifference to Ritschlians whether there ever was any "historical Jesus" or not: it is only necessary that they should have had a genuine "experience." This is a full-fledged "christless Christianity."

⁵⁹ *American Journal of Theology*, vol. xvi, January, 1912, p. 110.

for subsequent Christians. Why should not they, as well as he, rise out of the void? He may be the first of the series: that is an accident. Being the first of the series he may have set an example which works powerfully through all subsequent time; he may even have left precepts and directions which smooth the path of all who would adventure the Christian walk with him; above all he may have by his "inner life" of perfect trust in his Father become an inspiration which throbs down all the years. He may, in other words, be exceedingly useful. But indispensable? To be indispensable he must be something more than a teacher, an example, an inspiration. He must be a creator. And to be a creator, he must be and do something far more than the first Christian, living in realization of the fatherhood of God. Whenever Jesus is reduced in his person or work to the level of his "followers," his indispensableness is already in principle subverted and the seeds of a christless Christianity are planted.

The application of this principle will, no doubt, carry us far. When Auguste Sabatier, for example, tells us⁶⁰ that the whole of Christianity is summed up in the parables of the prodigal son and of the publican, he is intent only on abolishing from Christianity the idea of satisfaction. But does he not by necessary consequence with it abolish also Jesus himself, so far as his indispensableness to the Christian religion is concerned? In point of fact, these parables have a Jesus in them as little as a satisfaction. Sabatier very naturally teaches us, therefore, that there is no uniqueness in Christ's work, nothing in it "isolated and incomprehensible." "The sufferings and death of the righteous and the good operate in the same way as the passion of Christ upon the conscience of the wicked"; "all God's servants" have stood by the side of Jesus as, along with him and in the same sense (though not in the same degree), our saviours. We need not, however, journey so far from home for an example. When Horace Bushnell expends the first Part of his *Vicarious Sacrifice* in proving that there is "nothing superlative in vicarious sacrifice, or above the universal principles of right and duty,"

⁶⁰ The Doctrine of the Atonement, and its Historical Evolution, Eng. trans., 1904, pp. 123, 133. Cf. also the review of the book in the Princeton Theological Review, vol. iii, 1905, pp. 508-509.

that in what Christ did, he did "neither more nor less than what the common standard of holiness and right requires," and what was "no way peculiar to him, save in degree," he has already thrown the door wide open for a christless Christianity.⁶¹ He may himself be preoccupied in vindicating to Jesus some kind of uniqueness, if not in the nature, yet in the effect of his work. But this is not intrinsic to the system, and easily falls away. The assimilation of Christ to his followers in the nature of his work and the kind of effect wrought by it is logically fatal to his indispensableness to the religion of which he is still thought of as the founder.

There are other forms of teaching, also, that have enjoyed great vogue, in which the indispensableness of Jesus is, to say the least, not explicit. One such, oddly enough, finds incidental expression in a criticism by Shailer Mathews of Macintosh's separation of Christianity from Christ.⁶² Mathews very properly questions whether the issue raised by Macintosh's reasoning "does not really involve the momentous question as to whether we are not in the process of evolving a new phase of religion from historic Christianity"; and as properly remarks that the retention of the name Christianity for "what we regard as ideal," even though it is not historically traceable to Jesus or to Paul, "would not be the first time that the effort has been made to submerge New Testament teaching in general culture, and in much the same fashion of substituting dehistoricalized, speculative systems for a Christianity with historical content." He expresses hearty agreement with Macintosh, however, in one thing. It is this: that "saving faith, in the personal religious sense, does not wait upon the verdict of the higher criticism as to the historicity of Jesus." Why? Because, apart from the higher criticism, that is, apart from all scientific scrutiny of the

⁶¹ Cf. especially *Vicarious Sacrifice*, New York, 1866, p. 107, and 2d ed., vol. i, New York, 1877, p. 107.

⁶² *American Journal of Theology*, vol. xv, October, 1911, pp. 614-617. For an uncompromising assertion of the point of view here intimated by Mathews see J. Warschauer, *Jesus: Seven Questions*, 1908, pp. 206-233; "Is Belief in Him Necessary?" Warschauer has no hesitation in declaring that "there is no room in a civilized theology for a doctrine which would limit salvation to those professing any one form of religious belief" (p. 230).

gospel records, there is reason enough for trusting our all to Jesus? No. Because Jesus is not necessary to "saving faith, in the personal religious sense"! "Men are not saved by mere orthodoxy or heterodoxy," Mathews remarks,—inconsequently, since nobody ever supposed they were. But then he adds positively: "In the sense that their wills are one with God's, men who have never heard of Jesus have been and are to be saved."

The doctrine here enunciated is practically the doctrine which has played a large part in theological controversy—witness the "Andover debate" of a quarter of a century ago—under the name of the "essential Christ." According to it, men can exercise "saving faith" without any knowledge of Christ; that is to say, as Mathews suggests, their "religious faith, however imperfect," may "possess a quality" that makes them "one with those who through the clearer revelation and deeper certainty given by Jesus also trust God as fatherly and so partake of the divine spirit." In this very prevalent doctrine, there is obviously a very express preparation for a christless Christianity. In the form given it by Mathews it has indeed already fairly passed over into christless Christianity. He conceives the function of Jesus to be to induce trust in God as fatherly; and he conceives that men can exercise and do exercise a faith which has this "quality," apart from any action upon them by Jesus. This is already the announcement that Jesus may be dispensed with—all that he is and all that he does—for some. Some attain saving faith without Jesus; some—no doubt, more easily—with him.⁶³ More

⁶³ This is not nowadays a rare point of view. Emil Sulze, for example, who is very much afraid the honor due to God shall be accorded to Jesus, gives repeated expression to it. Paul Mehlhorn (*Protestantische Monatshefte*, vol. v, 1901, p. 190) describes Sulze's view, with references to his *Wie ist der Kampf um die Bedeutung der Person und des Wirkens Jesu zu beendigen?* 1901, as follows: "Although now Sulze emphasizes that faith is an immediate work of God in us, so that there are circumstances in which it can arise without the mediation of acquaintance with Christ and the church, yet it would be in his view a terrible loss for the individual if he did not permit himself to be helped forward and given assurance in this matter by history and its pioneering personalities. Just as a German statesman 'who had not formed himself on Stein and Bismarck must remain a pitiable beginner' (p. 34), so for the clarifying and establishment of our faith, 'the person of every child of God' is 'for us a means of grace in God's

commonly a higher function is attributed to Jesus. He has, it is said, made atonement for sin; on the basis of this atonement men may be saved. He has shed down his Spirit, quickening faith in men; their faith, therefore, though exercised in ignorance of him, has its warrant, and its source, and its effect from him. Their salvation is accordingly from Christ, and by Christ, and in Christ, though they are ignorant of all this. In proportion as this higher doctrine is approached, in that proportion is the preparation made for a christless Christianity less explicit. But even in it, there is an implicit preparation for it. A Christ of whom you are unconscious is at best in some sense a Christ who does not exist for you: and if everything he may be for you depends upon your consciousness of him, a Christ of whom you are unconscious does not exist at all for you. A salvation apart from knowledge of Christ is always liable to be conceived as a salvation apart from Christ. In Mathews's construction, though he is in the act of repelling a christless Christianity, it actually becomes salvation without Christ. He speaks of it only with reference to some. But if some may thus be saved without Christ, why not all? There seems no compelling reason, on Mathews's ground, why Jesus should be proclaimed, or why he should exist, at all.

We may learn from Otto Ritschl⁶⁴ that a very similar line of thought may be developed on Ritschlian premises. Ritschl is examining W. Herrmann's doctrine of faith. According to Herrmann, man finds the living God not within himself, where mysticism bids him seek him, but solely in the personal life of Jesus.

hand,' while Christ is and abides 'by his unique vocation . . . the perfectly unique means of grace for us' (p. 35)."

Sulze, however, is more hospitable to the idea of the independence of "Christian" faith of Christ than Mathews. Neither complete peace nor complete assurance can be had, he urges, without a free attitude towards Jesus himself. And quite after the manner of Macintosh, he argues: "And is the attitude to God which is here described not the same as that which, according to all that we know of him, was occupied by Christ himself? He did not win love to his Father in Heaven in dependence on an historical person. God himself gave him what he revealed by him" (*Protestantische Monatshefte*, vol. xi, 1907, p. 247). His views as to the dispensability of Jesus are more or less clearly expressed in a number of articles in the *Protestantische Monatshefte*.

⁶⁴ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, vol. iii, 1893, pp. 380-388.

Christian faith is thus made to carry with it "a clear consciousness of its conditioning through the personal life of Jesus." This, Ritschl thinks, is too narrow a view.

What [he asks] are we to hold respecting such Christians as lack a clear consciousness of the inner possessions for which they are indebted to Christ? Or is it also deficiency in complete faith when a Christian in prayer to his God and Father seeks and finds firm support in the cares and tasks and strifes of life, without at the same time recalling Christ as the sole revelation of this God; although he has failed in this perhaps only because he lacked the spiritual energy to grasp the religious conception of God and that of Christ in one and the same prayer-idea? Can we doubt that such Christians have faith in the full sense, because the theoretical consideration leads to conceiving Christian faith in general not apart from a clear consciousness of its conditioning through Christ's personal life?

It is plain fact, he urges, that the fruits of faith are reaped where this clear consciousness is not present; and it is equally plain fact that this clear consciousness can be present and no fruits of faith show themselves: the question obtrudes itself "whether the conscious but unfruitful or the fruitful but unconscious faith is the more valuable." Clear consciousness must obviously be looked upon as only occasional, as "a special charism"; some have it, in others it is "latent or undeveloped."

Wherever world-overcoming faith, recognizable in its fruits, is found, it must be referred back to the influence of Christ, whether the believing subject is conscious of this connection or not. On the other hand, it should be recognized, in opposition to Herrmann, that the faith which does not bring with it a clear consciousness of its conditioning through Christ, but which nevertheless is actually conditioned through Christ's operations, is only mediately grounded on the personal life of Jesus. Immediately, however, the ground of such faith is the Christian life practised in the sense of Christ in the community. And only in this also do the vital activities of Christ propagate themselves from generation to generation.

Jesus may have been needed, then, to set the course of Christian life going in the world. After that he may safely be forgotten. There is no obvious reason why he may not be forgotten by the whole Christian community,—why the memory of him may

not fade entirely out of the world,—and still faith be continued through the influence of the faith-exercising community; just as motion once induced in the first of a series of balls in contact with one another may be transmitted to the last ball, though it is touched actually only by the penultimate one. A fully developed christless Christianity may thus grow out of Christ himself; if you will only permit us to think of Christ as providing merely the initial impulse and then withdrawing out of sight.

It has been thought worth while to bring into view these remoter tendencies of thought making towards christless Christianity, that the numerous pathways may be kept in mind along which men may travel, from depreciation of the function of Christ in “redemption,” through neglect or forgetfulness of him, to actual denial of his indispensable place in the religious life of Christians. These pathways, while very direct, are also no doubt often somewhat long. That is to say, the passage from unconscious to conscious disregard of Christ is made logically much more quickly than it is practically. From the practical point of view the distance that separates the conscious from the merely virtual denial of the indispensableness of Jesus to faith is beyond doubt immense. The phenomenon which now faces us is that this immense space has been actually overstepped by many about us. There are many still calling themselves Christians who have come to the pass that, not inadvertently or by way of logical implication merely, but in the most heedful manner in the world, and by express declaration, they turn away from Jesus as no longer possessing supreme significance for their religious life. They deliberately pronounce him unnecessary for their faith, and seek its source and ground and content elsewhere. No doubt, they exhibit differences among themselves. George B. Foster, who surely ought to know, distinguishes two varieties.

To-day [he says] ⁶⁶ there are two kinds of spirits which dream of a Christianity without Christ: the weak and the strong. The weak are those who have received all the priceless blessings which we possess in Christianity, only at third or fourth hand. They have been refreshed, nourished, led by these blessings—whence they came is of little concern to them. . . . The others are the strong.

⁶⁶ *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, 2d ed., 1909, p. 331.

They know very well that Christianity sprang from Christ. But one does not now need him longer. Were they to be quite frank, they would say that he, not entirely unlike miracles, had come to be something of a hindrance. But would it not poorly serve the advancement of Christianity [he adds], the pervasion of the world with Christianity, and one's own peace and joy in Christianity, to drain off the fountain? Is not their view much the same as if we were to sever the connection of our arteries with the heart whence the blood comes?

The criticism is apt, from the Christian point of view: apt, though not quite adequate. From the Christian point of view it may very properly be said (though this is far from all that needs to be said) that those who are advising us that Christianity can get along very well without Christ are very much like men sitting by a brookside and reasoning that since we have the brook we do not need the spring from which it flows, and may readily admit the doubt whether there is a spring. If even this criticism does not seem valid to our christless Christians, that can only be because they no longer occupy the Christian point of view.

The point which needs particular pressing lies, indeed, just here,—that in thus separating themselves from Jesus as the source and ground and content of their faith, they sever themselves from Christianity and proclaim themselves of another religion. By some odd tangle of thought they may still declare themselves Christians, though they no longer hold to Christ or look to him for redemption from their sins. They have learned, we are told, from David Friedrich Strauss (in his Christian period) to distinguish between the principle of Christianity and the person of Christ. The discovery of this distinction was, we know, with Strauss “the first step which counts” towards we know what end. May we not commend to those who follow him in this first step the example which he set them when he opened his eyes at last and saw whither it really had conducted him?

Therefore, my conviction is [he writes] that, if we are not dealing in evasion, if we do not wish to tack and trim, if we do not desire to say Yea, yea, and Nay, nay,—in short, if we speak like honest and candid men, we must confess that we are no longer Christians.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 1872, p. 90; cf. p. 143.

Why should there be any hesitation in the matter? A Christianity to which Christ is indifferent is, as a mere matter of fact, no Christianity at all. For Christianity, in the core of the matter, consists in just, "Jesus Christ and Him as crucified." Can he be of the body who no longer holds to the Head?

What is, after all, the fundamental difference between Christianity and other "positive" religions? Does it not turn just on this—that the founders of the other religions point out the way to God while Christ presents Himself as that Way? It is primary teaching that we receive, when we are told:

Buddha and Confucius, Zarathustra and Mohammed are no doubt the first confessors of the religions which have been founded by them, but they are not the content of these religions, and they stand in an external and to a certain extent accidental relation to them. Their religions could remain the same even though their names were forgotten, or their persons replaced by others. In Christianity, however, it is altogether different. To be sure the notion is occasionally given expression that Christ too does not desire to be the only mediator and He would be quite content that His name should be forgotten, if only His principles and spirit lived on in the community. But others who for themselves have wholly broken with Christianity have in an unpartisan fashion denied and refuted these notions. Christianity stands to the person of Christ in a wholly different relation from that of the religions of the peoples to the persons by whom they have been founded. Jesus is not the first confessor of the religion which bears His name. He was not the first and most eminent Christian, but He holds in Christianity a wholly different place. . . . Christ is Christianity itself; He stands not outside of it but in its centre; without His name, person and work, there is no Christianity left. In a word, Christ does not point out the way to salvation; He is the Way itself.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Herman Bavinck, *Magnalia Dei*, 1909, p. 312.

MOHAMMED AND THE ISLAM OF THE KORAN

CRAWFORD H. TOY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

It is reckoned that Islam is now professed by from 150 to 200 million people, nearly one-seventh of the population of the globe. For thirteen centuries it has played a great rôle in the history of religion. Its adherents have been found among civilized, half-civilized, and barbarous peoples; its theory and its practice have traversed the whole gamut of religious thought and experience; it has sometimes been associated with the leadership of thought in Western Asia, Egypt, and Europe; and it has maintained its position against the assaults and seductions of neighboring faiths. It presents an interesting and perplexing problem to students of religion, of anthropology and psychology, and of the general history of civilization. Recent events have raised afresh the question of its achievements in the past and its possibilities for the future, and writers of various points of view and various degrees of knowledge and insight have discussed its genesis and its essential nature and the character of its founder.¹ It is the object of this article to state some of the questions thus raised and to examine briefly some of the answers that have been offered.

I. MOHAMMED

Trustworthy material for the life of Mohammed, particularly up to the flight to Medina, is scanty. The only contemporaneous guide is the Koran, and the Koran, devoted, as it is, to the proclamation of dogmas and the organization of the young community of believers, has little occasion to give biographical details, which, moreover, were well known to his hearers and needed no mention. If we call in tradition to supplement the Koran, we find that this is an uncertain guide. The earliest Moslem biog-

¹ A list of some useful works on Mohammed and Islam is given at the end of this article.

raphers of Mohammed wrote long after his death, and the character of their works (in the form in which they have come down to us) is not such as to strengthen our confidence in the exactness of their information.² It is true that tradition (*ḥadith*) concerning the prophet was gradually organized into what purported to be an exact science. It was required that any saying attributed to him should be traced back through a line of credible reporters to some member of his family or to some person who was intimately associated with him. But we know little of the credibility of the intermediaries, and we have abundant evidence of the rapidity with which legend gathered about the person of the founder of the faith. The great traditionist Bokhari (810–870) brought back from an extended tour 600,000 traditions, out of which he selected and published 7275 as in his opinion authentic. When we consider the amount of impossible matter contained in Ibn Ishāq's biography of the prophet, we can hardly doubt that the mass of the later collections is of the same sort. It is possible that these contain some genuine reports of Mohammed's sayings and doings, but we have no certain means of distinguishing them; a critic's judgment of a tradition will be determined by his opinion concerning its consonance with the Koran or with some other authority held to be trustworthy, and in this procedure there is abundant room for coloring by individual feeling and points of view. Yet we are not left wholly without means of arriving at the facts of Mohammed's life. The uncertainties of the tradition pertain largely to dogmas and embellishments. What a man does under the public eye, particularly when he occupies a prominent position, may impress itself on the memory of contemporaries and be handed down with a reasonable degree of accuracy, and the general course of such a man's life may be fairly well known.

Mohammed was born in Mecca about the year 570 of our era. As there was no exact chronological system in Arabia at that time, the date of the event has to be reckoned from general indications. The tradition was that the year of his birth was that

² Ibn Ishāq, the earliest biographer, died in the year 768; his work is lost, but a great part of it is preserved in a compilation by Ibn Hisham, who died in 834. Ibn Sa'd, the secretary of Al-Waqidi, died in 845; his biography is presumably based on the materials left by his famous master.

of the expedition of the South-Arabian Christian king Abraha against Mecca; this expedition is mentioned in the Koran (Sura 105), was a well-known and notable event, and would be a decisive chronological guide if we knew its date, but this we do not know. However, accepting the tradition that he was about forty years of age when he came forward as prophet, and fifty-one or fifty-two when he left Mecca for Medina (in 622),³ we arrive at the year 571 or 570 for his birth. He was of the Hashimite clan—it was the Hashimites that stood by him, on the ground of kinship, in the time of his greatest trial in Mecca. Exactly what the social position of this clan was is not clear; its attitude in the Meccan period of the prophet's life was not that of an influential body—its men were brave and faithful enough, but could not hold their own, except by passive endurance, against the leaders of the dominant Koreish. That Mohammed early lost his parents appears from Koran 93 6: "Did not he [thy Lord] find thee an orphan and provide thee shelter?" He was cared for first by his grandfather and then by his uncle, Abu Talib. As the latter was a trader, according to the Meccan custom, the young man took part in commercial journeys to Syria and southern Arabia, and when he was about twenty-five years old entered the service of the rich widow Ḥadijah (Khadijah) as commercial agent. This turned out to be an important step for him—he married his patroness, and, though she is said to have been fifteen years his senior, the marriage proved to be a happy one; during her lifetime he took no other wife. For the next fifteen years we have no details, but it was doubtless a period of reflection. Mecca, the commercial, literary, and religious centre of northern Arabia, was a meeting-place for men of various views, and the young man, relieved by his marriage from pecuniary cares and enjoying an assured social position, could not fail to come in contact with the ideas that Jews, Christians, and Persians represented. Gradually, by processes of thought that are not recorded, when he was about forty years old, he reached the conclusion that one God alone was to be worshipped, and, not content with holding this belief for himself, he felt impelled to preach it to his fellow-townsmen as

³ This date may be regarded as fairly well fixed.

a prophet of Allah, the successor of the great prophets of the past.

He spoke of his conviction first to his intimates, his wife, his cousin Ali (son of Abu Talib), and his freedman and adopted son Zeid. Encouraged by them he came forward publicly as a religious teacher claiming to be sent by Allah. He addressed himself first to individual men, and then boldly to groups of men. The Kaaba was the Meccan general place of meeting; hither came men from all quarters to pray (the Kaaba housed the gods of many tribes), and here the notables used to assemble and discuss the affairs of the city. Mohammed, going with the others to perform his devotions, took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him of approaching the chief men of the Koreish. He denounced the worship of the local gods, and proclaimed resurrection and final judgment, with paradise for those who accepted his doctrine, and gehenna for all others.

Now began a time of stress and strain for him and for Mecca. He deliberately and sharply set himself in antagonism to all the conservative elements of the people—to the popular attachment to the inherited religion, to the commercial interests which feared that rejection of the gods would alienate the surrounding tribes and imperil the trade of the city, and to the pride of the Koreish aristocracy, which resented the intrusion of a doctrine that threatened its prestige and its power. It was, in fact, nothing less than a social revolution that Mohammed proposed, the overthrow of present standards of honor and influence and the elevation to primacy of a man who did not represent the existing tribal authority. The boldness, not to say audacity, of his demand compels surprise and admiration. Naturally his speeches finally set the city on an uproar. At first, however, the opposition to him was quiet. He had few followers; the body of the citizens were against him, and they contented themselves with ridicule or contemptuous denial of his assertions. The Koran abounds in references to the charges brought against him. He was sneered at as crazy (81 22), as a soothsayer (52 29), or a magician inspired by a cursed satan (81 25), and as a poet (52 30, 37 35)—he was, in a word, described as a crazy or fanciful person, unworthy of serious consideration by a sensible man. The inclusion

of "poet" in the same category with "madman" and "soothsayer" is due probably not merely to the passionate element in poetry and the ravings of some who set themselves up as poets, but also to the fact that in Arabic a poet is a "knower," as the soothsayer also was endowed with knowledge, and both were anciently supposed to be inspired by some supernatural being.⁴ Mohammed's earlier utterances resembled poetry in that they consisted of short phrases, passionate ejaculations; otherwise no man was ever more innocent of poetry than he, as his keen critics doubtless knew (for in that day the form of Arabic poetry was strictly regulated, and his discourses did not follow the rules), but they chose to ridicule what they called his wildness.⁵ To all such scoffs he replied by positive denial, and indeed they were sufficiently answered by his preceding record and by his present procedure, which gave evidence of sanity and seriousness.

A more important attack on his claim to divine inspiration was the charge of pretence and falsification. His discourses, it was said, offered nothing new, they were only copies of old stories (68 15), which he caused to be written down morning and evening and then gave out as revelations from Allah (25 6 ff.); or, more definitely, it was alleged that they were taught him by a certain man (16 105), and he was, therefore, an utterer of falsehoods and an impostor. What man is here referred to as his teacher is not known; he was, presumably, a Jew or a Christian, and it may be assumed that Mohammed got narrative material, from time to time, from such sources. But he stoutly denied that he was dependent on men. If, said he, my accusers wish to sustain their assertion that my Koran is of human origin, let them bring something like it (52 33)—an effective argument, for no Arab could have produced anything like it in religious distinctness and elevation; and as to foreign aid he observed that a foreigner would have spoken in a foreign tongue, whereas the Koran was pure Arabic (16 105)⁶—a futile observation, for in any case he himself must have employed the Arabic language.

⁴ Poetry and poets were, however, highly regarded, especially by the desert tribes, among whom were not a few men of poetical genius.

⁵ And he, in his turn, hated the poets (26 224 f.).

⁶ His insistence on this point constituted an appeal to the national feeling of his audience.

In addition to these attacks on Mohammed's sanity and truthfulness the Meccan critics objected to the manner in which his message, which he claimed to be divine, was said to be revealed, and to its doctrinal content. They took exception to the absence of visible supernatural features. What sort of apostle, said they, is this? he eats food and walks about in the streets like one of us—he should be accompanied by an angel as fellow-preacher, and should have treasure and a garden to supply food and other needs (25 8 f.); or at least some great man in Mecca or in Tayif should have been chosen as Allah's messenger (43 30). It was also shrewdly observed that the Koran, if it came from Allah, should have been sent down at once entire and not piecemeal, as, according to Mohammed, was the case (25 34)—for, they held, why should a divine message be given in driblets? He seems to have felt the force of this objection, for about this time he received an admonition from Allah not to be hasty in demanding revelations (20 113). He might have replied that it was thus the old Jewish prophets received their messages, a word for every situation as it arose; but it is doubtful whether he knew this fact, and whether such an explanation would have satisfied the Meccans. As to his teaching, a bodily resurrection seemed to them absurd. We live and we die, they said; death is the end, time alone destroys us, and we shall not live again; if there be a resuscitation, bring our fathers back to life (44 33 ff., 45 23 f.). In defence of the popular religion it was urged, besides the appeal to the custom of the fathers, that Allah could have prevented the worship of the gods if he had desired to do so (43 19–21). To these arguments Mohammed replied that Allah chose his messengers (as, for instance, an Arab of Mecca) and sent his messages as seemed to him good; that he was all-powerful, and, as he had originally given life, could give it again after death; and that, having formerly permitted the religion of the fathers, he now sent something better.

The tradition has stories of persecution—the adherents of the new faith, it is said, were insulted, a few slaves among them were cruelly treated.⁷ In the Koran (86 *al.*) there is mention

⁷ One of these slaves was the Abessinian black, Bilal, who was afterwards the first *muezzin*; he was bought and freed by Abu Bekr in Mecca.

of plots, but no details are given. It does not appear that Mohammed's life was ever in danger; he was protected from extreme violence by his kinsfolk.⁸ But as time went on and there was no sign that he would cease preaching, he became more and more obnoxious to the Koreish leaders. Probably their objection to him was rather political than religious; religious convictions sat lightly on the Arabs of that day, but the new doctrine was a menace to the power of the aristocracy. It was determined to adopt rigorous measures. First, however, a delegation went to Abu Talib with the request that he would dissuade his nephew from proceeding farther. Abu Talib's appeal was in vain; Mohammed remained firm, and the ties of blood held the Hashimites with him. The next step was more serious—the Hashimite clan was put under the ban, intermarrying and trading with it were forbidden the Meccans. The banned families retired to an outlying quarter of the city and there remained three years, suffering from scarcity of food; then the situation excited the pity and the indignation of some persons of influence, and the ban was removed. But the prospect of success for Mohammed and his teaching in Mecca was small, and he was forced to consider the possibility of establishing himself elsewhere. Some years before this, groups of his followers had gone over to Abyssinia, but had returned without accomplishing anything. He now bethought him of Tayif, a prosperous city lying about sixty miles east of Mecca; but his proposals were rejected by the people with scorn. It seemed as if his mission was a failure—he had made no marked impression on his native city.⁹ There is no indication that the thought of surrender ever occurred to him; the Meccan suras maintain their unyielding tone to the last, but he must have been profoundly depressed. He seems, however, not to have abandoned his conviction of ultimate victory (though of his inner life we have regrettably few details), and he was a man of resource.

At the moment when things were at their worst help came from an unexpected quarter. Falling into conversation, at the season

⁸ There is a vague reference to a murderous plot in the Koran (8 29).

⁹ About this time also (619) death deprived him of two staunch friends, his wife and his uncle Abu Talib.

of the pilgrimage, with some men of Yathreb, he so impressed them that they agreed to present his claims to their fellow-townsmen. A year later (621) they returned with a favorable report and a definite invitation, leading men of the two Arab tribes of Yathreb (Aus and Khazraj) pledging their faith and promising obedience to him in all things. Still another year elapsed before the preparations for departure were completed. His followers had been withdrawing in small groups, and in June, 622,¹⁰ he himself, accompanied by Abu Bekr, succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Koreish (who had got information of his purpose and wished to detain him), and reached in safety his new home, where he was received with enthusiasm. Henceforward it was known as Medina, "the city (*medina*) of the prophet." This sudden acceptance of Mohammed by Yathreb (in sharp contrast with the attitude of Mecca) appears to have been induced by a combination of conditions. The Yathrebites had long been in contact with certain Jewish tribes settled in their vicinity, and the doctrine of one only God could not have been strange to them; they had no such powerful conservative aristocracy as ruled in Mecca, and their city was not a great religious centre; the two cities were commercial rivals, and they of Yathreb were, doubtless, not indifferent to the honor of carrying off a prophet¹¹ from their Meccan brethren. However the upturning of opinion came about, it proved to be real and of high significance.

Installed in Medina, Mohammed of necessity changed his tone—he became dictator as well as preacher. After establishing public worship he turned his attention to strengthening his political position. The situation was not without dangers. The Koreish were his implacable enemies, and were superior to him in military force; the desert tribes were of uncertain disposition except in their love of plunder; the Jews formed practically independent, well-guarded communities, and had to be reckoned with; and in the city, while Khazraj was friendly, there were not a few men in Aus who yielded only a grudging obedience to the new

¹⁰ This is the date of the *hijra* (*hej'ra*), the Mohammedan chronological epoch.

¹¹ They must have heard much of prophets from their Jewish neighbors, perhaps a prediction of an expected prophet who would do great things; and here was a prophet of their own nation!

government, and withheld support from it whenever they could do so without coming to open conflict.¹² These antagonistic conditions Mohammed met, on the whole, with skill. It was necessary to provide support for the Emigrants, the Companions of the prophet, who had left everything in Mecca to follow him, and were now largely dependent on the hospitality of the Medinan converts (the "Helpers"); this he attempted to do by attacking Meccan trading caravans. The first successful foray was made by a party of his followers in the sacred month Rajab (623), in which war was forbidden—a grievous offence against law; Mohammed was displeased, but condoned and in a measure justified the act (2 214). The next year an attack on the Meccan caravan returning from Syria brought about the first conflict with the Koreish (battle of Bedr), a Moslem victory that greatly strengthened Mohammed's position in Medina (8 9, 17, 42). A defeat at Ohod (625) was explained as a test, and final victory was promised (3 117, 145). On the other hand, a formidable Meccan attack (627) was repelled by means of an intrenchment (battle of the ditch), and this ended the war with Mecca. Meantime a certain number of the desert tribes had been won over, and the increasing power of Medina made it less and less difficult to secure the aid of the bedawin. The Jews were gradually disposed of. They made the mistake of underestimating Mohammed's strength and, in one case, of allying themselves with his enemies; occasions of quarrel arose, and the result was that two of the three tribes, Kainuka and Nadir, were banished (625), and the third, Kuraiza, was annihilated (627)¹³. The disaffected in Medina were now overawed and unable to give trouble. The remaining years of Mohammed's life witnessed some military reverses, but a general advance in power. In 629 he was permitted by the Koreish to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the following year the city fell into his hands without a blow. The idols were demolished, the Moslem worship was established, and he found himself political and religious master of Arabia. He took measures to organize and consolidate his government, made his farewell pilgrimage, and died

¹² These are the "hypocrites" so vehemently denounced in the Koran: they probably regarded themselves as patriots.

¹³ See Suras 59 and 33.

two months later (June, 632), having seen his dream of victory gloriously realized.

As we are dependent for our knowledge of Mohammed's character mainly on the Koran, it is fortunate that we are able to fix the relative chronology of its parts with a fair degree of probability. Of the 114 suras, or chapters, the tradition assigns somewhat over four-fifths (comprising about three-fourths of the book) to the Meccan period, and within this period a division, based on the tone and material of the contents, into earlier and later suras may be made. In general the shorter and more rhapsodical suras are to be regarded as the earlier; as time went on, the prophet's discourses became more methodical, and in Medina he was naturally led to introduce much legislative material. No absolute chronological certainty is attainable, but the reader, whether he has the original or a translation, cannot fail to feel differences in the suras, and the headings "of Mecca," "of Medina," may be taken as a good general guide. The hints in the Koran may be supplemented, as is remarked above, by some statements of the tradition.

We get the impression that Mohammed's personality was an attractive one. He had the devoted attachment not only of his immediate family but also of strong and thoughtful men like his uncle Abu Talib,¹⁴ Abu Bekr, and Omar, and many others, and the hostility of the Koreish was due not to his character but to his preaching. His bearing under persecution was generally dignified. The remarkable confidence that he inspired in his followers was probably based in part on belief in the sanity and solidity of his character. There are indications of tenderness also in his relations with his friends and with children. He seems to have been physically brave, as was natural in a man of his place and time—he bore his share in the battles with the Koreish. He showed moral bravery also in the stanchness with which he proclaimed and maintained unpopular opinions in Mecca. The story that, to conciliate the Koreish, he publicly admitted that the three goddesses, Al-Lāt, Al-Uzza, and Manāt, were intercessors with Allah, and that repenting he publicly took back his admission,

¹⁴ Two of his uncles took a different attitude: Abbas long stood aloof from him, and Abu Lahab was his bitter enemy.

appears not to be authenticated. It may have originated as a legendary explanation of his positive declaration (53 19 ff.) that the three were mere names and that their worship was unauthorized by Allah. But if he publicly admitted his error and revoked his concession, it was a brave act. The theory of some late commentators that he did really make this admission, by suggestion of Satan, when he was out of himself and did not know what he was saying, is probably a mythical attachment to the affirmation (22 51) that there has been no apostle or prophet but Satan has approached him with wicked suggestions.

That he was of an excitable and passionate nature is evident from his violent outbursts against his enemies. His denunciations of the Koreish may perhaps be excused as condemnation of religious error and of antagonism to God; he is not behind them in exuberance and sharpness of invective—for every charge of craziness or falsity he has a countercharge of blindness or treachery and a threat of hell-fire.¹⁵ His attitude toward his uncle Abu Lahab also may be regarded as religious hatred, but it was in part hatred of a personal enemy, not merely condemnation of a wrong opinion. The concentrated bitterness of Sura 111 is offensive: "May the hands of Abu Lahab and he himself perish! His riches shall not profit him. He shall be cast into flaming fire [*lahab* is "flame"], and with him his wife, bearing wood, a cord about her neck." It belongs to his nervous excitability that he had visions which he did not distinguish from real events. He mentions, briefly in a single sentence (17 1), the night-journey from the temple of Mecca to the temple of Jerusalem in the same tone in which he speaks of himself as an orphan cared for by Allah (93 6).¹⁶ Twice (53 5-18) he saw the mighty one (probably Gabriel)¹⁷ who was Allah's agent of revelation to him, once on the horizon, once at the lotus tree near the garden of the (divine)

¹⁵ A prophet, identifying his opinion with the will of God, must necessarily be implacable toward religious opponents; compare Ezekiel's anathema against Zedekiah (Ezek. 17 11 ff.), whom he regarded as an enemy of Yahweh, and early Christian anathemas against heretics.

¹⁶ This incident, referred to very simply by Mohammed, is enormously expanded in the tradition (Weil's translation of Ibn Ishāq, pp. 200 ff.).

¹⁷ If Allah had been meant, the statement would have indicated him clearly.

abode. For the explanation of these visions (which are such as are not uncommon in the experience of prophets, ancient and modern) it is unnecessary to resort to the hypothesis of epilepsy. There is, in fact, no convincing evidence that Mohammed was an epileptic, and if he was indeed subject to epileptic attacks, this did not affect the sanity and cogency of his teaching. During his Meccan ministry he seems to have given much time to devotional exercises. Allah, he says (73), bade him rise from bed and devote the greater part of the night to prayer and the reading of the Koran; "Call on the name of thy Lord," said Allah, "devoting thyself exclusively to him." In Mecca he appears, in a word, to have been unworldly. While Khadijah lived she was his only wife; only after her death did he begin his remarkable accumulation of consorts, continued almost up to his last year. Some of these wives were widows of his followers, and it has been urged that he took most of them from motives of charity, to provide for them when they had lost their natural protectors. This may have been true in some cases, but in most of the marriages we have to recognize his passion for beautiful women.¹⁸

His intellectual qualities were such as are found in most religious organizers—insight and practical ability. Of erudition in our sense of the word there could be no question in the Arabia of that time. Learning consisted in the knowledge of poems and tribal traditions and sometimes of foreign stories—all acquired orally. Writings were few and there were few persons who could read them. The ideal man was a warrior and a robber (like the mediaeval robber baron); even poets were rarely masters of the mysterious arts of reading and writing. It is uncertain whether or not Mohammed could read and write. He several times (7 156, 158 *al.*) describes himself by an adjective (*ummi*) that may be rendered "illiterate" or "ignorant" or may mean "belonging to the common people"; in one place (29 47) he says that before the revelation of the Koran he could not read or write (or was not in the habit of reading and writing)—otherwise, it is added, his opponents might doubt; his ignorance or unaccustomedness in this regard is cited as proof that what he preached was from

¹⁸ He married Sauda a few months after Khadijah's death, and took the Coptic maid Mary as concubine about two years before his own death.

Allah. He had a profound respect for the art of writing, which he says (96 4 f.) was taught man by Allah; if, however, he was acquainted with it, there is no indication in the Koran that he made use of it. The question is not an important one. Education in his day was not by reading and writing, but by observation of men and events, and he was a keen and intelligent observer, gathering facts from all quarters, and using them skilfully for his own purposes. Logical thinker he was not, but he had instinct that took the place of logic. He cannot be called a statesman, for he had no definite plan of political organization, but he accomplished much of what statesmanship aims to do. For many years it was Mecca that he expected to make his permanent home and the centre of his propaganda. Circumstances drove him to Medina, and there his course was shaped by events from day to day. He was always vigorous and determined, rarely headstrong. He was a born ruler of men, yet generally willing to listen to advice and be guided by it. A multitude of incidents illustrated his knowledge of human nature and his excellent practical judgment and power of achievement. It was demanded of him, for example, that he work miracles, but his good sense led him to disclaim the sort of power that his opponents had in mind; the Koran, he said, was his miracle.

He was a true prophet in the sense that he seized on and vigorously proclaimed certain fundamental religious conceptions much needed by the community in which he lived. He had also a gift not always possessed by prophets, wisdom to insist on the main things and to stop at the point where insistence became dangerous or fruitless. His whole career proves that he thoroughly believed the great doctrines he taught. Nor is there good reason to doubt that he believed himself called of God to preach. Possibly this conviction may have been suggested or strengthened by visions (such as are perhaps alluded to in 96 1 and 74 1), but its basis was probably his reflection and experience. He had come gradually to a practically monotheistic faith,¹⁹ and believing this to be of prime importance for his generation, he could not

¹⁹ One of his sons was named Abd Menāf, "servant of Menāf," a minor Ko-reish god. This was before he began to preach, at a time when he worshipped the local deities.

but hold that he was commissioned by Allah to proclaim it. His introduction of Allah as the dictator of his utterances is parallel to the usage of the Hebrew prophets, who preface their discourses with "thus saith Yahweh." Inferior though he was to these prophets in certain points, he had in common with them the consciousness of being divinely inspired. He bore himself, as a rule, with the dignity proper to the prophetic office.²⁰

In his moral life there were conflicting elements. In his ordinary social relations, so far as appears, he was above reproach—he was honest, just, and kindly. He was disposed to show clemency to prisoners of war, except in cases where they had particularly angered him by ridicule, opposition, or barbarity. On the other hand, there appear in his conduct at certain times evidences of the dominance of passion, lack of moral clearness of vision, and abdication of personal moral responsibility. In his attitude toward his opponents it may often be hard to distinguish between the indignation of the apostle and the hatred of the man; but he rarely, if ever, shows moral discrimination in his judgments of his enemies. He does not apprehend the importance of the element of motive in actions, and he appears to have been incapable of understanding any point of view that differed from his own. The ground of the opposition of the Koreish to him was essentially the same as that of his opposition to them. In their eyes he was the enemy of the established civil and religious order; for him they were the enemies of the new order of which he was the representative. It did not occur to him to ask himself whether there might not be a patriotic motive, worthy of respect, in their antagonism to his revolutionary programme. Their tone is not commendable, neither is his. Both he and they were deficient in sympathy and in power of moral discrimination. From the point of view of political success Mohammed's mode of procedure proved to be good—reformers often have to be uncompromising and violent, and in the end the Koreish had to be beaten into submission; but his attitude was morally narrow, and has not led to the highest success.

²⁰ An instance of a less worthy regard for his dignity as ruler and great man is the injunction to his followers (49 2 ff.) not to talk familiarly with him or loudly in his presence; those who lower their voices, it is said, will have great reward.

Other sorts of moral weakness appear in his marriage to Zeinab, wife of his adopted son, Zeid. The account of the affair in the Koran (33 37) is of refreshing simplicity and directness:

When thou saidst to him on whom Allah had conferred favors and thou hadst conferred favors, "Keep thy wife and fear Allah," and, fearing men (though it is better to fear Allah), thou didst conceal thy thought that Allah had determined to make manifest, then, when Zeid²¹ determined to divorce her, we gave her to thee as wife, that believers may commit no sin when they marry the divorced wives of their adopted sons.

In this displeasing procedure Mohammed's chief fault was not that he set aside a generally acknowledged social rule in order to gratify his passion,²² but that he profited by his position as apostle and employed an alleged divine revelation to justify his act. It is a proof of his power in Medina that he dared to use the Deity as the minister of his pleasures, and that his followers accepted his explanation (for the thing was so bad that an explanation was necessary) without losing faith in him. This incident, however, is only one example of his conception of his relations with the Deity—Allah is everywhere his sponsor and guarantor. Allah is said to dictate or relate to him various Biblical stories (as in 28 2) and extrabiblical legends of the Ephesian youths in the cave (18 12), Alexander (18 82), and others; he must have known that these came to him from men. When it becomes necessary to abrogate a verse, it is Allah that substitutes another verse for it (16 103 f.). He avers that he has had no assistance from man in composing the Koran—it is all a revelation from God (16 105). It is hard to say what his mental attitude was when he made such assertions; perhaps he meant that he was giving the stories in their correct form and with a proper application.²³ In any case his theory of the transmission of truth is confused, and he discards responsibility by throwing the burden on Allah, who is thus

²¹ This is the only case in which a follower of Mohammed is mentioned by name in the Koran.

²² He was not guilty of adultery and murder like David in the affair with Bathsheba, but in other respects his offence was more heinous than that of the Hebrew king.

²³ He asserted that the Jews had corrupted their scriptures (3 64 f.).

made responsible for the prophet's historical statements. This is perhaps the greatest sin a prophet can commit—it saps the foundations of moral life.

In Mohammed's political career the deed that his apologists find it hardest to defend is his treatment of the Jewish Kuraiza tribe. It is referred to in the Koran (83 26 f.) in a matter-of-fact way as an instance of Allah's favor to the true believers:

The Jews who assisted the Meccans, Allah brought down from their fortresses and cast terror into their hearts; some of them ye slew, some ye made captives, and Allah bestowed on you their land and their wealth.

The Kuraiza violated their agreement with Mohammed and sided with the Koreish in the battle of the ditch (627). After the battle (in which the Moslems were victorious) the Kuraiza were besieged and capitulated, and, according to Ibn Ishaq,²⁴ Mohammed left the decision of the fate of the survivors to a certain Saad, who decided that the men should be put to death and the women and children sold as slaves—which was accordingly done. The Jews were guilty of treachery, and according to the existing laws of war deserved punishment, but not so bloody a one—they might have been deported, and would then have been powerless for harm. Whether or not it was by another man that the sentence of death was pronounced, Mohammed approved it—"it is Allah's will" he is reported to have said—and he is to be held responsible for it.

In passing judgment on these procedures it is only fair to take into account the ideas and manners of the time and the peculiar nature of Mohammed's situation. The custom of blood-revenge then existed, and the usages in warfare were barbarous; women sometimes accompanied an army, and after a battle searched for and killed wounded personal enemies. There was no conception of the sanctity of human life. The marriage-bond was not held to be permanent; temporary unions were not uncommon, and the woman as well as the man had the right of divorce. Up to the capture of Mecca (two years and a half before his death)

²⁴ Ibn Ishaq, pp. 688 ff., Germ. tr., pp. 107 ff. It is here said that the number of men killed in cold blood was, according to one report, between six and seven hundred, or, according to another report, between eight and nine hundred.

Mohammed lived in perpetual conflict. In Mecca the Koreish were hostile; in Medina there were, besides the Koreish, the disaffected in the city, the neighboring Jewish tribes, and the unreliable bedawin. It seemed to him necessary to control these dangerous elements by force, to remove or destroy them. He was a man of his time, and the time was not morally well-developed. Yet, making due allowance for these conditions, we must hold that a morally strong man ought to have risen above them.

The existence of features in Mohammed's conduct that appear from an ethical point of view mutually exclusive suggests the conclusion that there were mutually antagonistic tendencies and forces in his moral constitution. On the one hand, we find in him an attraction toward great religious ideas, and sympathy with the higher social code of the time. Other men of his time and people may have believed in a unitary divine government of the world and a judgment to come, but he alone took hold of this idea with such clearness, persistence, and enthusiasm as established it in the creed of Arabia and eventually in that of many neighboring lands. His prescriptions in the Koran (rules laid down, to be sure, primarily for others rather than for himself) show effort to lift the standard of the popular moral life. We may, probably, accept the tradition that in his early days in Mecca he was called "the faithful"—doubtless he was then trustworthy and morally exemplary. In the Koran he alludes to sins that he and his followers had committed (47 21, 48 2), but no details are given, and there is no sign of effort to overcome sinful propensities. On the other hand, he was in certain cases governed by passion—desire for revenge, love of sensual pleasure, ambition to rule; this ambition appears to have been the natural human craving for power intensified by the belief that as apostle of Allah he was invested with authority over all things. We may trace the conflict between the two sides of his nature throughout his public life, first one and then the other getting the upper hand, as circumstances were favorable to the one or the other. In Mecca, so far as the records go, the conditions brought out his more pleasing side. His domestic life seems to have been quiet and happy—his wife Khadijah, devoted to him and watch-

ful over him, is reported to have been a woman of firmness and good sense; and in the city, as he was politically impotent, there was no occasion or opportunity to assert himself except in warning his fellow-citizens of the fate that awaited them if they continued in unbelief. Soon after his wife's death he began to yield to that fondness for marriage that was to play so prominent a part in his life. On his settlement in Medina he found himself free from external authority. He was surrounded by enthusiastic friends, there was no one to call him to account, there grew up a belief that he could do no wrong; it was here that the lower side of his nature came to the front—he was at times self-indulgent, intolerant, despotic. Yet not always—when fear of opposition was removed, he could show himself kindly, thoughtful for others, lenient toward the erring. When Mecca was captured he treated the people with a kindness that won him their hearty allegiance. His address at the final pilgrimage, a few months before his death, when all Arabia was at his feet, is marked by dignity and tenderness. He spoke as one to whom God had committed the care for the temporal and eternal interests of his people, and with the happy consciousness that he had performed his duty and finished his work, leaving, in the Koran, a sufficient guide for this world and the next. Through all his temperamental conflicts he had kept steadily in view what gradually shaped itself as his aim in life, the establishment of a pure religion among the people of Arabia. It is this aim that gives unity to his life. He seems never to have lost self-respect and confidence in his mission and his power. To his devout followers in all ages he has been not a fallible man in whose bosom there was a war of impulses, but the type of perfect manhood. This devotion to an imperfect type might seem to exert an unfortunate influence on the ethical ideas of his disciples. Whether or how far it has done so it is hard to say. But the ill effects that might have followed blind imitation of him have been largely set aside by a process of idealization: whatever in his conduct or teaching has seemed to be opposed to the current ethical standard has been explained away by familiar exegetical methods; or, if some slight infirmity is admitted, it is held not to tarnish the beauty of a soul devoted to the service of God and man.

II. THE RELIGION OF THE KORAN

To a modern non-Moslem reader the Koran may seem to be merely an ill-arranged mass of matter, much of which is trivial or irrelevant. Such a judgment, ignoring, as it does, the great rôle played by the book in religious history, would be superficial. It is true that we find many of the discourses tedious. They abound in repetitions of argument, invective, denunciation, self-assertion, legend, and myth, and they seem to be composed of scraps pieced together without regard to logical order. This half-chaotic form is due to the way in which the discourses were composed, uttered, and edited. A preacher who finds himself obliged to address groups of people for many years on a few leading topics necessarily repeats himself. It was in Mecca that Mohammed gradually put his ideas and his arguments into shape. When he began to preach, he had long since ceased to travel on commercial errands. It was in Mecca that he learned legends of Biblical and other personages and formulated his conception of the divine government of the world. Stories of prophets and descriptions of the day of judgment and of paradise and hell doubtless came to him in scraps, and were introduced by him into his appeals in this form. His discourses must have been somehow written down by his disciples, but as to who his reporters were and of their mode of procedure we have no information. It seems improbable or impossible that the discourses could have the literary form which they show in some passages in the Koran unless they were revised or dictated by him. Soon after his arrival in Medina he employed as amanuensis a well-instructed young man, Zeid son of Thabit by name,²⁵ by whom his words would be more exactly set down, and he may have had amanuenses in Mecca. But whatever revision or dictation there may have been in Mecca has not done away with the fragmentary character of the discourses. After his death the scattered reports of his sermons were collected and made into a book by this Zeid (by command of the Calif Abu Bekr in the year 633), and it was he who conducted the final revision of the text seventeen years later, giving it the form in which we have it. Though the revision was not formally as careful as it might have been (in

²⁵ His adopted son was Zeid son of Haritha.

the present text there are sentences syntactically incomplete), there is no reason to doubt that it has preserved Mohammed's utterances with substantial correctness and fulness. The Koran is the only sacred book in the world that is the composition of a single man. While this unitary origin gives it unity of thought and rhetorical impressiveness, it is a disadvantage so far as it confines the ideas of the book within the bounds of one mind and allows no escape from the intellectual and spiritual limitations of its author.

The religion of the Koran, like the religion of the New Testament, arose from the confluence of several different systems of thought, and its elements are in some important respects identical with those of the earlier book. But in the historical conditions of its genesis it differs notably from the latter. The New Testament took shape in an enlightened age, in an atmosphere of refined Judaism permeated with fresh and inspiring Greek thought. The birthplace of the Koran was a half-civilized community which was in some sort of contact with a stagnant Judaism and a debased Christianity. Mohammed's religious nourishment was drawn in part from the popular cult of Arab tribes, in part from the higher conceptions then existing in Arabia and elsewhere. The old Arabian material of supernatural beings was that which appears everywhere in the undeveloped Semitic world, namely, local gods, regarded as all-sufficient each for his community, and local spirits (*jinn*), mostly hostile to men, and attached to outlying regions not occupied by human beings. Arabia produced no great god, but in many places the local divine chief and protector had acquired a character of considerable dignity; so it was in the southern cults, Minean, Sabeian, and Himyaritic, and largely also in the northern part of the country. In the region in and about Mecca the local divinity was generally known simply as "the god" (*al-ilah*, pronounced "*allah*"), and to this name Mohammed sometimes appealed as an argument for his monolatry: "when," said he, "anything happens, you say that Allah has done it."²⁶ He used the name in a sense different

²⁶ There is here, perhaps, an allusion to Hobal, the patron deity of Mecca. This deity is not mentioned by name in the Koran, but the Meccans would naturally think of him when they heard the expression quoted in the text; Allah, "the god," was for them their special god.

from that in which they understood it: they meant by it the local god, he meant the one only supreme God, so that his argument was little better than a quibble except for those who had got a higher conception of the Deity. How far such a conception had penetrated Mecca we do not know. Besides the Jewish tribes settled near Yathreb (Medina) and the Christian, Jewish, and Persian circles in the south, there was a line of christianized or half-christianized Arabian tribes in the north (extending westward from Hira), and Mecca was doubtless influenced by this body of belief, though whether it had touched the mass of the people is uncertain. The tradition tells of a small number of men who gave up the Arabian cult, accepting Christianity or Judaism, or holding aloof from both. It is in this last category that Mohammed belongs. He represents Arabian Semitism touched by outside influences; his was the constructive genius that selected what his time demanded, and made it real and potent.

In all religions the deity is the central figure, in all Semitic religions, and among these especially in the Jewish, the deity is external to man, transcendent and absolute, and in the Koran the quality of absoluteness is most distinctly stated and most vehemently insisted on. The divine administration of the world, issuing solely from the will of Allah, may be said to be the differentia of the Koranic system.²⁷ It is the distinction of Mohammed that he laid hold of this conception and maintained it with unflinching strictness against the current polytheism. This unshaken consistency he owed in part, doubtless, to his intellectual limitations—he was unaffected by difficulties that have troubled many other religious thinkers—but, whatever its origin, it has given tone to the Koran. In the Koran the aloneness of Allah and his universal creative power are assumed, and opposing beliefs are denounced as absurd and wicked.²⁸ The Arabian

²⁷ Allah's sway embraces everything, from the courses of the heavenly bodies and of empires to the details of Mohammed's management of his wives. He combines the functions of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and the protecting deities of the Roman household.

²⁸ For Mohammed a trinitarian conception of the deity was unthinkable, as, indeed, no Semitic people has ever adopted such a conception. His understanding was that the Christian Trinity consisted of God, Jesus, and the mother of Jesus (5 116).

gods are declared to be impotent, and a special argument is directed against the three goddesses known as "daughters of Allah," whose worship was widely diffused. They were originally local divinities, and this title seems to have meant originally that they were divine beings, just as the Old Testament title "sons of the Elohim" ("sons of God") describes certain beings as members of the Elohim class. Neither among the Hebrews nor among the Arabs do we find married gods or (except in the cases here cited) mention of a relation of parent and child between two deities. But in the Koran the word "daughters" is taken literally, and there is scorn for the supposition that Allah should be assigned children of the inferior sex: "what? you have sons and Allah daughters?"; "when one of them is told of the birth of a daughter, his face becomes black, he is distressed, he conceals himself from men, doubtful whether to keep [the child] to his disgrace or hide it in the dust."²⁹ Whether or not this consideration affected the Meccans we are not informed, but Mohammed put a stop to the practice of infanticide as soon as he came into power.

The argument in the Koran for Allah's governmental control of the world is derived from the phenomena of nature and of human life. Allah, it is said, has created all things, including human beings, *jinn*, and angels (and Iblis [*diabolos*] was originally one of the angels),³⁰ and has ordered things for man's comfort, the rain, fruits, cattle, waters, and ships that move through the seas; thunder also he sends to call forth fear and hope.³¹ Stories of Pharaoh, Ad, Thamud, and other peoples are narrated to show that national experiences are produced by Allah in furtherance of his righteous plans (Sura 54 and many others). Sometimes, as for example in the stories of the Queen of Sheba (27) and Alexander the Great (18),³² the narrator appears to be absorbed in the adventures of the hero or heroine and to lose sight of the appro-

²⁹ 53 19; 16 59 ff.

³⁰ 2 32; but in 18 48 he is said to be one of the *jinn*—a revised opinion, perhaps, to free the angelic host from so undesirable a member.

³¹ 88 17 ff.; 55; 36 34 ff.; 27 60 ff.; 13 2 ff., 13 ff.

³² He is here called Dhu al-qarnein, "he of the two horns," a name probably derived from the representations of Alexander on coins on which he is depicted with horns as the symbol of divinity.

priate religious teaching; the tests to which the queen is subjected by Solomon are neither religious nor dignified. But, in general, the narratives illustrate the fact that not even the mightiest kings and nations can maintain themselves against Allah's power. The legends are treated as veritable history, and were doubtless so regarded by the Arab masses. A certain man, it is said (31 5), amused the Meccans with rival stories (probably brought from Persia) seeking to seduce them from the truth; but such stories were denounced by Mohammed and (if they have survived) appear only in the later Persian literature.

Though Allah is thus throughout the Koran described as omnipotent, his power is practically limited and his plans to some extent thwarted by the old Arabian *jinn*, by the Christian figures of Iblis (the Devil) and his attendant satans, and by the men who are misled by these hostile powers. The problem of the quasi-dualistic control of the world is treated by Mohammed in characteristic fashion. The New Testament and the Avesta accept the rôle of the great enemy as a fact and offer no explanation of its origin; the Koran describes its genesis and attempts to harmonize it with Allah's supreme power. When Adam was created—so the account runs³²—and the angels were commanded to pay him homage, all obeyed except Iblis, who refused to recognize Adam's superiority on the ground that the latter was created of clay, but he himself of fire.³⁴ Thereupon he was cursed and condemned to dwell in hell. He begged, however, to be respite until the day of judgment, and, this request having been granted,³⁵ he frankly announced his purpose to seduce all men except the chosen of Allah. The situation was accepted by Allah, who indeed employed Iblis and satans and *jinn* to lead men astray. His omnipotence was thus saved, but with the result that a moral question was raised which is not seriously considered in the Koran. As for the satans and the *jinn*, their functions are the same as those of Iblis, but with one exception: some of the *jinn* were well acquainted with religious history, knew of the book of Moses, came

³² 2 32 ff.; 4 117 ff.; 7 10 ff.; 38 71 ff.

³⁴ That is, he was of the class of gods, and thus above a human being.

³⁵ A similar liberty is accorded the Evil Power in the New Testament (2 Thess. 2 9 ff.; Rev. 20 7 ff.), and is assumed in the Avesta and the Bundahish.

(invisible) and listened to Mohammed's reading (or reciting) of the Koran, became Moslems, and preached the faith.³⁶ Whether or not the intention in this account is to distinguish between the religious receptivity of the native Arabian spirits and that of the Christian and Jewish satans the Koran does not inform us; but the story bears witness to a belief in the adaptation of his creed to the whole universe, with, probably, the exclusion of the Devil and his immediate attendants.

Mohammed's conception of the Koran and its teaching is intimately connected with his doctrine of Allah's sovereignty. He describes it as the transcript of an original volume preserved in heaven: "We have made it an Arabic Koran, that ye may understand it; it is in the original book with us, exalted, wise" (43 2 f.);³⁷ selections from this celestial book were made known to preceding apostles, and appear as Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and now the final revelation has been sent down to the Arabs, explaining and completing all that has gone before. This grandiose conception of an eternal body of truth made known to men in parts, as they have been prepared to receive it, is maintained throughout the Koran, and the primacy and finality of the Arabic book is defended in ways proper to the time, with naïve assertions based on fortunate ignorance of history. Yet, though the Koran is innocent of knowledge of historical details, its general construction of the religious history of the world is remarkably simple, clear, and striking. It embraces in its view all the great religious movements known to Mohammed and combines them into a unity;³⁸ each fulfils its purpose, and is expected to retire at the appearance of the later and better revelation. This unitary construction of history appears further in the rôle assigned to Abraham. Jewish tradition represented Abraham not only as the great ancestor of Israel, but also as the establisher of true

³⁶ 46 28 ff.; 72 1-14; cf. Jas. 2 19; 1 Pet. 3 19.

³⁷ The rabbinical descriptions of the Tora as the copy of a heavenly book are, doubtless, figurative representations of the eternal significance of the national Law.

³⁸ It is doubtful whether Mohammed had any definite knowledge of Mazdeanism; its dual scheme is not mentioned in the Koran, and would naturally be incomprehensible or absurd to a strictly monocratic Semitic prophet.

religion in the world after the flood.³⁹ The Epistle to the Galatians (chap. 3) finds proof of the temporary nature of Judaism in the religion of Abraham, and Mohammed, enlarging this general view, goes back of both Christianity and Judaism, and makes the patriarch the representative and leader of the faith embodied in Islam (2 124 ff.). Abraham, he says (3 60), was neither Jew nor Christian, but *hanif*, moslem, not idolater. It was a happy thought on Mohammed's part to make Abraham his patron, an illustration of his power of seizing on a current idea, weaving it into his system and making it effective for his purposes. The old Jewish patriarch was acknowledged by both Jews and Christians to be a divinely appointed model, his distinctive characteristic was faith in the one only true God, and this was the essence of Islam—who could be so blind as not to see this fact, or so perverse as not to accept this original divinely-revealed religion? The proper signification of the term *hanif* is uncertain; it is used in the Koran as identical in meaning with “moslem,” that is, “one who discards the worship of all gods but Allah.”⁴⁰ There is mention of contemporaries of Mohammed who, independently of his teaching, were *hanifs*; these appear to have been isolated monotheists—there is no proof of the existence of a hanifite organization. The term, whatever its original meaning and application, gave way to the more definite “moslem,” which became the distinctive appellation of the new faith.

The Allah of the Koran represents in important respects an ethical standard far superior to that of its time. He enjoins, and maintains by future rewards and punishments, a moral code admirable for a peaceful society—he is the enemy of all conduct that interferes with the relations that should exist among the members of such a society. In one place (59 22) he is styled “the King, the Holy, the Giver of Peace, the Faithful, the Guardian, the Powerful, the Strong, the Exalted.” It is assumed throughout that he is just, in the sense that he treats men in this world and the next in accordance with their deserts; if he sends

³⁹ Josephus, *Antiq.* 1 7.

⁴⁰ Wellhausen (*Reste arabischen Heidentumes*, pp. 207 f.) thinks it is employed simply in the sense of “Christian”; but though it includes Christians, it is doubtful whether it did not also include any monotheists.

adversity on the good, it is to try them, and prosperity is accorded the bad that they may be led on to work out their own condemnation (19 76 ff.). He is merciful to mankind, bestowing on them all pleasant influences and products of nature, and merciful and forgiving to those who sin ignorantly, or, if they sin knowingly, afterwards repent (32 5, 41 1, and many other passages). In the latter part of Mohammed's ministry in Mecca Allah is frequently called *al-Rahman*, "the Merciful" (21, 25, 43, 44, 17 110), but this title appears to have been dropped in Medina, for what reason we do not know.⁴¹ He is everywhere spoken of as gracious to believers and especially to Mohammed, and on those who obey him he bestows love (19 96). The character thus depicted is in general an attractive one. It must also be remembered that he represented an effective idea of brotherhood in society, not, certainly, the brotherhood of all men, but in a real sense the brotherhood of all Moslems. He helped to banish or diminish tribal animosities, and he dignified moral rules and made them more effective by giving them a divine origin and divine sanctions.⁴² On the other hand, traits of the old life cling to him. He approves or condones acts that are violations of a good social code. He indulges a revengeful spirit, he is violent and bitter against personal enemies; of such an one he says (96 15 ff.): "If he cease not we will seize him by the forelock, the lying sinful forelock—and let him summon his friends, we will summon the guards [of hell]"; the picture of the supreme God seizing an unfortunate mortal by the hair does not accord with a refined conception of the divine character. He dispenses the horrors of hell with a freedom that smacks of malicious pleasure. His conception of justice is largely determined by external conditions—the persons who deserve reward are those who truthfully acknowledge his supremacy and the leadership of his apostle, all others deserve punishment. In this respect he is the enlargement of the tribal god, who is kind to his own people and hostile to all other peoples. He is the embodiment of the spirit

⁴¹ Perhaps because it was a foreign (Jewish) title of the Deity. It was also South Arabian.

⁴² See the excellent injunction in 49 9-12, and cf. 3 97 (the bond of faith is stronger than the bond of blood).

of Arabia, and more particularly of the spirit of Mohammed, of whose virtues and faults his character is a copy.

In the Koranic religion, as in all primitive theistic religions, the problem of one form of governmental dualism, the relation between divine and human wills, is passed over without comment and without embarrassment. Allah is absolute governor of men, chooses for his own whom he will (42 6, 6 87 ff.), and no one can believe except by his permission (10 100); he is the creator of the soul, endows it with its capacity for good and for evil (91 7), and decides whether it shall follow the one or the other. Yet man is held strictly responsible for his deeds, every individual for himself, every one must bear his own burden (44 40 f.); at the last day no one shall make satisfaction for another, no intercession will be accepted, of men or angels (2 117, 53 26), except that of persons permitted by Allah. Man, in a word, is free (3 139). Happy is he who turns to righteousness, wretched he who turns to wickedness (91 9 f.). The question whether there is a rational order of the world would be alien to the spirit of the Koran; it is concerned not with devices of human reason but with the pleasure of the divine mind. And it is clear and consistent in its teaching that there is a moral order in the world. Allah's purposes, it holds, are all morally good and his ability to realize them is unlimited—whatever failures in this regard may seem to men to exist would be explained if men had greater knowledge—man's unbelief or doubt on this point results from his ignorance.⁴³

The divine worship prescribed in the Koran is simple. Mohammed retained certain ceremonies that he found too firmly established in the affections of the people (or which, perhaps, were too highly esteemed by himself) to be discarded. Such are the pilgrimage to the Kaaba at the great annual festival and the ceremonies connected therewith (the compassing of the sacred building, the visit to the sacred mountain Arafat, the devotional season in the valley of Mina, the sacrifice, the casting of stones at the Devil). He himself reverently performed the pilgrimage

⁴³ This principle is illustrated in the story of Moses' journey (18 59 ff.). The prophet who is his guide does things that seem to Moses to be cruel, but they are shown to be wise and kind.

and took part in all the ceremonies. These, which are similar to customs found all over the world, had great religious significance for the Arabs as methods of bringing them into contact with the god of the place; exactly what they meant for Mohammed we do not know. He abolished some improper features, especially the going round the Kaaba naked, and made the rest obligatory on his followers.⁴⁴ The institution of the pilgrimage has helped to make Mecca the central point of the world for Moslems and thus to strengthen their sense of unity; and a peculiar importance is given the Kaaba by the statement (22 27, 2 119 ff.) that Allah assigned the site of the building to Abraham.

Mohammed, however, having before him the examples of communities of Jews and Christians, felt the need of a more stable and more devotional organization of his people, and took from the neighboring sects such arrangements as seemed to him appropriate and sufficient. Local places of worship (mosques) were established, one day in the week was set apart for public worship, and the order of service in the mosque, consisting of prayer, reading from the sacred scriptures, and an address, was copied from that of the synagogues and the churches. The choice of Friday for the sacred day was, doubtless, induced by the desire to have a day different both from that of the Jews and from that of the Christians. There is no mention in the Koran of officers of a mosque (62 9). In Medina, where the first mosque was established, the service was usually conducted by the prophet (4 103), afterwards by the calif, a governor, or other prominent man, or by a regularly appointed *imam* ("leader"); the sermon was delivered by the preacher (*khatib*), who might also officiate as *imam*, but in case of need any person might act as *imam*. There is no priesthood in Islam; sacrifice plays a subordinate part, and may be performed by any one in authority. The old-arabian *kahin* was a soothsayer,⁴⁵ through whom the will of the deity was made known. Contact with the god was effected by ceremonies in which little use was made of blood, and this con-

⁴⁴ 2 192-199, 22 25 ff., 37 ff.

⁴⁵ The corresponding Hebrew word, *kohen*, means "priest." The offices of soothsayer and priest go back to the same original, the magician.

ception is retained in the Koran—there are no communal meals, no substitution of an animal victim for the sinner or, in general, atonement by blood. The place of such procedures is taken by obedience.

All public religious ritualistic details and conditions of membership in a religious community are necessarily external and may be mechanical. In the Koranic scheme any one is a Moslem who professes belief in the aloneness of Allah and the apostleship of Mohammed, recites the daily *salāt* ("prayers"), gives the legal alms, fasts during the month of Ramadan, and performs the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in his lifetime. The official *salāt* is not petition but recital of praise, to be performed a certain number of times during the day. The indication of hours of *salāt* in the Koran is not quite definite: "celebrate the praise of thy Lord before sunrise and before sunset and during the night and evening and morning" (20 130); "glorify Allah at evening, morning, afternoon, and noon" (30 17); "perform the *salāt* at early morning, at close of day, and at approach of night, for good deeds put to flight evil deeds" (11 116); "perform the *salāt* at sunset, at nightfall, and at daybreak" (17 80). It seems likely that stated times were established by Mohammed after a while (6 71), possibly the five seasons that became the custom (noon, afternoon, sunset, night, dawn). It is enjoined that the recital be neither very loud nor very low, and it is to be prepared for by washing. At first Moslems in Medina turned toward Jerusalem in prayer; later, in order to make the exercise purely Arabian, the place (*kibla*) was changed to Mecca (2 136 ff.). The proper attitude in prayer is prostration: David, it is said, fell down and bowed himself and repented (38 23): "Perform the *salāt* and pay the alms, and bow down with those who bow down" (2 40). No details of the prostration are given in the Koran; at a later time the *salāt* was defined by the number of prostrations (*rekas*) of which it consisted, and the performances tended to become mechanical. This official "prayer" is not, however, the only kind commended in the Koran. Servants of Allah are represented as addressing petitions to him for higher as well as for lower blessings. Abraham is made to pray in the following words: "O Lord, grant me wisdom and join me with the righteous; and grant

me an honorable report among future generations; and make me an heir of the garden of delight; and forgive my father that he was one of those who went astray; and cover me not with shame on the day of resurrection, the day when neither riches nor children shall avail, but only the coming to Allah with a pure [or, believing] heart" (26 88 ff.). Job prays to be freed from his affliction (21 88), Moses that he may be able to perform the divine commands (20 26 ff.), David for forgiveness (38 23), and the Ephesian youths for mercy (18 9). Such persons are regarded in the Koran as models for Moslems—the latter are commanded to turn to Allah with sincere repentance and ask for perfect light and pardon (66 6-9), being assured that he hears the prayers of his servants (2 182). The petitions in the opening sura (the *fātiha*, the Moslem "pater noster") are simple and comprehensive: "Thee we worship and of thee we ask assistance. Direct us in the right way, the way of those to whom thou art gracious, not those with whom thou art angry, and not those who go astray" (cf. 3 14 f.). Mohammed himself was in the habit of praying (9 85 and other passages). Little is said in the Koran concerning prayer for the dead. It is directed (2 196) that at the conclusion of the ceremonies of the pilgrimage the worshippers shall make reverent mention of Allah (or, have him reverently in mind) as they make mention (or, are mindful) of their fathers—a form of expression that suggests some sort of cult of ancestors. In old Arabia graves were sometimes shrines (and so it is now), but there is no trace of such worship in the Koran.

The two remaining prescribed duties have no religious value. In Medina contributions for the support of the Meccan immigrants were necessary, and such almsgiving was, doubtless, recognized as a social duty as well as a religious prescription; when this social situation ceased to exist (as it did very soon), the tax for alms fell into the category of state taxes, and no longer made appeal to individual kindly feeling—it was paid, of course, in obedience to the prophet's command. The establishment of the Ramadan fast was a mistake on Mohammed's part. The custom of fasting, which he knew existed among the Jews and the Christians, probably seemed to him useful for the promotion of piety (and his temperament may have made such abstinence easy

for him). But the fast inevitably became obstructive of devotion, and the absolute prohibition of food during daylight for a month made too great a demand on human power of endurance.⁴⁶ Asceticism has never been a feature of Semitic religion—where it exists in Moslem lands it is of non-Semitic origin—and this attempt to introduce it, in mild form, into Islam has not been religiously a success.

When we pass from external conditions to the inner religious life, the definition of the Koranic teaching is less easy. As, on the divine side, Allah's claim to obedience is the central point of doctrine, so, on the human side, man's attitude toward this claim is the controlling fact. Sin is the violation of divine law, and in the Koran all law, the ethical as well as the religious, is divine. The Koranic moral code is excellent—it includes respect for human life and property in ordinary social conditions, and for the marriage relation (polygamy and the right of divorce being conceded), justice in commercial transactions, kindness to orphans, to divorced women, to the poor, and to believers in general.⁴⁷ It does not distinctly recognize the claims of all men, without distinction of race or creed, to sympathetic treatment. The summary in 2 172 is authoritative:

Righteousness does not consist in turning the face [in prayer] to the east or the west, but belongs to him who believes in Allah and the last day, and in the angels, the book [that is, the Koran] and the prophets—who gives money (though he loves it) to his kindred, to orphans, to the needy and the wayfarer, and to those who ask for it, and for [the redemption of] captives; and performs the *salāt*, and pays the [prescribed] alms; and to those who keep their agreements, and are patient in times of adversity.

It is of course taken for granted that Moslems will obey the ethical law. But the stress is laid on the religious law, and naturally the fundamental sin is unbelief. It is against the unbelief of

⁴⁶ The length of the fast was, perhaps, suggested by that of the Christian Lent. In modern times the smoking of tobacco has been included in the prohibitory rule. It is said that there is more quarrelling in Ramadan than in any other month of the year.

⁴⁷ The civil code, like that of the Old Testament, recognizes the *lex talionis* (2 173 ff.).

Ad, Thamud, and Madian, idolaters, pretending friends (the "hypocrites"), and *jinn* that denunciations are hurled throughout the Koran. The violence of the invective, the furious hate, shows the importance that was attached to the profession of belief in Allah and his apostle, and indeed it was a matter of life and death for Islam to secure this adhesion in Arabia. Hence Mohammed's detestation of the Jews, who refused to change their faith. The question how to treat Jews and also Christians was an embarrassing one for him. They formed a class by themselves—in respect that they did not accept Islam they were unbelievers, but in respect that they followed the divinely accredited prophets Moses and Jesus, they could not be regarded as idolaters or as enemies of Allah. In some passages they are regarded as entitled to future reward, the only condition being that they believe in God and the last day and do what is [morally] right (2 50, 5 73).⁴⁸ In one place they are mentioned along with those who join other gods with Allah, and it is said that Allah will decide between them on the day of resurrection (22 17).⁴⁹ Later, the obstinate opposition of the Jews led the prophet to declare that the curse of Allah was on them (2 82 ff.), and Christians are denounced as infidels for their worship of Christ and Mary along with Allah (5 17 ff.). Finally, protection is accorded the non-idolatrous dissentient sects on condition of their paying tribute (9 29).

In the Koran "faith," or "belief," is the acceptance of Mohammed's creed and mission. In Mecca this test divided the people into two parties, headed respectively by Mohammed and the Koreish; in Medina the civil and the religious governments became one—acceptance of Islam was a necessary condition of citizenship. Thus the term "belief" received a political coloring, and political passion entered the Islamic propaganda. There is no attempt to define belief as a spiritual force or to trace the shades and moral significance of unbelief. Trust in God there is—it is the conviction that Allah would give the victory to his apostle, a conviction that appears to have sustained him

⁴⁸ With them are included the Sabians, an obscure Christian sect.

⁴⁹ Here the Magians also are included. Mohammed seems to have known nothing of Zoroastrianism beyond the fact that it was not idolatrous.

in adversity and made him despotic (though his despotism was sometimes tempered with kindness) in prosperity. Unbelief is regarded as a wilful opposition to truth, to be crushed, when argument is unavailing, by the strong hand of God or man.

Sin is taken (as in the Old Testament) as an obvious fact of human life, and no curiosity is expressed as to its psychological origin.⁵⁰ The account of Adam's initial transgression is identical with that in Genesis (2 33 ff., 7 18 ff.), but it is added that he was taught by Allah the proper form of words (that is, in asking for pardon), repented, and was forgiven.⁵¹ He does not transmit a sinful nature to his descendants,⁵² but he is a warning to them. The tempter was Satan, and the satans have been appointed by Allah patrons of unbelievers (7 26). There is no conception of spiritual regeneration or spiritual struggle in the Koran. The point of view is purely objective in the sense that regard is paid merely to deeds. A man fails to believe because he is blind, he believes because he comes to see; but there is no distinct statement concerning a reconstruction of his spiritual nature. This objective conception was suited to Mohammed's time and people, and has commended Islam to many persons since his time.

Life is held to consist of one act of faith and a mass of religious and general social acts, and these are to be rewarded or punished. The rewards and punishments are relegated to the future⁵³—in this life a pious man may suffer and a wicked man may prosper, but this will not be the case hereafter. The descriptions of future recompenses are couched in naïvely sensuous terms, relating to food and drink, the possession of pure and beautiful wives, and other such pleasures; they are to be taken literally—there is nothing in the text to suggest that they are meant to be under-

⁵⁰ Mohammed, as is noted above, often confesses that he is a sinner, but the nature of his sin is not stated.

⁵¹ Eve is included in the history, but merely as the companion of Adam; she is not the first transgressor.

⁵² The statement that the Lord drew forth their posterity from the loins of the sons of Adam (7 171) is simply an expression of descent; so in Heb. 7 5, 10.

⁵³ The vanity of earthly things is insisted on in 57 19, 47 38, 16 78.

stood figuratively;⁵⁴ but the pleasures, though sensuous, are not sensual or in any way immoral. The details of punishment are such as are found in early Christian apocalypses and are repeated in the *Divina Commedia*. The accompaniments of the last day also are taken from Christian sources: the blast of the trumpet, the cleaving of the heavens, and the scattering of sun, moon, and stars; the shattering earthquake, when the mountains shall pass away, and the earth shall cast forth the contents of its graves; when all men shall rise, clothed in their bodies,⁵⁵ and shall stand before the judgment-seat, alongside of which the angels are drawn up in ranks; to every man his record-book is given—those into whose right hands the books are given pass on to the joyful life; those who receive their books in their left hands or behind their backs pass into hell.⁵⁶ There is no appeal from the divine decision, and no end to the happiness and the misery. The determining fact in any person's record is his or her attitude toward Islam. Women, no less than men, may obtain the bliss of paradise (33 31 ff., 40 43), but what their relation will be to the celestial wives⁵⁷ is not explained. Nor is there any clear statement regarding the lot of believers who live immoral lives on earth. We expect the ethical character of deeds to be considered: "On that day men shall go forward in separate groups to see their deeds; and he who shall have done good of the weight of an ant shall see it, and he who shall have done evil of the weight of an ant shall see it" (99); and in many passages good works are spoken of as a condition of acceptance with Allah and as the best possession of a man (3 79, etc.). But the good works referred to are often clearly not ethical but doctrinal and ritual,⁵⁸ and the righteous are defined as those who keep the requirements of Islam (almsgiving and the rest). The Koranic teaching is

⁵⁴ Apparently, believers pass immediately at death into paradise (3 152). And there are suggestions of something better than sensual pleasures, a general happy peace. But of spiritual delights nothing is said.

⁵⁵ The idea of bodily resurrection was taken by Mohammed from the Jews and the Christians.

⁵⁶ See suras 75-101; 39 68 ff.; 3 193.

⁵⁷ The *huris* (56 22 ff., 34 f.).

⁵⁸ In 6 121 the eating of forbidden food is described as "iniquity." In 9 112 ff. the requirements are: to fight for Allah's cause, to fast, bow down, and worship, to command what is just and forbid what is evil, and observe the ordinances of Allah.

definite that unbelievers (leaving aside the doubtful case of the dissident monotheistic sects) are to be cast into hell;⁵⁹ and we get from the text the definite impression that there is no doubt about the future felicity of those who continue firm in faith. Perhaps it is taken for granted that such believers will not persist in things morally wrong—for slips in conduct there is repentance, and Allah is merciful and gracious; and even at the last judgment there is provision for intercession by persons (angels and Mohammed) to whom Allah grants this privilege.⁶⁰ The admission that a believer might possibly fail to enter paradise because of moral delinquencies would have been discouraging to the Moslems of Mohammed's day, a time when it was all-important to keep the support of all his followers.

The religion of the Koran regards man as standing alone in the presence of God, a free agent before an absolute lord. In spite of Iblis, satans, and *jinn* Allah is omnipotent, and in spite of Allah's omnipotence man is master of his fate. Obedience is all that is required of him, and he may obey or not as he may please. There is no intermediary between him and his divine judge—Mohammed is a man and, like other men, must ask forgiveness for his sins, and such intercession as is casually mentioned in the Koran is controlled (allowed or forbidden) by Allah, and seems to have no practical importance. There is no atoning ceremony—pardon is granted in response to repentance and prayer. All intermediate persons and conditions are swept away—so far as a man's future welfare is concerned, there are only two Powers in the universe, himself and Allah. Allah does not inquire curiously into motives and other inner experiences—these are left to manifest themselves in deeds. Nor does he expect intimate communion of soul between himself and believers—he is, indeed, too exalted for such converse, he understands man and the world, but man cannot understand him, and he confines his demands on men to what they are capable of. The Moslem of the Koran is not an analytical thinker or a searcher of his own heart; his life is made up of outward things, like that of the warrior of the desert. The Koranic ethical standard has a similar external

⁵⁹ Apostates may repent, and be forgiven, provided they do not go on in unbelief (3 79 ff.).

⁶⁰ Sura 2 256; 9 81.

character—it does not define or insist on inward truthfulness, self-sacrifice, love. The moral rules do not contemplate non-moslem communities; it is assumed that all the world ought to be Moslem, and those peoples that stand aloof must take the consequences—the legislation is not for them. The ethical experience of Islam has been similar to that of other religions: the theoretical acceptance of rules does not necessarily carry with it obedience to them in actual life. The most humane and benevolent of Koranic prescriptions—that which relates to brotherhood among believers—was set at naught, not long after the prophet's death, in bloody conflicts between rival parties. This fact, however, must not blind us to the excellence of Mohammed's moral code, or to the unifying and inspiring tendency of his conception of the unitary divine government of the world and the equality of all believers, without distinction of sex, social position, or nationality, in the eyes of the divine overlord.

III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE KORANIC FAITH

Both the vigor and the flexibility of the religion of the Koran are illustrated by its later fortunes. Though it was, in a real sense, the product of its age, it was put into shape by the hand of a master whose genius or instinct taught him to make universal ideas prominent and to reduce accessories almost to a minimum. During the prophet's lifetime all Arabia submitted to him, and in the centuries succeeding his death Islam spread over Western Asia, Egypt, the north coast of Africa, and the south of Spain, then over parts of Central Asia, China, Indonesia, the Philippine Islands, Central Africa, and Northern and Southern India, finally gaining a foothold in Eastern Europe. Its conquests in these lands were accomplished sometimes by force, sometimes by peaceful social pressure, sometimes by its moral and intellectual superiority, sometimes by a combination of two or more of these influences. In the majority of cases its propaganda appears to have been carried on by peaceful means. Political and social rewards, which were all in the hands of the conquerors, proved to be a powerful inducement to conversion. There was often a social fusion of conquerors and conquered, and this was

accompanied by mutual religious influence. The conquered peoples, while adopting Islam, retained every one its native intellectual and religious coloring, and contact with ancient culture (mainly through translations of Greek works) brought new points of view and new constructions of religious thought and life. These conditions produced certain modifications of the Koranic scheme in various parts of the Moslem world.

When a higher religion is nominally accepted by an undeveloped community, it often happens that old ideas and usages are retained, with new names taken from the new creed, or without an attempt to harmonize the two schemes. This has been the case in the history of Islam in certain regions, just as, in mediæval and modern Europe, the popular religion kept and still keeps heathen customs and beliefs, with a veneering of Christian forms. In northern Arabia the worship of ancestors is widely practised by the desert tribes, and in the south of the peninsula crude fetishistic and magical observances are found. Similar ideas and customs exist in Egypt and Morocco and among certain African tribes. Or, Moslems, living in communities with well-organized religious systems, sometimes conform to a greater or less extent to the usages of their neighbors—in India Brahmanistic customs are adopted by not a few Moslems (mostly of the lower class), in China many of the faith have taken part in the official worship of Confucius, and have thus often escaped persecution. In none of these cases, however, is there any desire to modify or reinterpret the creed of the Koran. They are merely concessions to traditional beliefs or to pressing considerations of peace and safety. In Spain, when the Christians got the upper hand, many Moslems and Jews gave in their adherence to the church, and kept their devotion to Mohammed and Moses respectively.

An interesting definition of the teaching of the Koran on one point was occasioned by the growth of the Moslem empire. In the ninth sura it is ordered that idolaters (except those with whom treaties had been made) should be attacked⁶¹ until they accepted Islam, and that Jews and Christians should be forced to become

⁶¹ The verb is sometimes *jahad*, "work earnestly" for the cause, sometimes *qatal*, "kill"; the two are here often synonyms. The noun *jihād* is practically "sacred war."

Moslems or to pay tribute. This order contemplated Arabia only, but embassies were sent to the emperor Heraclius, the king of Persia, the governor of Egypt, the Persian viceroy of Yemen, and the Negus of Abyssinia, calling on them to embrace Islam, and under the first califs Syria, Egypt, and Persia were attacked and conquered. The question has arisen whether or not the Koran requires Moslems to attack all non-moslem peoples and force them to accept the faith or pay tribute. Moslem jurists have generally decided this question in the affirmative, but political relations have decided it otherwise. Moslem rulers have been governed by the ordinary human desire for power and by the regulations of war that have been agreed on among civilized nations. The sultan of Turkey (who, as calif, is the ecclesiastical head of the Moslem world) is simply one ruler among many, and must conduct negotiations like any unbeliever. This, then, is a case where the exegesis of a sacred book has been determined by political conditions.

Increase of luxury and non-koranic superstition in the Moslem world occasioned movements of reform, particularly in Africa and Arabia. The Berbers of the Maghreb, an intellectually dull but emotionally excitable people, incapable of apprehending the finer side of the teaching of the Koran, were zealots for the letter of law; they felt lost without visible supernatural guidance, and readily followed men who proved themselves holy by the rigidity of their obedience to ritual and by their ascetic observances. In the eleventh century the Morabits⁶² (Almoravides), under such guidance, undertook to do away with excessive official taxes and other customs not sanctioned by the Koran. They ruled for a time in Morocco and southern Spain, but succumbed to the corrupting influences of their position, and in the twelfth century were crushed and followed by the Mowahhids, or Mohads (Almohades), who maintained the unity of God against the low forms of saint-worship that then prevailed.⁶³ The most important attempt

⁶² This term has come into English in the French form *marabout*.

⁶³ It is noteworthy that these unitarian Berbers, affected by the culture of Moslem Spain, became patrons of learning, especially of philosophy. It must be added, in justice to the Berbers, that in the fourteenth century they produced Ibn Haldun, the greatest of the Moslem historians.

at reform was that of the Arabian Wahhabis, who in the eighteenth century instituted a vigorous crusade against luxury (silks, satins, and tobacco) and saint-worship, and advocated an uncompromising literalism; they still exist in Arabia and India, but have lost their power as an organization. While these movements produced no new doctrine, they show the vitality of the Koran as a guide of religious life.

Persia has been the home of doctrinal reinterpretations of the sacred book of Islam. Partly by accidental historical relations, but mainly through native tendencies and the influences of foreign thought, she has continued for twelve centuries to construct at intervals systems and forms of religion which, assuming to rest on the Koran, introduce conceptions that are to a greater or less extent alien to those of Mohammed and his people. The prophet bitterly denounced the worship of any being but Allah, he had, apparently, never heard of the idea of the incarnation of God, his temperament was distinctly not ascetic or mystical, and he was at the farthest possible remove from a philosophical construction of the world; yet all these things found acceptance among certain of his followers.

The peculiar position of the fourth calif, Ali (Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law), led a large body of the Persian Moslems (the Shiite sect) to regard him as the only legitimate successor of the prophet in the headship of Islam, and Aryan thought divinized him and Mohammed and paid them divine worship. The headship of Ali was continued in the imams (leaders) who followed him, and the seventh (or twelfth) of these was to be the Mahdi ("he who is divinely directed") and to introduce the universal and final religion. One branch of this sect, the Ismailic, organized one of the most remarkable systems of propaganda that the world has ever seen, and promulgated in the name of the prophet doctrines of incarnation, inspiration, and freedom from the rules of morality that completely extinguished the teaching of the Koran. Passing into Africa, the Ismailians established the Fatimide dynasty in Egypt, and the mad calif Hakim (996-1021) was hailed as an incarnation of God and became the centre of the religion of the Druses.

In the opposite direction from this demand for incarnate super-

natural guidance was the cultivation of philosophy, introduced to the Moslem world in the ninth century by translations of Greek works, and pursued with great zeal in Bagdad, Cordova, and elsewhere. The Moslem philosophers eliminated local and anthropomorphic features from the Koran, maintained the freedom of the will, denied that the Koran was eternal, and in general rationalized religion. A protest against such reliance on human reason was made by the mystics (sufis, fakirs, dervishes), who found the basis of religious faith in the experiences of the soul.⁶⁴ Man, it was held, might come to an immediate perception of God, would be freed from the burden of dependence on external authority (including that of the prophet), and would become in essence a part of the divine nature. The more intellectually and morally refined mystics (of whom Al-Ghazzali was the most eminent) sought to find sanction for their view in the Koran while ignoring almost completely its conception of religion.

In recent times contact with European thought has led many devout Moslems to what is really a reconstruction of Islam. The cruder elements of the Koran are discarded, its conception of Allah and its eschatology are purified, the character of Mohammed is idealized, and in general Islam is made into what is regarded as a perfect system of religious thought. In such reconstructions, as in the cases mentioned above, the believer holds fast to his loyalty to the Koran. In some eclectic systems, as in Bahaism (an offshoot of Babism) and in the quasi-universal scheme of the Panjab Messiah, the Koran, though not considered supreme, is given a leading or eminent place. The Moslem world at large is indifferent to puritanical reforms and rationalistic and philosophical speculations. Its religion is simply the religion of the Koran—that is, with many heathen survivals, crudities, and inconcinnities, it believes in the sole sovereignty of Allah and the practical infallibility of Mohammed, and this belief is a bond of religious (but not of political) union.

⁶⁴ The separate existence of the soul as an entity is assumed in the Koran, but there is no discussion or explanation of its nature and powers, or of its relation to the body.

SELECTED LIST OF BOOKS OF REFERENCE

- Translations of the Koran by Sale, 1734, Rodwell, 1861 and 1878 (the most convenient), and Palmer, 1880.
- G. Weil, *Das Leben Mohammed's nach Mohammed Ibn Ishaq bearbeitet von Abd el-Malik Ibn Hischam*, 1864.
- Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, chaps. 50 f.
- Carlyle, "The Hero as Prophet," in his *Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History*, 1846.
- E. Renan, "Mahomet et les origines de l'Islamisme," in *Études d'histoire religieuse*, 1857, 8th ed., 1897, Eng. transl. 1864.
- Sir William Muir, *Life of Mahomet, 1858-1861* (full, but biassed).
- Id.*, *Mahomet and Islam*, undated, ca. 1894 (a short, impartial biography).
- Id.*, *The Caliphate*, 1891.
- Th. Nöldeke, *Geschichte des Korans*, 1860 (investigates the chronological order of the suras).
- Id.*, "The Koran," and "Islam," in *Sketches from Eastern History*, Eng. transl. 1892 (very valuable).
- A. Sprenger, *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed, 1861-1865* (has much useful material, but his account of the sources of Mohammed's teaching is not borne out by the facts).
- Syed Ahmed, *Essays on the Life of Mohammed and subjects subsidiary thereto*, 1870 (apologetic, but good).
- Ameer Ali, *Life and Teachings of Mohammed*, 1873 (also apologetic, and excessively laudatory).
- Id.*, *Islam*, 1897 (a convenient summary of doctrine).
- R. Bosworth Smith, *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, 1875 (good).
- A. Müller, *Der Islam im Morgen- und Abendland*, 1887 (the best general history).
- J. Wellhausen, "Reste Arabischen Heidentumes," and "Medina vor dem Islam; Mohammed's Gemeindeordnung von Medina," third and fourth parts of his *Skizzen und Vorarbeiten*, 1884-1892 (of prime importance).
- T. P. Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, 1896 (useful for information concerning Moslem usages).
- T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, 1896 (good sketch of the spread of Islam).
- H. Preserved Smith, *The Bible and Islam*, 1897 (excellent account of what Islam took from Old Testament and New Testament).
- D. B. Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, 1911 (instructive descriptions of Moslem thought, partly from personal observation).
- Articles, "The Koran," in Johnson's *Universal Cyclopaedia*; "Mohammed," in *La grande encyclopédie*; and "Mahomet," and "Mohammedan Religion," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th edition.

THE PRIESTLY FUNCTION IN THE MODERN CHURCH

W. ELLSWORTH LAWSON

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

It is not with conceit but by constraint that one ventures to write on the priestly function in the modern church. Can anything new be said about it? Can anything be said at all without wounding the sensibilities and adding to the burdens—already too heavy—of the modern minister? Criticism there must be, construction there ought to be, in any discussion of this subject. But both criticism and construction will be inevitably and deeply affected by the temperament of the writer. So at the outset you are asked to believe that, however dogmatic this discussion may at times appear, it is carried on in the perfect awareness that there is another side to most of the questions that will arise, and that excuses and even justifications may be urged for some of the tendencies upon which those who have cultivated a religious scrupulousness in such matters look with increasing dismay.

I

Throughout the long history of mankind two types of men have confronted each other: the priest and the prophet. They have not always understood each other, and sometimes they have been in open and violent antagonism. Historically, they stand for contrasted, though not necessarily for contradictory, ideals of life. The priest, as the divinely endowed administrator of the grace of God, has always feared and many times hated the prophet with his direct appeal to the free spirit, the questioning intellect, and the active conscience of the individual. To the priest, as above defined, God is always mediated, and the thought of an immediate experience of the Eternal Spirit in the soul is the rankest sort of blasphemy. Always it is God *and* something other: God and the symbol, God and the institution, God and the celebrant himself. Absolving penitents, offering sacrifices, imper-

sonating Deity, boldly taking upon himself holy functions which in the New Testament are either concentrated uniquely in Jesus Christ or diffused throughout the church universal, the priest has exerted a blighting influence upon the church for centuries. The enemy of true religion, the subverter of true morality, the destroyer of all liberty, the caricature of the Christian minister where ministry is most divine—that is the priest as history largely reveals him, and that is the figure that rises spontaneously in our minds whenever we hear the word mentioned.

But there is another and a higher sense in which the word may be used of a man. There are certain tender, winsome, sensitive natures that work upon and within our social life, men who seem to carry about with them an atmosphere of peace and consolation, and sweet reasonableness, men whose strength is as the strength of ten because their hearts are pure, men whose ministry is truly sacramental and whose very presence in the church and in society is an abiding benediction. It is with these men (or with the creation of them), and not with the priest in the historic sense, that this discussion concerns itself. In them lie the salvation of the church and the hope of the world. If ever the day should dawn when we no longer expect or desire such priestly personalities either in our pulpits or our pews, then surely the final shame will have fallen upon our churches. For, as Dr. William Adams Brown reminds us, "the Christian ideal is not that of a society in which there are no priests, but one in which priesthood is a universal experience, each man bearing his neighbor's need upon his heart, and unsparingly giving himself for his salvation."

Here, then, however much it may mock and scourge us, is the personal ideal we should ever cherish, and toward which we should ever move. And what, after all, is this but the ideal of the Apostle Peter whose noble, inspiring words should be read in the hearing of the people at least once every year: "But ye are an elect race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people for God's own possession, that ye may show forth the excellences of him who called you out of darkness into his marvellous light."

II

Now, apart from the sublime truth of the universal priesthood of all believers, the modern minister has still a peculiarly priestly function in the church in that he is the director of the visible forms of church life, the chief officer of the church as organized for the public worship of God. It is in the discussion of this that your sympathetic consideration is asked, for the task is far from being a pleasant one.

It may be remembered that when Cicero, to escape the vengeance of Clodius, voluntarily exiled himself from Rome, he crossed over into Greece and lived for a while in Thessalonica. One day he looked upon Olympus, where the rapt vision of the ancient Greek had beheld the radiant home of his deities. "But I," said the lofty Cicero, "saw nothing but snow and ice." It may be that you who read this will say: "Here is one who has looked upon the church with the same disillusioned and unpoetical eyes with which Cicero gazed upon Olympus." But it is not so. The church remains to me in a very peculiar sense the house of God and the gate of Heaven. Yet there are certain tendencies in the church life of today which cause one the greatest uneasiness, and which appear to indicate that we are in peril of making the church a house of Pleasure and a gate of the World. It is these tendencies which cry aloud for the restoration of the priestly function in our churches.

We have denied, and rightly, the special sacredness of institutions, of ceremonies, of *things* considered only in themselves; but in our iconoclastic zeal have we not almost lost the consciousness of the profound sacredness of life itself, and of the needy human spirit in the midst of life? It is a perfectly legitimate question of our day to ask if we have not forgotten how to lead the soul into the holy of holies where all its perplexities are stilled and all its needs supplied. The modern vice of egotism has put forth its last poisonous flower—irreverence; and its evil odor, sometimes even the blossom itself, has invaded the place of worship. "The decay of reverence" has become a cant phrase of the times. Both our religious and secular press exploit the phrase in a continual procession of depressing paragraphs. What is so

universally acknowledged must be a condition, and not a mere creation of the journalistic fancy. As a condition, then, it must be faced with what of courage yet remains in us.

It was prophesied of the Servant of Yahveh that, when he should come, he would "not cry, nor lift up his voice, nor cause it to be heard in the streets." That is to say, there would be nothing violent, nor hysterical, nor corybantic, nor of the wild dervish in his methods. How one hears the swift condemnation of many of our modern church manners in those ancient words! The straining after screaming titles for our sermonettes; the emphasis we lay on the wrong things in our church calendars; the "special features"; the extra special Sunday-night affair which with a pathetic sacrilegiousness we hope will catch the eye or ear of restless, volatile people; the vices of hysterical advertising which we have allowed to mar the simplicity and grandeur of our vocation; the enervating habit, caught from outsiders, of speaking of the pulpit as though it were a proscenium, and of our services as though they were entertainments—how all these things stand once and for ever condemned in the calm, sane, spiritually dignified method laid down for the Servant of Yahveh! "He will not cry, nor lift up his voice, nor cause it to be heard in the streets." No! for that is the method of the theatre, of the music hall, of the pulpit mountebank. It was the method of the false prophets before the exile, and has been the method of every false prophet since. Not so worked the Son of Man, the preacher of righteousness, the High Priest of our confession—even Jesus.

The worst feature of all these things is that they are flagrant violations of the divine purpose for which the church exists, and help foster the restlessness of soul, the irresponsibility of mind, the love of sensation, and the spirit of ego-indulgence which are the curse in all departments of modern life, and which in the highest department of all—that of collective worship—has resulted in a loss of reverence, of decorum, and occasionally even of decency, until there is sometimes little to distinguish the worship in church from a public meeting of any kind. The whispering, chattering, jolly congregation; the fidgety, flashy, self-complacent choir; the lounging, slovenly priest praying with one hand in his pocket; the bustling impresario who, for an awful moment,

has donned the robe of a priest—how far are these a caricature of the truth, and how much of truth gleams through the caricature?

It is the glory of our free churches that the ministers are granted a large freedom in the conduct of public worship. It is, however, a glory that carries with it a continual and perilous temptation. And the time has fully come to answer the question quite definitely whether the church is a social club whose members gather weekly to discuss their social engagements, hear some good or indifferent music and a lecture on anything from pseudo-psychotherapy to the morals of polar bears; or whether it is, indeed, the one Holy Place on earth where men and women come together in soberness and joy, in penitence and prayer, to worship and adore the Holy Father.

III

It is to this that we now turn. The position maintained here is that the church is not for the purpose of entertainment, however high the quality of the entertainment may be, nor yet for the sole purpose of instruction, though that has a very noble place therein. The church is primarily for the purpose of worship, of adoration, of spiritual fellowship.

Here is the one positive need of the soul in these days to which the church must minister or cease to exist. As ministers, we can, if we choose, play baseball with our young men, run competitive "socials," manage boys' clubs, and by painful ingenuity keep up the other extra activities which a feverish church life forces upon us. We can also, if we choose, give them little moral lectures on love, courtship, marriage, and such like popularities. Perhaps all these things are very good. But can we, and do we, lead the ecclesiastically petted and flattered young people of our churches up the spiritual stairway of life to the heights where God is seen in his holiness, and felt in his grace, and known in his power? Unless we do this, and do it with unfaltering courage and persistency, the essential triviality of those other things will creep into our very acts of worship, and the hours which should be the consecration of accomplished work and the inspiration for future effort, will neither satisfy the souls of the people, nor confirm their faith, nor strengthen their will.

Adoration is not a luxury, neither is it—as Professor Carver so curiously reiterates in his pragmatic vision of *The Religion Worth Having*—a mere gratification of the aesthetic instinct. It is not an extra added to the common life of mankind, a life which would be just as beautiful, just as helpful, and just as inspiring without it. No! Worship is the necessity of man's being, something which belongs to him as a child of the Most High, something without which he cannot complete himself, but must remain through all his days a creature with starved instincts, narrow vision, and pathetic impotence.

The ideal of a church service, then, is that it should be the collective expression in acts of worship of the life of God in the soul of man. That ideal is fulfilled when men and women are made thrillingly aware of the presence of the eternal God in their own souls and in the souls of their fellow-worshippers. It is said that on the pedestal of the image of an Egyptian goddess these words were carved: "No mortal ever removed my veil." It is the function of the modern priest, as the leader of public worship, to draw aside the veil, to enable men and women worn by the fierce attritions of the world, weary and faint in the perpetual struggle with passions within and without them, to see the vision of God in their midst; of God the comforter, of God the redeemer, of God the continual inspirer of faith and works.

How, then, are we to recover and maintain the atmosphere of worship in our churches? Only, one may say, by a more severe attention to a multitude of details which we are in danger of neglecting. Will it do, for example, to speak of so simple, and to some minds so trivial, a matter as one's appearance in the pulpit? If he choose, the prophet may come to us clothed in camel's hair, with a leathern girdle about his loins, and with sandals upon his feet. But the prophet-priest must observe the common decencies of civilized life, if he would lead his people up the heights. He may wear a gown or discard it, he may fasten his collar in front or behind—these are things of personal preference—but the eternal fitness of things demands that he be soberly clothed. Some attention also he will give to the appearance of the choir behind him. He may prefer that the choir be vested. It is not a vital matter. But this is vital, that the picture-hat and the flaming

blouse be banished from the choir loft. A giddily costumed choir clustering about the organ and a sharp business-looking master of ceremonies in the pulpit present at the outset very serious obstacles to the attainment of a reverential mood. And is it too much to hope that the time draws near when not only the choir but the whole body of worshippers shall appear bareheaded in the house of God?

Now the most important moments of public worship are the first five and the last two. Of what avail are a decorously clothed choir and a beautiful order of service, if the preacher himself be not a priestly person, aware of the solemnity and responsibility of his position? A lady told the writer recently of an experience which he would hope is not representative. Seated in church before the service began, the stillness of the waiting congregation impressed her, and a sense of reverence filled her soul. By and by the choir, a vested one, filed silently in. A moment afterward the minister came bustling in, bent for a flying instant over the pulpit, then announced a hymn in a loud voice. "Let everybody sing," he cried cheerily, "sing heartily; make it go." *And it went.* But with it went also every feeling of reverence from that woman's soul. Now one would not like to believe that this preacher even suspected that he was irreverent. He may only have been possessed with a disquieting fear of dulness. But dulness and reverence are not synonymous terms. If, instead of the first voice in that service being the preacher's, it had been the united voice of the church singing unannounced the strains of "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty," the sense of worship would have been retained and intensified, and it might have spread its inspiring influence over every detail of that service. Then those unutterably solemn moments when the minister of God pronounces the tender, exquisite words of the benediction—how careful one should be that no suspicion of haste or formality be permitted! Much may be forgiven us by our patient congregations, but for slovenliness and irreverence here no forgiveness is possible.

I can touch but lightly on the vexed question of the enrichment of worship. In our righteous revolt against the lifeless formalism of the past and the sacramental ideas imported into the liturgical forms of worship, we have dropped some things which

might now with considerable advantage be restored. A great gain of reverence would ensue from the addition of printed prayers and responsive sentences. These should of course be brief. The whole opening service need not occupy more than nine or ten minutes, but in those minutes the mind of the congregation would be drawn away from trivial and disturbing things and fixed upon the idea of worship; and there would be created that sense of oneness between preacher and people which is so necessary for the achievement of the highest ends for which we labor and pray. This, of course, is merely a suggestion. But it is a growing conviction of many that something must be done—things being as they are—to calm the mind and to create the consciousness of a common spiritual heritage in the restless, feverish beings who come to church for they scarcely know what. And it is only when this unity of feeling in worship is reached that the minister's special message can produce its deepest and most enduring effect.

Of that special message this is not the time to write. But there is surely a priestly function for the sermon also to fulfil. God hath committed unto us a ministry of reconciliation; how can this reconciliation be effected save as the consciousness of the holy Father's presence be deepened and not dissipated by the personal message of the preacher? Sometimes the prophet, overwhelmed with the greatness of his vocation, absorbed in the exalted ideals and ideas which thrill his own soul, or stirred to the finest fibre of his being with the fervor of his moral vision, forgets the sore hearts, the perplexed minds, and the weary bodies before him. The thing he has to say seems so momentous to him that he forgets that it is not only the word of God but God himself that we must recognize, if we would go from the church healed and strong and bravely ambitious in the things of the spirit. He beholds the strength and the glory of God, but not the weakness and need of men. Here, then, the human insight and tender sympathy of the true priest, as the atmosphere through which the prophet's message reaches men, is the supreme need of our day.

There is one great priestly function of which something should be said, for surely it is the highest of all. We are not always in

church, we have a great and very difficult private ministry. From childhood to old age, in all the crises of our people's lives, we have a place to fill which cannot be paralleled by any other class of the world's workers. What perplexities, what misfortunes, what griefs, what bitter shames are laid before us! And what the soul needs then is not eloquence, not brilliant scholarship, not dazzling social gifts, not even the passionate message of the prophet, but just the wise and tender heart. How many of us have failed just here! It is a bitter memory. For this private ministry of consolation and guidance nothing but the highest qualities of the true priest can suffice. Let us seek them anew in penitence and prayer.

Priesthood, then, as here so inadequately outlined, has nothing official about it. It is a priesthood not of gross and impertinent ecclesiasticism, but of consecrated personality. It is, indeed, as Dr. Denney somewhere calls it, "an element and function of Sonship," and only as such can it have any meaning at all. Here lies the problem of liturgical and non-liturgical churches alike. Liturgy availeth nothing, nor free prayer, nor free speech; but the character of the soul who reads and prays and speaks. We are discovering that the one supreme evil in the leadership of public worship is the irreverent mind, the unprepared heart, the undisciplined will. We fear the actor in the pulpit, the man bent upon impressing men with the exuberance of his eloquence, the sprightliness of his enthusiasms, the facility of his modernness. We fear the entertainer behind the altar, the irresponsible soul who has no high sense of his vocation, whose ministrations have no consolation in them, and whose presence has no abiding strength and inspiration.

Who is sufficient for these things? That must ever be our cry if we know ourselves. And so it is for the priestly *life* that we should incessantly pray and strive. We cannot lead the people into the holy of holies unless we ourselves habitually enter therein. We can only inspire men by the magic of superior spirit. The exaltation of the prophet may, indeed, be the creation of the moment's high vision; but the genuinely priestly spirit can only be the ultimate flower of the sacramental life.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTION IN RELIGION

JAMES H. LEUBA

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

I

It is held by many that religion had its origin in the emotional life, in "loving reverence," or in fear, or in awe; and many make some particular emotion the distinguishing mark of religion. Since, indeed, religion is a part of the struggle for the preservation and perfection of life, it involves from the very beginning emotional states. But to speak of religion as originating in emotions is to assume a conception of religion which seems to me utterly unacceptable. If any sentiment or emotion, such as reverence or fear or awe, is found at the dawn of religion, it exists as part of the response, in a particular situation, to a sense of the presence of an invisible Being, upon whom one depends and with whom one desires to hold satisfactory relations. The emotion belongs to an experience involving the whole man, that is, man as a feeling, thinking, willing being.

The first question, then, that I desire to raise is not, "In what emotion does religion originate?" but, "What is the dominant emotion at the beginning of religious life?" Let us first consider the question *a priori*. What are the emotions which even the most primitive savage is likely to have as he feels the invisible presence of his great tribal ancestors, of mighty nature-beings, of creators? Fear these he certainly does. If he believes himself able by magic to coerce any one of them, his attitude towards that one is self-assertion, self-reliance, and pride, perhaps even arrogance, mitigated no doubt by a lurking fear that his magic may fail. But such a relation to a spirit or god does not constitute religion; it is, as we know, magic. If, on the other hand, he finds himself in a personal, anthropopathic relation with one of these unseen beings, and, realizing his need, seeks to win the god's favor with presents or by bowing before him in an attitude of fear, respect, and hope, we have an altogether different emotional attitude. The man is no longer self-assertive and proud.

A sense of subjection is present, together with fear, either as pure fear, or as that higher emotion derived from fear and curiosity—awe. There may be, in addition, something belonging to the opposite end of the emotional gamut,—something approaching the tender emotions. If this should seem to endow primitive man with feelings beyond him, I would answer that we owe to our animal ancestry not only the instincts and emotions of fear, of self-assertiveness and its opposite, but also those simpler forms of the tender emotions which appear in the parental relations of the higher animals and in the attachment of certain of our domestic animals to their masters. Why, then, should we be unwilling to attribute to the most primitive savage a degree of tender regard for his Great Ancestor or for his Creator? The first group of human beings need not be imagined as either bloodthirsty brutes, incapable of anything but violence and cruelty, or abject, timorous creatures, familiar only with fear. The lowest men we know do not at all answer to either description. There is among them kindness, mutual consideration, and even real affection. This is what we should expect of primitive man, if he had inherited the best in his animal ancestry. Shall we add gratitude to the list of original religious emotions? Young children have the reputation of being thankless, and savages show the same trait. Gratitude is not a simple primary emotion, as are fear, self-assertion, self-subjection, and the tender emotions. Nevertheless, I do not see why some degree of gratitude should not, even at the beginning, mix with the other emotions. If the gods are regarded as in some degree benevolent, then one has a right to expect expressions of gratitude towards them when they have fulfilled the desires of their dependants.

The oldest and probably most widely accepted opinion is that fear led to religion. Hume's conclusion, that "the first ideas of religion arose . . . from a concern with regard to the events of life and fears which actuate the human mind," is maintained by most of our contemporaries. Among psychologists, Ribot, for instance, affirms that "the religious sentiment is composed . . . first of all of the emotion of fear in its different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power."¹ The sway of fear at the dawn

¹ Th. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 309.

of human existence is a well-established fact. It is probable that evil spirits were the first to receive particular attention. "Among the Bongos of central Africa 'good spirits are quite unrecognized, and, according to the general negro idea, no benefit can ever come from a spirit.'"² In other tribes good spirits are known, but the savage always "pays more attention to deprecating the wrath of the evil than securing the favor of the good beings." The tendency is to let the good spirits alone, because they will do us good of themselves.

But though fear is the most conspicuous emotion of primitive religious life, it is not the only one present, and there is no quality in fear that fits it to be called the original religious emotion.³ The making of religion requires nothing found in fear that is not present also in the other emotions. If tender emotions are not prominent at the dawn of religion, it is only because fear is the first of the well-organized emotional reactions, and biologically at first the most valuable. It antedates the human species and today appears first in the infant as well as in the young animal. In early human existence it was kept in the foreground by the circumstances of existence. No doubt before the protective fear-reaction could be established, the lust of life had begun to express itself in aggressive habits,—for instance, the habit of securing food. But these desires did not, as early as in the case of fear, give rise to any emotional reaction as constant, definite, and poignant as fear. The place of fear in primitive religion is, then, due not to its intrinsic qualities, but simply to the circumstances which made it appear first as a well-organized emotion, vitally

² Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock), *The Origin of Civilization*, 5th ed., 1892, p. 225.

³ R. R. Marett, in an essay entitled "Pre-Animistic Religion," gives expression to an interesting view of the original religious emotion. "Before, or at any rate apart from, Animism, was any man subject to any experience, whether in the form of feeling, or of thought, or of both combined, that might be termed specifically 'religious'?" His answer is affirmative; the emotion arising in the presence of the mysterious—awe—is the original religious emotion. "Of all English words, Awe is, I think, the one that expresses the fundamental religious feeling most nearly. Awe is not the same thing as 'pure funk.' 'Primus in orbe deos fecit timor' is only true if we admit Wonder, Admiration, Interest, Respect, even Love, perhaps, to be, no less than Fear, essential constituents of this elemental mood" (*The Threshold of Religion*, 1909, pp. 8, 13).

connected with the maintenance of life. It is for exactly the same reason that the dominant emotion in the relations of uncivilized men and of animals toward strangers is usually fear.

Nevertheless there does not seem to be anything preposterous in the supposition that groups of primitive men found themselves in circumstances so favorable to peace and safety that fear did not occupy the foremost place. Neither wild men nor wild animals need have found themselves so situated as to be in a constant state of fright. If the African antelope runs for its life twice a day on an average, as Galton supposes, the wild horse on the South American plains, before the hunter had appeared in his pastures, ran chiefly for pleasure. Travellers bear testimony to the absence of fear in birds and animals inhabiting certain regions. But, it may be asked, would religion have come into existence under these peaceful conditions? A life of ease, comfort, and security is not conducive to the establishment of practical relations with gods. History teaches us that in times of prosperity men forget their gods. Why should happy, self-sufficient men look to unseen, mysterious beings for assistance? Under such circumstances the unmixed type of fear-religion would never have come into existence. Religion would have appeared late, and, from the first, in a nobler form. It would have been characterized by a feeling of dependence upon Creators and All-fathers regarded as benevolent gods, and would have elicited primarily awe and reverence.

W. Robertson Smith denies that the attempt to appease evil beings is the foundation of religion. "From the earliest times religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion, in the only sense of the word, begins."⁴ He does not deny that certain practices intended to avert the action of evil spirits preceded the establishment of

⁴ W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 55.

affectionate relations with benevolent powers, but declares that the attempt to propitiate dreaded evil spirits is not religion.

Can this limitation of the meaning of religion be accepted? When a person seeks to conciliate an evil being, his feelings and his behavior are undoubtedly very different from his experience when he communes with a benevolent being. Yet in both cases an anthropopathic relation with a personal being is established. In this respect both stand opposed to magical behavior. This common anthropopathic element is so fundamental that it seems advisable to give both types of relation the name religion. But since they differ in important respects, the term "negative religion" may be used for man's anthropopathic dealings with essentially bad spirits, and "positive religion" for his relations with benevolent gods.

But not even positive religion is at first free from fear. The benevolent gods are quick to anger, and cruelly avenge their broken laws. This is one more reason for not completely dissociating the propitiation of evil spirits from the worship of kindly gods.

II

Origins are interesting chiefly because of the light they shed upon the present and the future. In order to give that light its fullest illuminating power, the beginnings should be connected with the present by a knowledge of the intervening developments.

One of the most significant facts revealed by a comparison between the earlier and later forms of religion is an emotional progress. It begins with the yielding of fear to its relative, awe, which in its turn is displaced by other emotions in which fear is not merely held in control, as in awe, but is completely overcome. They are reverence, admiration, gratitude, a sense of the sublime, and the tender emotions. In the highest civilization of today, fear, awe, and, to a considerable degree, even reverence have been displaced by the tender emotions, which rule supreme. Fear expresses itself in rejecting or breaking away from its object; the tender emotion, in embracing or accepting its object. The progress of the dominant emotional tone from fear to the tender emotions, passing through awe, reverence, and sublimity, means,

then, the gradual substitution of acceptance, agreement, and union for rejection, disagreement, and separation. The importance of this fact will appear in what follows.

The advance from a negative to a positive reaction is, of course, not the *result* of religion. To take it so would be to put the cart before the horse. Religion is the instrument, not the creator, of human impulses and desires. Whatever the development through which it passes, that which takes place is no more than the manifestation in one realm of life—the religious—of what takes place in life generally. The obviousness of the transformation I have indicated makes a long demonstration unnecessary. A few illustrative facts may, however, be in place. Neither Christ nor Gautama, nor even Mohammed, was actuated by fear. They were, of all men, fearless. But they were in advance of their times. After their death their religions, founded upon a plane far above the lives of their contemporaries, were degraded to the level of the period,—a level so low that even in the Christian era fear is found entrenched as the predominant religious force. For those acquainted with history, the mention of the Dark Ages, when cruelty and dread sounded the leading notes in the tumultuous dramas in which the church of Rome frequently played a chief part, will be a sufficient reminder of the potency of fear in those times. After the great Protestant schism, fear remained for another long period the preponderant emotion in the life of most Christian bodies. Predestination, together with the belief in hell, was made an instrument of terror. Nowhere was the dread awfulness of God more seriously realized than among the Jansenists of Port Royal. The brothers Antoine Lemaistre and Isaac Lemaistre de Saci, and Pascal, three of their great leaders, were brought to God chiefly through fear.⁵ What Fontaine says of de Saci, in the *Mémoires* quoted by Sainte-Beuve, could perhaps have been asserted with equal truth of all the noble men who directed the movement. “Those who have said after his death that the fear of the Lord had filled him, have made a true portrait of him.” “The chaste fear of God and respect for His infinite grandeur so possessed him that he was in

⁵ Sainte-Beuve, Port Royal, vol. i, pp. 378–380, 33; vol. ii, pp. 323, 502 ff. Comp. Histoire de M. M. Alacoque, 10th ed., pp. 124–125.

His presence as in a continual tremor of fear." The great movement started by John Wesley was also fed by fear, as is sufficiently attested by the terrifying eloquence of its most distinguished disciples. Even the society that took the peaceful name of "Friends" was not at the beginning free from fear.

The change that has come over the Christian world with regard to fear is reflected in the altered emotional tone of religious revivals. In all revivals earlier than the present generation one of the chief instruments was fear,—fear of God's wrath, fear of wretchedness in this life, fear of torments hereafter. It was common for people "under conviction of sin" to be so frightened that they would "throw themselves on the ground and roar with anguish." The terrifying method was carried so far that a few ministers made an effort to soften the preaching. Jonathan Edwards, however, thought that "speaking terror to them that are already under great terrors, instead of comforting them" is to be commended if done with the intention of bringing more light. He complains of the weakness of those who shrink from throwing children into ecstasies of fear with talk of hell-fire and eternal damnation. "But if those who complain so loudly of this," he remarks, "really believe what is the general profession of the country, viz., that all are by nature the children of wrath and heirs of hell; and that every one that has not been born again, whether he be young or old, is exposed, every moment, to eternal destruction, under the wrath of Almighty God; I say, if they really believe this, then such a complaint and cry as this betrays a great deal of weakness and inconsideration. As innocent as children seem to be to us, yet, if they are out of Christ, they are not so in God's sight, but are young vipers and are infinitely more hateful than vipers and are in a most miserable condition, as well as grown persons."⁶ This appeal to fear of a hun-

⁶ Jonathan Edwards, *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion* (1832), p. 203. The terrifying nature of Edwards's sermons is indicated by such titles as *The Eternity of Hell Torments*, *The Justice of God in the Damnation of Sinners*, *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*. In the last is found the following famous passage: "The God that holds you over the pit of Hell, much as we hold a spider or some loathsome insect over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked. His wrath toward you burns like fire. He looks upon you as worthy of nothing else but to be cast into the fire. He is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight. You are ten thousand times so abominable in his eyes as the most

dred years ago is rare today. The evangelist Moody⁷ had little to say about hell and the wrath of God, and a great deal about heaven and the love of Christ. In the latest of great revivals, the Welsh revival, the meetings were pitched in the key of the tender emotions. "The burden of Evan Roberts's teaching is love and gratitude, obedience and personal service and joy."⁸ The practices of the Salvation Army show that even in the lower strata of society fear has fallen into disuse as a religious tool. If this is true of the uneducated part of our population, it is even more marked among the educated. Christ is best known to our prosperous church-goers as a compassionate Son of Man, healing the sick and comforting the wayward. The hissing of threats and maledictions has given place to the singing of the Son's redeeming love and of the delights of beulah-land.

One must, however, make two qualifications to this statement. At all times the spirit of Christ has here and there been repre-

hateful and venomous serpent is in ours. . . . There is no other reason to be given why you have not dropped into Hell since you arose this morning, but that God's hand has held you up. There is no other reason to be given why you have not gone to Hell since you sat here in the house of God, provoking his pure eyes by your sinful, wicked manner of attending to his solemn worship."

Finney was of Edwards's mind. "Without pity or abatement he appealed to the selfish emotion of fear. He held that whoever comforts the sinner does him an injury 'as cruel as the grave, as cruel as hell,' for it is calculated to send him headlong to the abyss of everlasting fire" (F. M. Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, p. 193).

"Impassioned appeals to terror were uncommon with Wesley" (*ibid.*, p. 167), yet he believed in everlasting torment for the wicked, and at times made fearful pictures of what awaited unrepentant sinners. If Wesley did not go so far as Edwards in "preaching terror," some of his followers did. "No community ever saw more terrible scenes of mental and nervous disorder than are described in the *Journal* as having occurred under the preaching of one Berridge and one Hicks in the vicinity of Everton, almost under the shadow of the University of Cambridge" (*ibid.*, p. 171).

⁷ "With Moody, religious evangelism was emancipation from the horrid spectres of irrational fear. I do not mean that he was blind to the natural law of retribution. . . . There was no thoughtless optimism about his preaching of divine justice. But the old emphasis was completely changed. Moody's favorite theme was the love of the Heavenly Father. He believed that the lash of terror is for slaves and not for the free born of Almighty God" (F. M. Davenport, *op. cit.*, p. 204).

⁸ A. T. Fryer, "Psychological Aspects of the Welsh Revival 1904-5," *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, vol. xix, 1905, p. 92.

sented in all its gentleness. There have always been rare men like Francis of Assisi and Fénelon to bear witness to the struggle between the spirit of fear and the spirit of love. Moreover, the cruder attitude is still occasionally met with, chiefly among the less intelligent.

A few years ago I circulated a *questionnaire* on several phases of religion, especially upon its impulses and motives. The three hundred answers received were in many cases supplemented by personal correspondence. Inadequate as these answers are for statistical purposes, they are valuable as "qualitative" information concerning the religious attitude of our contemporaries. They reflect strikingly the new temper. Fear is of so little significance in their religious life that its removal would make practically no difference, except in the case of two of them, an elderly French clergyman and a young law student. The former wrote as follows:

I feel very much that my letter will disappoint you. The feeling of divine justice and of its exigencies has much weakened in pious persons. In me it has continually grown stronger. The principles are neglected and sentimentality is put in their place. Moreover, I have suffered dreadfully, physically and morally; the history of Job is constantly present to my mind. I have seen the evil spirits at work trying to injure me. I have seen Satan displaying his utmost ingenuity to make me suffer the inexpressible. You will therefore readily understand that my usual mood is not one of superficial light-heartedness, that I cannot be an optimist in the common acceptance of the word. I believe that the just man will be saved,—without that certitude there can be but despair and death,—but he is to be saved painfully, as by fire. . . . I am moved to religious practices by a feeling of duty and to appease the wrath of God which rises against sinful humanity. . . . For many people the most characteristic religious experience is the feeling of God's love, of his goodness, compassion, and readiness to succor those who call upon him. I would not say that this is false, but its one-sidedness brings it near to being false. . . . My experience is that man being sinful must suffer, suffer much, drink also of the bitter cup of Jesus Christ. In my religious exercises, I always experience fear towards the Holy God, who must inexorably avenge his broken law and his majesty outraged by sin.⁹

⁹ Reprinted from "The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, vol. xi, 1901, pp. 563-564.

The law student (age 23) admits that the circumstances which oftenest affect him religiously are those which frighten him or make him nervous. Fear is with him an emotion easily aroused. Several of his religious practices are kept up chiefly because of a vague fear that harm will befall him if he discontinues. This is true, for instance, of his attendance on Young Men's Christian Association meetings, although he "shrinks" from them. There is "little pleasure and some annoyance in them." He used to read the Bible morning and evening. Lately he has left off the evening chapter because "it wearies him so." "But," he says, "it was a great effort, and I felt the fear for a day or two."

In these two cases of fear-ridden religion—the sole instances that have come to my notice through the *questionnaire*—fear is constitutional. Both men are mild phobiacs, and their natural disposition makes use of obsolete Christian doctrines. The young man knows that he is very nervous and he suspects that his fears are abnormal. "It [the fear] makes me very unhappy even when I am anxious, or at least willing, to do the very thing it prompts me to do. It may be a disease; for I remember that as a mere child it led me into the most absurd habits or tricks. I would feel it my duty to pick up all the loose pieces of glass and china in our home-yard lest some poor barefoot be injured." He knows now, even at the moment the fear is felt, that it is "admittedly groundless, unreasonable, and inconsistent."

In most cases my correspondents have their attention so habitually turned in other directions that, when they write upon the impulses and motives of religious life, they either forget fear or have actually nothing to say about it. When they do mention fear, it is as a rule in general terms; for instance, "fear of danger." A few are more definite. One writes that she would not begin the day without prayer for fear that things in general would go wrong. Another would not dare undertake a railway journey without first securing God's protection. A few mention the fear of death itself, without reference to the beyond, while still others seem not to dread the great crisis so much as the other world.¹⁰

¹⁰ In his study of conversion Starbuck found that in 14 per cent. of his cases fear of death and hell played a considerable part. His were chiefly adolescent conversions. (*The Psychology of Religion*, 1899, p. 52.)

The "fear of God" appears more frequently than any other fear. Some describe it as a "reverential fear" or as a "feeling of dependence." In others it bears a more self-regarding stamp. I find only five who seem to have been disturbed at any time by the thought of the hereafter, and of these five, four declare that they have outgrown that youthful stage.¹¹ In childhood and adolescence it is not unusual for fear to be the principal incentive to religious life. Before reaching the point where we fear sin and remorse extremely but punishment not at all—a height which Harriet Martineau attained at the early age of twenty¹²—there is usually a period during which our religion is prompted by fear of physical suffering and punishment. St. Theresa confesses that it was base fear more than love that prompted her to enter the religious life. Mrs. X., of whom I have written elsewhere,¹³ had "no use" for God in her childhood, except when she was frightened. "I do not think I bothered with God when I was a child, except when frightened. Usually I did not care a button for him. I would say my prayers as directed, but automatically. Only, if I got into a plight, I would cling with the completest faith to what I had been taught about God's power and his readiness to answer our prayers."

In the religious experience of my correspondents, fear plays on the whole an exceedingly insignificant rôle. Our contemporaries have the positive attitude. Their virtues and their defects are those of an aggressive, optimistic, and democratic age. It may be, however, that among other classes not fully represented in my *questionnaire*, for instance, among Roman Catholics, fear is more influential.

¹¹ G. Stanley Hall, in "A Study of Fears," reports that only 11 out of 299 persons who answered his *questionnaire* mention specific fear of hell. (American Journal of Psychology, vol. viii, 1906-7, p. 223.) Scott finds in an inquiry on "Old Age and Death" that 90 per cent. of his correspondents do not mention hell at all. (American Journal of Psychology, vol. viii, 1906-7, p. 104.)

¹² Harriet Martineau, Autobiography, vol. i, p. 31.

¹³ J. H. Leuba, "The Personifying Passion in Youth with Remarks upon the Sex and Gender Problem," Monist, vol. x, 1900, p. 547.

See also Th. Flournoy's "Observations de psychologie religieuse," in Archives de psychologie, vol. ii, 1903, Observation II, p. 331.

Let us turn now from the facts to their interpretation. Three causes for the decline of fear are discernible.

(1) At present in civilized society the occasions for fear have become relatively few. The dangers to which men were formerly exposed have almost ceased to exist. Wild beasts, human enemies, and the horrors of war are for most of us only imaginary experiences. It was not so in New England at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Then the conditions of life were favorable for the spread of the harsh Calvinistic beliefs. Conflicts with unsubdued nature and with savage Indians kept the fear-reaction uppermost. The tender emotions could hardly thrive where one went to church with a gun on the shoulder and divided one's attention between worship and the expectation of war-whoops. Speaking of the Edwardian revivals, Davenport says: "I think it may be said that no such effects as are there visible could have been produced, even with the aid of the shocking appeals to terror employed by the preachers of that period, if there had not been in the population a tremendous amount of latent fear."

The causes of fear which have not been removed by civilization,—the celestial bodies, thunder, lightning—have lost much of their terrifying power; for they are now understood and partly mastered. At any rate, eclipses, comets, tornadoes, and electric storms are to us physical phenomena. In a study of fear among children, I find the following: "The director of the school and his assistants, after having considered the question, agreed in saying that they had never discovered in the children the least sign of fear." Another teacher made the same declaration, in words that deserve to be repeated: "I have never noticed fear in my pupils. What should they fear? Their master? We are not in that age. Their school? That is made as pleasant as possible. Their work? They are amused while being taught. Their punishments? They are so light and so infrequent! No, rightly or wrongly, the children of today fear nothing; at least the feeling of fear has no occasion to manifest itself during school-time."¹⁴

¹⁴ A. Binet, "La peur chez les enfants," *Année psychologique*, vol. ii, 1895, pp. 224-225.

(2) The fear-reaction is falling into disuse not only because of a lack of proper stimuli, but also because modern intellectual and moral education produces an increased capacity for converting emotional stimuli into controlled reactions. Reflection and attention are natural enemies of emotional reactions. They engender a habit of self-possession: the more reflective and attentive, the less emotional.

(3) The fundamental cause of the decline of fear is, however, neither knowledge of the physical world nor mental training, but the recognition of the inadequacy of fear as a method of meeting danger. Without entering into a detailed examination of the defects of the hereditary fear-reaction, we may note that it meets each and every danger in the same manner. It is an instinctive tendency to run away from the source of danger, a tendency which, it must be noted, is accompanied by a scattering of the wits. When violent, it brings about a paralysis of the whole voluntary apparatus; it interferes with respiration; it produces spasmodic constriction of the blood-vessels, shiverings, violent spasms of the heart, resulting in pallor and peripheral anaemia. These physiological constituents of the reaction are not altogether without direct or indirect value; for instance, the immobility which they enforce would often be the wisest behavior for the threatened man or animal. Yet this animal fear-reaction is not the only way, nor always the best way, in which an intelligent being, living in highly complex relations, may meet every dangerous situation.

The origin of the fear-reaction accounts for its inadequacy. It arose at a low level of animal life through the natural selection of those chance variations (assisted probably by adaptive habits) which gave an animal an advantage over its fellows. Now the struggle for life does not create improvements; it simply preserves the fittest among the variations blindly produced by nature. The "fittest" is anything, however wretched, which is superior, for the purpose of animal life, to that which previously existed. Natural selection can do no more than preserve the less deficient. The selected improvements have been transmitted to man through generation after generation of animals in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. As a result, man,

with powers of observation and foresight immeasurably superior to those of the animals in which this way of meeting danger was established, still retains the instinct to act in this primitive inadequate fashion. The typical fear-reaction is a survival of a bygone age. "The dominant impression left by such a study" [of fears in children and adolescents], writes Stanley Hall, "is that of the degrading and belittling effects of excessive fears."¹⁵

This insufficiency of the fear-reaction leads civilized man to struggle against its manifestation. Our instinctive legacy for meeting danger is so evidently deficient that a man in peril struggles as frequently against fear as against its object. In other words, that which was meant to be a means of safety is itself looked upon as a source of danger. A most interesting phase of the powerful mind-cure movement is the war it wages against fear. "Fear," says Horace Fletcher, "is to be placed in the category of harmful, unnecessary, and therefore not respectable things."¹⁶ For these people fear is the Great Sin; it is Satan's new name. Physicians are ready to agree with the more moderate of the Christian Scientists in their impeachment of fear. One physician writes: "When all is said that can be said about the uses of fear, we come to the conclusion that on the whole the sense of danger is a nuisance. Fear is out of date, an anachronism, a vestige, a superannuated and silly servant that has seen better days. . . . We cannot begin to know the meaning of freedom in spiritual life until we have done with it. Until men and women learn that there is nothing about which it is worth while to be anxious, until they put fear aside and look forth upon the world with equanimity and confidence, they cannot exercise a free judgment nor exert a free will." "Generally speaking, the capacity for fear in the human mind is absurdly in excess of its utility."¹⁷

¹⁵ G. Stanley Hall, "A Study of Fears," *American Journal of Psychology*, vol. viii, p. 238.

¹⁶ Horace Fletcher, "Happiness as found in Fore-thought minus Fear-thought," *Menticulture*, Series II.

¹⁷ George R. Wilson, "The Sense of Danger and the Fear of Death," *Monist*, vol. xiii, 1903, pp. 367, 366.

Civilized man, however, does not strive to be rid of the awareness of danger. What he wants is to be independent of the single, blind, inherited way of meeting every emergency, and to remain in possession of his intellectual and muscular powers, so as to use them judiciously. The goal towards which we are moving is a fearless alertness to physical and moral dangers.

It may seem to some that we have uselessly complicated a simple problem. They might say that, if the influence of fear in religion is waning, it is because we have ceased to believe in terrifying doctrines. When the belief in the judgment, hell, the devil, and an angry God gives way, fear is dethroned. This account would be satisfactory, if the discredit into which these doctrines have fallen were not itself the outcome of the progressive changes I have mentioned as truly as it is the product of the activity of reason exercised directly upon religious ideas. If we no longer believe in hell, it is as much because, being tuned to another key, we are not easily frightened, as because we have come to admit the insufficiency of the proofs for the existence of hell. In the two cases cited above, in which fear held its old sway, the beliefs were supported by a temperament in accord with them. Without this temperamental disposition, they would probably not have believed in the torments of hell. In the early days of New England the conditions of life kept fear in the foreground, hence its dominance in religion. Love agrees better with the contemporary popular temper, and so our judgment is biased in favor of the doctrines which exhibit the love of God. In regard to these doctrines we are as easily satisfied intellectually as others used to be regarding the fearful doctrines.

The decline of fear in religion is to be ascribed primarily neither to religious influences nor to critical doctrinal studies. Its more profound causes are, as I have said, increased knowledge of the physical universe, intellectual and moral training, and, above all, the realization of the defects of the fear-inheritance. The nature of these causes indicates that the lessening of fear observed in the Christian religion must take place in the religions of all progressive peoples, despite their theologies and creeds. As human nature changes, so do gods and religions change. The effort to readjust our primitive instincts and impulses to the

present altered circumstances is what is meant by the expression "the struggle of the spiritual against the natural man."

Fear gradually yields the place of dominance to awe.¹⁸ In the ancient Greek mysteries, in the old Druidic rites celebrated amid the sombre majesty of forests, in the elaborate ceremonies of the Roman Catholic church, as well as in the plainer forms of worship where simplicity and silence take the place of ornamentation and music, awe constitutes an essential part of the whole emotional impression. Judged by the efforts made to affect the worshippers with awe, this emotional reaction must possess a high religious value. Of what use, then, is awe in religion? One of the services that awe and a sense of the sublime render to religion is to bestow upon it a dignity which fear cannot give. Fear is not an experience of which we may be proud; it is a narrowly utilitarian and unintelligent reaction. In so far as it expresses essential selfishness, it can only discredit religion in the eyes of those who have awakened to the nobility of disinterestedness.

Awe and the sense of the sublime differ from fear in that they do not openly refer to personal needs, neither do they blatantly announce weakness and incapacity. They have no apparently selfish purpose; they have, indeed, no obvious purpose at all. The shudder that creeps over one at the sight of the leaping waters of a cataract is neither selfish nor altruistic; it is disinterested. It is true, however, that the awe-producing aspects of nature all have lurking about them the threat of potential danger.

The value of awe to religion is not only its disinterestedness, —which is a purely negative virtue,—it has a direct ennobling effect. To be impressed by the great, the powerful, the mysterious, and still to be unafraid, is to evince one's partial kinship with these forces. Fear reveals antagonism, enmity, isolation; awe, involving as it does the recognition of greatness without actual fear, gives the first sense of a not unfriendly relation with the cosmos. To feel the power of a thing and at the same time to admire it, as we do in awe, is not only to begin to understand,

¹⁸ See on awe, W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 129-132; on the sublime, Th. Ribot, *Psychology of the Emotions*, pp. 270, 348-350.

but also to be attracted. The sympathetic vibrations of awe are the first organic sign of a friendship with the cosmic forces, the first step towards that ultimate union with the Great Whole achieved in certain forms of practical mysticism. The thrills of awe are thus enlarging, vitalizing, ennobling.

It should be observed further that there is but a single easy step from awe and sublimity to admiration and reverence. Now in passing from fear through awe to admiration and reverence man advances from the state of a beggar asking for protection to that of a bestower of praises. Since he is bent upon self-respect and self-exaltation, it is not surprising that among the selfish utilitarianisms of the fear-religion he should have seized upon awe and the sublime as redeemers of his religious nature.

However important to religion disinterestedness and the sense of kinship with greatness may be, awe and the sense of the sublime render religion a still greater service by bringing to the mind ideas of superhuman agents, of gods, or of God. Majestic greatness favors a religious rather than a scientific solution of the question of origins; for it suggests an explanation by reference to unseen, personal beings as agents. In reflective, non-emotional moments one might refer natural phenomena to physical forces, while when under the influence of instinctive, emotional reactions, one might interpret the same events in the traditional anthropopathic manner necessary to the historical forms of religion. Emotions absorb attention, arrest the stream of thought, and thus for the moment limit the intellectual range. Even those who have formed in youth the habit of looking upon nature as a mechanism may, when awed or frightened, relapse into an animistic conception. There are persons who in a forest or in a tempest "feel the divine" within them; "something in the stars of the night reaches out" to them. In this way the ever-present animistic tendency crops out and bids us dispense with rational proofs of the existence of God.¹⁹ Any experience awakening a strong emotion is likely to shake off the unstable accretions of rational intelligence, to throw us back upon primitive tendencies, and thus resuscitate ghosts, spirits, and gods. This discrepancy between the god-

¹⁹ Compare William James on the sense of presence, in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 58 ff.

ward tendency of our thoughts in certain emotional seizures and their direction when under the guidance of experience indicates on the one hand the progress made by the individual since he discarded animism, and on the other hand the tenacity of the mental habits rooted in a distant past.

When questioned concerning the emotions most conducive to religion, our Protestant contemporaries rarely forget to mention awe and the sense of the sublime. For one who names fear, there are hundreds who single out awe the sense of the sublime, and of the beautiful as potent sources of religious moods and activities.²⁰ The following selections will illustrate this influence:—

“Mid-ocean, lightning, and thunder inspire me with awe and the sense of dependence and turn my feelings toward God.” (No. 8.)

“I can never look up at the stars at night but adoring love and worship fills my soul. The same at early dawn when the beautiful new day comes straight from the hand of God.” (No. 39.)

“Formerly it was chiefly a sense of awe and adoration which accompanied religious worship.” (No. 51.)

“Places in which the sense of the sublime is appealed to always call forth religious emotions. I have felt this in grand old cathedrals. The last time I noticed the feeling was at the sight of Niagara Falls about two years ago. I had to restrain myself from kneeling down when I first came near the Falls. This feeling was entirely natural, as I had not looked forward to anything but a pleasant admiration of the scene, . . . but am I right in calling this a religious feeling?” (“Quebec.”)

²⁰ Who sank thy sunless pillars deep in Earth?

.

Who made you glorious as the Gates of Heaven beneath the keen full moon?

.

God! Let the torrents, like a shout of nations,

Answer! and let the ice-plains echo, God!

God, sing ye meadow streams with gladsome voice!

.

And they too have a voice, yon piles of snow,

And in their perilous fall shall thunder, God!

Coleridge, Hymn before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni.

No. 51, who is frequently moved to awe by nature and also by the works of man, writes further: "The same religious feeling I experienced when meditating upon the massiveness of the Brooklyn bridge, and again when I behold such steamships as the St. Paul, Touraine, etc."

No. 37 writes: "I prefer a religious service of much formalism. I have no religious feelings in public except as I am surrounded by the noble in architecture, in colored glass, in the pageantry of the Church. I have knelt at some shrine in walking through the country abroad, with religious feelings, and I have done likewise in some altar in a cathedral. I prefer the Romish worship to any other on this account, but I refrain from having anything to do with it because I think it dangerous to liberty."

Even those who declare themselves without religion often call awe a religious emotion. (For instance, Nos. 51 and 37, quoted above.) Why should they do so unless it be that awe brings to their minds discarded ideas of a Power which, if they believed in him, would be their God?

If the data I have collected show clearly that in Protestant communities men have, as a whole, set their faces away from the dreadful and towards the desirable in religion, they indicate further that the stage of culture at which awe can be the dominant religious emotion is also past. I imagine that the worshippers of Odin and Thor were swayed more by awe than by any other emotion. The Christianity of past centuries knew no better ally, after fear, than awe. But now the awful, as well as the fearful, is losing its power. To be sure, these emotions still retain much of their original power in large portions of the Christian world. The Roman church, for instance, is not ready to dismiss so efficient an agent. Vast cathedrals, majestic music, mysterious rites, gorgeous pageantry, still entrance the faithful, impress the thoughtless, and draw to its spectacles even those indifferent to religion. The terrible they have for the most part outgrown; the awful they have not passed; and the sublime they are using as effectively as possible. In Protestant worship, and especially in the United States, it is somewhat different. Yahveh, who was wont to thunder on the summit of Mount Sinai, in

the presence of whom Moses himself could hardly live, is being displaced by the God of love, before whom not even prodigal sons need tremble. The "new" revelation is a gospel of love: "Children, flowers, fruit-trees,—everything is full of God's love" (No. 39). In church architecture, the comfortable is put before the majestic; in doctrine, the serviceable is preferred to the mysterious; and in the conception of God, the loving is not to be overshadowed by the awful.

The tendency to banish awe as well as fear is evident not only in religion, but in secular life also. The rod is proscribed in home and school; the child is no longer to sit at the feet of the master, but pupil and teacher are to work arm in arm as becomes good friends; sin is either weakness or disease, and should be met with sympathetic tenderness. Nothing is worth while except sympathy, charity, love, and their companions, trust, hope, courage, fortitude. The positive reactions are being selected because of their superior efficiency for the conditions of civilized life.²¹

²¹ A study of the origin, function, and future of religion will be found in the author's book, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, Macmillan, 1912.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- SUNDAY SCHOOL TEACHING. ITS AIMS AND ITS METHODS. *Edited by H. A. Lester, with an Introduction by the Bishop of London.* (London Diocesan Sunday School Series.) pp. 10+132. London: Longmans, Green and Company. 1912. 70 cents net.
- A RACE'S REDEMPTION. *By John Leard Dawson.* pp. 10+428. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1912. \$1.50 net.
- SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF BOSTON. AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL ETHICS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY. BULLETIN NO. 1. A PRELIMINARY LIST OF RECENT SOCIAL INVESTIGATIONS IN GREATER BOSTON, JULY, 1912. pp. 42. Cambridge: Printed for the Council.
- THE GOSPELS. *By the Rev. Leighton Pullan.* (The Oxford Library of Practical Theology.) pp. 9+323. London: Longmans, Green and Company. 1912. \$1.40 net.
- A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN PALESTINE. *By R. A. S. Macalister.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 8+138. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. 1912. \$1.50 net.
- METHODISM. *By H. B. Workman.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 8+133. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. 1912. 80 cents net.
- ANCIENT ASSYRIA. *By C. H. W. Johns.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 8+175. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. 1912. 40 cents net.
- THE GROUND PLAN OF THE ENGLISH PARISH CHURCH. *By A. H. Thompson.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 14+138. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. 1911. 40 cents net.
- THE HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH PARISH CHURCH. *By A. H. Thompson.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) pp. 12+142. Cambridge, Eng.: University Press. 1911. 40 cents net.
- BERAKOT (GEBETE) TEXT, ÜBERSETZUNG UND ERKLÄRUNG NEBST EINEM TEXTKRITISCHEN ANHANG. *Von Oscar Holtzmann.* (Die Mischna text, I. 1.) pp. 8+106. Giessen: Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann. 1912. Unbound, 5 marks; subscription, 4 marks 40.

- PESACHIM (OSTERN) TEXT, ÜBERSETZUNG UND ERKLÄRUNG**
NEBST EINEM TEXTKRITISCHEN ANHANG. *Von Georg Beer.*
(Die Mischna text, II. 3.) pp. 24+212. Giessen: Verlag
von Alfred Töpelmann. 1912. Unbound, 10 marks; sub-
scription, 9 marks.
- THE MECHANISTIC CONCEPTION OF LIFE. BIOLOGICAL ESSAYS.**
By Jacques Loeb. pp. 232. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. 1912. \$1.50 net.
- THE METHOD OF THE MASTER. A Study of the Clinics of Jesus.**
By George Clarke Peck. pp. 207. Chicago: Fleming A.
Revell Company. 1912. \$1.00 net.
- AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT SINCE**
KANT. *By Edward Caldwell Moore.* (Studies in Theology.)
pp. 249. 1912. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 75
cents net.
- DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION AND THOUGHT IN ANCIENT EGYPT.**
Lectures delivered on the Morse Foundation at Union Theo-
logical Seminary. *By James Henry Breasted.* pp. 18+379.
1912. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$1.50 net.
- MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT. A STUDY OF THE**
SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS OF THE PRESENT
DAY. *By Rudolf Eucken.* Translated by Meyrick Booth.
pp. 488. 1912. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$4.00
net.
- A CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON HAGGAI, ZECH-**
ARIAH, MALACHI AND JONAH. *By Hinckley G. Mitchell, D.D.,*
John Merlin Powis Smith, Ph.D., Julius A. Bewer, Ph.D.
(The International Critical Commentary.) pp. 26+362+
88+65. 1912. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00
net.
- THE LATIN WORKS AND THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HULDRICH**
ZWINGLI TOGETHER WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS GERMAN
WORKS. *Edited; with Introductions and Notes, by Samuel Ma-*
cauley Jackson. Translations by Henry Preble, Walter Lichten-
stein, and Lawrence A. McLouth. Volume One 1510-1522.
pp. 15+292. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$2.00.

49250
75.50

Princeton University Library



32101 076387305



